

THE INFLUENCE OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY
ON BULTMANNIAN AND POST-BULTMANNIAN THEOLOGY

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this dissertation is to establish the influence of Martin Heidegger's philosophy on leading contemporary theologians. In doing so it will be shown how various and occasionally opposing theological views can validly claim to have adapted the thoughts of the same philosopher. The first division of this analysis will consider the nature of Heidegger's philosophy. It will be maintained that ontology is his primary interest and that he pursues Being through the consideration of such topics as man (Dasein), language, and thought, as well as Being itself (in its various manifestations as truth, nothingness and the 'ontological difference').

This philosopher's development will be traced from an earlier emphasis on the initiative of man (Dasein) in the relation to Being to a reactionary emphasis on Being as totally dominating man to a final, balanced appreciation of the role of both man and Being in their relationship. This balance will be the criterion by which the various theological adaptations of this philosophy will be gauged. In the second division Rudolf Bultmann's theology will be seen as strongly influenced by the earlier, existential concerns of Heidegger. The resulting lack of balance in his theology will be seen in the often heard charges that it is subjective and anthropocentric. The relevance of the later Heidegger's more balanced views will then be suggested. It will then be established that the 'new hermeneutic' theologians (Ernst Fuchs, Gerhard Ebeling and

Heinrich Ott) are strongly influenced by Heidegger's later belief that Being as language totally dominates man. The extremity of their views will be exposed in the expanded role they assign to language and hermeneutics (It is through language that all beings are granted their Being and that the authenticity of existence is gained. Hermeneutics thus concerns all of reality and existence.) Heidegger's insight that the roles of both beings (of which man is one type) and Being must be respected in their relationship will then be proposed as a valuable corrective to the position of the 'new hermeneutic' theologians. In John Macquarrie's existential-ontological theology will be seen a position which strives to maintain the balance of Heidegger's position. Like Bultmann and the earlier Heidegger, Macquarrie will be portrayed as respecting the need for an existential emphasis and like the 'new hermeneutic' theologians and the later Heidegger his interest in the initiative of Being or God will also be shown. And finally his appreciation for the balance of Heidegger's philosophy will be established as a vital factor in the relevance and clarity of Macquarrie's existential-ontological theology.

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INTRODUCTION

I. Contemporary theological issues

Of the many issues with which theology has traditionally been concerned, the following would seem to be dominating the contemporary scene: the doctrine of God, anthropology, history, hermeneutics, the meaning of theological language, and the relation of philosophy and theology. It is by virtue of their views on these issues that today's theologians are divided into various camps. Furthermore, the vitality, relevance, and, some would even say, the very existence of Christianity is seen as dependent upon the manner in which its supporters resolve the problems associated with these issues.

In the preface to his book, The Question of God, Heinz Zahrnt says that the question of God is particularly representative of the tumultuous times in which we live. "The question of God is the interior obverse of our century, a century crowded with outward catastrophes, revolutions and discoveries: it is the deepest level of the earth-shaking transition in which we find ourselves." Hence he feels the crucial theological issue no longer involves such topics as the virgin birth or the ascension but the very ground of faith itself, the reality of God.⁽¹⁾ Similarly John Macquarrie speaks of the stream of books flowing from the press on this question, ranging from Robinson's Honest to God to Altizer's and Hamilton's Radical Theology and the

1 Heinz Zahrnt, The Question of God, trans. by R.A. Wilson, (London: Collins, 1969), p.11.

Death of God and calls the doctrine of God the "hot issue" in theology today.⁽¹⁾

Like many theologians these men have sensed that the role of God as traditionally understood is being radically called into question today. Furthermore, Langdon Gilkey points out that such questioning comes from within the ranks of the believers as well as without for the foundations of theology are now also being shaken by concerned Christian laymen and clergy.⁽²⁾ Hence theology must establish the reality and relevance of God for today's believer as well as non-believer.

It is the complexity and range of the God problem which involves theology in other issues. In light of the Scriptural understanding of man as made in the likeness or image of God, one important mode of access to clarifying God's nature would be through a better understanding of man. This in turn means concentrating on an analysis of man's nature or structure of being. Hence theologians are constantly endeavouring to understand the meaning of man's special relationship to God and how it affects his relation to the rest of creation.

To what extent is man a part of creation; should his primary allegiance be to worldly surroundings or an ultimate source? What does it mean to be in but not of the world?

1 John Macquarrie, God and Secularity, (London: Lutterworth Press, 1968), p.19.

2 Langdon Gilkey, Naming the Whirlwind: The Renewal of God-Language, (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1969), p.11.

To what extent is man's relationship with God broken by his fallen condition? How is the frustration, uncertainty, and finiteness of existence to be understood? Is death an inherent part of man's nature, or is it punishment for his sinful condition? What is it about man's structure which allows for the reorientation of his life from an allegiance to his environment to faith in God? Does such decision involve a radical change in life, or how much continuity and discontinuity is there between the new man and the old? Is the reorientation of man's life the result of God's initiative, man's initiative, or both? These are all questions with which contemporary theology deals.

Perhaps the one factor which makes the anthropological concern for today's theologian distinctive (after all the above questions have always been considered by theology) and gives it a new sense of urgency stems from a popular belief that modern man has matured into a more secure and autonomous position. Bonhoeffer speaks of man "come of age" and Bishop Robinson feels that man no longer needs a "fill in the gaps" God to account for the shortcomings in his knowledge.

Does theology have to make apologetical allowance for this new man? In making the Gospel relevant how is this new man to be understood? Has there been a basic change in man's nature or do his needs, his shortcomings, and all the ultimate factors in man's existence remain the same? How correct is Karl Jasper's claim that the modern man's gullibility for the myths propagated by Nazi Germany

indicates a basic similarity between the man of today and the man of Christ's time?⁽¹⁾ Thus the need to understand the nature of the man in the pew has given real impetus to contemporary theology's interest in anthropology.

Another issue which has come to the fore in contemporary theology is history. Not only is man's structure temporal and historical but God's mode of revelation is Scripturally associated with historical events. Hence theology must strive to understand how God works in and through the historical process. One of the crucial arguments has been the relation of fact and significance or meaning in history.

Contemporary theologians have interpreted Christ's actions in terms of their understanding of history and thus this concern has affected such basic issues as the nature of the resurrection and the relation between the kerygmatic Christ and the historical Jesus. Indeed, the quest for the historical Jesus has once again become a live theological issue and many theologians also feel that the contemporaneity of Christ becomes more plausible in light of this approach to history. The doctrines of creation and eschatology have also been affected by this approach to history.

Another issue with which twentieth century theology is involved concerns language. Such titles as God-Talk (John Macquarrie), God and Word (Gerhard Ebeling), and

1 Karl Jaspers, "Myth and Religion," Kerygma and Myth, ed. by H.W. Bartsch and trans. by R.H. Fuller, II (London: SPCK, 1962), p.135.

Naming the Whirlwind: The Renewal of God-Language (Langdon Gilkey) reflect theology's concern for the lack of vitality and relevance in its expression of the reality that is God. Thus it is striving to clarify the manner in which man's language can legitimately refer to God and claim validity for its transcendent reference. Furthermore, this language problem has become closely associated with the crisis in the question of God. Such concerns have led theologians to study the structure and nature of language in general. New emphasis has been placed on the role of this language process in existence and this in turn has affected the contemporary approach to Christology and the doctrine of revelation.

A strong interest in hermeneutics is another aspect of contemporary theology which is closely related to the concern for language. Theology has always been involved in interpretation (e.g. in its consideration of Scriptural texts, past thinkers, and historical events) and contemporary theologians have made a concerted effort to establish principles by which this process of interpretation can be guided. These principles have clarified the relationship between the subject matter and the interpreter.

What is the common ground that allows for the initial point of contact between the two? Does the text affect the interpreter's understanding or does the understanding brought to the text affect the outcome of the interpretation? What is an appropriate mode of expression for giving new meaning to otherwise obscure texts? All these are questions in which contemporary theologians have shown a strong interest. Since these hermeneutical principles ultimately contribute to a

better understanding of God and His revelation (through the Scriptures, history and historical figures), we can see that the God question is also a factor behind this theological concern.

And finally, another interest which has dominated much of contemporary theology (and one which is related to the God question in a less direct manner) concerns the relation of philosophy and theology. Anthropology, language, history and hermeneutics are all areas of interest for the philosopher, and thus the contact between philosophy and theology is hardly surprising. In his contribution to the series of books "New Directions in Theology Today", William Hordern says this area of interest is especially representative of the present transition and turmoil in theology. He suggests that while there are still theologians who feel "Jerusalem" has nothing to do with "Athens", "the real problems arise when theologians decide to converse with Athens."⁽¹⁾

The theologians openly employing philosophical insights, terminology and methods argue that the question concerning the use of philosophy is not really debatable; the issue instead is whether the theologian is conscious and selective in his use of philosophy or whether his philosophical presuppositions will resemble the naive philosophy of the "man in the street." How much should Jerusalem have to do with Athens then? Many theologians

1 William Hordern, Introduction to Theology, (London: Lutterworth Press, 1968), p.21.

feel that the main contribution of philosophical interests lies in the realm of apologetics, giving a better understanding of the secular outlook with which a common ground for communication must be established and providing a relevant form of expression for dogmatic content.

The task then becomes the selection of a particular philosophy or school of philosophy as both compatible with the Gospel and representative of the secular outlook. In other words where is the Athens of today; is it the Black Forest, the Left Bank, Oxford or elsewhere? By what criteria is a selection to be made? Can only certain aspects of a philosophy be utilized or does the inclusion of any one part involve a commitment to the whole? Is there any danger of the Gospel content being swallowed up in its philosophical form of expression? These too are questions frequently encountered in the study of contemporary theologians.

II. Heidegger and contemporary theology

In considering Heidegger's influence on several contemporary theologians we will establish that his thinking has a profound effect on each of these issues listed as being in the forefront of twentieth century theology. In light of his interest in the ultimate dimension, or Being, as it is manifest in man's nature, language and history (all parallel concerns to those of theology), Heidegger's influence on theology is not too unexpected. Hence our main contribution will be not only to establish that Heidegger influences theology but also to establish how extensive this

influence really is. In doing this we should be able to resolve the confusion which surrounds (a) the interpretations of this philosopher's thinking in itself and (b) its influence on various theologians.

As for the former, one invariably finds Heidegger's name mentioned in any discussion of existentialism. For instance, great attention is given his work in such books as James Collins' The Existentialists, Ronald Grimsley's Existentialist Thought, Ralph Harper's Existentialism, D.E. Roberts' Existentialism and Religious Beliefs and many others. And yet Heidegger himself insists that his thinking should be understood as ontological and stoutly refuses the title of existentialist. The very book which is often hailed as one of the foundations for the existentialist movement (Being and Time) is full of reminders about its ontological nature. Further, such prominent commentators on his work as John Macquarrie, W.J. Richardson, Laszlo Versenyi, and others agree with Heidegger's portrayal of his work as ontological.

The result is a fierce debate about the unity of his work. Are there two Heideggers, an existentialist and ontologist? If so, are they related and how? Which makes the greatest contribution? On this last question we find Marjorie Grene (Heidegger) bitterly denouncing the ontologist who has deserted his earlier existentialist interests: "the tragedy of an artist who has destroyed his own work."⁽¹⁾

1 Marjorie Grene, Martin Heidegger, (London: Bowes and Bowes, 1957), p.125.

On the other hand, we shall encounter such theologians as Heinrich Ott, Gerhard Ebeling and Ernst Fuchs who feel Heidegger's greater contributions stem from his later ontological emphasis. To add to the debate, we will establish that John Macquarrie and W.J. Richardson believe Heidegger's existential and ontological contributions can only be appreciated when their inter-relatedness is understood.

Not surprisingly this confusion in the interpretation of Heidegger's thinking is carried over into the interpretations of his theological influence as well. The first area in which there is a basic difference of opinion concerns the question who influences who? In opposition to those who emphasize Heidegger's influence on theology, Hans Jonas believes that in actuality theology has been the dominant factor in its relation with Heidegger's thought.

As a result, "instead of theology's finding validation or corroboration for itself in what has been borrowed from itself, the real case is that philosophy must examine the philosophical validity of Heidegger's borrowing from theology."⁽¹⁾ Is Jonas correct in concluding that Heidegger's debt to an early theological training invalidates his theological relevance or is André Malet correct in seeing this as merely a contribution to and strengthening of

1 Hans Jonas, "Heidegger and Theology", Review of Metaphysics, 18 (1964-65), p.214.

Heidegger's relevance for theology.⁽¹⁾

Another question greatly debated is whether Heidegger's influence is constructive or harmful for theology. Is Rudolf Bultmann correct in utilizing this philosophy to express New Testament insights or is Karl Barth right in charging that such an approach leads theology into a regrettable dependence on a secular outlook (the "Babylonian captivity" of theology by philosophy.)⁽²⁾

This confusion continues in that even amongst those theologians who accept Heidegger's relevance there are great differences of opinion as to which aspect of his thinking to use. As a result one finds the "post-Bultmannians" employing Heideggerian insights to move beyond Bultmann's theology which is itself based on Heideggerian insights. How is it that one man's influence can lead to such a variety of results?

We can see then that the task of establishing Heidegger's influence on contemporary theology must first resolve the confusion as to the nature of his thinking itself and, secondly, unravel the knotted threads in the relation between his thinking and theology. As a result, the first division of this work will be devoted to an analysis of Heidegger's philosophy while the second will consider various contemporary theologians insofar as they are influenced by Heidegger.

1 Andre Malet, The Thought of Rudolf Bultmann, trans. by R. Strachan, (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1969), pp.329-330 and p.403.

2 Karl Barth, "Rudolf Bultmann. An Attempt to Understand Him", Kerygma and Myth, II, p.127.

DIVISION ONE

MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY

Statement of Purpose

Our analysis of Martin Heidegger's philosophy will stress that his main interest is ontology and that his pursuit of Being carries him into such diverse areas as existentialism, language analysis and the consideration of the thought process as well as discussions of Being itself. This variety in Heidegger's thinking does not result from any confusion or instability on his part but instead reflects the very nature of that which he seeks, Being itself.

In analyzing Aristotle's statement: "To on legetai pollakos," which he translates at one point as, "The being, particularly in regard to its Being, will be manifest in a multiple way," and at another as, "Being-being appears in a manifold way,"ⁱ Heidegger says that "in this sentence the unchanging question of my way of thought is concealed: what is the overarching single unitary designation for Being of all its manifold meanings?"ⁱⁱ

Because of its various modes of manifestaess, then, Being must be considered by way of a multi-faceted analysis. As we shall see, it is in the balance between the singleness of his purpose (to pursue Being) and the diversity of his interests (Dasein, language and thought) that the strength of Heidegger's thinking lies. As a result any attempt to appropriate his insights must avoid focusing too exclusively on any one facet of it, thereby losing sight of its balance and resulting inevitably in a distorted interpretation.

i Martin Heidegger, Was Ist das, die Philosophie?, (London: Vision Press Ltd., 1958), p.97.

ii Martin Heidegger, Preface to W.J. Richardson's Heidegger-Through Phenomenology to Thought, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), p.X.

DASEIN ANALYSIS

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

1. Outlook and vocabulary

The purpose of this first chapter is to examine the method and results of Heidegger's analysis of Dasein and to establish that this analysis is motivated solely by his interest in Being. John Macquarrie, in his book Martin Heidegger, expresses the position that shall be taken in the following pages on Heidegger the existentialist. He acknowledges that the analysis in Being and Time is "existentially" based but stresses that this existential interest is motivated by an ontological concern. Therefore "...Heidegger is not an existentialist in the narrow sense of one whose primary interest is in man...From first to last, the goal toward which Heidegger's thought is thrusting is the question of the meaning of Being."⁽¹⁾

Before turning to the task ahead, a few remarks concerning Heidegger's rather difficult, some would even say obscure, vocabulary are in order. His discontent with the present status of language is clearly reflected in Being and Time where he explains that the "awkwardness and

1 John Macquarrie, Martin Heidegger, (London: Lutterworth Press, 1968), p.8.

inelegance" of his language is due to the fact that for the task of considering entities in their Being "...we lack not only most of the words but, above all, the grammar."⁽¹⁾

In his letter to William J. Richardson, which serves as the preface to the latter's book Heidegger - Through Phenomenology to Thought, one can see that Heidegger feels his thought is incompatible not only with the current status of language but, even more basically, that it is incompatible with the contemporary frame of mind. "Every effort to bring what has been thought closer to prevailing modes of (re) presentation must assimilate what-is-to-be-thought to those (re) presentations and thereby inevitably deform the matter."⁽²⁾ Therefore, Heidegger's difficult terminology is due to a basic disagreement with the current modes of language and thought and is an integral part of his self-appointed task of overcoming metaphysics.

Indeed, in "Brief über den Humanismus" (1947) Heidegger claims that the project begun in Being and Time was never completed due to the failure of contemporary thought and language forms to express his radical insights.

1 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time. trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, (1st English ed.; London: SCM Press Ltd., 1962), p.63.

2 Martin Heidegger, Preface to W.J. Richardson's Heidegger - Through Phenomenology to Thought, (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), p.VIII.

He reveals that a third section to Being and Time entitled "Time and Being" was abandoned due to the insufficiency of the traditional language of metaphysics to express his intentions.⁽¹⁾

2. A preliminary definition of Dasein

In seeking to understand the Heideggerian concept Dasein, it is a necessity to begin with Being and Time and support for our proposal that Heidegger's analysis of Dasein is subordinate to his over-arching concern for Being is abundant throughout this major work. Indeed, the first half of the introduction is devoted solely to the question of Being. In his preface the author states the purpose of Being and Time quite clearly. "Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of Being and to do so concretely."⁽²⁾ In his concluding remarks he reiterates: "Our aim is to work out the question of Being in general."⁽³⁾

From the following discussion in "The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics" it is apparent that Heidegger's views on the fundamental aim of Being and Time remained unchanged in later years as well. "To lead our thinking on the way on which it may find the involvement of the truth of Being in human nature, to...recall Being itself in its truth-to do that the thinking attempted in

1 Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken, (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1967), p.159.

2 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.19.

3 Ibid., p.487.

Being and Time is on its way."⁽¹⁾ There can be no doubt, then, that Heidegger's intention in his analysis of Dasein was to pursue the question of Being. The question to be considered in the following analysis is whether or not he successfully conveyed this intention in Being and Time.

Heidegger begins his introduction with the assertion that the question of Being has been forgotten. He goes on to summarize the reason for this status in the form of three major presuppositions in the history of philosophy: Being is the most universal concept, the concept of Being is indefinable and this concept is self evident.⁽²⁾ This being the case, he asks, where do we begin our quest for Being? One starts with the vague awareness all men have of Being which allows the question to be asked and which has resulted in the faulty understanding of Being in history. He further insists that this faulty understanding "...is itself a positive phenomenon which needs to be clarified."⁽³⁾

Having begun with this vague awareness of Being, Heidegger next seeks an object to be interrogated about

1 Martin Heidegger, "The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics", Contemporary Philosophic Problems, ed. and trans. by Y.H. Krikorian and A. Edel (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1959), p.315.

2 Heidegger, Being and Time, pp.21-23.

3 Ibid., p.25.

Being. Being itself is not available; if it were there would be no problem. Therefore he must seek the entity or object through which Being might be glimpsed. At this point, Laszlo Versenyi's analysis of Heidegger's thought in Heidegger, Being and Truth, is most helpful.

Every inquiry has three constitutive moments: (a) the object of inquiry, i.e. that which is in question, (b) the subject of the inquiry, i.e. that which is interrogated, asked about what is in question and (c) a conceptual framework within which the answer could be formulated and given... In this particular investigation, that which is in question (a) is Being. This seems to present no immediate problem, for we do have a vague, preconceptual grasp of the meaning of the term... But (b) Being is everywhere. Every being participates in it and can thus be questioned as to its mode of Being, and this is what makes our inquiry difficult: it is not by virtue of a lack of possible directions, a scarcity of beings to be interrogated that our questioning is undirected, but rather by their over-abundance.(1)

At this point Heidegger anticipates the results of later analyses and asserts that Dasein is the "(b) subject of the inquiry, i.e. that which is interrogated, asked about what is in question." This stems from Dasein's unique nature as a being characterized by an inherent concern for Being. Because of its ontological nature, the pursuit of Being is "...nothing other than the radicalization of an essential tendency-of-Being which belongs to Dasein itself - the pre-ontological understanding of Being." (2)

Since it is a central concept let us pause here

1 Laszlo Versenyi, Heidegger, Being and Truth, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p.2.

2 Heidegger, op.cit., p.35.

for a preliminary definition of Dasein which will be clarified and filled in as our analysis progresses. The clue to the basic nature of Dasein is seen in the introduction to Being and Time which stresses that ontology must be based upon the results of an existential analysis of Dasein which is called fundamental ontology.⁽¹⁾ That an analysis of Dasein can be referred to as fundamental ontology is due to its basic characteristic of openness to and concern for Being. Basically then, Dasein is to be seen as that entity which is uniquely oriented toward Being. As Heidegger explains, "...a necessary condition for [man's] Dasein is that he understand Being."⁽²⁾

André Malet, in a brief but penetrating analysis of Heidegger's thought in his book, The Thought of Rudolf Bultmann, supports our interpretation of this concept as follows: "In his real essence, man can only be openness to and for Being...Man is merely the presence and locus (the Da) of Being (Sein); he is Da-sein...Man is himself only when he is the presence, the disclosure of Being..."⁽³⁾

We can further clarify the meaning of this concept by determining its relationship to the meaning of the term man. Michael Gelven stresses that Dasein and man do not have exactly the same connotations since there are many aspects of man besides his concern for Being, or that part

1 Ibid., p.34.

2 Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. by Ralph Manheim, (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), p.84

3 Andre Malet, The Thought of Rudolf Bultmann, trans. by Richard Strachan, (Ireland: The Irish University Press, 1969), p.327.

of him which is called Dasein. He illustrates by saying that the digestion of food does not involve any understanding of existence. However, if the digestive system is disrupted, one then might reflect on the fact that suffering is an inherent part of life and, on this level, digestion becomes an existential concern and Dasein is brought to the fore.⁽¹⁾ As Laszlo Versenyi puts it, Dasein is man, "the ontological animal."⁽²⁾

3. Methodology

Turning now to the third phase in Versenyi's outline of the introduction to Being and Time, we shall consider the (c) conceptual framework used by Heidegger. The (a) object in question is Being, in so far as it is vaguely comprehended by all men. The (b) subject to be questioned about Being is Dasein, by virtue of its unique concern for Being. Basically we shall see how the terminology from his approach to the phenomenological method contributes to the conceptual framework for Heidegger's analysis.

It should be made clear at the outset that while greatly indebted in many ways to Edmund Husserl, his predecessor in the chair at Freiburg, former teacher, and the man to whom Being and Time was dedicated, his use of the phenomenological method does not adhere strictly to the intentions of the method's founder. F.H. Heinemann clearly

1 Michael Gelven, A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1970), p.29.

2 Versenyi, op.cit., p.41

reflects this break between professor and former student.

"...at Freiburg, his /Husserl's/ most original pupil, Heidegger broke away from him. He told me that he had taken him most seriously, that he had read his Sein und Zeit twice, but that he could not discover anything in it."
(1)

Heidegger too recognises this break with his former teacher. In a letter to W.J. Richardson which serves as a preface to the latter's book, he stresses that while his understanding of phenomenology evolved into a position different from that of Husserl's, it did so out of what he considered a stricter adherence to the "principle of phenomenology." Although acknowledging that dialogues with Husserl provided the original impetus for his thinking about the phenomenological method, he insists that an even more important factor was his reflection on the root words logos (to make manifest) and phainesthai (to show oneself).⁽²⁾

Heidegger begins his definition of phenomenology in Being and Time by cautioning the reader that this term refers primarily to a "methodological conception." Rather than describing the "what" of the objects of philosophical research, it characterizes the "how" of that research. "It is opposed to all free-floating constructions and accidental findings; it is opposed to taking over any conceptions which only seem to have been demonstrated, it is

1 F.H. Heinemann, Existentialism and the Modern Predicament, (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1953), p.48.

2 Heidegger, Preface to Richardson's Heidegger, Through Phenomenology to Thought, p.X and XIV.

opposed to those pseudo-questions which parade themselves as problems..."⁽¹⁾ He then proceeds to analyse the Greek root words of this term, phainomenon, and logos.

He explains that phainomenon stems from the verb phainesthai, which means "to show itself." Hence phainomenon means that which shows itself, the manifest. He goes on to say that the way a phenomenon shows itself, becomes manifest, is by announcing itself simultaneously with the appearance of entities other than itself. Hence, a phenomenon always shows itself vaguely or "unthematically". As he best conveys his meaning at this point by way of an example, an analysis of his illustration would provide the clearest insight into an otherwise extremely difficult section. (The editors themselves provide a very elaborate scheme or outline of this section in a long and involved footnote, p.52, which ends rather ambiguously and, if anything, contributes to the obscurity of the passage.)

If we keep within the horizon of the Kantian problematic, we can give an illustration of what is conceived phenomenologically as a "phenomenon" with reservations as to other differences: for we may then say that that which already shows itself in the appearance as prior to the "phenomenon" as ordinarily understood [phenomenon is here alone used in its Kantian sense, as that appearance opposed to an underlying noumenon which never appears to finite cognition] and as accompanying it in every case, can, even though it shows itself unthematically, be brought thematically to show itself; and what thus shows itself in itself (the forms of the intuition) will be the "phenomena" of phenomenology.⁽²⁾

1 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.50.

2 Ibid., pp.54-55.

Therefore space and time, as used in Kant's philosophy, would be phenomena in Heidegger's understanding of the term as he has developed it to this point. At this point Heidegger feels he has a "formal conception of phenomenon" and will return later to fill in the definition.

He turns now to an analysis of the concept logos. He begins by noting the many ways in which this word has been translated or interpreted. He takes as a basic interpretation, however, logos as discourse and considers Aristotle's work on this topic. He suggests that logos is closely associated with deloun, which means "...to make manifest what one is talking about in one's discourse." He suggests that Aristotle further explained the function of discourse as apophainesthai. The logos lets something be seen (phainesthai) from (apo) what is said.⁽¹⁾

It is not difficult to see the inter-relatedness of the two terms as defined by Heidegger. Phainesthai means "to show itself" and logos means that which "lets something be seen." The end result is that phenomenology means "...apophainesthai ta phainomena - to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself." This, of course, is just another way of expressing the motto of all phenomenologists: 'to the things themselves.' He concludes by stressing that phenomenology is a methodology which does

1 Ibid., p.56.

not interfere with a pure perception of the subject matter studied.⁽¹⁾

He then turns his attention to "deforming" the formal conception of phenomenon into the finished product as it will fit into his own scheme of phenomenology. At this point we need to recall (a) his presupposition that all men have a vague comprehension of Being in their comprehension of beings or entities and (b) his formal definition of a phenomenon as that which shows itself vaguely, or "unthematically", as itself by announcing itself simultaneously with the appearance of entities other than itself.

What is it that can be called a 'phenomenon' in a distinctive sense?, he asks. It must be something which normally does not show itself at all, but lies hidden in contrast to that which normally does show itself. Nevertheless at the same time it must be something which is an inherent part of that which shows itself, something which is so essential "...as to constitute its meaning and its ground."⁽²⁾ Being is the concept which completely meets the conditions laid down by this definition of phenomenon since it appears in such a way that it has been forgotten, overlooked and misunderstood throughout the history of philosophy. Therefore he can say ontology is phenomenology

1 Ibid., p.58.

2 Ibid.

and phenomenology is ontology.

Heidegger further describes phenomenology as having a hermeneutical character. Remembering Versenyi's scheme, we know ontology for Heidegger is fundamental ontology, or the analysis of Dasein. (Being, the object of inquiry, is pursued through interrogation of Dasein which is distinctive in its ontological concern.) This being the case, phenomenology therefore involves interpretation, it must interpret Dasein's understanding of Being and it is hermeneutical in nature. There is an apparent contradiction at this point which is frequently noted by Heidegger's critics.⁽¹⁾ This contradiction stems from a traditional understanding of hermeneutics, from hermeneuein, as interpretation. To speak of hermeneutical phenomenology then would be a contradiction, since the motto "To the things themselves" indicates a desire to escape any imposition of meaning on entities as, for instance, where the facts are interpreted in the light of preconceived theories.

However, as is often the case, Heidegger here has devised his own meaning from an analysis of the roots of the word. The confusion stems from the fact that a reading of Being and Time alone does not make this clear. The passage in question reads as follows: "The logos of the phenomenology of Dasein has the character of a

1 Gelven, op.cit., p.34.

hermeneuein, through which the authentic meaning of Being, and also those basic structures of Being which Dasein itself possesses, are made known /author's italics/ to Dasein's understanding of Being."⁽¹⁾ Although he emphasizes his translation of hermeneuein as "made known" by way of italics, the distance between the word and its translation in the text thwarts the author's intention here.

W.J. Richardson, whose commentary is most comprehensive, picks up this intention through the philosopher's later writings. Having explained that hermeneuein means "to make manifest", he explains that hermeneutic as "the process of letting-be-manifest" and phainomena, "that which manifests itself", together with logos, "to let-be-manifest", joined together to such an extent that hermeneutic and phenomenology became one for Heidegger.⁽²⁾ In this way the contradiction dissolves with a more sensitive awareness of the term's meaning in their Heideggerian context.

This concludes our introduction to Heidegger's Dasein analysis in which we have established his underlying ontological concern, the extent and reason for his difficult terminology, the object of his analysis (Being), the subject to be interrogated (Dasein) and the methodology involved (hermeneutical phenomenology). We are ready now to move into the analysis proper and our approach will have the same twofold structure as Heidegger's, with its division into preparatory and primordial analyses.

The former will penetrate beyond the everyday

1 Heidegger, op.cit., pp.61-62.

2 Richardson, op.cit., p.631.

views of human nature to reveal more basic structures of existence, culminating in one unitary structure, care.

The primordial analysis will fill out the results of the preparatory consideration of care and penetrate beyond it to an even more basic structure, time. We will then note how this most basic structure of existence is inherently related to Being and this relation of Being and time will conclusively support the proposal that Heidegger's concern here is basically ontological.

A Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein

Section One

4. Preliminary view of analysis

We begin then, with the "Exposition of the Task of a Preparatory Analysis of Dasein" (the title of chapter one) in which the author clarifies the task of the first half of his analysis. Again Versenyi's scheme is helpful. The object to be clarified is Dasein, the subject investigated is Dasein in its everydayness and the conceptual framework of the phenomenological method will be oriented around existentials as opposed to categories.

The object under inquiry is Dasein and the essence of Dasein lies in its existence or its way of Being. In his book on Kant, Heidegger gives a comprehensive definition of existence. Of all beings man's alone is such that "... the being which he is and the being which he is not are always already manifest to him. We call this mode of Being existence, and only on the basis of the comprehension of Being is existence possible."⁽¹⁾ He also stresses that the term existence refers exclusively to Dasein's mode of Being.⁽²⁾ He further explains that the Being which is an issue for Dasein in its existence, or way of being, and toward which Dasein "comports" itself is in every case my Being and because of the inter-relatedness between Dasein

1 Martin Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1951), p.205.

2 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.67.

and Being, the Dasein under consideration is also my Dasein.

Turning next to the subject to be interrogated about the object under inquiry, we find Heidegger conforming to the phenomenological method with his insistence that Dasein be allowed to reveal itself in its everyday mode of existence. Heidegger feels that this aspect of existence is one which is being analyzed ontologically for the first time, having been overlooked in past analyses of existence.

He feels that because of its familiarity Dasein in its everydayness "...has again and again been passed over in explicating Dasein. That which is ontically closest and well known, is ontologically farthest and not known at all; and its ontological signification is constantly overlooked."⁽¹⁾ He cautions, however, that Dasein even in its everydayness, "comports" itself toward Being, even if it does so ineffectively.⁽²⁾

We turn now to the conceptual framework in which Heidegger will couch his phenomenological analysis. He first suggests the need for a unique framework in dealing with Dasein, that Being which is always my Being and which alone can be said to exist.

All explicata to which the analytic of Dasein gives rise are obtained by considering Dasein's existence-structure. Because Dasein's characters of Being

1 Ibid., p.69.

2 Ibid.

are defined in terms of existentiality, we call them "existentialia." These are to be sharply distinguished from what we call "categories" - characteristics of Being for entities whose character is not that of Dasein. (1)

The translators of Sein und Zeit render Existenzial as existential, or existentialia in the plural. For our purposes, existential will be used in reference to matters pertaining to Dasein's structures of existence (e.g. an existential or structure of existence and an existential analysis which is open to the basic level of existence involving existential structures.) Existential (no underlining) will refer to the type of awareness involved in considering the ontological aspects of any being and not just Dasein as is the case with an existential awareness and existentiell will refer to the type of awareness which approaches beings unaware of their ontological dimensions. The terminology for describing the structures of Being for all beings other than Dasein will be category and categorial.

Heidegger repeatedly stresses that the most important characteristic of existential structures (Existenzialien) is their a priori nature. (2) Magda King, in Heidegger's Philosophy, explains this characteristic by saying that even the simplest comprehension of an entity involves the disclosure of such phenomena as space, time and relation. "What already lies there in every experience

1 Ibid., p.70.

2 Ibid., pp.65, 69, 71, 78.

as the condition of its possibility is said to be a priori, "earlier"...Heidegger understands it as "fore-going and going-hand-in-hand-with" experience...⁽¹⁾

To clarify the meaning of the adjectives existential and existentiell, we shall first show how they involve different levels of awareness and then how the two levels are interrelated. Basically, all men are concerned with their existence, (security, food, shelter, happiness, death, work, etc.) and these concerns in themselves are existentiell. However, when considered as a whole, in their inter-relation with each other and particularly in their ontological dimension, or insofar as they are related to the basic determinative factors in existence, these concerns move on to the more basic level of existential awareness.

For example, the usual thoughts about death, which occur as regret at the death of another or fear in face of the personal threat of death, involve an existentiell attitude. However, when it is considered as an inherent structure of existence which throws light on Dasein's ontological structures, then an existential awareness is involved. Now we can see how these terms involve different levels of awareness. Existentiell refers to the everyday concerns of existence, while the consideration of existential structures involves a broader perspective and more basic level of existential awareness. The two are distinguished not so much by their objects of concern as by the manner in which they approach these objects.

1 Magda King, Heidegger's Philosophy, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1964), pp.63-64.

Having established the distinction between these two levels of awareness, we turn next to a consideration of their inter-relatedness which can be seen (a) in the need for the existential analysis to be rooted in its existentiell subject matter and (b) in the need for the process of the existential analysis itself to be incorporated back into existentiell awareness and concerns.

Both of these can be seen in Heidegger's assertion that the roots of any existential analytic are "ultimately existentiell" and that only if the "...inquiry of philosophic research is itself seized upon in an existentiell manner as a possibility of the Being of each existing Dasein, does it become at all possible to disclose the existentiality of existence..."⁽¹⁾ Thus these two approaches are inter-dependent even though they operate on distinctive levels.

5. Being-in-the-world

Having explicated the task ahead, the object, subject and terminology of his phenomenological analysis, Heidegger proceeds then to consider the broadest and most general of all existentials, Being-in-the-world. He immediately indicates that the need for hyphenating this expression stems from the nature of the reality it represents. "The compound expression Being-in-the-world indicates in the very way we have coined it, that it stands for a unitary phenomenon. This primary datum must be seen

1 Heidegger, op.cit., p.34.

as a whole."⁽¹⁾ However, the different items within this phenomenon can be analyzed separately and Heidegger here maps out the remainder of his preparatory analysis of Dasein. He will consider world and worldhood, the who of the entity which has Being-in-the-world, inhood as such (In-sein) and finally a trait which summarizes and unites all the various existentials considered, care.⁽²⁾

Before moving into the analysis proper, Heidegger feels that a brief characterization of Being-in, which will be analyzed in depth later, might be helpful by "way of orientation." This orientation is helpful in that it gives an example of Heidegger's existential-categorical distinction at work. He begins by discussing the use of the word "in" when applied to entities whose mode of Being is other than that of Dasein, e.g. water in a glass. In this case, 'in' refers to the spatial relationship of two entities and such a relationship would be of the categorical type. Being-in, however, must be distinguished from an entity "Being in something." The lack of the hyphen is, of course, crucial here.

Instead of its normal use in regard to objects within the world, Heidegger suggests another meaning for this word "in" when used to denote an existential structure of Dasein. "'In' is derived from 'innan' - 'to reside',

1 Ibid., p.78.

2 Ibid., pp.8-9 and pp.78-79.

'habitare', to dwell.'⁽¹⁾ Werner Brock, in the introduction of Existence and Being, summarizes Heidegger's analysis of this word by saying that a "thing" can be in something only in a spatial sense while Dasein is said to be in something not only in a spatial sense but also in the sense of dwelling or sojourning. For instance, the way a match is in a box would have a different connotation from the way a man is in his home. In the latter case, much more is involved than a simple spatial relationship.⁽²⁾

However, this distinction between the spatial connotations of the word 'in' and its status as a component within an existential structure is not intended to deny any sort of spatiality to Dasein. Instead, it merely distinguishes between the spatiality of things and of Dasein and also points to the fundamental nature of the existential Being-in-the-world. As Heidegger explains, Dasein does have spatial relationships but these are possible only because of its primary and basic structure of Being-in-the-world.⁽³⁾

6. World

We turn now to Heidegger's analysis of a major component of that existential Being-in-the-world. In the chapter of Being and Time entitled "The Worldhood of the World" he states at the beginning that worldhood is an

1 Ibid., p.80.

2 Werner Brock, Introduction to Existence and Being, by Heidegger, (London: Vision Press Ltd., 1949), p.42.

3 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.82.

ontological concept and is to be seen as an existential. His analysis continues in the familiar pattern and we see world and worldhood examined through an interrogation of Dasein's everyday Being-in-the-world. "The theme of our analytic is to be Being-in-the-world, and accordingly the very world itself; and these are to be considered within the horizon of average everydayness - the kind of Being which is closest to Dasein."⁽¹⁾

As for his terminology, he lists four separate meanings for the word "world": (a) world as an ontical concept indicating the sum of all entities, excluding Dasein, within the world; (b) world as an ontological term representing the Being of that sum of entities; (c) "World can be understood in another ontical sense - not however, as those entities which Dasein essentially is not and which can be encountered within-the-world, but rather as that wherein a factual Dasein as such can be said to live."; (d) world as it can also be used to represent that which Heidegger terms worldhood.⁽²⁾ Heidegger's intention is to use the word solely as it is defined in (c).

We shall trace Heidegger's analysis beginning with his examination of the world and follow it through his understanding of the world as it relates to ontological dimensions underlying this term. He calls the average

1 Ibid., p.94.

2 Ibid., p.93.

everyday world of Dasein its environment and says this environment consists mainly of objects with which it has to deal. He begins with these objects within-the-world by analyzing the Greek word for things, pragmata "...that which one has to do with in one's concerned dealings."⁽¹⁾

His own term for such entities is equipment and the basic trait of equipmentality, or that which makes an entity equipment, is its pointing beyond itself. It is always to be seen in terms of its "belonging to" something else. The "belonging to" of equipment is illustrated by a list of such inter-related items as inkstand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room. Each piece of equipment then, in its ontological sense, is an arrow or sign pointing beyond itself.

Another basic trait of equipment as defined by Heidegger is its practical nature; it is always an "in order to." For instance, the "in order to" of a hammer is hammering. Marjorie Greene, in her book Martin Heidegger, remarks that Heidegger's analysis here is extremely pragmatic. "Things are for him not Cartesian res extensae bits just there (vorhanden) in an indifferent space; they are stuff for use (Zeug), which are at hand (zuhanden) for our handling."⁽²⁾ For Heidegger then, the Being of equipment or useful objects is labelled readiness-

1 Ibid., p.96.

2 Marjorie Greene, Martin Heidegger (London: Bowes and Bowes, 1957), pp.21-22.

to-hand. (1)

However, there is another basic category of entities encountered within-the-world. Although we are first aware of entities ready-at-hand, because of their usefulness, we also encounter useless entities, or those merely present-at-hand (vorhanden). Werner Marx, successor to the chair formerly held by Heidegger and Husserl, in Heidegger and the Tradition explains that an entity zuhanden can become an entity vorhanden. Such a transition occurs for example when the handle of a hammer breaks in the course of hammering and the 'in order to' of the tool 'for the sake of' working or hammering is interrupted. In this way the "referentially meaningful being handy" /zuhanden/ changes into the "mere persistence of being on hand" /vorhanden/. (2)

Entities zuhanden are closest to us, however, and consequently are the primary entities within Dasein's environment. Because of the predominance of the scientific approach which, according to Heidegger's scheme, considers entities in their vorhandenheit (presence-at-hand), this emphasis on the pragmatic view of entities definitely seems to be against the grain of contemporary thought. However, Heidegger's approach is generally defended, as seen in Calvin Schrag's position in Existence and Freedom.

1 Heidegger, op.cit., p.98.

2 Werner Marx, Heidegger and the Tradition, (Evanston: North-Western University Press, 1971), p.89.

As physical object [this is Schrag's term for an object present-at-hand] the hammer can be scientifically analyzed and described in terms of its primary and secondary qualities. But this scientific analysis is already at second remove from the reality of the Umwelt [environment] as it is immediately encountered. The heaviness of the hammer is not initially the heaviness of an object which has the quantitatively determined weight of 10 pounds; rather, it is the heaviness of a utensil which in reference to my practical concerns renders difficult the act of hammering. The mode of at-handness [zuhandenheit] is thus the primitive mode of man's orientation in the Umwelt. The mode of on-handness [vorhandenheit] comes later in man's understanding of his world as a world of tools. (1)

We might recall now that we are considering these entities encountered within Dasein's immediate environment in order to grasp the ontological-existential significance of world. With the consideration of entities which either have lost their usefulness or never had any from the start of an encounter with Dasein, we come to a point where the "pointing beyond itself" nature of entities zuhanden becomes apparent. Heidegger stresses that "...when an assignment [usefulness] has been disturbed...then the assignment becomes explicit."⁽²⁾ It is only then that we catch sight of all that towards which the entity is pointing. Only then does the world in its wholeness become apparent.

W.J. Richardson reflects this in his explanation that the ontological structure of any equipment is determined by its "insertion into a total purposeful pattern."

1 Calvin O. Schrag, Existence and Freedom, (Evanston: North-Western University Press, 1961), pp.34-35.

2 Heidegger, op.cit., pp.121-122.

This pattern is latent in the sense that it is usually taken for granted. However, it becomes apparent and is brought to the fore whenever the breakdown of some equipment draws attention to the then disrupted series of relationships. This totality of relationships is what Heidegger understands by world.⁽¹⁾

Let us turn now to see how the worldhood of this world becomes an existential of Dasein, a mode of Being for Dasein. As seen previously, the basic trait of tools, instruments, or entities ready to hand is their reference beyond themselves. A chain of reference between such entities continues until reaching its goal in Dasein. The chain of references ends with Dasein "...because of its ontological structure, sc., the Being of instruments is to-be-destined to another, but the Being of Dasein is to be concerned with its own Being and cannot therefore be referred beyond itself."⁽²⁾

In seeking to grasp the connection between Dasein and world, we need only remember that Dasein serves as the centre of the matrix of the relations between entities, indeed is the goal of the chain of references from one entity to another, e.g. the needle implies the thread, the garment and finally the sewer. Therefore it is Dasein which gives meaning and direction to the term worldhood.

1 Richardson, op.cit., p.54.

2 Ibid., p.55.

It then becomes apparent how Heidegger can consider worldhood an existential of Dasein. Remembering that the existential Being-in-the-world is a unit and that all entities ready-to-hand refer back to Dasein for their meaning, we can see how the world as defined by Heidegger is really an extension of Dasein. "Ontologically, world is not a way of characterizing those entities which Dasein essentially is not; it is rather a characteristic of Dasein itself."⁽¹⁾ Therefore, to understand Dasein, one must consider worldhood as an existential, or mode of Being of Dasein.

Before moving to a consideration of the next stage in Heidegger's thinking, let us again stress the ontological purpose behind this analysis of Dasein's structures of existence. At the beginning of the chapter "The Worldhood of the World", Heidegger strongly reminds his readers of this underlying purpose. "In the disclosure and explication of Being entities are in every case our preliminary and our accompanying theme; but our real theme is Being."

(2) When we realize that he is analyzing world in order to clarify the nature of Dasein, the 'ontological animal', it is not difficult to see that his interest here is ontological and thus he is carrying out his earlier expressed intention.

1 Heidegger, op.cit., p.92.

2 Ibid., p.95.

7. The "who" of Being-in-the-world

We move now to the next portion of Heidegger's analysis of the different components of the existential Being-in-the-world. He here considers "...that entity which in every case has Being-in-the-world as the way in which it is. Here we are seeking that which one inquires into when one is asking the question who?"⁽¹⁾ This "who" will be considered in this section along with Being-with and Dasein-with. His scheme continues to follow the same pattern: an object of inquiry, the "who"; a subject of inquiry, everyday Being-in-the-world; and an appropriate terminological framework for his phenomenological analysis in the unusual implications he finds in such words as "they", "I" and "other."

Heidegger first poses and sets the stage for his question about the "who" of Being-in-the-world. He warns his readers to beware the obvious answer. We are not to be misled by his opening statement that Dasein is in each case mine into correlating "I" and Dasein. On the ontic level this might seem true. Ontologically his previous statement is only an "indication", and he refers to this previous discussion as being only a "rough and ready" one. While the ontical identity of Dasein and "I" might seem apparent, "...this must not mislead us into supposing that the route for an ontological interpretation of what is

1 Ibid., p.79.

given in this way has thus been unmistakably prescribed... It could be that the who of everyday Dasein just is not the 'I myself'."⁽¹⁾

His first clue for identifying the 'who' of Being-in-the-world comes by way of a reminder that we must ground our present analysis in the results already obtained by the previous analysis of world, the first component in Being-in-the-world to be considered.⁽²⁾ With this in mind we are reminded of the referential nature of equipment which points toward a Dasein. John Macquarrie, in An Existentialist Theology, illustrates how Heidegger uses this analysis to show the existence of other Daseins. He explains that any instrument a person uses points toward the existence of others. For instance the book a person holds was written by another, printed by another, bought from another and read in order to inform yet another of its contents. In this way Being-in-the-world invariably involves Being-with-others.⁽³⁾

Having established the existence of other Daseins, Heidegger states that we relate to entities and other Daseins in two separate ways, Besorgen and Fürsorgen. (The translators of Sein und Zeit translate these as concern and solicitude respectively. They mention their dissatisfaction with these renderings which are unavoidably

1 Ibid., p.150.

2 Ibid.

3 John Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1955), p.89.

inexact, there being no close English equivalents for them.) Macquarrie explains Heidegger's use of these words by saying that one is never related to a person in the same way as to a thing. "A thing is to me an instrument, and my relation to it is a practical concern. (Besorgen). But my relation to a person is personal concern (Fürsorge) ...Here Heidegger is distinguishing between the I-it and the I-thou relationships." (1)

In the following Heidegger explains how Being-with is an existential of Dasein:

...Being-with others belongs to the Being of Dasein ...This must be understood as an existential statement as to its essence. Even if the particular factual Dasein does not turn to Others and supposes that it has no need of them or manages to get along without them, it is in the way of Being-with, its understanding of Being already implies the understanding of Others. This understanding...is not an acquaintance derived from knowledge about them, but a primordially existential kind of Being which, more than anything else, makes such knowledge and acquaintance possible. (2)

In this we see reflected both his underlying ontological concern and the a priori nature of existentials.

Heidegger, having defined Being-with or Dasein-with as a characteristic of the 'who' of Being-in-the-world, further clarifies how the 'Other' of this Being-with affects Dasein. Arne Naess, in Four Modern Philosophers, states that man is always aware of the difference between himself

1 Ibid., p.90.

2 Heidegger, op.cit., pp.160-161.

and other men. For example, is one behind or ahead of the other? If behind, one must struggle to catch up and if ahead struggle to maintain the lead. In this way, Dasein's actions are constantly affected by others.⁽¹⁾

Heidegger proceeds to identify "who" the others are and to speak of the manner and extent of Dasein's domination by this other. He first eliminates the common sense answer as to the identity of the other. "By Others we do not mean everyone else but me - those over against whom the 'I' stands out. They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself - those among whom one is too."⁽²⁾ Instead, the "who" of the Others is called the 'they', (das Man).

As for the way in which Dasein is dominated by the 'they', Heidegger illustrates as follows:

In utilizing public means of transport and in making use of information services such as the newspaper, every Other is like the rest. This Being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely into the kind of Being of the Others, in such a way, indeed, that the Others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this...the real dictatorship of the "they" is unfolded. We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge; ...we find shocking what they find shocking. The 'they'...prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness...the particular Dasein in its everydayness is disburdened by the they.⁽³⁾

Heidegger further explains that the 'they' is an existential

1 Arne Naess, Four Modern Philosophers, trans. by Alastair Hannay, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), p.202.

2 Heidegger, op.cit., p.154.

3 Ibid., pp.164-165.

and as such a basic inherent part of existence.

We can also see how the Dasein becomes so immersed in and controlled by the others, the "they", that in a very real sense, it becomes 'they' and vice versa. Thus the everyday self is the they-self and the world becomes understood in terms of this they-self. He goes on to distinguish between the they-self and the authentic self, "...that is from the self which has been taken hold of in its own (eigens) way."⁽¹⁾ The etymological connection is easily seen between own (eigen) and authentic (eigentlich).

Michael Gelven, in his commentary on Being and Time, is very sensitive to the subtle new meanings Heidegger applies to these ordinary terms 'they' and 'others'. "By 'they', he is referring to a characteristic of each individual, a mode of the self." Therefore, inauthenticity, or existing as a they-self, is each one's personal responsibility and the word 'they' should never be understood here as referring to others. Instead, the 'they' refers to one's personal mode of existence while 'others' are relationships one has in both authentic and inauthentic existence.⁽²⁾

In his conclusion to this section Heidegger answers the question of the who of everyday Being-in-the-world by stating that it is the 'they', not the I-myself which

1 Ibid., p.167.

2 Gelven, op.cit., p.69.

constitutes the everyday identity of that entity constituted by Being-in-the-world.⁽¹⁾ Further, it is Dasein's inauthentic mode of Being-in-the-world which colours and distorts its understanding of all other entities within-the-world. This is the basic factor overlooked by past analyses which threw them off the track in ontologically analyzing Being, Dasein and Being-in-the-world.

He stresses also that because the 'they' is an existential, "Authentic Being-one's-self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from the 'they'; it is rather an existentiell modification of the 'they' - of the 'they' as an essential existential."⁽²⁾ The difference then between authentic and inauthentic existence is not the presence or absence of the 'they' as a determining factor, but rather how the 'they' is confronted and dealt with in our existentiell affairs.

He now has analyzed Being-with, Dasein-with, the 'they' and answered his question about the 'who' of Being-in-the-world. The ontological import of these analyses can be seen in the fact that without a correct comprehension of these terms, Dasein in its basic state, Being-in-the-world, cannot be clearly seen and, as Dasein is the avenue to comprehending Being, the latter is necessarily thrown out of focus.

1 Heidegger, op.cit., p.168.

2 Ibid.

8. Being-in

We move now to a consideration of Heidegger's analysis of another component of Being-in-the-world, In-sein, or Being-in. We see that he is still operating within the framework proposed earlier. The object of interrogation is Being-in, which he characterizes as the 'there' or disclosedness of Dasein. The subject to be interrogated is still everyday existence and his methodology continues to be phenomenological. We continue to find ourselves operating within a conceptual framework built on such terms as existential, ontological, existentiell and categorial while new terms are constantly being introduced.

Being-in is characterized in the initial stages of the analysis and thereafter considered as disclosedness. Heidegger arrives at this characterization by considering the fact that Dasein, for which Being-in is an existential, is always 'there', is always Being-in-the-world. Remembering that this basic existential is a unit, then Dasein is always 'there' in its world. Further, as the goal of and centre for the entities which constitute that world, Dasein also discloses the meaning of that world. Being-in, as Being-there in the world, discloses the world. However, this disclosure is simultaneously a disclosure of Dasein itself, since to disclose one portion of the unit, composed of world and Dasein, is also to disclose the other. Hence "Dasein is its disclosedness." He illustrates his point by thinking of Dasein as a clearing in the forest. The light coming into this clearing reveals not only the

clearing itself but also those objects in its immediate surroundings. Similarly Dasein "lights up" itself and its world.⁽¹⁾

Heidegger's analysis considers three modes of disclosure: states-of-mind, understanding, and discourse in both their authentic and "fallen" condition. Macquarrie's summary of this analysis will serve as an introduction here:

The analysis has disclosed a three-fold structure in existence: (a) Dasein is ahead-of-itself - here belong the phenomena of possibility, projecting, understanding; (b) Dasein is already-in-a-world - here belong the phenomena of facticity, thrownness, affective states [states-of-mind]; (c) Dasein is close to its world, so close to it that it is absorbed in it - here belong the phenomena of falling, the 'they', the scattering of possibilities.⁽²⁾

We begin with the first mode of disclosure, state-of-mind, and by a closer look at the German term for state-of-mind, Befindlichkeit, we can again see Heidegger's tendency to root his analysis in everyday existence. As the translators of Sein und Zeit point out, the word is rooted in the common greeting "Wie befinden Sie sich?" or "How are you?" Further, the word for mood is die Stimmung, which normally has to do with the tuning of a musical instrument.⁽³⁾ Mood, then, refers to how one is in tune with the world.⁽⁴⁾ Heidegger also stresses that this mode of disclosure is an existential.

1 Ibid., p.171.

2 Macquarrie, Martin Heidegger, p.27.

3 Heidegger, op.cit., p.172.

4 Gelven, op.cit., p.80.

Heidegger distinguishes three important traits of states-of-mind. First he examines what it is that these moods reveal. Not only is the entity which has Being-in-the-world 'there' in its world, but through its moods, it comes to see that it must be 'there', it is characterized by "Being-delivered-over-to-the there." Heidegger continues and says that this is the "...thrownness of this entity into its there; indeed, it is thrown in such a way that, as Being-in-the-world, it is the there. The expression thrownness is meant to suggest the facticity of its being delivered over."⁽¹⁾ (This term's origin in Heidegger's experiences in the trenches of World War I sheds further light on its meaning.⁽²⁾)

The second trait of states-of-mind is that they reveal Being-in-the-world as a whole. Heidegger asserts that moods, in their ontological aspect, "assail" us and arise out of our concern for and dealings with our world. The third and most important trait is simply that states-of-mind disclose the world to Dasein. It is this basic disclosure which is prior to and makes possible all existentiell comprehension of our world.⁽³⁾ In this can be seen its a priori nature as an existential.

By way of illustration Heidegger devotes a complete sub-section of Being and Time to fear as an example of a

1 Heidegger, op.cit., p.174.

2 Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, p.83.

3 Heidegger, op.cit., p.177.

state-of-mind. In fear, Dasein feels itself and its world threatened. In a real sense, only an entity concerned about its mode of Being and its world can be threatened or feel fear. Thus, with fear is disclosed to Dasein its concern for its mode of Being and its world of relations. For instance, to be afraid for an acquaintance or for a possession would still disclose to Dasein its own mode of Being as well as its world since the particular object which is threatened ultimately relates or refers back to its centre, Dasein itself.

We move now to that second important aspect of disclosedness, understanding. As was the case with moods or states-of-mind, we must approach this term with an open mind as it too will be given a distinct Heideggerian meaning. As moods were concerned with revealing the fact, the actuality of existence, understanding will reveal the possibilities of existence. Here we have come across an extremely important cog in Heidegger's framework and a closer analysis is needed.

In the context of an earlier discussion in Being and Time unrelated to the present issue, Heidegger makes the rather startling, and, until this point in Being and Time, unexplained statement that: "Higher than actuality stands possibility."⁽¹⁾ He now clarifies this earlier statement by saying that in reference to an entity present-at-hand, possibility refers merely to that which is not yet

1 Ibid., p.63.

actual and is never necessary. In this case it can be said to be on a lower level than actuality and necessity. However, as a structure of existence, possibility is the most "primordial and ultimately positive aspect of Dasein's ontological characteristics."⁽¹⁾

Perhaps the best clue to what Heidegger means by possibilities comes from his word, Seinkönnen, which means possibility, potentiality, ways to be or ability-to-be. Simply stated, Dasein's possibilities are the various ways to be with which it is confronted and from which it can choose. When we recall that existence is factual and thrown we can say further that these possibilities are the ways Dasein has to be; it cannot choose whether or not to be confronted by possibilities. Furthermore, as factual, Dasein is always confronted by a definite world or set of possibilities into which it is thrown.⁽²⁾

Understanding then is the disclosure to Dasein of its possibilities in that it is the projection, throwing forward, of possibilities. The meaning of this term projection, is clearer when we realize that Dasein's world is not just a neutral set of objects. Instead it is primarily composed of useful tools, e.g. the door handle is not a round piece of metal, it is an instrument for opening the door. Thus we can say that Dasein's world is always

1 Ibid., p.183.

2 Ibid., pp.182-183.

colored by the possibilities it presents and upon which Dasein can project itself. For Heidegger then, Dasein is its possibilities and is always projecting.⁽¹⁾

These existentials, possibility and projection, make Dasein a unique entity which cannot be grasped nor analyzed as other entities can for it is always more than it "factually" seems to be. However, it is never more than it "factically" is for "...to its facticity its potentiality-for-Being belongs essentially. Yet as Being-possible...it is existentially that which, in its potentiality-for-Being, it is not yet...only because it is what it becomes...can it say to itself 'Become what you are'..."⁽²⁾ Understanding as projection thus implies that it is only in projection towards its own possibilities that Dasein can become "fully meaningful."⁽³⁾

Because of the uniqueness of the entity whose mode of Being is to be-in-the-world, Heidegger suggests a particular way, or sight, by which this entity can be viewed.

1 Ibid., p.115. Arland Ussher points out that Heidegger's understanding of projection is rooted in his study of the Husserlian concept, intentionality, e.g. just as an idea is related to the world by always being an idea of something, so also is Dasein related to its world by always projecting its possibilities onto it. Journey Through Dread, (London: Darwen Finlayson Ltd., 1955), p.71. See also Kuhn's Encounter with Nothingness, pp.138-139.

2 Heidegger, op.cit., pp.185-186.

3 Ronald Grimsley, Existentialist Thought, (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1955), p.53.

As opposed to Umsicht for viewing the world as environment, and Rücksicht for the world of other Daseins, he chooses the term transparency, Durchsichtigkeit, for designating knowledge of the self. By this term he seeks to indicate that in viewing the self, it is not a case of "... perceptually tracking down and inspecting a point called the 'self', but rather one of seizing upon the full disclosedness of Being-in-the-world throughout all the constitutive items which are essential to it..."⁽¹⁾

We move now to the third basic mode of disclosedness, that of discourse or talk (Rede). Heidegger begins his analysis of discourse by saying that it is "existentially equiprimordial" with state-of-mind and understanding.⁽²⁾ Just as with understanding and state-of-mind, so also with an analysis of discourse we will come to see how Dasein discloses to itself its own structures and the inter-related structures of its world. Like the other two modes of disclosure, discourse, or talk, (Rede can be translated either way, and is in Being and Time) is an existential. It is related to these other two existentials in that Dasein's understanding of what it means to be-in-the-world, an understanding which is accompanied and affected by states-of-mind, is expressed as discourse.⁽³⁾ As was also the case with understanding and states-of-mind, the existential discourse has an everyday or existentiell

1 Heidegger, op.cit., p.187.

2 Ibid., p.203.

3 Ibid., p.204.

counterpart in what is normally called language or speaking. Heidegger further states that 'hearing' and 'keeping silent' are two traits of this basic existential.⁽¹⁾

Let us focus on the former of these two traits and see how Heidegger's analysis of 'hearing' reveals discourse as a basic mode of disclosure. Being-with, an important aspect of existence, is revealed in hearing in that hearing, as listening to, implies the existence of an entity besides the hearer or listener. Thus, he states that "Listening to is Dasein's existential way of Being-open as Being-with for Others."⁽²⁾ Hearing also reveals another basic existential, Being-in-the-world. He explains that one never hears simply sound or noises, but that hearing is always associated with some specific tool or equipment, e.g. motor-cycles and waggons.⁽³⁾

Again, we should stress that Heidegger's analysis of language is ontological-existential. This means that language is seen in its primordial state as something ready-to-hand and its significance can only be understood in relation to that which gives it meaning, Dasein, as all entities ready-to-hand can be seen to have significance only in relation to the central goal or ultimate purpose toward which they all point. Since Dasein in turn receives its significance from its ontological drive,

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid., p.206.

3 Ibid., p.207.



Heidegger's linguistic analysis can be called ontological. Further, to correctly understand and analyze language, grammar, meaning, etc., one must use this approach and condemn as misguided the approach of many analyses of language which treat it theoretically as an entity in itself, or something present-at-hand since this is a sterile, once-removed side of language.

Thomas Langan, in The Meaning of Heidegger, points out that Heidegger has divided his analysis of Dasein's disclosedness into two sections, authentic and inauthentic disclosing.⁽¹⁾ Remembering that inauthentic existence is related to Dasein's domination by the "they", we can now look for an analysis of the modes of existence of Dasein under the influence of the "they". This will involve, then, a consideration of Dasein in its everydayness. Nevertheless, Heidegger cautions that even here his concern is ontological and is not intended as a "moralizing critique of everyday Dasein."⁽²⁾

There are three phenomena in everyday existence which point to this domination by the "they". The first is idle talk (Gerede, which can also be translated as gossip or prattle), the inauthentic parallel to discourse. "Idle talk is the possibility of understanding everything without previously making the thing one's own."⁽³⁾ This "idle

1 Thomas Langan, The Meaning of Heidegger (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959), p.24.

2 Heidegger, op.cit., p.211.

3 Ibid., p.213.

talk" fills Dasein's daily existence and each time something is accepted on the basis of it, as inevitably happens, this subject becomes "closed off" from any personal examination and appropriation by Dasein. As he explains: "In no case is a Dasein untouched and unseduced by this way in which things have been interpreted, set before the open country of a world-in-itself so that it just beholds what it encounters."
(1)

The second phenomenon is curiosity, the inauthentic parallel to understanding. This refers to Dasein's tendency to dwell on the superficial and insignificant aspects of existence and indicates a lack of originality and creativity. Heidegger sees curiosity as a distracted type of hurrying from one interest to the next, seeking "...the excitement of continual novelty and changing encounters." The result of this "not tarrying" is that Dasein never "dwells" anywhere and is constantly "uprooting" itself.⁽²⁾

The third phenomenon which characterizes Dasein's everyday existence is ambiguity, the inauthentic parallel to state-of-mind. (It should be noted here that while all commentators remark on this parallel between ambiguity and state-of-mind, it certainly is not as striking as are the parallels between understanding - curiosity, and discourse - idle talk.) Heidegger defines this concept as follows: "When, in our everyday Being-with-one-another, we encounter

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid., pp.216-217.

the sort of thing which is accessible to everyone, and about which anyone can say anything, it soon becomes impossible to decide what is disclosed in a genuine understanding, and what is not." He further explains that such ambiguity affects not only the world but also Being-with-one-another and even Dasein's Being toward itself.⁽¹⁾

One of the main points Heidegger tries to make in his discussion of ambiguity is that this inauthentic mode of existence grows almost naturally out of Dasein's mode of finite existence. Indeed, finitude is a term which can be closely associated with the Heideggerian terms "facticity" and "thrownness." Thus Heidegger claims that ambiguity is not the result of a conscious effort of Dasein but is always already implied in Dasein's existence as "thrown" existence.⁽²⁾

These three phenomena, idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity, characterize the mode of disclosure of everyday Dasein. Together they reveal an inherent part of everyday existence which is called 'fallenness'. Heidegger stresses that although an inauthentic mode of existing, fallenness is an existential and as such is just as prominent and real as any authentic factors in existence. The terms authentic and inauthentic must be understood here in their existential sense, Heidegger cautions. Furthermore, the inauthentic mode "...has to be conceived as that kind of

1 Ibid., p.217.

2 Ibid., p.219.

Being which is closest to Dasein and in which Dasein maintains itself for the most part."⁽¹⁾

It is not a question then, as in the theological use of the term, of falling from a pristine state into a lower one. We get some idea of the term's Heideggerian implications from his explanation that Dasein falls from itself, as factical Being in the world, into the world, which is also a part of Dasein's being. To understand fallenness as an ontical or existentiell state beyond which man progresses would thus be a grave error in Heidegger's opinion.⁽²⁾

Heidegger distinguishes four traits of "fallenness". The first is that of temptation. It refers to the fact that Dasein's structure of existence is such that it necessarily is constantly tempting itself into falling. The second, tranquillity, refers to the self-sustaining, deceptive nature of this state of fallenness. The third, alienation, indicates that Dasein, in its state of fallenness, is alienated from and denied access to its real ground in potentiality-for-Being. The fourth trait is entanglement. This refers to the fact that Dasein is not alienated from itself but becomes completely absorbed in itself (remembering that its world is a part of itself), thereby reinforcing its alienation from authentic

1 Ibid., p.220.

2 Ibid.

existence. (1)

Again we should stress the ontological motives behind the investigation, in this case, of inauthentic, fallen existence for Heidegger introduces and concludes his study of fallenness with a discussion of its ontological relevance. Gelven, in his commentary on Being and Time, states that Heidegger is not moralizing in his discussion of fallenness but is trying to show how "...inauthentic moments reveal the structure of how one avoids the confrontation of the ontological question. This is done for the sake of exposing the dimensions of the Being question." (2)

The analysis of fallenness, or inauthentic existence, reinforces his analysis of understanding and state-of-mind, which reveal authentic existence, in that fallenness reflects and is only possible because of the structures understanding and state-of-mind. In Being and Time we read: "Dasein can fall only because Being-in-the-world understandingly with a state-of-mind is an issue for it." (3)

9. Care as the basic, unitary existential

We move next to a crucial chapter of Being and Time in which Heidegger formulates and analyses the concept 'care.' His concern in this chapter is to unite and form

1 Ibid., pp.221-223.

2 Gelven, op.cit., p.109.

3 Heidegger, op.cit., p.224.

a ground for the whole of the other existentials formulated to this point. He explains that to arrive at an understanding of the whole of Dasein's structure through adding up all the various elements would be to treat Dasein inappropriately since such a scheme would "need an architect's plan." Instead he advises penetrating through this whole to a "single primordially unitary phenomenon" which could then serve as the "ontological foundation" for the whole of Dasein.⁽¹⁾

The importance of achieving this task cannot be over-emphasized, as seen in the following words of Michael Gelven:

Heidegger is bent on finding a single unitary existential because if there were no unitary existential, there could be no basis for going beyond the simple enumeration of existentials, and there would then be no possible link between the mere analysis of everydayness and the ontological ground that lies at its foundation. Unless there was a single unifying existential, one could not go any further than Division One /the preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein/ of Being and Time: it provides the possibility of Division Two /a primordial existential interpretation of Dasein./⁽²⁾

Heidegger must find, then, one single phenomenon reflected in or underlying Dasein's everyday mode of existence which will also provide access to Dasein's ontological roots and thus Being itself. He states that for the analysis of Dasein to retain its identity as fundamental ontology and lay bare the Being of Dasein, it must look for

1 Ibid., p.226.

2 Gelven, op.cit., p.112.

"...one of the most far-reaching and most primordial possibilities of disclosure - one that lies in Dasein itself... With what is thus disclosed, the structural totality of the Being we seek must then come to light in an elemental way."⁽¹⁾

He is looking then for a distinctive mode of disclosure (an understanding state-of-mind) in which Dasein "brings itself before itself." The subject to be interrogated about this distinctive mode of disclosure will be Dasein in its everydayness. He suggests anxiety as this distinctive mode of disclosure and proceeds to consider its existentiell appearance (or how it is seen in everyday existence).

In looking at Dasein's everydayness, we have already noted that "falling" is a basic existential. Further, this falling is clarified by Heidegger as a fleeing from one's authentic self into the world and the "they" self. This fleeing then is basically a "turning away" and Heidegger suggests we further analyze this "turning away" as it is manifested on the everyday ontic level in order to grasp in an existential-ontological way that which is "turned away" from.⁽²⁾ If we might anticipate Heidegger somewhat, we can say here that what is being turned away from is authentic Being-in-the-world, which is Dasein's

1 Heidegger, op.cit., p.226.

2 Ibid., p.229.

general mode of existence as this is disclosed by anxiety.

He begins by distinguishing between fear and anxiety as states-of-mind. As he has stressed previously, fear is always fear "in the face of" some specific entity in Dasein's world or environment. However, those experiencing anxiety or dread (different words for the same concept) can not identify any such specific object "in the face of" which anxiety is aroused. In "What is Metaphysics?" he stresses the difference between fear and dread. While the former is always associated with some definite object, the latter is less specific, as he says, 'fear of' is always 'fear about' something while 'dread of' is also 'dread about' but not about anything specific or concrete. (1)

The object of dread is, in a very real sense, "nothing and nowhere within-the-world" and this "nothing and nowhere within-the-world" means as a phenomenon that the world as such is that in the face of which one has anxiety.

(2) Therefore anxiety qualifies as a mode of disclosure in that it reveals Dasein as Being-in-the-world. Indeed, because it is anxiety that reveals to Dasein its facticity, we can say that anxiety is the state-of-mind par excellence.

Having seen that which Dasein is anxious in the face of, Heidegger next considers that "about" which Dasein

1 Heidegger, Existence and Being, pp.365-366.

2 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.231.

is anxious. He explains that Dasein is anxious about its Being-in-the-world. In anxiety the world, or that system of relations between entities ready-to-hand, "sinks away" and has nothing to offer to Dasein. In this way anxiety breaks Dasein's tendency to fall into and ground its existence in the world and instead forces it responsibly to shoulder its role as an "authentic-potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world."⁽¹⁾

In his essay "What Is Metaphysics?" Heidegger gives a further description of this experience:

In dread, as we say, 'one feels something uncanny.' What is this 'something' and this 'one'? We are unable to say what gives 'one' that uncanny feeling. 'One' just feels it generally. All things, and we with them, sink into a sort of indifference. But not in the sense that everything simply disappears; rather, in the very act of withdrawing away from us everything turns towards us. This withdrawal of what-is-in-totality, which then crowds round us in dread, this is what oppresses us. There is nothing to hold on to.⁽²⁾

In dread, then, Dasein's preoccupation with the world is broken, and it is forced back in upon itself. In this enforced solitude Dasein is first able to "come to grips" with itself. Further, this excludes any possibility of Dasein disclosing itself to itself in terms of an inauthentic understanding. Therefore, "Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its Being-free for the authenticity of its Being, and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always is."⁽³⁾

1 Ibid., p.232.

2 Heidegger, Existence and Being, p.366.

3 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.232.

In review, (a) we are looking now for a single unitary existential which underlies all existentials and will thus be able to serve as the bridge between a preparatory analysis of Dasein and the primordial interpretation which will be even more ontological in nature. (b) We began by looking for a distinctive mode of disclosure (an understanding state-of-mind) whereby Dasein sets itself before itself. Anxiety was suggested as that state-of-mind which "filled the bill." (c) We then looked at the "turning away" nature of everyday fallenness to see that which is "turned away" from, which we anticipated as authentic Being-in-the-world as disclosed by anxiety.

In inverse order, we have found that what is revealed in anxiety is authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. In a very real sense anxiety reverses the turning away from authentic Being-in-the-world (that "in the face of" which we are anxious) and forces Dasein into authentic Being-in-the-world (that "about" which we are anxious). Thus, the task in (c) is completed.

In order to meet the requirements of (b) we needed to show that anxiety qualifies as a distinctive mode of disclosure (an understanding state-of-mind). Because anxiety discloses the world to Dasein, it is definitely a state-of-mind. Further we saw that anxiety discloses to Dasein its potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. Remembering that states-of-mind reveal the actuality, the fact (facticity) of existence, while understanding deals with possibility and potentiality, we can see how anxiety is a

distinctive mode of disclosure, including both the modes of understanding and state-of-mind. Therefore the task of (b) is completed and the stage is set for the appearance of that crucial existential sought in the task of (a).

The analysis of anxiety has focused our attention on Dasein for the first time simply in terms of itself. We now are examining Dasein as Dasein, not as Being-in-the-world, nor as seen in terms of entities, nor as seen through the "they" self, nor as seen through Being-with Others. While all these are basic existentials, the existential constituting Dasein as Dasein will be the basic one.

Remembering Macquarrie's words (p. 45) we can see how anxiety has revealed three basic modes of Dasein's disclosure of itself to itself. In answer to his question concerning the possibility of anxiety revealing the whole of Dasein's structure, Heidegger summarizes his analysis of this concept by saying that anxiety is a state-of-mind; "... that in the face of which we have anxiety is thrown Being-in-the-world; that which we have anxiety about is our potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world." He explains that anxiety thus shows Dasein as factically existing Being-in-the-world, the main characteristics of which are "existentiality, facticity, and Being-fallen."⁽¹⁾

He proceeds next to define care based on these inter-related structures revealed by anxiety. Here again

1 Ibid., p.235.

it is important to understand Heidegger's language, not in light of the usual implications such terms might have, but in light of the meaning assigned them by Heidegger. As he says in Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, if the term care is considered as an ontic characteristic of man, as having "ethical-ideological" implications only, "...then everything falls into confusion and no comprehension of the problematic which guides the analysis of Dasein is possible."
(1)

Insofar as Dasein is a potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world, it is composed of possibilities toward which it can understandingly project itself and is thus Being-ahead-of-itself. Insofar as Dasein is seen as thrown Being-in-the-world, it is ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-a-world. Furthermore, anxiety has revealed Dasein as inauthentically absorbed and immersed in its world; therefore it is also Being alongside its world. In summary he defines care in the following manner: "...the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world.). This Being fills in the signification of the term care..."⁽²⁾

Here, also, the importance of the hyphens should not be overlooked. This basic existential is a unit, a whole. Magda King, in Heidegger's Philosophy stresses how all three of the existential elements are inter-related,

1 Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, p.213.

2 Heidegger, Being and Time, pp.236-237.

each showing the others:

When we say 'Man exists' we are already saying, though not explicitly expressing it, that he exists factually (facticity, thrownness), and that thus factually existing, he is already falling away from himself to the things he meets within his world. Similarly, when we speak of thrownness, we already imply that this thrown man is in the way of existence, because only in coming back to himself in the possibilities of his being can man find himself already thrown into a world, and not merely occur in it like a thing. Similarly, when we speak of fallenness, we are already implying existence and thrownness, for only a man who understands by being in a world can lose himself to the things he meets within it. (1)

With the appearance of the existential care, all previously considered existentials have been gathered up and united into one. Being-in (as dwelling or residing), Being-in-the-world, worldhood as an existential, Being-with, the "they", modes of disclosure, all are united by the underlying existential care. Just as Sorge is included in Fürsorge and Besorgen (concern for others and concern for entities) so care lies at the base of and is included in all other modes of Being and Dasein.

The task suggested in (a) (to find an underlying existential which unites all other existentials and can serve as the bridge between the preparatory analysis and more basic primordial interpretation) is fulfilled with the following suggestion by Heidegger concerning the phenomenon care. In reviewing his analysis of care he feels that in

1 King, op.cit., pp.51-52.

regards to this existential, "...we must pursue the ontological question even further until we can exhibit a still more primordial phenomenon which provides the ontological support for the unity and the totality of the structural manifoldness of care."⁽¹⁾

With these words Heidegger is pointing toward the second stage of his analysis when this concept will provide the structural framework for his definition of time.

(Michael Wyschogrod, in Kierkegaard and Heidegger, The Ontology of Existence, notes that the structure of care refers to Dasein's nature as a field or an extension and not a static point. It is most important to keep this aspect of care in mind when we move into the next stage of Heidegger's analysis.⁽²⁾) Now we have fulfilled the task set before us in (a).

10. Truth

Before moving on to this second stage, Heidegger pauses to consider truth, an issue with which any ontology must deal. He begins by stating that his approach operates on a more basic level than past approaches and is concerned with the most essential aspect of truth. Therefore, he will be able to show how the traditional understanding of truth has been derived from this more primordial phenomenon.⁽³⁾

1 Heidegger, op.cit., p.241.

2 Michael Wyschogrod, Kierkegaard and Heidegger, The Ontology of Existence (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1954), pp.60-62.

3 Heidegger, op.cit., p.257.

He begins by referring to the currently pre-dominant and also traditional understanding of truth as the correspondence theory in which the truth is determined by a correct or incorrect correspondence between a statement and its object. Such an approach overlooks the real issue in that before there can be any correspondence, the object in question must be able to show or "unconceal" itself. As he explains: "What is to be demonstrated is not an agreement of knowing with its object...What is to be demonstrated is solely the Being-uncovered of the entity itself..."⁽¹⁾

In his essay "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes", Heidegger defines truth as follows: "Truth means the nature of the true. We think this nature in recollecting the Greek word aletheia, the unconcealedness of beings."⁽²⁾ We should note here that Heidegger is speaking about the essence of truth while he says other theories of truth only deal with the "criterion" by which truth is established, e.g. correspondence.

If we remember that one of the basic existentials of Dasein's mode of Being is Being-in as disclosure, it is not difficult to see that Heidegger is now going to connect closely truth as aletheia and Dasein as disclosure. He

1 Ibid., p.261.

2 Martin Heidegger, Holzwege, (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1950), p.39.

states that disclosedness is the basic characteristic of Dasein "...according to which it is its 'there'... In so far as Dasein is its disclosedness essentially, and discloses and uncovers as something disclosed, to this extent it is essentially 'true'. Dasein is 'in the truth'." (1)

However, as fallen, Dasein's disclosure is often distorted by its absorption in the world and the public 'they'. The result is that Dasein is 'equiprimordially' in the truth and the untruth. (2) (By way of clarification, we might recall Heidegger's parallel between Dasein and a clearing in the woods. Just as the light entering through the clearing makes visible the clearing itself as well as its surroundings, so too does Dasein, by its transparency to Being, make itself and the entities within its world visible. As Vincent Vycinas says: "Truth is located not in things and not in man, but in Dasein, the openness of Being itself. Man can be the source of truth only because Being holds sway over him." (3))

Not surprisingly, Heidegger states that: "'There is' truth only in so far as Dasein is and so long as Dasein is." (4) Now we can see that just as Being is best seen through an analysis of Dasein, so too does truth find its

1 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.263.

2 Ibid., p.265.

3 Vincent Vycinas, Earth and Gods: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961), p.264.

4 Ibid., p.269.

expression through Dasein and can only be understood in relation to Dasein. However, he would not want to make truth completely subjective. Laszlo Versenyi relates how Heidegger defends his approach against any charges of subjectivism. His assertion that all truth is relative to the Being of Dasein does not make truth subjective in the sense of being arbitrary since Dasein is thrown into its Being and has no control over it. It is because Dasein is thrown into its Being, and can have no "arbitrary decision" about its modes of existence that "the universality of truth is assured."⁽¹⁾

We come now to the end of the first stage in Heidegger's analysis of Dasein. We have considered the broadest and most general existential, Being-in-the-world; its different components, Being-in as dwelling and as disclosure, both in authentic and inauthentic modes; Being-with, worldhood, and finally the existential which underlies, unites and is included in all the others, care. With this latter phenomenon established we are prepared to move into the second stage of the analysis, remembering that the concept care will provide the continuity between the two stages.

1 Versenyi, op.cit., p.40.

The Primordial Existential Interpretation of Dasein

Section Two

11. Primordial versus preparatory analyses

We move next into the primordial existential interpretation of Dasein. Heidegger begins by reiterating his overall ontological motive in considering Dasein. He again explains that as the one being concerned about its mode of Being, Dasein is a primary area of concern for any study of Being itself. He then explains that the analysis to this point cannot claim to be primordial since it "never included more than the inauthentic Being of Dasein, and... Dasein as less than a whole."⁽¹⁾ [While authentic existence has been a factor in his preparatory analysis, it has not yet been treated "thematically" as the sole object and centre of attention.] In order to be primordial then, the analysis must consider Dasein in its totality and authenticity.

Therefore Heidegger will begin his primordial analysis with a consideration of Being-towards-death, which will reveal Dasein in its totality, and a consideration of conscience which will reveal Dasein in its authenticity. Anticipatory resoluteness will be the concept which characterizes Dasein's existence in its totality and authenticity, and in this concept care, as the basic

1 Heidegger, op.cit., p.276.

structure of Dasein's mode of existence, will find its fullest expression. Heidegger will then penetrate beyond or behind care, as anticipatory resoluteness, to an even more primordial structure of existence, time.

We will then note how this basic structure serves as the point of contact between Dasein and Being. In this way, we will have traced his analysis from its existentiell beginning to its ontological culmination. We will next see how he reanalyses several of the existentials revealed in his preparatory analysis in light of these more basic insights and, finally, we shall note how in his consideration of history, which covers Dasein's mode of existence from beginning to end, he rounds off and completes his fundamental ontology.

12. Being-towards-death and Dasein in its totality

He begins this primordial analysis with a consideration of death which rounds off and limits Dasein, thereby revealing its totality or wholeness. This particular analysis will involve the following steps: (a) a consideration of problems stemming from the subject of the analysis, (b) fitting this concept into the framework established in previous analyses, (c) determining if this concept is compatible with Dasein's everyday mode of existence as so far described and, (d) a phenomenological consideration of everyday existentiell attitudes toward death, from which will be derived a full existential-ontological concept, anticipation, which will point toward

Dasein's wholeness.

Heidegger begins his consideration of death by painting himself into a corner, so to speak. Death is a uniquely difficult concept to grasp because to experience it is to cease to exist. It is impossible to solve this difficulty by observing the death of another as this would be a once-removed experience and thereby not an acceptable piece of data. Furthermore, to consider the body of the deceased is also unacceptable as it is now a lifeless entity in the mode of zuhanden or vorhanden.

Another difficulty enters now to compound the dilemma. As seen previously, it is an essential part of Dasein's nature to be ahead of itself, it is always more than it factually is. Now if we were to round out Dasein as it ends in death, thereby grasping it in its wholeness, then by virtue of our previous definitions we would no longer be considering Dasein but rather an entity of some other nature.

The key to how Heidegger solves his dilemma lies in his previous assertion that Dasein is its possibilities. Because death is a possibility, in a very real sense Dasein is its death. As Heidegger states: "The ending which we have in view when we speak of death, does not signify Dasein's Being-at-an-end, but a Being-towards-the-end... Death is a way to be, which Dasein takes over as soon as it is."⁽¹⁾

1 Ibid., p.289.

We further resolve the dilemma by recalling that we are considering the meaning of death, not death in its physical, biological aspects or death as the end of entities other than Dasein. Now we can see Dasein in its totality, its wholeness, if we can manage to face authentically the meaning of our Being-towards-death, a task which is rarely accomplished in everyday existence. This concludes the task set forth in step (a).

He next determines if death, as the end of Dasein, can be fitted into the existential framework of Dasein as it has been exposed to this point. The basis of this framework, of course, is care and we see here how Heidegger insures continuity between the two levels of his analysis. Recalling his definition of care (which we considered on p. 63) he states that the fundamental characteristics of Dasein's Being are existence, seen in its ahead-of-itself, facticity seen in its Being-already-in, and fallenness seen in its Being-alongside. "If indeed death belongs in a distinctive sense to the Being of Dasein, then death (or Being-towards-the-end) must be defined in terms of these characteristics."⁽¹⁾

In the very definition of death as a Being-towards, the aspect of ahead-of-itself in care becomes apparent. It is not difficult to see how the two are closely related since "towards" often refers to something "ahead."

1 Ibid., p.293.

However death is a distinctive mode of disclosure in that it forces Dasein back into itself. Death as a possibility is always my possibility and in this way death forces Dasein to accept its possibilities as its own. In addition, this particular possibility is the possibility to not be, and what is called into question here is really Dasein's own Being-in-the-world. Therefore, the first factor in the make up of care, potentiality-for-Being, or Dasein's ahead-of-itself "...has its most primordial concretion in Being-towards-death."⁽¹⁾

As for the other two factors in care, death reflects facticity in that it is not an avoidable possibility. In a sense, Dasein is 'thrown' into a situation wherein death is the ultimate possibility. Similarly, fallenness is seen in the universal tendency to flee from or deny the reality of death. The symptoms of this flight from death are all too familiar, e.g. the euphemisms for the word death itself (passed away, at rest) and the fear people have of cemeteries and funerals. Therefore death as the end of man which provides a wholeness to Dasein's existence can be analyzed within the framework of Heidegger's existential-ontological concerns and this completes step (b).

He turns next to see if this phenomenon, as it recurs in everyday life, is compatible with everyday

1 Ibid., p.294.

existence as he has so far defined it (the ontic-
existentiell and ontological-existential levels must always
 be kept in mind in their inter-relatedness.) Werner Brock,
 in his introduction to Existence and Being, very aptly
 summarizes Heidegger's analysis of death as it is commonly
 viewed:

In the publicity of the "one like many" death is
 known as an event which constantly occurs.../but
 which is/ not yet "vorhanden" for the person
 concerned and thus of no threatening character.
 "People die" (man stirbt). This "man" is "not
 just I"; it is "no one". The publicity of the
 "one like many" intensifies the temptation of
 concealing to oneself one's own "Being-towards-
 death"... An indifferent tranquillity is expected
 in view of the "fact" that "one" dies. The
 development of such "superior" indifference
 "estranges" the Dasein from its innermost,
 irrelative potentiality of Being.(1)

As we saw previously, temptation, tranquillity, and
 estrangement (or alienation) are all traits of fallenness,
 which is a common trait of everyday existence as defined
 by Heidegger. This completes the task of step (c).

He turns next to the development of a full
existential definition of death. In everyday existence,
 the certainty of death, as well as the indefiniteness of
 its arrival, is obliterated by the domination of the "they."
 In considering a statement which typifies the common
 attitude toward death, "Death certainly comes, but not
 right away", Heidegger shows that with the "but" of this

1 Werner Brock, "Introduction" to Heidegger's Existence
 and Being, pp.72-73.

sentence, the "...they" covers up what is peculiar in death's certainty - that it is possible at any moment. Along with the certainty of death goes the indefiniteness of its 'when.'⁽¹⁾

He goes on to establish a full existential definition of death as "...the end of Dasein... Dasein's ownmost possibility - non relational, /no one can die for another/ certain, and as such indefinite, not to be outstripped /unavoidable/. Death is, as Dasein's end, in the Being of this entity towards its end."⁽²⁾ In this context then, death does not refer to an end point but instead indicates the attitude Dasein bears toward its end or death.

He further clarifies this attitude by determining the authentic way to-be-towards-death. A problem is encountered here when we realise that death is a possibility. How can one be toward a possibility as a possibility without annihilating it. Heidegger reminds us that the proper mode of Being-towards in this case would not be to actualize this possibility, as this would be to bring about one's death. Nor does he suggest "dwelling" or "brooding" over death as one's end. He is not advocating a negative or pessimistic approach to death.

The proper attitude towards death he calls

1 Ibid., p.302.

2 Ibid., p.303.

'anticipation' of it as a possibility. The translators of Sein und Zeit state that Vorlaufen can also mean "running ahead." They go on to say that the anticipation involved in Being-towards-death "...does not consist in waiting for death or dwelling upon it or actualizing it before it normally comes; nor does "running ahead into it" in this sense mean that we 'rush headlong into it.'"(1)

Heidegger goes on to show how anticipation of death reveals existence in its totality or wholeness. We have already noted that Dasein's mode of existence is such that it cannot be arbitrarily rounded off at one particular point in time. This would destroy its nature as always ahead-of-itself. However, it can be rounded off and viewed in its totality if there is one possibility which cannot be exceeded by any other.

It is this ultimate type of possibility which Heidegger sees in Being-towards-death, a possibility which Heidegger says is "not to be outstripped." Therefore, anticipation of this possibility, which exceeds all others and thereby provides a limit or boundary to them, "includes the possibility of taking the whole of Dasein in advance /and of/...existing as a whole potentiality-for-Being."(2)

A very important result of anticipation of death

1 Ibid., p.306.

2 Ibid., p.309.

is a better appreciation of the possibilities from which one must choose which, in turn, leads to authentic existence. As he explains, in anticipation "...one is liberated from one's lostness in those possibilities which may accidentally thrust themselves upon one; and...for the first time one can authentically understand and choose among the possibilities lying ahead of that possibility which is not to be outstripped."⁽¹⁾ In accepting its finitude, its limited number of possibilities and limited time in which to fulfill its potential, Dasein acquires a better appreciation of its situation and is better able to focus its energy on the task ahead.

This completes step (d) in that we have now established the nature of that existential-ontological concept, anticipation, which allows our analysis to consider Dasein in its wholeness or totality. In addition, we have noted how this leads inevitably into a discussion of Dasein in its authentic mode of existence.

13. Conscience and authenticity

His task now is to ground authenticity in Dasein's structure of existence. He selects the conscience as that aspect of existence which will provide the bridge between his concept, authenticity, and the common understanding of existence. He proceeds by (a) fitting conscience into the

1 Ibid., p.308.

framework already established, (b) grounding this concept of conscience in what is normally understood as conscience, (c) moving from an existentiell understanding of conscience to a more basic, underlying existential structure, resoluteness, (d) establishing the relation of authenticity and resoluteness, and (e) explaining a trait of authenticity which results from resoluteness.

It would be helpful to reiterate at the outset that Heidegger is looking at conscience in an existential-ontological manner. As Magda King points out, his interest here is neither psychological, ethical-moral, nor religious. Instead his task is "...to show how man must a priori be, i.e. how he must be manifest to himself in his Being so that in his factual existence he can hear a voice of conscience at all..."⁽¹⁾

In order to fit this concept into the framework established in previous analyses, Heidegger reveals how conscience is related to disclosure as one aspect of care. He begins by noting that all definitions of conscience agree that it reveals, or discloses, something and therefore it can be considered a mode of disclosure and will be involved in all four aspects of disclosure: understanding, state-of-mind, discourse and fallenness.⁽²⁾

In the section "The Character of Conscience as a

1 King, op.cit., p.167.

2 Ibid., p.168.

Call" Heidegger asks to what is the call made, or who is called? The answer is that Dasein, as it understands itself in the everyday mode under the domination of the "they", is what is called. He then asks to what is Dasein called, where is it directed by this call? His answer is: "When the they self is appealed to, it gets called to the Self...to that Self which...is in no other way than Being-in-the-world."⁽¹⁾ However, the call is one of silence, "nothing" is discussed or communicated in it. Yet this nothing has important implications in Heidegger's framework. As seen previously, it is the experience of "nothing" which in anxiety focuses Dasein back into its own potentiality for Being.

Next he considers who it is that calls Dasein and explains that this caller can be defined in a worldly manner by "nothing at all." Instead, the caller is Dasein in its anxious awareness of nothingness, a Dasein which is "not at-home" in its world. The result is that its voice is completely alien to the inauthentic Dasein immersed in its immediate surroundings. As Heidegger explains, what "...could be more alien to the "they", lost in the manifold "world" of its concern, than the self which has been individualized down to itself in uncanniness and has been thrown into the "nothing"?"⁽²⁾

W.J. Richardson quite aptly summarizes how this

1 Heidegger, op.cit., p.318.

2 Ibid., pp.321-322.

consideration of conscience leads naturally into and is grounded in care. He explains that Dasein as fallen is called to move toward an authentic existence as "...the anticipatory drive-towards-Being by which it is its own potentiality." Further, the caller is Dasein in its "sheer thrownness" as this is revealed in anxiety. And as we have already noted, existence, facticity, and fallenness complete the structure of care so that conscience can now be identified as the call of care and thus the firm connection between care and conscience is established.⁽¹⁾

As for the relation of conscience and Dasein's disclosedness, we see manifested in Heidegger's discussion about the called "who" a consideration of Dasein as it understands itself under the fallen domination of the "they". In his words about the "who" of the caller, we see Dasein speaking from the authentic and basic state-of-mind, anxiety. Finally, in his characterization of conscience as a call, we see its relation to discourse. Therefore he has grounded conscience in the four modes of disclosure, understanding, state-of-mind, discourse and fallenness and in this way has fitted this concept into the framework of his overall analysis. This completes step (a).

He moves next to establish the continuity between his understanding of conscience and what is normally understood as conscience. What is it that one hears in the call of conscience? Heidegger suggests that nearly all

1 Richardson, op.cit., p.81.

interpretations of this phenomenon see it as somehow pointing toward guilt. Heidegger goes on to consider a variety of common definitions of guilt and then he looks for a "formalized" notion of guilt which is common to all such understandings. He finds this in the idea of guilt as a "lack." However, the idea of a "lack" is inappropriate in relation to existence because "...as the not-Being-present-at-hand of something which ought to be..." it would be a characteristic of an entity present-at-hand. "In this sense it is essential that in existence there can be nothing lacking, not because it would then be perfect, but because its character of Being remains distinct from any presence-at-hand."⁽¹⁾

If we want to understand how guilt can apply to Dasein's existence (e.g. Being-guilty) then we have to see this "formalized" idea of guilt in its existential dimension as a "not". "...we define the formally existential idea of the "Guilty" as Being-the-basis for a Being which has been defined by a "not"."⁽²⁾ Can this definition of guilty be applied to Dasein? Is there anything in Dasein's structure which would correlate with this existential version of what is normally understood as the concern of the conscience?

He answers by revealing how Dasein's basic structure care (consisting of thrownness, projection and

1 Heidegger, op.cit., p.329.

2 Ibid.

fallenness), is permeated with guilt, nullity or a not. As thrown, Dasein has not laid its own basis; as projecting, there are numerous rejected possibilities which it has not chosen; and finally, this nullity in existence is what drives Dasein into fallen and inauthentic attempts to ground its existence, thereby overcoming its guilt or nullity.⁽¹⁾ In this we can see the continuity between conscience as it is normally understood and conscience as a structure in Dasein's existence. This completes step (b).

Again we should stress that this is an understanding of Being-guilty as an existential and, hence as a priori. "Being-guilty is more primordial than any knowledge about it. And only because Dasein is guilty in the basis of its Being, and closes itself off from itself as something thrown and falling, is conscience possible..."⁽²⁾ Being-guilty then is prior to any knowledge or awareness of guilt as ordinarily understood and it is because of this a priori nature that Dasein can exist day by day unaware of its Being-guilty (in the existential sense) and this unawareness is what makes the call of conscience possible.

Heidegger turns next to a description of conscience on the existentiell level, moving then to expose the existential roots of this phenomenon, thereby establishing

1 Ibid., pp.330-331.

2 Ibid., p.332.

a full existential concept, resoluteness. Having identified the caller, the called, and the content of the call he next asks how the call is to be understood.

"Understanding the appeal means wanting to have a conscience."⁽¹⁾ Because the caller is Dasein in its uncanniness or as anxious, and the content of the call is nothingness (the experience of which prepares Dasein for an openness to Being), Dasein's wanting to have a conscience implies a willingness to confront its "ownmost potentiality for Being."⁽²⁾

The existential roots of this existentiell desire for a conscience can be seen in the fact that this is a mode of disclosure since the authentic side of Dasein is disclosed in it. Furthermore, this mode of disclosure can be seen as on the existential level in that it involves understanding, state-of-mind and discourse.

Since this is a disclosure of a potentiality for Being, it also involves a possibility, which is the realm of understanding. We have already noted the relation of the caller and content of the conscience to nothingness and uncanniness which, in turn, are closely associated with anxiety. As anxiety is a principal state-of-mind, we see how the disclosure involved in wanting to have a conscience can also be characterized as a mood or state-of-mind.

1 Ibid., p.334.

2 Ibid.

And finally we previously established that "keeping silent" was one of the basic traits of discourse and since the content of the conscience's call is nothingness, we can see how this disclosure can be characterised as discourse as well.⁽¹⁾ He has now moved beyond the existentiell level to a more basic existential phenomenon and is ready to describe it as a full existential-ontological structure. "This distinctive and authentic disclosedness, which is attested in Dasein itself by its conscience - this reticent self-projection upon one's ownmost Being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety - we call resoluteness."⁽²⁾ This completes step (c).

The next step will be to establish that resoluteness reveals Dasein in its authentic mode of existence. This can be done in two ways. First, in that resoluteness means facing nothingness, it naturally leads into an awareness of Being which characterizes authentic existence. The second more important way of establishing the relation between resoluteness and authenticity stems from Dasein's central trait, disclosedness. ("Dasein is its disclosedness."⁽³⁾)

If we recall also how Heidegger grounds truth as aletheia in Dasein as disclosure, we can see that Dasein can only truly disclose itself and its world to itself in

1 Ibid., p.342.

2 Ibid., p.343.

3 Ibid., p.171.

resoluteness. Therefore it is only as resolute that Dasein can fulfill its primary function of disclosure in an authentic manner.⁽¹⁾ This completes step (d) and we can now see how Heidegger has derived this authentic mode of existence from a phenomenological analysis of the everyday understanding of conscience.

As Magda King explains, resoluteness is "...merely an ontological construction and remains worthless unless man himself, in his ontic existence, confirms that the disclosure which has been postulated is possible in concrete existence."⁽²⁾ In proceeding from an existential version of the usual understanding of conscience, step (b), through the existentiell phenomenon "wanting to have a conscience" to a full existential structure resoluteness, step (c), which in turn makes authenticity possible, step (d), Heidegger has grounded his ontological-existential results in ontic-existentiell evidence.

Another trait of authentic existence stems from the fact that just as Dasein and its world are only truly disclosed in resoluteness, so also does that aspect of Dasein, Being-in-the-world, assume authentic significance and meaning only in resoluteness. By resolutely facing its world, Dasein creates what Heidegger calls a 'situation'. Remembering that the entities (zuhanden and

1 Ibid., p.343.

2 King, op.cit., p.167.

vorhanden) which compose the world only assume meaning through the centre or goal of their relations, we can see how a resolute disposition towards Being-in-the-world might give the world new significance.

Ronald Grimsley explains that all have the opportunity of moulding their environment by "...transforming the chance events of life into a genuine situation." Unlike the inauthentic Dasein which exists from day to day under the influence of das Man, the resolute Dasein sees these chance events of life as an opportunity for imposing its own desire and will upon its environment, thus authentically exercising its own powers, abilities and freedom.⁽¹⁾ This completes step (e).

Heidegger now has established his analysis as primordial in that Dasein is seen in both its totality and its authenticity. Since he has carefully grounded resoluteness and anticipation in his preparatory analysis, care, as Dasein's basic unitary existential, has now been revealed on an even deeper, existential level. Furthermore Being, as the object of his analysis, is coming into better focus each time the nature of Dasein, the 'ontological animal', is clarified.

14. Anticipatory resoluteness

So far in his primordial analysis, Heidegger has established his definition of anticipation and resoluteness.

1 Grimsley, op.cit., pp.68-69.

He asks now whether it is possible to unite these two phenomena, not in the sense of forcibly coercing them into union but rather in the sense of allowing them to "show themselves as they are" in their inter-connectedness. It is most important that this unity be apparent on the existentiell level, or as observable in actual experience, so that the analysis can proceed beyond into that existential domain where a single underlying structure will be made visible. This particular existential structure will have been responsible for allowing the existentiell union.

Heidegger stresses that this existential structure must be rooted in observable existentiell phenomena, otherwise this exercise would assume the appearance of an "arbitrary construction."⁽¹⁾ Here again, the existential findings are to be validated by observation of visible existentiell phenomena. This approach is typical of Heidegger's method throughout Being and Time. The preparatory analysis dealt mainly with the everyday, inauthentic awareness while the later, primordial analysis is penetrating into data of an authentic and existential-ontological nature based on guidelines already established by the earlier analysis.

As we examine how the two phenomena become one in anticipatory resoluteness, we might recall that both

1 Heidegger, op.cit., p.350.

components in the union are rooted in care as the all-uniting existential of Dasein. We are still moving toward that even more basic phenomenon which makes care possible. Michael Gelven summarizes how Heidegger reveals the relationship between anticipation and resoluteness by showing that they are actually contained in each other. Resoluteness reveals to Dasein that it is guilty "all the time", that is until it ends. In other words, Dasein is guilty for as long as it exists and implied in this is an awareness of death, or Being-towards-death, the authentic mode of which is anticipation.⁽¹⁾ Thus Heidegger explains that resoluteness can only be itself in an authentic way as anticipatory resoluteness.⁽²⁾ He has shown then how the two actually are inter-related in an existentiell awareness.

15. A methodological pause

Heidegger pauses at this point in his analysis for a reconsideration and justification of his overall methodology in light of the new insights gained. He has not paused earlier for a full consideration of his methodology since his first task has been to "...go forth towards the phenomena." However at this point he feels it appropriate to pause, not for the sake of resting but so that "...we may be impelled the more keenly."⁽³⁾

1 Gelven, op.cit., p.176.

2 Heidegger, op.cit., p.356.

3 Ibid., p.350.

He begins by noting that the nature of the subject under interrogation is such that the investigation encounters particularly subtle difficulties which often mislead the inquirer. He is referring to the fact that inauthenticity is inherent, indeed almost inevitable, given Dasein's modes of existence. By way of illustration we need only realise that fallenness, in which one is absorbed and immersed in the world or environment, is a direct consequence of the basic existential Being-in-the-world, whereby one is always "alongside" entities.

Similarly, living under the domination of the "they" self stems easily out of another existential, Being-with. As a result, he explains that Dasein's mode of existence is such that any analysis of it will have to "... capture the Being of this entity, in spite of this entity's own tendency to cover things up."⁽¹⁾ He also reiterates that the existential findings must be grounded in an existentiell awareness.

Heidegger then defends the necessity of his "circular method." As mentioned previously, this method begins with the vague "unthematic" pre-understanding of Being which all men have. It then proceeds to bring this pre-ontological awareness into clearer focus. The circularity stems from the fact that the result is pre-supposed in the beginning. However, this approach can now

1 Ibid., p.359.

be seen to be particularly appropriate in light of certain new insights into Dasein's mode of existence which is always ahead-of-itself. As already noted, Dasein constantly projects itself upon definite possibilities within its world and, in a pre-ontological manner, it has "...also projected something like existence and Being."⁽¹⁾

Because it is so appropriate for fundamental ontology, rather than avoiding the circular method, Heidegger feels one must be prepared to "leap" wholeheartedly into it.

16. Time

What is it that makes care possible? Is there some underlying basic phenomenon behind even this unitary existential. At the end of the preparatory analysis Heidegger hinted that there was. (p. 65) We began our analysis by considering a variety of existentials. We then saw them united and grounded in care. We progressed to see how care is reflected totally and authentically in anticipation and resolution. Finally we saw the unity of care reinforced with the appearance of anticipatory resoluteness. If something can be "thematically" brought into view underlying care then we would certainly be confronted by a fundamental factor in Dasein's make-up and would have a valuable clue in the search for Being as it is manifested through Dasein.

Because of the importance of this particular analysis in Being and Time we shall first consider it in Heidegger's own words and then offer our own

1 Ibid., p.363.

summation of his argument. Again, we need recall that anticipatory resoluteness is an authentic mode of care.

Anticipatory resoluteness...is Being towards one's ownmost, distinctive potentiality-for-Being. This sort of thing is possible only in that Dasein can, indeed, come towards itself in its ownmost possibility...This letting-itself-come-towards-itself...is the primordial phenomenon of the future as coming towards. If either authentic or inauthentic Being-towards-death belongs to Dasein's Being, then such Being-towards-death is possible only as something futural...Anticipatory resoluteness understands Dasein in its own essential Being-guilty. This understanding means that in existing one takes over Being-guilty; it means being the thrown basis of nullity. But taking over thrownness signifies being Dasein authentically as it already was...As authentically futural, Dasein is authentically as having been...Anticipatory resoluteness discloses the current Situation of the "there" in such a way that existence, in taking action, is circumspectively concerned with what is factically ready-to-hand environmentally. Resolute Being alongside what is ready-to-hand in the Situation - that is to say, taking action in such a way as to let one encounter what has presence environmentally - is possible only by making such an entity present.(1)

In the above, we can see how an analysis of care as anticipatory resoluteness yields the three underlying dimensions of future, past, present. Understanding deals with possibilities which are associated with projection or moving in a forward direction. In this forward direction is seen the futural dimension. However, understanding is always associated with a state-of-mind, which is related to Dasein's facticity, its being rooted and limited by the past. On the basis of its concern for the future in understanding and its orientation towards the past in state-

1 Ibid., pp.372-374.

of-mind, Dasein "falls" into a present association with the objects of its world and thus falling is primarily present. In addition each of these three existentials necessarily implies the other two and thus temporality provides the underlying unity of Dasein's care structure.

We should stress here that Heidegger is looking for the meaning of time in the context of fundamental ontology. He is not seeking an abstract self-contained understanding of time in itself. He is looking for what it means "to be" in time (thus the title Sein und Zeit). Michael Gelven explains that in order to develop the existential dimension of time Heidegger deliberately avoids any metaphysical formulation of time as some sort of substance or entity. In other words, he avoids an ontical description of time so that the ontological can be brought into focus.⁽¹⁾

With this in mind, it is understandable that Heidegger considers the future to be the more important dimension of temporality. We need only to recall that Dasein, in understanding itself and its world, is constantly projecting beyond itself, is always ahead of itself and is always more than it factually is, to appreciate his emphasis on this temporal dimension.

Despite the emphasis on the future, the three

1 Gelven, op.cit., p.188.

dimensions of time can only be seen as a unit. This can be seen in the term, *ecstasis*, by which Heidegger designates each dimension. It is based on the Greek word, ekstasis, which means "stretching out or extension."⁽¹⁾ The unity of the ecstases is reflected in the fact that the Dasein "stands out" from itself or extends beyond itself in different ways, it might even be permissible to say in different directions. Speaking very loosely and figuratively, we can say that the Dasein extends forwards (future), as having already extended behind itself (past) and the Dasein extends out of itself alongside entities in its environment (present). The unity of the ecstases stems from the fact that it is always the same Dasein "extending out" or "stretching out" beyond itself.

It was stated above that the unity of the ecstases is reflected in Dasein's ecstatic nature and this is not to say that this unity is grounded in Dasein's nature. Just as time cannot be conceived of in an objective manner so also it cannot be considered in a purely subjective manner. The nature of time does not grow out of, is not contingent upon Dasein's nature, rather the relation is vice versa. Time is the basic, a priori factor underlying the care structure of Dasein. This care structure was unfolded in order that the more primordial element might be exposed.

1 H.G. Liddell and R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, I, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1925), p.521.

Heidegger states: "Temporality temporalizes, and indeed it temporalizes possible ways of itself. These make possible the multiplicity of Dasein's modes of Being ..."(1) This "temporalizing" is reflected in Dasein's care structure and makes possible its future, past, and present. At this point it is necessary to wander far out on a rather fragile limb and make the assumption that Heidegger was pointing in this section of Being and Time to a further section never written entitled "Time and Being." Here it would have been clear how these two factors were related. The later section was never released, however, for reasons already discussed. (We noted earlier that Heidegger felt contemporary modes of thought and language forms failed to accommodate his insights which go against the grain of all previous philosophical insights.)

Fully realizing the inherent danger, we might attempt to express loosely and broadly what Heidegger intended to say in "Time and Being" by stating that Being "be-ings" in a temporal way. Vincent Vycinas explains that Being is not a self-contained entity but is constantly moving out from itself in revelation and openness. "This coming out of Being from concealment into revelation gives birth to time: it is time. Being cannot be thought of as separate from time; time is Being's coming to openness." (2)

1 Heidegger, op.cit., p.377.

2 Vycinas, op.cit., p.3.

We can also say that Being "beings" through the clearing which is Dasein and since Being "beings" in a temporal way, Dasein is in time.

We can now see how Heidegger begins with inauthentic everyday modes of Dasein's existence, then proceeds to care as Dasein's basic structure and how he goes from care to lay bare the structure of time and (although we can only anticipate the last step, it certainly fills out the process or completes the picture) finally gains insight into Being itself through an analysis of Dasein's temporality. This strongly supports our proposal that Being and Time is the work of an ontologist and that Heidegger does make his ontological intentions clear even though his original project was never completed.

To this point, Heidegger has only roughly revealed the temporal basis of care and he next moves into a detailed reconsideration of all the basic existentials in which he painstakingly lays bare the temporal structure of each one. For our purpose we shall only follow the section in which he establishes the temporal basis of understanding, state-of-mind, falling, and discourse, (the following will be mainly a condensed summation of section 68 in Being and Time and will only be footnoted where direct quotes are involved.)

He begins by laying bare the temporal structure of understanding. "If the term "understanding" is taken in a way which is primordially existential, it means to be projecting towards a potentiality-for-Being for the sake

of which any Dasein exists."⁽¹⁾ A Dasein is able to understandingly project because it is ahead of itself and this "ahead of" toward which Dasein can come is its "futural" dimension. Remembering that Dasein comes toward itself (p. 91) we can better grasp this movement by recalling that Dasein is not a point but a field (p. 65) and is characterized by extension and standing out (ecstasis). Thus a Dasein comes toward itself out of or from a possibility. It comes from itself in a present unrealized possibility to itself as a "futural" realized possibility. Further we can see Dasein moving or stretching along this extended line or field in both a forward and backward direction.

The primary temporal dimension of understanding is the future and Heidegger calls authentic understanding in this dimension anticipation, whereby Dasein comes toward itself (in a forward direction) in light of its "ownmost non-relational potentiality-for-Being." Inauthentic understanding in its future dimension is called awaiting, whereby a Dasein comes toward itself not under the influence of its ownmost potentiality-for-Being but in light of its potentiality-for-Being as affected by its relation to and absorption in the world and "they-self."

This term "awaiting", with its more passive connotation, also implies that in the inauthentic mode it

1 Heidegger, op.cit., p.385.

is not so much a question of meeting the future, or going towards the future, as a question of letting the future come towards oneself. This inauthentic mode is one of "letting the chips fall where they may." With this attitude one is completely subject to the happenings and events of the world, seeking merely to "ride out the storm."

Although primarily futural, understanding would not be temporal if it did not also have present and past dimensions. As with the future dimension, each of the other two will have an authentic and inauthentic mode, making a total of six modes of understanding. We consider next understanding in its present dimension. Here we see Dasein understandingly "alongside" its world or environment.

In its authentic mode this understanding is called "moment of vision" in which entities are understood and have meaning in light of their pertinence for future projections and as instruments for Dasein's moving ahead of itself. The inauthentic mode of understanding in its present dimension is termed "making present." This refers to Dasein's being "alongside" its world in a more passive way. Here Dasein is not making or creating its environment by understandingly projecting out on it, instead it is just "taking the world as it comes."

Understanding also has a past dimension in that the understanding Dasein always is and will be as "having been." We said previously that the movement along the extension or field that is Dasein as it comes toward itself

is two directional. Dasein comes toward itself by moving forward and also by coming back. In coming towards itself Dasein's "having been" can be seized anew as a possibility and not just an inert, actualized, once for all past. He explains that if Dasein understands its past correctly and if its "Being-as-having-been" is authentic, then its approach to the past is to be called 'repetition'.⁽¹⁾

The inauthentic mode of understanding in its past dimension which parallels authentic repetition is "forgetting." Here the self towards which Dasein comes back is not the ownmost self of Dasein's potentiality-for-Being. This authentic self is forgotten and replaced by the "they-self" immersed in its world and seen as a once-for-all, unrepeatable, arid "having been."

We turn next to a reconsideration of the temporal basis of state-of-mind. Here the main temporal division, although not the only one, is the past, or having been. In his earlier analysis of state-of-mind, Heidegger established the meaning of this phenomenon by considering two particular moods, fear and anxiety, and in this temporally oriented reanalysis, these two moods must be shown to have temporal structures. Further these temporal structures need to be revealed as having an a priori nature, as being that which makes possible the state-of-mind. Basically, Heidegger says that moods always bring us back to ourselves and their temporal basis is a priori in that without "having been" there could be no "bringing back to."

1 Ibid., p.388.

First, we turn to fear which is characterized as an inauthentic state-of-mind. We might recall that dread is always fear of some definite threatening entity or event. Confusion as to which dimension constitutes its temporal basis can arise from the fact that usually fear involves being afraid of something in the future. An event or occurrence which is past is no longer a threat, since past. Further, it can only become a threat again in repercussions which might occur later. However, this "later" itself implies a future dimension.

Under Heidegger's phenomenological scrutiny it soon becomes apparent that, while what the Dasein is afraid of is in the future, what it is afraid for is its own self. Now it is an accepted fact that in retreating from fear, one retreats into the security of the certain, the known. The certain, the familiar, in this case would be Dasein as "having been" in an actualized manner, since the possible is not as certain and secure as the actual. Hence a secure retreat would be Dasein as having been, not in light of its non-relational ownmost potentiality-for-Being but rather its actualized "having been" in relation to its world or environment.

We can see how a phenomenological consideration of fear reveals its temporal basis in Dasein's having been. Further, because the self is revealed in fear as "having been" in a relational, actualized manner, and not in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, the authentic self is

"forgotten." The present dimension is also involved here in that fear results in Dasein "making present" its world.

Under the threat of fear, one is "bewildered" into acting with little fore-thought or reflection. As Heidegger illustrates, it is a well known fact that when a house is being consumed by fire, the occupants often save the most insignificant articles which just happen to be closest to hand.⁽¹⁾ Fear reveals a future dimension also. We need only think of the paralysing effect fear often has on a threatened individual who "freezes" instead of acting. It is this inactivity, this passive attitude toward the future, which Heidegger characterizes as awaiting.

Second, Heidegger reconsiders anxiety and seeks to show its temporal basis as "having been." Further, since fear as an inauthentic state-of-mind manifested the inauthentic modes of the three temporal dimensions, anxiety as an authentic state-of-mind should reveal three authentic parallels. We can recall that anxiety shows Dasein its facticity or thrownness, and this facticity has been established as related to the way Dasein always "has been."

Anxiety reveals repetition in that it brings Dasein back to the way it has been in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. In anxiety, we saw how Dasein has the uncanny experience of the world slipping away. The nothingness

1 Ibid., p.392.

which fills the remaining void breaks Dasein's absorption in and concern for its world and frees it for a confrontation with its ownmost potentiality-for-Being.

Anxiety does involve repetition since it brings Dasein back to its "having been", not as having been in relation to the world but as "having been" in its non-relational, ownmost potentiality-for-Being.

Further, anxiety also reveals the present dimension in its authentic mode, called "moment of vision", in that the world is seen through anxiety in its proper perspective. No longer is Dasein's existence constituted mainly by its world. Instead the world is grasped as a tool or instrument, and becomes one of the means with which Dasein itself constitutes its existence. In anxiety Dasein is alongside its world in an authentic manner. The future dimension in its authentic mode, "anticipation", is involved here also. Anxiety, by isolating Dasein from its world in nothingness and bringing it face to face with its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, frees Dasein to face its future authentically.

Heidegger next considers the existential "falling", which is grounded primarily in being-alongside and the present. Michael Gelven explains that any interpretation which centres upon the actual instead of the possible can provide the "ontological ground for falling." Hence, an inauthentic understanding sees the present as a situation involving factual entities while the authentic view (moment of vision) sees it in terms of possibilities to be

encountered. Similarly, the past dimension, seen in terms of falling, is composed of "no-longer-actual events" (forgetting) rather than still still significant possibilities (repetition). And the future dimension is seen as "...not-yet events (waiting) rather than possible projections of one's ability-to-be (anticipation)."(1)

Finally Heidegger considers the temporal basis of language. Since Dasein's fallen, understanding state-of-mind finds expression in discourse, it is not difficult to see that discourse, the basis of language, is necessarily as temporal as those other existentials it expresses. However, the temporal basis of discourse is also seen in the fact that language has a past, present, and future tense. (2)

Heidegger summarizes his reanalysis of the care structure and basic existentials by saying that while understanding is grounded mainly in the future, states-of-mind in the past, and falling in the present, it is important to remember that each of these three structures involves the other temporal dimensions as well as its primary one. For instance, understanding is always occurring as a present event which "is in the process of having been." In this way he stresses the unity of the temporal basis underlying the care structure. (3)

1 Gelven, op.cit., p.195.

2 Heidegger, op.cit., p.400 and Gelven, op.cit., p.196.

3 Heidegger, op.cit., p.385.

17. History

Heidegger pauses now to remind his readers that his overall aim in clarifying the structures of Dasein's existence is to gain a better view of Being. He introduces his chapter in Being and Time on historicality with the following words: "All our efforts in the existential analytic serve the one aim of finding a possibility of answering the question of the meaning of Being in general." He goes on to explain that the best means of access to the meaning of Being is Dasein's understanding of it. As a result, he says it is only after Dasein's nature has been "interpreted in a way which is sufficiently primordial" that the meaning of Being can come into focus.⁽¹⁾

Always Heidegger has sought to get at the basic, the "primordial", structures underlying Dasein's existence. He asks now if there might not be an even better way of grasping Dasein as a whole. To this point he has attempted to round off Dasein by focusing on its ending, death. However, this is only "one of the ends by which Dasein's totality is closed round." As well as an ending, there is a beginning and both of these are determinative factors in Dasein's makeup. To understand Dasein, then, we must see it in light of both ends.

We know from previous analyses that Dasein is an ecstatic standing out and stretching along a line. Dasein's

1 Ibid., p.424.

stretching along is, furthermore, done between these two ends. However, these ends are not simply events of the past and the future; instead they are vital factors in the makeup of the between. Heidegger explains that understood existentially, birth is not a factor relegated to the past, nor is death to be seen only as an event yet to come.

"Factical Dasein exists as born and, as born, it is already dying, in the sense of Being-towards-death."⁽¹⁾

Heidegger goes on to say that Dasein's stretching along between these ends is its "historizing" and this process is based on temporality. It is by virtue of this temporal base, which unites Dasein's existence as care, that there can be a sense of continuity, identity and self-constancy from beginning to end in Dasein's existence. To understand Dasein as it historizes, Heidegger says, is to understand the historicity of Dasein.⁽²⁾ We can see now how Heidegger is about to complete and fill out the picture of Dasein in its wholeness and in its unity.

Having established a preliminary working definition of history as historizing, Heidegger goes on to consider various other understandings of history and he summarizes all by saying that the common denominator in each is man as the "subject of events." If man alone is historical, as Heidegger implies, then what is the meaning of antique

1 Ibid., p.426.

2 Ibid., p.427.

pieces of equipment or entities in museums and collections which are commonly said to be of historical significance (e.g. the flag of a disbanded regiment and the bed of Mary Queen of Scots).

Indeed, how can such items be called historical when they still exist in the present. What is the difference between the flag or bed then and as they exist now. They are historical but not yet past. Heidegger says that what made these entities significant was not some trait of their own but rather their belonging to the world of a significant person or group of people. These historical items are important because once the goal of their useful or "for the purpose of" nature was a significant Dasein. Although the entities themselves continue, this world which belonged to a particular Being-in-the-world no longer exists and their significance, what made them historical, is in the past. Heidegger states: "We contend that what is primarily historical is Dasein. That which is secondarily historical, however, is what we encounter within-the-world..."⁽¹⁾

Heidegger entitles his next section "The Basic Constitution of Historicity" and here he analyses historicity in an attempt to show that it is based upon Dasein's underlying temporal structure. We might recall at this point how earlier in his primordial analysis

1 Ibid., p.433.

Heidegger revealed the temporal structure of Dasein through a consideration of anticipatory resoluteness which was grounded in the comprehensive existential, care. He will now stress the temporal basis of historicity by basing it in anticipatory resoluteness.

He reminds the reader that in anticipatory resoluteness, "...Dasein understands itself with regard to its potentiality-for-Being, and it does so in such a manner that it will go right under the eyes of death in order thus to take over in its thrownness that entity which it is itself..."⁽¹⁾ The question which has not been considered to this point is the "whence" or "where from" of the possibilities upon which Dasein projects in anticipatory resoluteness. Analysing authentic Being-towards-death and resoluteness only tells us how the Dasein deals with these possibilities, not from where they arise in the first place. In answering this question the analysis of historicity will be further "rounding out the picture" of Dasein's structure.

We need to remember that Dasein finds itself thrown into the world (facticity). This Being-in-the-world is the starting point behind which Heidegger does not go, as would be the case were he to look for a "thrower" God. However, Dasein can exist in this world either authentically or inauthentically. In resoluteness Dasein passes from

1 Ibid., p.434.

an inauthentic Being-in-the-world to an authentic Being-in-the-world in which for the first time it sees its possibilities in their correct perspective.

Heidegger answers the question about the whence of Dasein's possibilities by saying that they come from its taking over the world authentically in resoluteness. That which is taken over resolutely he terms heritage. Dasein's environment, into which it is thrown, becomes a heritage when it is accepted and confirmed as Dasein's own. "In one's coming back resolutely to one's thrownness, there is hidden a handing down to oneself of the possibilities that have come down to one..."⁽¹⁾

While the Dasein always has possibilities, it does not always have them authentically as its own possibilities. When it does have its possibilities authentically they become its heritage. As Ronald Grimsley explains, by accepting the possibilities inherited from the past, "... and by freely choosing to accept them as a being abandoned to facticity, I remove these possibilities from the sphere of accidental circumstance and imbue them with a genuine existential significance."⁽²⁾

Resoluteness is only complete and authentic as anticipatory resoluteness and this complete phenomenon is revealed in the way Dasein takes over its heritage, a

1 Ibid., p.435.

2 Grimsley, loc.cit.

process Heidegger calls fate. In Being-towards-death, Dasein resolutely takes over as its heritage that into which it is thrown with a keen awareness of its finitude. This awareness forces Dasein to choose selectively of the innumerable possibilities around it and to make the most of its "situation" (as Heidegger uses the term).

In authentically Being-towards-death Dasein is not a slave to its world and is not subject to the passing occurrences of everyday existence. Instead it resolutely creates a situation out of its Being-in-the-world. In Being and Time we read: "...fate. This is how we designate Dasein's primordial historizing, which lies in authentic resoluteness and in which Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has inherited and yet has chosen."⁽¹⁾

Heidegger goes on to say that fate is alone authentic historicity and that fate is only possible in an entity where death, guilt, conscience, freedom and finitude are constitutive factors.⁽²⁾ Since we can see all these phenomena in Dasein as anticipatory resoluteness, we see how historicity itself is possible in Dasein only on the basis of an underlying temporal structure. As the connection between temporality and historicity is somewhat involved, we might summarize by saying that

1 Heidegger, loc.cit.,

2 Ibid., p.437.

historicality is only authentic as fate. Fate is revealed as basically anticipatory resoluteness and anticipatory resoluteness has an underlying temporal structure. This temporal dimension is even more apparent if we realize that as anticipatory resoluteness, fate involves the future, anticipating or looking ahead towards death; the past, as thrown or abandoned Dasein; and the present, in resolutely creating a situation out of the entities Dasein is alongside of.⁽¹⁾

Heidegger expands his definition of historicality with the use of the term destiny, which refers to the fate of more than one Dasein. He states: "But if fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentially in Being-with-others, its historizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for it as destiny. This is how we designate the historizing of the community, of a people."⁽²⁾

Heidegger next moves into an analysis of a very important concept in the makeup of his definition of historicality. The term involved here, in German, is die Wiederholung and has been translated in various ways. The translators of Being and Time feel that for Heidegger it means neither "to fetch again" nor "to repeat" or "do over again." Instead "...it means rather an attempt to go back to the past and retrieve former possibilities,

1 Grimsley, op.cit., p.77.

2 Heidegger, op.cit., p.436.

which are thus explicitly handed down or transmitted."⁽¹⁾

On the other hand, John Macquarrie, in his book Martin Heidegger, agrees with W.J. Richardson's translation of this word as retrievable.¹ It "...is not just a mechanical reproducing, but rather a going into the past in such a way that one fetches back the possibility which it contains and makes present this possibility in our existence now."⁽²⁾

Richardson goes on to point out that Heidegger uses the word in several different ways, two of which are important to us. In a very general sense it refers to "handing over the self to the self." In a more specific sense it refers to an attempt to "...retrieve a potentiality-for-Being of a There-being that is gone, with such success that the full force of Being comes upon him as if out of his own future."⁽³⁾

Let us first consider the way Heidegger uses retrieve in its general sense as a basic part of the historizing process of Dasein. As we said before, Dasein resolutely takes over the world into which ^tit finds itself thrown, seizes this world and its possibilities anew and hands them back to itself, thereby making them its own in a new way. When this happens resoluteness "...then

1 Ibid., p.437.

2 Macquarrie, Martin Heidegger, p.38.

3 Richardson, op.cit., p.92.

becomes the repetition of a possibility of existence that has come down to us. Repeating is handing down explicitly - that is to say, going back into the possibilities of the Dasein that has-been-there."⁽¹⁾ Therefore historizing necessarily involves retrieve or repetition since in resoluteness Dasein becomes aware of its past as its heritage and seizes upon the possibilities of this Dasein that has been in such a way as to make them meaningful possibilities for its future and present.

Now we shall consider the second more specific way in which Heidegger uses the term retrieve. He has his own term also for the study of history seen as historicity. Historiology is the study of history (historicity), but not history as a once-for-all, completed, and dead past. As he says, "...historiology will disclose the quiet force of the possible with greater penetration the more simply and the more concretely having-been-in-the-world is understood in terms of its possibility, and only presented as such."⁽²⁾

Heidegger goes on to say that historiography is only possible because of Dasein's historicity. This also would mean that repetition or retrieve in Richardson's second sense is only possible because of repetition in the first sense. Were it not for the retrieving structure of the individual Dasein, as it retrieves its own having-been,

1 Heidegger, op.cit., p.437.

2 Ibid., p.446.

there would be no possibility of a Dasein retrieving the possibilities of other Daseins which have been.

Here again we find ourselves involved in a circular reasoning. We can recall how it is difficult to operate in the ontological-existential realm because of an unclear or unthematic awareness of Being on the ontic-existentiell level. Further, as we gain insights and thematize our awareness on the former level, this affects our existence on the ontic-existentiell level. Macquarrie points out that here again the hermeneutical circle is involved. "It is because we are ourselves historical in our being that we can take up the study of history; yet in so far as this study discloses to us what the possibilities of human existence are, we reach through it an enlarged self-understanding."⁽¹⁾

Perhaps Heidegger's greatest contribution in his understanding of history is his emphasis that history, as a study of the past, is not limited to a scholarly, objective exercise but also has important repercussions for the present and future. Certainly such an approach would make history seem more alive and attractive than does the usual understanding of historical studies. The key to how Heidegger evolves his definition of history as a living, vital process lies in his concepts "retrieve" and "possibilities."

1 Macquarrie, op.cit., p.37.

In an analysis which one commentator observes "may well become a classic in the philosophy of history,"
 (1) Heidegger explains that the real theme of history is neither brute fact nor "some generality that hovers over them." Instead, the real concern of history is the factually existent past possibility which:

...can never be repeated, i.e. historically understood authentically, as long as it is turned into the paleness of a super-temporal model. Only factually authentic historicity as resolute destiny can so reveal past history that in the repetition the force of the possible gets struck home into one's factual existence, which is to say will be allowed to affect its futurity. (2)

The common understanding of history Heidegger would consider inauthentic for two reasons. One is that often we mistake what is only historical in a secondary manner for what is truly historical. We saw before that only Dasein with its world is historical and all entities within that world can be said to be historical only on the basis of their receiving significance from a particular Dasein to which such entities might be related. Often this secondary type of historicity is considered the only type with the result that the Dasein which has been is viewed in an improper manner. (3)

The second reason for the inauthenticity of the common understanding of history is related by Gelven to

1 Langan, op.cit., pp.62-63.

2 Heidegger, op.cit., p.447.

3 Ibid., p.437.

the influence of das Man which always looks for false security in emphasizing brute facts as the sole concern of history. Such a view of history "...cannot in principle be significant. To be sure, facts can be learned...can be analysed scientifically. But that is not history, for history must be significant."⁽¹⁾

18. Conclusion to Dasein analysis

With our consideration of history we come to the end of the analyses in Being and Time. We have seen that this work is devoted to an in-depth consideration of Dasein. Nevertheless only a superficial reading of Being and Time would lead to it being considered the work of an existentialist. As stated in the introduction (see p.11) our purpose has been to show that Heidegger's analysis is motivated solely by ontological goals. Dasein was interrogated not as an end in itself, but only as it pointed towards Being. Indeed, the selection of Dasein as the subject for interrogation was made according to ontological criteria. Dasein's importance for Heidegger stems from its ontological nature.

We have followed Heidegger as he progressively exposed the ontological roots of Dasein in his fundamental ontology. We traced the development of his analysis from the preparatory, fundamental to the primordial stage, carefully scrutinizing "care" as the bridge between these

1 Gelven, op.cit., p.216.

two sections. We have seen his phenomenological method applied as he progressed from the everyday ontic to the ontological-existential level and then back again. Always his use of the circular method has brought his ontological-existential results back into their ontic-existentiell roots, not only to lend the former credibility but also to provide new insights into the meaning of phenomena on the latter level.

Throughout we have noted Heidegger's constant reminders of his ontological motive. His radical approach with its distinctive terminology strove, by its freshness and uniqueness, to burst the bonds of traditional ontology and to provide a pristine awareness of Being through its manifestation in Dasein the "ontological animal." There can be no doubt now as to his ontological intentions in analysing Dasein and we are justified in considering Being the sole object of his inquiry.

It is not surprising, in light of his comments concerning the need for a new terminology and frame of mind in philosophy, to find Heidegger abandoning Dasein as the sole concern of his ontological investigation in favour of such phenomena as language and thought. It is to his consideration of these that we turn next.

19. From the earlier to the later Heidegger

In moving from Being and Time to his analyses of language, thought and Being in itself, we are passing from what commentators call the earlier Heidegger to the later Heidegger. The position we are taking is that this refers only to a chronological development and not to separate distinct stages in Heidegger's thinking. As stated earlier, we are treating him as an ontologist who pursues his interest through the investigation of various fields. In this view there can be no question of distinct stages.

Nevertheless, because of the interest it has aroused, we should pause at this point to consider the debate concerning the earlier and later Heidegger, or some would even say, the two Heideggers. In this debate the earlier Heidegger is associated with the existential emphasis of Being and Time and the later Heidegger refers to his other attempts to open up the meaning of Being.

Basically the unity of Heidegger's thought has been assailed by two types of criticism. The first claims that the earlier Heidegger of Being and Time alone makes a significant contribution. For these critics the later Heidegger represents a falling away from and deterioration of the earlier systematic insights of Being and Time.

Marjorie Grene's appraisal of Heidegger's work is typical of such criticism. She acknowledges that the whole of his philosophy exhibits a superficial unity. However, she feels this unity breaks up under close scrutiny.

Between his earlier and later works, "...there is not only the difference in style; there is a very marked difference in calibre. The later work is thin, ill-organised, in part even humdrum and dull. Sein und Zeit, with all its weaknesses, has true philosophical powers."⁽¹⁾

The answer to such criticism can only be that the later Heidegger quite definitely develops out of and is grounded in the earlier Heidegger. A variety of commentators, as well as Heidegger himself, have noted that his later thinking is firmly guided by the insights of his earlier period, although these later thoughts are manifested in a different "garb." In the introduction to his book on Heidegger, Thomas Langan asserts that he will be able to show the consistency of "the whole range of Heidegger's thought," the necessity to understand his later works in light of his earlier insights and "...most importantly of all, that the basic program proposed in Sein und Zeit appears...in the pieces and patches of later essays."⁽²⁾

Similarly, Werner Marx feels that Heidegger's later works are firmly grounded in his earlier insights, that his "method" remains the same throughout his work, and that the problems and issues of Sein und Zeit continued to stimulate the later Heidegger. He stresses that even in

1 Grene, op.cit., p.117.

2 Langan, op.cit., p.7.

Being and Time, Heidegger realized the nature of man could only be clarified after the nature of "Being in general" was clarified. As a result, the focus of his later writings switched from an emphasis on the nature of man to the nature of Being. "But it seems to us that, in spite of this "turnabout", Heidegger in the later determinations had fallen back on the structures which he developed in Being and Time."⁽¹⁾

Heidegger himself stresses that his later works were striving always to develop the same issues as in Being and Time but from a different perspective. In the quote to follow, Heidegger notes that the work begun there would have to be continued in later works. At that time he referred to this later work with the title "Time and Being." However, he later realized that his earlier mode of thinking and language was insufficient and abandoned the approach designated by the rubric of Being and Time - "Time and Being" for a more suitable one. However this abandonment did not involve the basic subject matter itself.

He says:

The thinking of the turn is a change in my thought. However, this turn does not occur because of an alteration of standpoint or indeed an abandonment of the approach in Being and Time. The thinking of the turn resulted from the fact that I have remained with that which was considered in Being and Time, i.e. that I have questioned with regard

1 Marx, op.cit., pp.105-106.

to that which already in Being and Time was indicated by the title "Time and Being".(1)

The second type of criticism concerning the unity of Heidegger's thought focuses on the extent of the turn which separates the earlier and later periods. Several commentators refer to this turn as a radical about-face which results in a basic split of Heidegger's thinking. For these critics there are "two Heideggers", so to speak. Karl Löwith in Heidegger, Denker in Dürftiger Zeit refers to the turn as an umkehr (reversal) and Laszlo Versenyi labels it a "conversion."(2)

Such interpretations stem from a miscalculation of the extent of the change of emphasis from the earlier to the later Heidegger. Indeed, at one time, (from 1943-1949) it did appear that Heidegger was over-reacting to his earlier emphasis on Dasein and beings by concentrating too strongly on Being. Versenyi suggests that his opposition to the metaphysical preoccupation with beings to the exclusion of Being blinds him to the opposite danger for philosophy, "...the exclusive preoccupation with Being as such that fails to think of beings - human or other - and of Being as the Being of beings. And this oversight proves to be fatal for the last stage of his philosophy."(3)

1 Heidegger, Preface to Richardson's Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, p.xvii.

2 Karl Löwith, Heidegger, Denker in Dürftiger Zeit, (Frankfurt am Main: S.Fischer Verlag, 1953), p.1. and Versenyi, op.cit., p.165 and 185.

3 Versenyi, op.cit., p.167.

Such an opinion might be justified if expressed prior to 1949 when, as we shall see later in our consideration of Being as the "ontological difference," Heidegger changed a text expressing that Being can be without beings to Being can never be without beings. In this we will see his interest in the "Being of beings" and that with the consideration of the 'ontological difference' in his later thought Heidegger maintains the necessary balance between Being and beings, thereby avoiding any split or over-reacting in his thinking.

In this way we can refute any charges concerning a radical split and separation in his thinking. As André Malet notes, the study of Heidegger's later insights provides for a better understanding of his earlier concerns and this fact "...keeps us clear of the pitfall of treating his Sein und Zeit as an anthropology...Thus we spare ourselves the delusion that there are two Heideggers, one the man of Sein und Zeit and the other the man of more recent works."⁽¹⁾

Heidegger himself reflects on how closely the periods in his thinking are related by saying that a distinction can be made between his earlier and later works only if it is kept in mind that "...only by way of what Heidegger I has thought does one gain access to what is to-be-thought by Heidegger II. But the (thought of)

1 Malet, op.cit., p.326.

Heidegger I becomes possible only if it is contained in Heidegger II."⁽¹⁾

W.J. Richardson takes a position very similar to that taken in our approach. He suggests that the later Heidegger is able to "bring-to-expression" that which he "did not and could not say" in Being and Time. He sees the later Heidegger as a re-trieve of the earlier Heidegger. While the insights of the two periods are "not the same, they are one." In light of this, "...Heidegger I is a past which still-is-as-having-been which Heidegger II must recollect. Even for the contemporary Heidegger then Sein und Zeit must be considered as still in advent and still to be retrieved..."⁽²⁾

In keeping with Heidegger's own view as well as that of a substantial number of commentators (Macquarrie, Richardson, Malet, Ott, Marx, Langan and others), our position is that Heidegger is thoroughly consistent in his developing thought. The variety of his interests stem not from any inconsistency or "turns" on his part but from the nature of Being which manifests itself in various ways.

1 Heidegger, op.cit., p.xxii.

2 Richardson, op.cit., pp.625-626.

LANGUAGE ANALYSIS

CHAPTER TWO

Introduction

20. A preliminary view of Heidegger's language analysis

As indicated by his decision not to complete the work of which Being and Time was a portion, Heidegger abandoned his analysis of Dasein as the most important mode of access to Being. One of the principal reasons for this move was Heidegger's feeling that the language he was using to express his insights was too tradition-bound and not flexible enough to accommodate his radical insights. It is not surprising then to find him turning his attention even more exclusively to the phenomenon of language itself. Comments on this topic are to be found throughout his writings but his thoughts are expressed most comprehensively in the essays of On the Way to Language, a book on which we shall rely heavily.

Although not always obvious, the language problem was a constant factor in Heidegger's thoughts and works. This can be seen in the following conversation between Heidegger and a visiting professor. [The conversation is referring to a lecture course delivered by Heidegger in 1921, several years before the appearance of Being and Time]

(Visitor) Again and again it was said that your questions circled around the problem of language and Being. (Heidegger) In fact, this was not too difficult to discern, for as early as 1915, in the title of my dissertation "Duns Scotus"

Doctrine of Categories and Theory of Meaning", the two perspectives came into view: Doctrine of categories is the usual name of the discussion of the Being of beings: theory of meaning means the grammatica speculativa, the metaphysical reflection on language in its relation to Being ...I know only one thing...reflection on language, and on Being, has determined my path of thinking from early on... (1)

However, he does recognise that his concern with language in his earlier years was often indirect and certainly did not involve a concerted analysis of the phenomenon. Heidegger apparently feels that at that point he was being unconsciously guided toward an interest of which he was then only partially aware. He states, again in regard to an early lecture course, that the direction in which his thinking was moving was not then clear to him. "I knew only the most immediate short-range perspectives along that path, because they beckoned to me unceasingly, while the horizon shifted and darkened more than once."⁽²⁾ He does not hesitate to express disapproval of his own earlier thoughts on language. "...I had only an obscure if not confused intimation. Such youthful capers easily lead to doing injustice."⁽³⁾

It is also pertinent, in view of our concern for Heidegger's influence on theology, to note that he feels greatly indebted to his theological training for putting him onto the right track towards the language problem.

1 Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language, trans. by P.O. Hertz, (London: Harper and Row, 1971), pp.6-7.

2 Ibid., p.6.

3 Ibid., p.35.

In his study of hermeneutics, he was especially interested in the relation between the word of the Scriptures and the speculative thinking of theology. "This relation, between language and Being, was the same one, if you will, only it was veiled and inaccessible to me...Without this theological background I should never have come upon the path of thinking."⁽¹⁾

At this point, we should note some of the problems particular to an analysis of language as Heidegger sees them. These problems basically stem from two factors. The first is that most believe one cannot analyse language without lifting it from context. In this way the subject under consideration is immediately distorted. In a very real sense, this is like studying a fish by removing it from water. The fish can be analysed but not as it normally exists in its own habitat.

In his conversation with a visiting professor we find Heidegger touching on this point. "(Heidegger) Speaking about language turns language almost inevitably into an object. (Visitor) And then its reality vanishes. (Heidegger) We have then taken up a position above language, instead of hearing from it."⁽²⁾ In "The Way to Language" he stresses that any analysis of this phenomenon must avoid this "dead fish" pitfall. "In order to be who we are, we human beings remain committed to and within the

1 Ibid., pp.4-5.

2 Ibid., p.51.

being of language and can never step out of it and look at it from somewhere else."⁽¹⁾

The second factor which leads to problems in linguistic analyses is the result not of a human shortcoming but the nature of language itself. As we shall see later, Heidegger sees language as possessing man rather than vice versa and this situation means that problems encountered in studying language are to be seen as barriers erected by language itself. In "The Nature of Language" Heidegger stresses that the essential nature of language "refuses" to be expressed in words. Furthermore, such withholding is an important part of the nature of language. "Thus language not only holds back when we speak it in the accustomed ways, but this holding back is determined by the fact that language holds back its own origin and so denies its being to our usual notions."⁽²⁾

We should also note at this point that from which Heidegger distinguishes his own views of language. In reference to Aristotle's treatise "On Language," he rejects the interpretation of language as vocal signs of mental images.⁽³⁾ At another point he stresses that words and syntax are merely the "threshold" of language.⁽⁴⁾ He also expresses strong disapproval of any view which sees language

1 Ibid., p.134.

2 Ibid., p.81.

3 Ibid., p.97.

4 Heidegger, Existence and Being, p.31.

as a tool for or possession of man, e.g. as a means for giving information.⁽¹⁾

That these mistaken notions about language are so prevalent is ample evidence that the difficulties mentioned earlier have proven insurmountable barriers in most linguistic analyses. Although anticipating later considerations in which we shall see the close affinity between language and Being in Heidegger's thought, we should elaborate further on that trait of language which makes study of it so difficult. W.J. Richardson points out that in Heidegger's later thinking, language dominates and possesses man in such a way that it reveals and conceals its nature simultaneously. Even while man speaks, by virtue of a grant from language, the latter conceals and withholds its essential nature.

"The result is that language will seem to be at the disposition of there-being, when actually the reverse is true. There-being will seem to have invented language by itself when the fact is that it has discovered itself only in and with language..."⁽²⁾ Richardson also explains that it is because man is completely dominated by language as it withholds its nature that he is so susceptible to the tendency of understanding language inauthentically.⁽³⁾

1 Ibid., p.229.

2 Richardson, op.cit., p.293.

3 Ibid., p.610.

Fully aware of the problems involved in the study of language, we are now prepared to consider Heidegger's own understanding of language. Our purpose here will be to show how his basic interest and motivation continues to be ontological.

The Greek Understanding of Language

Section One

21. Logos

We begin by looking at a favourite Heideggerian ploy of substantiating his insights and studies with etymological analyses of important Greek words. Such tactics assume importance in light of his critics' charges that he fails to provide proper grounds and authoritative support for many of his results (Walter Kaufmann, in From Shakespeare to Existentialism, is especially critical of Heidegger on this point. ⁽¹⁾) The early Greek thinkers have a special fascination for Heidegger as he feels they were the first to become aware of the ontological problem. It was to the Greeks that Being originally manifested itself and in their experience alone is to be found a pristine awareness of it. All thought since their time represents a gradual deterioration roughly proportionate to the time separating later thinkers from their Greek predecessors.

This process also holds true in the translation of the Greek experience from their own tongue to other languages. In An Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger explains that the real meaning of the Greek language has been inevitably distorted in later translations. Further, this distortion "...is not accidental and harmless: it

1 Walter Kaufmann, From Shakespeare to Existentialism, (New York: Anchor Books, 1960), p.360.

marks the first stage in the process by which we cut ourselves off and alienated ourselves from the original essence of Greek philosophy."⁽¹⁾ In a very real sense the original Greek experience of Being was imprinted on and retained in the early Greek language.

As a result Heidegger naturally seeks to determine what the language originally meant for the Greeks, what they intended to say by various words, and thereby to "retrieve" the original experience wherein Being manifested itself. Furthermore, he hopes to be able not only to experience that which was comprehended by the Greeks but also any aspects of Being's manifestations which might have been neglected or overlooked by them. In "A Dialogue on Language" he asserts that contemporary thinking must strive to be more Greek than the Greeks in its outlook and must "...pursue more originally what the Greeks have thought, to see it in the source of its reality. To see it so is in its own way Greek and yet in respect of what it sees is no longer, is never again, Greek."⁽²⁾

For his analysis of language, Heidegger considers two Greek terms, legein and logos, which are normally associated with speaking and language. In Vorträge und Aufsätze we find in the essay entitled "Logos" that he seeks to establish the close relation he felt the Greeks

1 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.13.

2 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, p.39.

saw between language and Being. He asserts that Logos must be understood in terms of legein and begins his analysis by delving into the background of this term, or retrieving it.⁽¹⁾

By way of orientation let us look at his earlier work, An Introduction to Metaphysics, in which Heidegger explains that originally logos was not understood as word or discourse; instead its fundamental meaning, as well as that of legein, would best be translated as lesen, to gather, collect, or read. Thus, "...ein Buch lesen (to read a book) is only a variant of lesen in the strict sense, which is: to put one thing with another, to bring together, in short, to gather..."⁽²⁾

We should not be surprised now to find Heidegger offering a new, "retrieved" meaning for the term legein. He suggests that when the Greeks thought of speaking, the process or action they had in mind was not just a vocalization of sounds but rather a "letting-lie-forth" of whatever was spoken about. As he explains, "Discourse and speech are (or live) as (the process of) letting-lie-forth-in-togetherness everything which comes to presence (or comes into being) in (or through) being put into unconcealment."⁽³⁾

For the Greeks, to speak meant to bring something

1 Martin Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze, (Pfullingen: Gunther Neske, 1954), p.207.

2 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.124.

3 Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze, p.212.

forth into the open. And to name something meant to let an entity appear, or manifest itself. "The process of naming (onoma) is not the expressing of a word's meaning but is a letting-lie-forth in the light wherein an entity can take its stand and thereby have a name."⁽¹⁾ We should note that legein is not only a letting-lie-forth but also a letting-lie-forth-in-togetherness. Thus this process places something, not just in the open, but in a context within everything else that has been allowed to lie-forth. (Here we see shades of Dasein creating a "situation", or bringing some sort of authentic order into its world which would otherwise be inauthentically chaotic. Creating a "situation" and letting-lie-forth-in-togetherness are parallel phenomena.)

He next considers the term Logos. In considering several phrases written by Heraclitus, Heidegger suggests that the phrase hen-panta provides insight into what Logos meant for the Greeks for "both are the same."⁽²⁾ For Heidegger, then, Logos refers to a process whereby many or various beings are unified and gathered into the 'One'. Not surprisingly in Vorträge und Aufsätze he states: "The word Logos names that which gathers all (beings) into (Being) and thereby lets (them) lie forth..."⁽³⁾

In An Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger pursues his analysis of Logos in even more depth, considering more

1 Ibid., p.223.

2 Ibid., p.221.

3 Ibid., p.227.

fragments of Heraclitus as well as comments by other Greek thinkers. He examines the close connection between Phusis and Logos in the writing of Parmenides and Heraclitus and suggests that by the term Phusis the Greeks were referring to Being. "Logos is the steady gathering, the intrinsic togetherness of the essent i.e. being. Therefore in Fragment I (Heraclitus') kata ton logon means the same as kata physin. Phusis and logos are the same." (1)

We have now seen that legein is translated by Heidegger into a "letting-lie-forth-in-togetherness" while Logos implies a gathering together, a One in many as well as a letting-lie-forth. Furthermore, legein refers to a human process while Logos indicates a similar process on another level, the ontological. We are now ready to see the results of Heidegger's etymological "retrieving" of the nature of language. Based on the pristine awareness with which the Greeks thought, Heidegger believes that language, as saying, is the result of, is caused by, the experience of the manifestation of Being. As a result "...the relation between Being and saying...assaults thinking in such an overpowering manner that it announces itself in a single word logos...the name for Being and for saying." (2)

Being careful to restrict our consideration solely to insights gained from Heidegger's etymological endeavors, we can now see how language in the dimension touched on by

1 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.130.

2 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, p.80.

the term legein is most as it should be when corresponding to language on the level referred to by Logos, as it gathers together and lets-lie-forth. We have already noted that legein and Logos refer to similar processes on different levels so it is not difficult to see that Heidegger's etymological analyses tell us language occurs when language (legein) corresponds with a more fundamental language (the process referred to by Logos).

Language now becomes a process whereby man or Dasein in his speaking or language provides an avenue through which Being's more fundamental speaking or saying (Logos) may take place. The emphasis here has clearly shifted from Dasein to Being. This becomes apparent in W.J. Richardson's critique of Heidegger's insights into language. He explains that Dasein is the place, the "there", where the gathering-process of Logos happens; it must provide the place for this occurrence to fulfil its own nature. Dasein "...must lay-out (legein) the very same (homo) beings that Logos lets lie forth in the Open, and in the very same way. When this happens, the legein of the There as a gathering-point 'corresponds' (homologein) with the legein of the aboriginal Logos." In doing this, Dasein 'concurs' with the process of Logos and in this concurrence authentic language takes place.⁽¹⁾

Just as in fundamental ontology Dasein was the "ontological" animal and was only authentically itself when

1 Richardson, op.cit., pp.494-495.

open towards and transparent to Being, so now is man only completely man when, instead of being the clearing for Being, he is the voice of Being as Logos. Indeed, Heidegger now says that it should be logos which speaks, not man, since "Only where the logos discloses itself does the phonetic sound become a word."⁽¹⁾

1 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.132.

An Ontologist's View of Poetry

Section Two

22. Poetry and art

We turn now to a consideration of Heidegger's analysis of that which he defines as poetry. The discrepancy between his definition and the accepted definition of poetry results in a certain amount of confusion and unwarranted criticism from commentators. This is reflected in Paul Roubiczek's charge that Heidegger, unable to define Being clearly, quotes several lines from a poem by Hölderlin which "...by their beauty, awaken a strong feeling and thus cover up the emptiness of the actual definition...Reliance on poetry in philosophy... can easily be a way of hiding confusing, unwarranted or inconclusive assertions."⁽¹⁾

In order to clarify Heidegger's understanding of poetry we shall consider it in relation to art, language, thought and Being. As we shall see, poetry in this context represents a very basic process which is thoroughly ontological in nature. Support for this appraisal of Heidegger's interest in poetry can be found in Thomas Langan's assertion that for Heidegger, a poem is "...Being that has come to be in words." Therefore, the study of poetry will reveal "...something about the very dimension of Being's Lichtung." In this view, poetry is

1 Paul Roubiczek, Existentialism For and Against, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1964, p.132.

seen as "...the road of the historical-destiny of Being."⁽¹⁾

Let us now consider the relation between poetry and art to see what insight this will yield into Heidegger's understanding of poetry. In "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" he attempts to determine the essence of art by considering one particular art work, Van Gogh's painting of a peasant's pair of shoes. What can be learned from this painting, he asks?

From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the toilsome tread of the worker stares forth. In the stiffly rugged heaviness of the shoes there is the accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge through...the furrows of the field swept by a raw rain. On the leather lies the dampness and richness of the soil. Under the soles slides the loneliness of the field-path as evening falls...This equipment is pervaded by uncomplaining anxiety as to certainty of bread, the wordless joy of having once more withstood want, the trembling before the impending childbed and shivering at the surrounding menace of death. ⁽²⁾

All of this was revealed, not by the shoes themselves, nor by their context in the painting, which includes none of those references mentioned, but solely by the painting itself which "spoke...[and] let us know what shoes are in truth."⁽³⁾ We begin to see now that the essence of art is to reveal the truth of the world around us. In this particular painting the peasant's shoes were disclosed (or unconcealed) to us. How does this happen? Heidegger states: "In the work of art the truth of a being has set itself to work. 'To set' means here: to bring to

1 Langan, op.cit., pp.116-117.

2 Heidegger, Holzwege, pp.22-23.

3 Ibid., p.24.

a stand. A being, a pair of peasant shoes, comes in the work to stand in the light of its Being. The Being of the being comes into the steadiness of its shining." The nature of art then, is "...the truth of beings setting itself to work."⁽¹⁾

We need recall now the previous definition of truth as aletheia in which Being uncovers itself, reveals and manifests itself, thereby making truth possible. This process of unconcealment takes place in various ways, one of which is in the art work. Art, as "the truth of beings setting itself to work" is the result of a confrontation or clash between two movements coming from opposite directions. It is of the essence of Being to reveal or unconceal itself to man and it is by virtue of its being the Da, the place wherein this unconcealment occurs, that Dasein exists. On the other hand, Dasein's nature and existence is such that it can project itself outwards upon the surrounding world by seizing Being in its unconcealment.

It is when Dasein meets and grasps Being as it comes forth to Dasein that art occurs. The result of the clash is that Dasein can "set" or "bring to a stand" the Being of the beings around it in a work of art. As W.J. Richardson explains: "...Being advances unto the There [Dasein] which has been thrown-forth by Being itself and is met by the project of There-being which forces it into

1 Ibid.

disclosure as the given work of art."⁽¹⁾

This process of setting up, or making to stand out, the truth of some entity is called poetizing by Heidegger and "all art, as the letting-happen of the arrival of the truth of beings is, as such, essentially poetry."⁽²⁾ Poetry understood in this sense is certainly a broader and more inclusive phenomenon than what is normally described as poetry and not surprisingly, Heidegger designates as poesy that which is normally considered poetry. He goes on to explain that poesy, like painting, sculpture and architecture, "is only one mode of the lighting projection of truth, i.e. of poetic composition in the wider sense."⁽³⁾

By clarifying the relation of art and poetry we have been able to better understand just how basic a process poetry is for Heidegger. Although it means anticipating a later analysis in which Being is defined as aletheia, we can also see that this relation clearly establishes the ontological nature of poetry in the following Heideggerian statement: "The nature of art is poetry. The nature of poetry, in turn, is the founding of truth."⁽⁴⁾

23. Poetry and language

We turn next to the relation between poetry and

1 Richardson, op.cit., p.409.

2 Heidegger, op.cit., p.59.

3 Ibid., p.60.

4 Ibid., p.61.

language; the insights gathered from this analysis will further clarify Heidegger's understanding of poetry. In "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry", he explains that as "the inaugural naming of Being and of the essence of all things", poetry first brings into the open all that with which everyday language deals. Not only does poetry thus make language possible, but it also happens that now"...the essence of language must be understood through the essence of poetry."⁽¹⁾

In this we can see Heidegger using the term language in a dual sense. The term refers not only to the everyday understanding of language but also to a far more basic phenomenon which is closely associated with that process indicated by the term poetry. As was the case with poetry and poesy then, language has a dual significance. The close association of essential language and poetry in their Heideggerian context can be seen in his assertion that the essence of language could only have arisen from man's experience of, or departure into, Being. "In this departure language was Being embodied in the word: poetry. Language is the most profound poetry in which a people speaks Being."⁽²⁾ Because of this close association, we will be able to understand better the term poetry by clarifying what Heidegger means by essential language.

In his article "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes", Heidegger explains that, in its essential form, language

1 Heidegger, Existence and Being, p.307.

2 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, pp.171-172.

"...by naming beings for the first time, first brings beings to word and to appearance. This naming first appoints beings to their Being..." He goes on to explain how in this naming, "unconcealedness submits and infuses itself into what is as such."⁽¹⁾ In its essential form, then, language is another term for the concept Being in that it performs the same function as Being (aletheia) which, as we shall see later, refers to the unconcealing of beings and the bringing of them into Being. Therefore, by virtue of its close relation to language, poetry is also another term for this basic function performed by Being.

The ontological nature of poetry as defined by Heidegger is coming clearly into focus. However, in light of his unusual definition of poetry, how does Heidegger justify his interest in poetry as it is normally defined (or what he calls poesy)? Heidegger prefers poesy as a prime object for ontological analysis because it alone, of all the various modes of poetry (sculpture, painting, etc.), employs language which, as we have established, is closely related to poetry through a mutual relationship to Being as aletheia.

In "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" he says: "...since language is the happening in which for man beings first disclose themselves to him...poesy - or poetry in the narrower sense - is the most original form of poetry in

1 Heidegger, Holzwege, p.60.

the essential sense."⁽¹⁾ As W.J. Richardson explains, it "is only because language as such is the primordial poetizing that poesy, which uses language as its medium, enjoys a primacy among other forms of art..."⁽²⁾

24. Poetry and thought

Having seen poetry in its relation to art and language, we shall now consider the relation between poetry and thought in Heidegger's works. We shall see that the two are basically alike although there are several important differences. In Was Ist Das - Die Philosophie? we read: "There holds sway between both thought and poetry a hidden relationship but, because they are both dedicated to the service of language, there is also a gulf between the two, for they 'dwell on most widely separated mountains'."⁽³⁾

Similarly, in "What is Metaphysics?: Postscript" Heidegger further clarifies the relation of poetry and thinking. Both are alike in their "care of the word", but "...since like is like only insofar as difference allows...the two things are at the same time at opposite poles in their essence. The thinker utters Being. The poet names what is holy."⁽⁴⁾

We shall consider first how and to what extent

1 Ibid., p.61.

2 Richardson, op.cit., p.410.

3 Martin Heidegger, Was Ist Das - Die Philosophie?, (London: Vision Press, 1958), p.94.

4 Heidegger, Existence and Being, p.391.

these two are different. Why do the poet and thinker "dwell on most widely separated mountains?" The clue seems to lie in the object of their concern, the Holy and Being. Heidegger's use of the term Holy is certainly obscure and what he intends to convey by this word can only be learned from its application in context. [This obscurity is not lost on Heidegger's critics either, be they sympathetic or not. Thomas Langan, in The Meaning of Heidegger, offers an explanation of this term radically different from W.J. Richardson's.⁽¹⁾ The latter's book generally seems to offer a more comprehensive appraisal of Heidegger's thought than the former so we shall follow in the same general direction Richardson takes on this topic.]

Richardson turns to another of Heidegger's works for help in comprehending the meaning of Holy in the latter's thought. In "Brief Über Den Humanismus" he points to Heidegger's saying that the "...truth of Being first allows itself to be thought out of the essence of the Holy."⁽²⁾ Being - aletheia refers to the process in which Being simultaneously reveals and conceals itself and Richardson feels that the Holy which is named by the poet is Being insofar as it reveals itself. As a result, the poet's task is to name Being in its positive aspect, as unconcealing and as the Holy, while the thinker's interest is Being in

1 Langan, op.cit., p.115.

2 Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken, (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1967), pp.181-182.

its negativity or as concealed.⁽¹⁾ The point here is to realize that Holy and Being are basically names for the same concept, although they name different aspects of it. Hence, the mountains upon which the thinker and poet dwell should certainly not be seen as too far apart.

Let us turn now to those places where Heidegger stresses the similarity between thinking and poetry. In Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens, he makes the following comment: "Singing and thinking are the neighbourly stems out of poetry."⁽²⁾ As branches of the same tree, the basic unity of singing (or poetry) and thinking is undeniable even though each plays a distinctive role (or constitutes a different branch).

In his essay "Remembrance of the Poet" Heidegger speaks of the poet as the one who first brings Being (as the most Joyous and the Serene) before the eyes of all his fellow men. Gradually a few of these, the "deliberating" or "careful" ones, will become more aware of Being than before and these come to have a special relation to the poet.

Because they think of that which is written of in the poem, they are directed with the singer's care towards the mystery of the reserving proximity [Being]. Through this single turning towards the same object the careful hearers are related with the care of the speaker, the others are the kindred of the poet.⁽³⁾

The thinkers, or deliberating ones, are kin to the poet in that they preserve the experience which the poet

1 Richardson, op.cit., p.545.

2 Martin Heidegger, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens, (Pfullingen: Gunther Neske, 1954), p.25.

3 Heidegger, Existence and Being, pp.287-288.

captures in words. The need for this preserving of the poet's original experience which is captured in his words stems from the tendency of language to become care-worn and faded through constant use. "Therefore the poet turns to the others, so that their remembrance may help towards an understanding of the poetic word..."⁽¹⁾ The poet and thinker are thus closely related by their kindred concern for the finite manifestation of Being in language. Thus it can be said that in poetry, the poet first brings Being into words or language while the philosopher follows in his footsteps and through the poet's words experiences Being's unconcealment and is thereby able to clarify "thermatically" this elemental power in existence. Because of their mutual concern, then, the poet and thinker are "ever structured in their kinship."⁽²⁾

We can now see that in Heidegger's works essential thought and essential poetizing as well as essential language are so closely related to the finite revelation of Being as aletheia that they become almost one in their subservience to Being. Having established the relation of poetry to art, language, poesy, and thought we have a much fuller understanding of Heidegger's ontologically motivated approach to poetry.

25. Poetry and Being

In conclusion we shall focus our attention on the

1 Ibid., p.289.

2 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, pp.155-156.

direct relation between poetry and Being in Heidegger's approach. In his essay on art, Heidegger states: "What poetry...unfolds of unconcealedness...is the Open which poetry lets happen and indeed in such a way that, for the first time, in the midst of beings, the Open brings beings to light..."⁽¹⁾ If poetry provides the opening through which Being, as the Open, can light up the world and give entities their Being, then certainly poetry provides the occasion in which thinkers can be confronted by Being. Therefore Heidegger's interest in poetry can easily be seen as ontologically motivated. By focusing on one particular instance of Heidegger's analysis of poetry we shall see: one, that his aim here is strikingly similar to his earlier endeavours in Being and Time which we have already seen as thoroughly ontological, and two, that Being actually does reveal something of itself in poetry (poesy).

As for the first, in "Remembrance of the Poet" Heidegger analyses Hölderlin's "Homecoming to Kindred Ones." Briefly he sees the poem as telling of how the poet, growing up in his homeland, has dwelled near the "Source" (Being) all his life without recognizing it as the Source. Yearning for proximity to the Source, the poet leaves his homeland and journeys to distant places. Only in his journey does he come to realize that the Source is not distant from his homeland. "That which thou seekest is near, and already coming to meet thee."⁽²⁾ (a line from Hölderlin's poem).

1 Heidegger, Holzwege, p.60.

2 Heidegger, Existence and Being, p.279.

The poet returns in a joyous homecoming and is able to dwell near the Source, now recognizing it as the Source. However, the journey was essential for this clearer perception since without it the poet would never have achieved this recognition. It is only as a returning wanderer that the poet could "...experience what the nature of the Sought-For might be, and then be able to come back more experienced, as the Seeker."⁽¹⁾

Indeed, the similarity is striking between the maturation of the poet and the process by which Dasein is able to open itself up to Being. In everydayness Dasein exists with an unthematic awareness of the Being all around in the beings of its world. It lives inauthentically absorbed in beings, thereby too distracted for any awareness of Being, (unable to see the wood for the trees.) However, in dread Dasein is held out into nothingness, its world slips away and for the first time Being comes to the fore. Now Dasein returns to its world but lives authentically in it, aware of the Being all around it. Here too is a journey from the homeland (inauthentic Being-in-the-world) to a distant land (nothingness) and then back to the homeland (authentic Being-in-the-world). Heidegger's aims and motives have not changed. He is still rooted in an ontological quest.

As for the second purpose in considering this essay, we find Heidegger learning a great deal about Being as he

1 Ibid.

"listens" to the poem. We might also say that we are not attempting to defend or criticise Heidegger's method of interpretation, we are only interested in showing that his interests and findings in the study of poetry are ontological. We see throughout the essay that Being always has the initiative in its unconcealment. This can be seen in the line from the poem that says: "That which thou seekest is near, and already coming to meet thee." It is a question then of Being coming to the poet, and not a process of the poet searching out and seizing Being. "The now dominating proximity makes the Near be near and yet at the same time makes it the sought-after and therefore not near."⁽¹⁾

The fact that the poet in his early years fails to recognize the Source for what it is results not so much from his own blindness as from Being's natural mode of revelation, concealing and revealing simultaneously. As Heidegger says: "In the essence of proximity a clandestine process of reservation takes place. The fact that proximity to the Most Joyous reserves the Near, is the mystery of proximity."⁽²⁾ Thus the mature poet knows that "...we never get to know the mystery by unveiling or analysing it, we only get to know it by carefully guarding the mystery as mystery."⁽³⁾ To yield to Being's revelation does not mean to name Being itself, for "...Holy names are lacking." (from

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid., p.280.

3 Ibid., p.279.

the poem). Instead, the poet learns to guard Being in its mystery and to make others aware of the mystery as the mystery.

We have seen now that Heidegger's interest in poetry does not represent an about-face from the earlier concerns of Being and Time but that he continues to be thoroughly ontologically oriented. We have seen a slight shift of initiative with the result that Being itself has become the dominant partner in the Being-man relationship. One result of this shift which becomes more explicit in Heidegger's later essays on poetry is especially relevant for our theological orientation. Because it is always the same Source (Being) to which the poet harkens in his poems, all his works will have a certain unity due to their underlying Source. The greater the poet and the more sensitive he is to this Source, the greater will be the compactness and unity in his poems.

In his essay "Language in the Poem" Heidegger states: "Every great poet creates his poetry out of one single poetic statement only. ...The poet's statement remains unspoken. None of his individual poems, nor their totality, says it all. Nonetheless, every poem speaks from the whole of the one single statement, and in each instance says that statement."⁽¹⁾ The result is that to understand the one Poem or poetic statement of the poet, one must consider each of his poems. Having grasped to a greater or lesser degree the one Poem,

1 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, p.160.

one then returns to the individual poems to find new meaning in them. The process progressively repeats itself.

This completes our analysis of Heidegger's views on poetry in which we have determined his definition of poetry by seeing it in relation to art, language, poesy, thought and Being. Throughout we have carefully noted his ontological concern.

Language and Being

Section Three

To this point we have considered Heidegger's analysis of language in its relation to poetry and to the Greek understanding and use of language. We shall now consider Heidegger's views on language as language, and again stress the ontological motif running throughout his linguistic concerns. That an ontological awareness is important for the study and use of language can be seen in his belief that currently language is misunderstood in its nature, "worn out and used up"; the reason for this being "...the destroyed relation to Being as such."⁽¹⁾

26. Essential language as Saying

We begin then with the essence of language which Heidegger defines as "Saying", Sagen. He explains that poetry and thinking are actually modes of saying and that in this concept can be seen the essential nature of language. "'To say', related to the Old Norse saga, means to show, to make appear, set free, that is to offer and extend what we call world, lighting and concealing it. This lighting and hiding proffer of the world is the essential Being of Saying."⁽²⁾ Thus we can see that essential thinking, poetizing in its basic sense, and language in its essence

1 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.51.

2 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, p.93.

are practically one in their functions of letting Being manifest itself.

As he has done with other terms Heidegger uses language in a way that differs from its ordinary meaning. Saying as speaking is not what he has in mind when he speaks of essential language. "To say and to speak are not identical. A man may speak, speak endlessly, and all the time say nothing. Another man may remain silent, not speak at all and yet, without speaking, say a great deal."⁽¹⁾ We shall gain insight into what Heidegger means by this term through considering essential language, or saying, as showing, as listening, and as Appropriation.

Heidegger arrives at his definition of saying as showing by pointing out that speaking to someone often means "showing" something to them.⁽²⁾ Of saying as listening he says:

It is the custom to put speaking and listening in opposition: one man speaks, the other listens. But listening accompanies and surrounds not only speaking such as takes place in conversation. The simultaneousness of speaking and listening has a larger meaning. Speaking is of itself a listening. Speaking is listening to the language which we speak. Thus, it is a listening not while but before we are speaking. ⁽³⁾ [Heidegger is using speaking here as an authentic mode of saying.]

To what does one listen before speaking? To language speaking, Heidegger asserts. This results from the fact that,

1 Ibid., p.122.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., p.123.

for him, it is more accurate to say language speaks, rather than man speaks. As opposed to the accepted view that man uses language, Heidegger suggests that language uses man, it "...puts man to use for its own sake." Furthermore, it is only as the tool for language that man can exist authentically.⁽¹⁾ Now we can better see how he describes saying or speaking as a listening. Man listens to the voice of language which will then be expressed through his own speaking.

Here we see Heidegger closely associating language and Being. Indeed it now appears that language is one more term for Being in one of its many aspects. Just as Being gives entities their Being by lighting them up, making them appear as present, so too does language "show" entities for what they are. Consider Heidegger's words on language as showing: "Language speaks in that it, as showing, reaching into all regions or presences, summons them from whatever is present to appear and to fade."⁽²⁾ [Notice also the parallel between appearing-fading and Being's revelation as a revealing-concealing process.]

John Macquarrie makes the observation of language in Heidegger's later thought that it "...increasingly takes over the character and functions once assigned to Being

1 Versenyi, op.cit., pp.133-134.

2 Heidegger, op.cit., p.124.

itself."⁽¹⁾ W.J. Richardson reinforces this comment when he notes Heidegger's belief that the everyday understanding of language is the result of Being's negativity as it withdraws itself. Authentic language is now seen as the result of Language (Being) showing itself while everyday language results from Language (Being) withdrawing itself from man.⁽²⁾ We should also note that Language (as Being) clearly has the initiative over man who is now seen as a message bearer, or perhaps loudspeaker, for Language as it speaks (shows).

We need to consider how the Saying of Language becomes the speaking of man. To indicate this process, Heidegger uses the term Appropriation. Man is "...made appropriate for Saying" and this "...releases human nature into its own, but only in order that man as he who speaks, that is he who says, may encounter and answer Saying..."⁽³⁾ Thus "Appropriation appropriates man to its own usage... and...is the way-making for Saying to come into language."⁽⁴⁾ We have now defined language as Saying through a consideration of language as showing, listening, and appropriation. We have also established how language becomes another term for the process normally referred to as Being.

1 John Macquarrie, Existentialism, (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1972), p.115.

2 Richardson, op.cit., p.610.

3 Heidegger, op.cit., p.129.

4 Ibid., p.130.

27. Language as another term for Being

Heidegger's ontological emphasis comes out also in the essays "The Nature of Language" and "Words" in which he contemplates the following line from a poem by Stefan George: "When word breaks off no thing may be." He interprets it very literally. He defines "thing" as anything which has Being and says that the word is "...what brings that given thing, as the being that is, into this "is"....the word is what holds the thing there and relates it and so to speak provides its maintenance with which to be a thing."⁽¹⁾ In a very real sense the word gives a being its Being and Heidegger calls this process "bethinging".⁽²⁾

In Heidegger's insistence that there can be true speaking and hearing only if they are directed in advance toward Being, the Logos, and in his assertion that only "where the logos discloses itself does the phonetic sound become a word",⁽³⁾ we can see how language is used in reference to one aspect or function of Being. He goes on to stress the importance of a comprehension of Being, however vague or "unthematic", for the very possibility of language by saying that if there were no awareness or understanding of Being at all, it would not mean merely the loss of a noun and a verb in our vocabulary. Instead, there "would be no language at all."⁽⁴⁾

1 Ibid., p.82.

2 Ibid., p.151.

3 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.132.

4 Ibid., p.82.

Having established the close association between Being and language in Heidegger's works, we are now ready to consider his well known phrase, "Language is the house of Being." In his "Brief Über den Humanismus" he says:

Thinking fulfills the relation of Being to the essence of man...[since] in thinking Being comes to language. Language is the house of Being. Man lives in the house of language. Thinking and poetry are the guardians of this house. Their watchfulness is the fulfillment of the manifestness of Being, insofar as they bring it to language through their language and preserve it in language.(1)

We can see here two things. The first is that Heidegger sees the relation of Being, thought, and language in a new perspective and the second is that he assigns language a most important role in the ontological make-up of all entities including Dasein. As for the first, Heidegger reverses our normal consideration of language as subservient to thought. According to him, most think of a process in which the mind formulates a thought and then utilizes language to reproduce and express it. Here priority definitely lies with thinking.

However, Heidegger stands in sharp disagreement with this view. In actual fact, he claims that Being comes to fruition in thought after having passed through language and therefore language is the more important of the two. For him it is only when man speaks that he thinks and not the other way around as is commonly thought.(2) As a result,

1 Heidegger, Wegmarken, p.145.

2 Martin Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, trans. by J.C. Churchill (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1954), p.16.

"thinking...stands in service to language."⁽¹⁾

As for the second implication of Heidegger's phrase, "Language is the house of Being", we need to realize that he is here making an extremely radical assertion. This comment is made by way of prefacing what is to follow since it often happens that when one hears a radically new viewpoint, there is a natural tendency to level it off by fitting it forcefully into the usual perspective, thereby depriving it of its essential force. In "The Nature of Language" we find: "The Being of anything that is, resides in the word. Therefore this statement holds true: Language is the house of Being."⁽²⁾

The Being of an entity resides not in that entity itself but in the word for it. In W.J. Richardson's opinion, by this statement Heidegger means that "...since Being makes beings accessible, we cannot gain access to beings except by passing through the house of language. Being "dwells" in the words by which beings are named..."⁽³⁾

We can now say that Heidegger is identifying language and Being and that it has become indispensable for an analysis of his insights into the nature of language to understand his views on Being. We have already noted this to some extent

1 Heidegger, Was Ist Das Die-Philosophie?, p.92.

2 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, p.63.

3 Richardson, op.cit., p.528.

in seeing that the everyday understanding of language is the result of Being in its negativity (withdrawal). We saw it also as we came to understand language as "showing" and in its relation to Being as bringing to presence or lighting up. Also we have seen that we cannot understand his analysis of poetry without some grasp of the Being process, e.g., Mystery is Being in its negativity.

28. Heidegger's hermeneutics

We shall conclude our consideration of Heidegger's approach to language by tracing the evolution of hermeneutics in his thinking. As we noted in the discussion on Being and Time, hermeneutics there referred to the interpretation of Dasein and its structures of existence which led in turn to a clarification of Being. However, this approach proved inadequate due to the failure of traditional language to express his intentions.

As a result his hermeneutical understanding became more and more historical in the sense that he focused on Being's manifestations to great thinkers and poets. We have already noted this approach in his interest in Hölderlin's poetry and the various Greek philosophers. With this development Heidegger's approach became more like hermeneutics as it is normally defined in that he was interpreting literary works instead of existential structures.

However, he interpreted such works in a very distinctive manner. Rather than concentrating on the written lines, his interest was more in the subject matter

"between the lines" so to speak. In What Is Called Thinking? he explains that every interpretation is a dialogue with the "saying" in any work and such dialogue demands involvement both in what is said and in the "unspoken", or that which is revealed 'between the lines'.⁽¹⁾

James Robinson explains Heidegger's distinctive approach to hermeneutics by saying that the interpreter, rather than presenting a technically correct exegesis of the text, should instead approach it as a means of access to the underlying subject matter about which the text speaks. The issue in interpretation is not related to the exegesis - eisegesis question but concerns the interpreter's ability to become involved in the matter which called forth the language of the text.⁽²⁾

Although this approach moves away from that of Being and Time due to the different subject matter for interpretation, both are characterized by a certain amount of passivity on the part of the interpreter. In a phenomenological interpretation, the phenomena are allowed to reveal themselves as they are, rather than being forced into the framework of some preconceived plan. By the same token, his later, more historical, approach involves a hearing of

1 Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, p.178.

2 James Robinson, "The German Discussion", The Later Heidegger and Theology, ed. by J. Robinson and J.B. Cobb, (London: Harper and Row, 1963), p.51.

Being's call to the interpreter through the text.

This passivity becomes even more predominant in the final development of hermeneutics in Heidegger's thinking. Now the interpreter becomes the "mouthpiece" or the messenger for the text. In "A Dialogue on Language" we find the source for this latest insight into hermeneutics. There he relates hermeneutics to the Greek noun hermeneus, which in turn stems from the name of the Greek god Hermes, the divine messenger who brings the "message of destiny." Hermeneus now refers to an exposition which not only interprets but also involves a more passive hearing of messages and tidings from the gods (or Being). The real importance of this process is now seen as 'bringing out the Being of beings.'⁽¹⁾

We can see here that the interpreter is now completely subservient to the call of Being and his primary duty is to give expression to this manifestation of Being through his own language. Another important consequence of this new development is that hermeneutics is no longer confined to the interpretation of texts. W.J. Richardson notes that hermeneutics now means "the entire effort to let Being be manifest..."⁽²⁾

In light of what we have already seen about how broadly he defines poetry (as opposed to poesy), it is not

1 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, pp.29,30.

2 Richardson, op.cit., p.631.

difficult to see how Heidegger can consider painting, sculpture and other subject matter as objects for interpretation. As it is now defined, hermeneutics refers to the whole of Heidegger's philosophical endeavour in its ranging from Dasein to Poetry, other thinkers, and thought itself in an attempt to let Being manifest itself.

This concludes our analysis of Heidegger's views on language in which we have considered his interpretation of the early Greek philosophers' views on language, his interest in poetry, his understanding of language as a term for Being, and his hermeneutics. We have established conclusively that his interest in language is ontological and we can now see how he considers language to be one mode of access to Being just as Dasein was in Being and Time. While the object to be interrogated has changed from Dasein to language, the subject of his investigation remains unchanged, Being.

ANALYSIS OF THE THOUGHT PROCESS

CHAPTER THREE

Introduction

29. A preliminary view of Heidegger's analysis of thought

We turn now to the nature of thought as understood by Heidegger. Thinking for him is not just one of several activities in which man can engage but is the activity of man which determines his unique character. As James Robinson states: "If man is the being where Being itself dawns on the beings, then this basic clearing of Being, which constitutes man's nature, is synonymous with thinking about Being. Thus the act most fundamentally related to man's nature is the act of thinking."⁽¹⁾

To understand the nature of thinking then is of vital importance in understanding the nature of man himself. Heidegger even goes so far as to say that man's failure to understand and "perform" thinking is more of a threat to humanity than the all too possible outbreak of nuclear war. In Discourse on Thinking he explains that the great danger in our age is not nuclear energy but the possibility that the technological revolution, with its emphasis on "calculative thinking", might breed indifference toward essential, meditative thinking. "Then man would have denied and thrown away his own special nature - that he is

1 Robinson, op.cit., pp.43-44.

a meditative being. Therefore, the issue is the saving of man's essential nature."⁽¹⁾

Not unexpectedly, Heidegger's views on thinking are radically different from those commonly accepted. Because of his radical approach, we need to "ease" into our analysis of his thoughts, being careful not to consider too much too quickly. (This might be compared to "easing" into the cold water when one goes swimming. To enter the water gradually at first lessens the shock of immersion later. In this way, one feels "at home" or comfortable in the water much quicker.) We shall "ease" into his views first by a glance at the general structure of Heidegger's thinking about thinking and then by a consideration of what essential, or authentic, thinking is not.

Heidegger's mode of thinking is often characterized as a path or trail. To understand the path, one must walk it. Furthermore, some of the paths might dwindle down into dead ends, necessitating a retracing of one's steps. One learns of this only by trying the path, however. In walking these paths, there can be no question of forsaking or rejecting one for another; each must be tried. By way of illustration we can say that the earlier path experienced in Being and Time is not rejected in Heidegger's later thinking, even though he no longer walks

1 Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, trans. by J.M. Anderson and E.H. Freund, (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1966), pp.55-56.

it exactly as before. In a later essay he says that his position in Being and Time was merely a 'way-station' (or one point along an ever changing way or Weg). That he moved beyond that particular point in his thinking does not indicate a denial of its validity but is simply due to an allegiance to the more important 'way' itself; for the "lasting element in thinking is the way upon which one can move backward and forward." ("only the way back will lead us forward.")⁽¹⁾

Indeed, it is quite possible to say that his later thoughts are merely re-hashing from a new perspective the insights expressed in Being and Time. The themes remain the same throughout his career, Dasein, Being, beings, language, thinking, hermeneutics, truth, existence and others. It is then quite permissible to say that Heidegger in his later thinking is re-tracing the paths of his earlier thoughts.

The important point here is to realize that we can only understand thinking by being involved in it. In What Is Called Thinking? Heidegger states: "Thinking itself is a way. We respond to the way only by remaining underway... Only when we walk it and in no other fashion, only, that is, by thoughtful questioning, are we on the move on the way."⁽²⁾

We can also "ease" into Heidegger's views on thinking by considering what he terms inauthentic or non-essential

1 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, p.12.

2 Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, pp.168-169.

modes of thinking. As he says, it is important to realize and identify such types of thinking in order to avoid the pitfalls thereof. "Especially we moderns can learn only if we unlearn at the same time. Applied to the matter before us: We can learn thinking only if we radically unlearn what thinking has been traditionally."⁽¹⁾

Basically Heidegger sees inauthentic thought dominating metaphysics as well as what he calls scientific-technological-calculative thinking. The latter would be the predominant type of thinking in the modern world. As we shall see, the theme running throughout all his criticisms is that thinking is so preoccupied with beings, or entities, that it fails to be aware of Being. In regard to the common mode of thinking in metaphysics, he states in his essay "The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics" that, despite its claims to do so, metaphysics fails to ask the question of Being because "...it thinks of Being only by representing beings as beings." From its beginning to its completion, the propositions of metaphysics have been strangely involved in a persistent confusion of beings and Being. Because of this flaw, he portrays metaphysics as an actual barrier to man's awareness of Being.⁽²⁾

He is also very critical of scientific-calculative-

1 Ibid., p.8.

2 Heidegger, "The Way Back Into the Ground of Metaphysics", Contemporary Philosophic Problems, pp.313-314.

technological thinking. At one point he makes the rather blunt statement that "Science does not think."⁽¹⁾ He further claims that science does not seek "truth in itself." Instead, it seeks to objectivize and dominate the beings with which it deals and by concentrating on beings, overlooks Being entirely.⁽²⁾

In non-essential thought, then, Being is completely overlooked since the thinker deals solely with the beings of his environment. He is particularly insensitive to the unconcealing of Being since his thinking involves an aggressive attempt to dominate and control everything in his world. The result is that any factor which does not conform to his scheme is ruled out as un-real. Not surprisingly, such thinking can be characterized as an "attack upon reality" which completely closes the door to any revelation of Being.⁽³⁾

We should note that inauthentic thought is so entrenched, and indeed inevitable, because of the very structure of thinking itself. (We can recall a parallel phenomenon in the inherent tendency of inauthentic immersion in the world to grow out of Dasein's structure as Being-in-the world.) In Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens Heidegger says: "The evil and therefore sharpest danger is thinking itself. It must think against itself, which it only seldom does."⁽⁴⁾

1 Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, p.8.

2 Heidegger, Existence and Being, p.318.

3 Robinson, op.cit., pp.28-29.

4 Heidegger, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens, p.15.

W.J. Richardson explains that thinking must think against itself because the nature of thought involves a "drag" toward inessential thinking. This "drag" results from the necessity of thinking Being only as it is revealed through beings. Hence, thinking must always resist its inherent tendency to become bogged down in beings.⁽¹⁾

This completes our introduction to Heidegger's views on the nature of thinking in which we have glanced at the general structure of his thinking about thinking and considered his views on the nature of inauthentic thinking.

1 Richardson, op.cit., p.556.

The Earlier Heidegger and Essential Thought

Section One

We turn now to a consideration of Heidegger's understanding of essential or authentic thinking. Our analysis will correspond generally to the chronological development of Heidegger's views. His thinking about thinking developed such that Being became more and more dominant in the thought process. In his earlier writings, which we shall consider first, man or Dasein holds the initiative in this process. However, this gradually evolves into a later position in which Being itself is the dominant factor.

Here also we shall see that an understanding of Heidegger's views on Being is essential for grasping his thinking about thinking, which itself is ontologically oriented. As was the case with his analyses of language, Heidegger's interest in the nature of thinking only became apparent after his interest in fundamental ontology waned. Indeed discussions of thinking as such are non-existent in Being and Time and are only partially developed in his other earlier writings.

30. Thought as resolve

We turn our attention first to his essay "On the Essence of Truth" in which we find only a few remarks on thinking reflecting an interest which has not yet come to the fore. The clue in this essay to Heidegger's view of

thinking lies in the term resolve which, as we shall see, assumes a meaning somewhat different than in Being and Time. By way of introduction we should say that Heidegger considers the "essence of truth" to be freedom. As might be expected, he has his own definition of freedom. It means to let-be, in the sense of not interfering-with, and is part of the process whereby Dasein lights up beings in their Being.

Truth, as aletheia, enters the picture in that when Dasein lets-be entities (beings), it allows them to reveal, or un-conceal, themselves as they actually are. This, as we have seen previously, is the process of truth and Dasein's mode of Being, existence, now becomes ex-sistence or ek-sistence, standing out into the truth of what-is. "Ex-sistence, grounded in truth as freedom, is nothing less than exposition into the revealed nature of what-is-as-such."⁽¹⁾

Further, truth and untruth always occur together in that letting-be is normally oriented around a particular being and, by virtue of this orientation, conceals Being behind the being. (In this essay he closely refers to Being as beings-in-the-totality.) By its interest in the one being, letting-be conceals being-in-the-totality. "Precisely because letting-be always...lets each thing be in its proper relationships and thus reveals it, it immediately conceals what is in totality. Letting things be is at once

1 Heidegger, Existence and Being, pp.335-336.

a concealment."⁽¹⁾ This concealed being-in-the-totality Heidegger refers to as mystery. Living in forgetfulness of the mystery he calls "error" and man's tendency towards this state he refers to as in-sistence. "As ex-sistent, Dasein is in-sistent."⁽²⁾

In this context authentic thought is referred to as "open resolve" in which Dasein becomes aware of its in-sistent nature, faces its "error" and becomes sensitive to the "mystery", realizing that there is Being behind the beings but not what the Being is, thereby respecting its nature as mystery:

...because the complete essence of truth also includes its dis-essence [concealment] and because it functions primarily as dissimulation [die Verbergung might be better translated as simply "concealment"], philosophy, regarded as the quest for this truth, has a two-fold nature. Its meditations have the calm dignity of gentleness, not denying the dissimulation of what-is in totality. At the same time they have the "open resolve" of hardness which, while not shattering the dissimulation, forces its essence whole and intact into the open, into our understanding and so to reveal its own truth.⁽³⁾

We should note here that the two-fold nature of philosophy reveals the that while respecting the what of Being. We might also note that the initiative clearly lies with Dasein as it "forces" the mystery into the open. We can also see that in order to understand thinking we must better understand the nature of Being which functions as concealment (dissimulation) as well as unconcealment.

1 Ibid., p.340.

2 Ibid., p.344.

3 Ibid., pp.347-348.

31. The Greek understanding of the thought process

In An Introduction to Metaphysics composed five years after "On the Essence of Truth", Heidegger returns to the Greeks to consider their understanding of the thinking process. In his analysis he considers the Parmenidean fragment (~~6~~5): to gar auto noein estin te kai einai. "The crude translation prescribed by a long tradition runs: Thinking and Being are the same - a mis-interpretation no less un-Greek than the falsification of the Heraclitean doctrine of the logos. [which he has previously refuted.]"⁽¹⁾

To understand this fragment Heidegger says we need to know the correct meaning of to auto, of noein, and of einai. We begin with the latter which he asserts has already been sufficiently clarified by his analysis of the term phusis. The meaning of this term was derived from a consideration of the Heraclitean fragment (~~5~~5) which Heidegger translates as follows: "Conflict is for all (that is present) the creator that causes to emerge but (also) for all the dominant preserver. For it makes some to appear as gods, others as men: it creates (shows) some as slaves, others as freemen."⁽²⁾

In commenting on this fragment, Heidegger says that in the polemos mentioned, the power (of the creator and preserver) that is phusis was first confronted by man and brought to a stand, thereby giving beings their Being.⁽³⁾

1 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.136.

2 Ibid., pp.61-62.

3 Ibid.

He goes on to equate phusis with logos (the gathering together of all entities which gives them order) and dike (which he translates as Fug, a term rarely used today which can be translated as organization, arrangement and disposition). Heidegger states: "Being, phusis, as the dominating Power, is original collectedness: logos; (and likewise it) is organization that organizes: dike."⁽¹⁾

We turn now to how Heidegger understands noein. He translates it as Vernehmung or "apprehending." It signifies "...taking a receptive attitude toward that which shows itself. When troops prepare to receive the enemy, it is in the hope of stopping him, at the very least, of bringing him to a stand. This receptive bringing-to-stand is meant in noein."⁽²⁾

As for to auto, the same, he says it must be understood in light of the word en as Parmenides used it. "We know that this unity is never simply empty indifference: it is not sameness in the sense of mere equivalence. Unity is the belonging together of antagonisms. This is original oneness."⁽³⁾ (Here again we see overtones of the polemos mentioned earlier.)

Where are these two factors, thinking and Being, at

1 Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, as quoted by Richardson, op.cit., p.263.

2 Heidegger, op.cit., p.138.

3 Ibid.

one then? In man he answers, for in thinking man collects (logos), makes to stand (noein), and organizes (dike) the power of Being (phusis) into the beings around him, thereby bringing them into Being. Thinking here has a very broad connotation: it is the essential trait of man and reflects the close relation between Being, man and beings. (1)

W.J. Richardson explains that Heidegger sees in this word noein a process of "receptive containment" by which Being as phusis is "forced" into disclosure. At this point in his thinking, man still retains a certain amount of initiative in relation to Being's disclosure of itself. Furthermore, thinking for the Greeks is seen as the essential function of human existence. Thinking is described now as the "coming to pass of the there of Being." To exist as Dasein then is to think. (2)

Heidegger also determined from his analysis of Greek thinking that they viewed the thought process as a decision. Thought has this nature by virtue of its goal, Being. As aletheia Being reveals and conceals itself simultaneously and it was this concealing of Being which the Greeks felt accounted for appearance or seeming-to-be. They saw appearance as an inherent part of Being's revelation and therefore as "...no less a power than Being as unconcealment." Indeed for the Greeks appearance is now seen as closely associated with Being in its negativity, its withdrawal. In

1 Ibid., pp.146-150.

2 Richardson, op.cit., p.282.

light of this, the purpose of thinking is to "...rescue Being from its plight of being submerged in appearance, to differentiate Being from appearance."⁽¹⁾

Heidegger notes that in this thinking, the Greeks necessarily encountered non-Being, and all of their philosophy became oriented around three paths to Being. "If [man] is to take over Being-there (Dasein) in the radiance of Being, he must bring Being to stand, he must endure it in appearance and against appearance, and he must wrest both appearance and Being from the abyss of non-Being."⁽²⁾ Heidegger finds support for these three paths in Greek thinking from his analysis of Parmenidean philosophy. He translates fragment 4 as follows: "Come, I will tell you: heed well the words that you hear as to which ways of inquiry are alone to be considered. The one: how it is (how it, Being is), and how also non-Being is impossible."⁽³⁾

The first path to Being Heidegger sees in this fragment is, of course, an openness toward Being itself. This path is unavoidable since openness toward Being is what constitutes there-being's nature. The second path is the recognition of non-Being as inaccessible. Since thought deals only with beings, or precisely that which non-Being is not, then it necessarily cannot attain to non-Being. However, it is important that this fact be recognized. Heidegger

1. Heidegger, op.cit., pp.108-109.

2. Ibid., p.110.

3. Ibid.

says that the third path, appearance, is the one most travelled and most misleading for "...on it men lose themselves entirely." However, the true thinker must travel this path, not ignorant of its nature, but well aware that Being exposes itself negatively and that this negativity must be experienced (and recognized as negativity or mystery) before one arrives at Being. "The true thinker must travel the path of Being and of non-Being, as well as take upon himself the third way, the arduous path of appearance."⁽¹⁾

We can now understand how the Greeks, who have a privileged position in the history of thought and are authoritative by virtue of their proximity to the original manifestation of Being, considered thinking as a type of decision. "The thinking and being there [Dasein] of the Greeks were a struggle for a decision between the great powers of Being and becoming, Being and appearance."⁽²⁾ Here again we see man playing an active role in the process of thought, he makes a decision. We might also note the close relation between resolve as the acceptance and recognition of Being in its negativity, with the resultant finitude of thinking about Being, and decision, which in taking cognizance of Being, non-Being and appearance also recognizes the inevitability of only a partial glimpse of Being in thinking. Therefore, we can say that in Heidegger's outlook, decision is a form of resolve.

1 Ibid., p.111.

2 Heidegger, op.cit., p.115.

32. Thought as questioning

In An Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger sees inquiry or questioning as another form of resolve. He also treats questioning as a basic trait of authentic or essential thinking and in this we find a concept, questioning, which occurs in both his earlier and later works. In its metamorphosis we have a bridge between these two periods that will give us some insight into the shift of initiative from Dasein to Being which occurs in Heidegger's development as a thinker about thinking.

We can begin by noting the way he connects resolve and questioning. True questioning, he says, as opposed to an idle and shallow quest, results from an intense desire or will to know. In this deliberate willing man has to confront and take into account his finite nature. In considering the reason for this he becomes aware of the negativity of Being. The actual process by which man "wills to know" is questioning of beings about Being and whoever "wills to know" through questioning is said to be 'resolved'. He defines the essence of resolve as "the coming-out-of-cover of human being-there [Dasein] into the clearing of Being..."⁽¹⁾

Heidegger further asserts that there is one particular fundamental question which sets the tone for all questioning. In a discussion entitled "The Fundamental Question" he

1 Ibid., pp.20-21.

considers what it is that makes the following question so fundamental: "Why are there essents [beings] rather than nothing?" Basically he gives two reasons. The first is that this question focuses on beings in general, not any particular essent or being. By focusing on beings, it raises the question of and brings to the fore beings as a whole (remember that at this time he was closely associating Being with beings-in-the-totality) and for this reason the act of questioning is "privileged." Hence from the basic question of metaphysics "Why are there essents rather than nothing?" he has separated the crucial question, "How does it stand with Being?"⁽¹⁾

The second reason this question is to be considered fundamental lies in its historical overtones. Heidegger believes that the initial posing of this question heralded the beginning of history itself for it was not until man opened up to Being in questioning it that Being was able to find a "there." With the appearance of a there for Being, Dasein came into existence and this marked the beginning of history. "Only where Being discloses itself in questioning does history happen and with it the Being of man...The asking of this question is historical in the fundamental sense that this questioning first created history."⁽²⁾

Thinking then is a questioning of beings as a whole, a questioning which holds Being in the open and by

1 Ibid., p.42.

2 Ibid., p.143.

continually "questing" for it keeps it in the open. Just as was the case with thought as resolve and as understood by the Greeks, so also with thinking as questioning the initiative lies with Dasein, man, the questioner. We have now seen that in the earlier Heidegger thinking is oriented primarily around the thinker.

The Later Heidegger and Essential Thought

Section Two

33. Thought as questioning

As we noted previously, Heidegger's views on thinking as questioning undergo somewhat of a change in his later works. The concept of questioning thought is retained but the initiative shifts from the questioner to the questioned. Heidegger concludes the essay "Die Frage Nach der Technik" with the words: "questioning is the piety of thought."⁽¹⁾

We can observe the shift in his thinking on this subject in these later interpretative comments from On the Way to Language.

Inquiry and investigation...require the prior grant of whatever it is they approach and pursue with their queries...the authentic attitude of thinking is not a putting of questions - rather, it is a listening to the grant...At the close of a lecture ...some time ago, I said: "Questioning is the piety of thinking." Piety is meant here in the ancient sense; obedient or submissive, and in this case submitting to what thinking has to think about.⁽²⁾

Hence questioning, the activity of a thinking man, is only possible due to a prior opening up of the questioned. It is only after attending to or hearing this opening up that the questioner can pursue his quest. This is a side to thinking as questioning that

1 Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze, p.44.

2 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, p.71.

Heidegger has not previously explored and here attention is focused squarely on the questioned, not the questioner.

In Was Heisst Denken these later views come to fruition. Now Being is referred to as the Question-able and the Thought-worthy - "What gives itself (as thought-worthy) is the gift of the eminently Question-able."⁽¹⁾ And at a later point he says: "...thinking would be a thanksgiving to the Thought-worthy...which would guard the Thought-worthy inviolable in its questionableness..."⁽²⁾

In referring to Being as the Question-able Heidegger is saying that the answer to the questions man poses about Being is to continue questioning, since it is only through this questioning attitude of man that Being reveals itself. To seek Being then is to be ever "on the way." As W.J. Richardson notes, "...what is desirable is not to absolve the questioning by an answer but simply to achieve by it a deeper fidelity to Being-as-questionable."⁽³⁾

With our consideration of the development in Heidegger's views on thinking as questioning we have now traced the evolution of his approach to the nature of thought. We have noted how he moves from an understanding in which man the questioner retains the initiative in thinking to a position wherein questioning becomes a passive hearkening

1 Heidegger, Was Heisst Denken, as quoted by Richardson, op.cit., p.615.

2 Ibid.

3 Richardson, op.cit., pp.615-616.

to Being's self-disclosure. In considering his later views on thinking in general we shall see that here Being has an undeniable priority in the thought process.

34. Various modes of essential thought

We shall proceed by considering several of the different approaches and terms Heidegger employs in his later analyses of thinking. In the first thinking is referred to as the result of a correlation between the wants or needs of Being and man for each other. We have noted in our earlier analyses that Dasein needs Being in order to exist as Dasein. We stressed that as the 'ontological animal', Dasein only becomes completely itself and exists authentically by deliberately hearkening to its inherent, unthematic tendency towards Being. We find a parallel to this in his later works when Heidegger says that thinking results from a need, inclination, or want (mögen) of man for Being as the thought-worthy. "Only when we want what is in itself thought-worthy do we have the power for thought."⁽¹⁾

However, we are told in his later writings that this need works both ways. In Discourse on Thinking (Gelassenheit), where Being is referred to as that-which-regions, we find: "Evidently the nature of man is released to that-which-regions because this belongs to it so essentially that without man that-which-regions can not be a coming forth of all natures..." He goes on to suggest that if the word truth

1 Ibid., p.600.

replaces the phrase "that-which-regions", then one can say of the relation between human nature and Being (or truth or that-which-regions) that "...human nature is given over to truth because truth needs man."⁽¹⁾ In this context, thinking is determined by Being's need of it as the process in man's makeup through which Being fulfils itself. Thinking, then, results from the needs of Being and man corresponding with each other.

In his later works Heidegger also considers thinking in terms of giving thanks. His original insight into the relation between these two seemingly disparate words stems from a consideration of such "root" words as the "Old English" verbs thencan, to think, thancian, to thank and the noun thanc, a thought. He connects the significance of these words by saying that the most appropriate way of giving thanks for the gift of being able to think would be to give thought to the 'most thought-provoking' or Being. Thoughtlessness is then seen as thanklessness and "pure thanks is...that we simply think."⁽²⁾

In his essay "Conversation on a Country Path" Heidegger refers to thinking in yet another way as a non-willing in which one waits (for Being to disclose itself). He refers to what makes this type of thinking possible in the following manner: "As a matter of fact [thought-as-] waiting, provided it be

1 Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, pp.83-84.

2 Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, p.143.

foundational, that is, a thoroughly decisive waiting, is grounded in the fact that we [already] belong to that for which we wait."⁽¹⁾

These words reflect a theme that has run throughout Heidegger's writings. Man is able to think because it is part of his essential nature to do so. He is able to turn toward Being deliberately in thought because he is inherently oriented toward Being. In its broad sense thinking is existence in that it is the intensification of a latent tendency in existence.

With this designation of thought as a non-willing waiting Heidegger is attempting to overcome "representational" thought which seizes its object and maintains control over it (as seen in the will-to-will culminating in technology). The difficulty in comprehending this type of thinking stems from one's tendency to approach it through that very type of thinking which it is intended to over-throw. In the following Heidegger is replying to someone's complaint that he "cannot represent to (himself)" this type of thinking: "Precisely because this will of yours and your mode of thinking as re-presenting prevent it."⁽²⁾

Heidegger refers to thinking in the narrow sense (as opposed to thinking as existence) as waiting and clarifies this term by contrasting it with awaiting.

1 Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, p.74.

2 Ibid., p.62.

Waiting...but never awaiting, for awaiting already links itself with re-presenting...Waiting, however ...lets re-presenting entirely alone. It really has no object. Yet if we wait we always wait for something...Certainly, but as soon as we represent to ourselves and fix upon that for which we wait, we really wait no longer...In waiting we leave open what we wait for.(1)

With his characterization of thinking as "waiting" we can see Heidegger stressing the passive role man plays in this process. This in turn implies that Being now has the initiative as it discloses itself to man in his thinking. However, we find in a closer consideration of the term "non-willing" as it refers to thinking, that this process still demands some effort on man's part since "non-willing" thought requires on man's part a "trace of willing."(2)

Although this trace vanishes later as "non-willing waiting" develops into completely authentic thinking, it is undeniable that the whole process was begun by a conscious effort on man's part. Thus in his essay "Nietzsche's Wort 'Gott ist tot'" thought is considered as preparation for Being's disclosure; its task is "...to light up the domain within which Being can seize...man in terms of his essence. To be preparational is the essence of such thought."(3)

This nullifies several critics' charges that the later Heidegger over-reacts to the Dasein-oriented earlier Heidegger by positing Dasein as a completely passive medium for Being's unconcealment. In actual fact there is far more

1 Ibid., p.68.

2 Ibid., p.80.

3 Heidegger, Holzwege, p.194.

equilibrium throughout his development than these critics realise. This trace of willing required for non-willing would certainly support a refutation of such criticism in that it reflects a certain amount of responsibility in man's role in the thought process.

35. Thought and Being

As was the case with language, we shall now see that thinking is so closely associated with Being in Heidegger's philosophy that it can be considered as another term for the process in which Being reveals itself. In "What is Metaphysics?" he refers to authentic thought as an 'occurrence' of Being.⁽¹⁾ Thinking then is the process in which Being unconceals itself and finds a place for itself, (a Da), in the clearing provided by thinking.

In "Brief Über den Humanismus" we find the phrase "thought of Being" interpreted in such a way as to stress the very close relation between Being and thought. Thought, he explains, is essentially thought of Being. "The genitive speaks in a two-fold way. Thought is of Being insofar as it occurs from Being and belongs to Being. Thought is at the same time, thought of Being insofar as it, belonging to Being, hearkens to Being."⁽²⁾ This phrase, thought of Being, does not refer to man thinking Being but rather to Being as affecting the beginning of the thinking process and then commandeering this process for its own revelation.

1 Heidegger, Existence and Being, p.387.

2 Heidegger, Wegmarken, pp.147-148.

In a similar vein Heidegger refers to Being as the "element" of thought in the sense that water is the element for fish. Without this element thinking could not occur. "Element is that by virtue of which thinking is able to be thinking."⁽¹⁾ As Richardson explains, "Element is here understood as that which renders something possible, therefore enables a presence to emerge, or, if one will, an essencing to take place...Being has the primacy over thought simply because it gives rise to it."⁽²⁾

The close relation between thinking and Being means that for thought to be authentic it must strictly adhere and attend to Being in its revelation. Paradoxically this same strict adherence also condemns thinking to finiteness and error. The blame for the finiteness of thinking lies not with the thinker but the thought-about, according to Heidegger. Here again we have to consider Being in order to grasp another concept, in this case thought, of Heidegger's philosophy. We can recall that Being as aletheia reveals and conceals itself simultaneously. It is this process which accounts for the nature of thought. In What is Called Thinking? Heidegger refers to thought as influenced by the withdrawal (concealment) of Being in the following manner: "What withdraws from us, draws us along by its very withdrawal, whether or not we become aware of it immediately, or at all. Once we are drawn into the withdrawal, we are

1 Ibid., p.147.

2 Richardson, op.cit., p.542.

drawing toward what draws, attracts us by its withdrawal."⁽¹⁾

This being-drawn-with by the withdrawing is thinking and this process is positive in that it attracts and induces thinking. However, it is negative in that it inevitably produces error in thought. In Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens we find: "Whoever thinks greatly must err greatly."⁽²⁾ In Vorträge und Aufsätze he says of essential thought: "The possibility of error is greatest with this type of thought."⁽³⁾ In a paradoxical way then, essential thinking's greatest strength, adherence and openness to Being, is also its great weakness. Because Being conceals as well as reveals itself, essential thought is prone to be led away from its object.

36. Retrieving the unthought

Another result of Being's withdrawal is the "unthought" that lurks in the thinking of all great thinkers. With the appearance of this concept we encounter a most important trait of Heidegger's own mode of thinking since the unthought is the subject matter for retrieving thought. What was called repetition in Being and Time recurs throughout his subsequent works as retrieving or backtracking thought and we shall now focus our attention on this subject which we have briefly considered at several previous points e.g. thinking more Greek than the Greeks.

1 Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, pp.8-9.

2 Heidegger, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens, p.17.

3 Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze, p.183.

In What Is Called Thinking? we find the following comments on the "unthought": "To acknowledge and respect consists in letting every thinker's thought come to us as something in each case unique, never to be repeated, inexhaustible - and being shaken to the depths by what is unthought in his thought." He asserts that the most original thought always has the greatest amount of unthought and respect for such original thinking involves a "...readiness to let our own attempts at thinking be over-turned, again and again, by what is unthought in the thinker's thought."⁽¹⁾

The unthought then is the result of Being's concealing itself while it is exposed to thought. In studying insights of past thinkers, one should now be open not only to the overt contributions they made but also to that element implied in their thinking which they were unable to comprehend and develop fully. This underlying element, the result of Being's self-concealment, is the unthought.

Furthermore there is unthought in every great thinker's thoughts, and the more he adhered to Being as aletheia the greater will be the unthought available through an analysis of his insights. The following excerpt from Vorträge und Aufsätze provides a description of the actual process by which Being reveals-conceals itself: "...in the beginning...of thought, the essence of language was lit up in the light of Being... However, that flash was quickly forgotten. No man comprehended its ray [its impact] and the nearness of that which it lit up."⁽²⁾

1 Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, pp.76-77.

2 Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze, p.229.

We see here that the flash of inspiration provided by the aletheia process is so brief as to be insufficient for a really clear insight into Being. The process of simultaneous concealment-revelment as described here is comparable to the sighting of an iceberg. The visible element represents a very small part of the complete iceberg. The real significance of the iceberg tip stems from the fact that it points to and reveals the bulk of the submerged iceberg. In a similar way past flashes of insight into Being as aletheia are significant in that they point toward the less visible but very significant unconcealed portion of Being which can be approached through the "unthought" portions of past thinkers.

This process of aletheia accounts for Heidegger's distinctive approach in studying past thinkers. For him it is not sufficient merely to revive and rethink (erneuern) their insights since these were necessarily limited by Being's partial disclosure.⁽¹⁾ We can see that, because of their failure to appreciate the Being - aletheia process, the insights of past thinkers can only be appreciated by penetrating beyond their expressed views into this underlying realm of the unthought. This type of approach Heidegger refers to as retrieving.

To retrieve thinking, then, is not to repeat past thinking, but is actually to "leap" into the Being process itself through those brief flashes of past insights resulting from Being's unconcealedness. This type of thinking is a back-tracking (der Schritt zurück). Heidegger says:

1 Heidegger, Holzwege, pp.39-40.

"...the back track reveals the realm thus far skipped on the basis of which the essence of truth becomes for the first time worthy to be thought...back tracking...leads us ...out of what has up to now been thought in philosophy."⁽¹⁾

A frequently heard criticism of Heidegger's philosophy stems from this concept retrieving. Many critics feel that Heidegger ignores, or at best fails to appreciate, the insights of past thinkers. However, in "Brief Über den Humanismus" he explains that retrieving is an important aspect of essential thinking. Of authentic thought, he says: "This thinking...is nothing else but the recalling of Being."⁽²⁾ The very fact that essential thinking involves retrieving or recalling Being as it was exposed to past thinking shows that Heidegger does take past insights very seriously in his own thinking.

The real problem arises when we consider how he interprets and incorporates the insights of past thinkers. Of his thinking at this point, critics make accusations of gross distortions, arbitrariness, and violent assaults on the insights of other thinkers.⁽³⁾ Such criticisms stem from the fact that Heidegger actually describes his approach

1 Heidegger, Essays in Metaphysics: Identity and Difference, trans. by K.F. Leidecker, (New York: Philosophical Library Inc., 1960), pp.42-43.

2 Heidegger, Wegmarken, p.188.

3 Grene, op.cit., p.100, and Karl Löwith, Heidegger: Denker in Dürftiger Zeit, (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1953), pp.84-85.

to past thinkers as violent and destructive. However, the meaning he assigns to these descriptive terms and his motives for such an approach effectively nullify such criticisms of him.

In Was Ist Das - Die Philosophie? Heidegger explains that while his thinking does involve a certain amount of Destruktion, this does not imply a breaking with history or denial of its importance. It is instead an "...appropriation and transformation of tradition." Destruktion does not refer to destruction but to a "...dismantling...of...statements about the history of philosophy. Destruktion means to open our ears and to be free for that which grants itself to us in tradition as Being of beings."⁽¹⁾

We can now see that Heidegger uses the term Destruktion in a positive rather than negative sense to describe his approach to tradition and past thinkers. His attitude is very appropriate in light of the fact that tradition can become a barrier which stifles creativity and cuts off later generations from the spontaneous and vital process which forms its roots. Werner Marx notes that in this situation Heidegger's Destruktion can play a positive role in that it "de-structures the hardened sedimentation of tradition in order to explicitly retrieve the original experiences concealed in it."⁽²⁾

In Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik Heidegger

1 Heidegger, Was Ist Das - Die Philosophie?, pp.70-72.

2 Marx, op.cit., pp.XX-XXI.

explains that while violent, his interpretation of past thinkers is not arbitrary in the least. He states that any interpretation which seeks to "wrest" from the actual words what they intended to say must be violent. However, such interpreting is not arbitrary since it is always guided by the "power of an illuminative idea." It is because of this adherence to a "guiding idea" that an interpretation can "...risk that which is always audacious, namely, entrusting itself to the hidden inner passion [or light] of a work, in order to...get through to the unsaid and to attempt to express it."⁽¹⁾

Criticisms of Heidegger's interpretations miss the point when they focus on the actual manner in which he deals with individual texts. To really criticize his retrieving, critics must deal with the "illuminative idea" that guides and motivates his interpretations. This idea, of course, is the understanding of Being as aletheia.

We have now seen what Heidegger considers to be authentic and essential thinking. In our analysis we noted again and again the close relation between Being as aletheia and the thought process. Thus it can be said that thinking is one more cog in the structure of Heideggerian ontology. It is ontological in a dual sense. First, we cannot comprehend this process without understanding the Being process of concealing-revealing disclosure. Second, thought has been seen as another name for Being's disclosure

1 Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, p.183.

of itself. It is through the thinking of man, as ek-sistent standing-out into the truth of Being, that Being finds the da, the place, where its unveiling can occur.

THE ANALYSIS OF BEING IN ITSELF

CHAPTER FOUR

Introduction

37. Guidelines for analysis

We come now to a consideration of Being itself in Heidegger's philosophy. We have seen that this was what motivated his examinations of Dasein, language and thinking and the very fact that he considered these other areas provides a clue about his thinking of Being: it is extremely difficult to comprehend and can never be considered directly or as itself. In previous analyses we have learned that Being is not a concept to be "grasped" in an objective manner. Being is not at our disposal, rather we are at Being's disposal and we can only become sensitive to this phenomenon by passively listening to its various revelations.

We should not approach Heidegger's work on Being too ambitiously or with great expectations of a definitive, once and for all conceptualization of Being in itself. Instead, we should be cautioned by Heidegger's insight that to view Being itself is parallel to gazing directly at the sun. The very light which enables us to see the world can also, when viewed at its source, blind us. In "Remembrance of the Poet" he analyses a line from Hölderlin's poetry, "To grasp him, our joy is scarcely large enough.", as follows: "To grasp means to name the High One himself, the very sorrowing joy itself will not suffice...[for] 'Holy names are lacking',"⁽¹⁾

1 Heidegger, "The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics", p.315.

Along the same lines, he suggests that Hölderlin, who died insane, feared that his insights into the truth of reality might be more than he could bear. In the following words of Hölderlin Heidegger sees the fear that true insight into the nature of Being might be disastrous. "I used to be able to exult over a new truth, a better insight into that which is above and around us, now I am frightened lest in the end it should happen with me as with Tantalus of old, who received more from the gods than he was able to digest."⁽¹⁾ For Heidegger then, Being can be neither viewed nor named in a direct manner.

Then what can be known of and said about that to which the term Being is applied? First, we should note, as we have done, the fact that this topic is not to be seized directly and thereby avoid blindly fumbling about for something which is inaccessible. This too has been touched on in prior analyses of Dasein, thinking and language. Further, we can consider the insights of others into this problem, note the strengths and weaknesses of their analyses and incorporate them into our own approach. This too has been done with our considerations of both philosophical and poetical contributions of past thinkers. Keeping these guidelines in mind, we can then look at those aspects of the Being process which can be comprehended, even if only in a finite manner.

1 Heidegger, Existence and Being, p.308.

ALETHIA

Section One

38. Being as a revealing-concealing process

We will begin our analysis by concentrating on Heidegger's consideration of those traits of Being which make it so inaccessible. Although he refers to Being by various terms, one of the more prevalent names for it is truth, or aletheia. In "Einleitung zu Was ist Metaphysik?" he says: "The meaning of Being and the truth of Being say the same thing."⁽¹⁾ And in An Introduction to Metaphysics he clearly identifies the two: "Truth as unconcealment is not an appendage to Being. Truth is inherent in the essence of Being."⁽²⁾

Now we can turn to what Heidegger says about Being as it reveals or manifests itself as truth. Anything learned about the nature of this truth will provide some clue as to the character of Being itself, as seen in the following from "The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics":

...metaphysics does not induce Being itself to speak, for metaphysics does not recall Being in its truth, nor does it recall the nature of unconcealedness... aletheia might be the word that offers a hitherto unnoticed hint concerning the nature of "esse" which has not yet been recalled...What is [now] wanted is ...some regard for the arrival of the hitherto unexpressed nature of unconcealedness, for it is in this form that Being has announced itself.⁽³⁾

1 Heidegger, Wegmarken, p.206.

2 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.102.

3 Heidegger, "The Way Back Into the Ground of Metaphysics", p.313.

From the above, we see that the meaning of truth for Heidegger is oriented around "unconcealedness" which he derives from the Greek term aletheia. James Robinson explains that as the term is composed of the root verb letho or lanthano (to escape notice) and the negating alpha prefix, it can be interpreted as 'no longer escaping notice' or 'unveiling' or 'unconcealed'.⁽¹⁾ To understand what this term means for Heidegger we must thus consider the term 'unconcealedness'. Let us attempt this understanding next, remembering that we clarify unconcealedness to understand better truth, hence to comprehend better Being, our ultimate concern here. Just as the Greek term for truth is based on the Greek term for concealedness, so also is unconcealedness (truth) closely associated with concealedness in Heidegger's thinking.

In the essay "Logos" he says that "...self-revelment not only never puts aside concealment but needs it in order to come-to-presence as itself, as revealment..."⁽²⁾ In Holzwege Heidegger establishes beyond doubt that unconcealedness and concealedness are inter-related, simultaneous processes. [In the following Heidegger refers to Being as a clearing and a lighting.] He explains that all beings can be only by standing within "what is lighted in this clearing." Furthermore, it is only this clearing which allows man to comprehend the beings

1 Robinson, op.cit., p.22.

2 Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze, pp.271-272.

around him. "Thanks to this clearing, beings are unconcealed in certain changing degrees. And yet a being can be concealed too, only within the sphere of what is lighted. Each being...keeps to this curious opposition of presence."⁽¹⁾

In this process of truth, it does not happen that unconcealedness completely eliminates its opposite, concealedness. Instead the two are constantly in tension, balancing each other out. As Werner Marx notes, the distinctive aspect of this approach is that it considers "...the "realms of darkness" [concealedness] and the "realm of light" [unconcealedness] as equal partners in the occurrence of Being and...conceives of their relationship to each other as a strife which keeps the character of the occurrence...radically creative."⁽²⁾

When we realize that untruth is equated with concealment, just as truth is equated with unconcealment, our analysis of unconcealment has revealed that truth and untruth also are not opposing factions; the appearance of one does not rule out the appearance of the other for they are inter-related and occur simultaneously. Heidegger stresses this by saying that truth "in its essence is untruth."⁽³⁾

In this nature of truth we can now find valuable

1 Heidegger, Holzwege, p.42.

2 Marx, op.cit., p.147.

3 Heidegger, Existence and Being, p.345.

insights into the nature of Being which manifests itself in the truth process. In Being as truth we can see why it is impossible to grasp Being in itself since Being never completely reveals itself. Instead its revealing is always a simultaneous concealing. We have already had occasion to touch on this aspect of Being when we spoke of Being withdrawing itself and drawing-with it man's thinking of Being. Also we spoke of how Being (as beings-in-their-totality) was overlooked due to concern for particular beings through which Being necessarily manifests itself.

The insight we have gained about Being from considering Being as truth is that it simultaneously reveals and conceals itself, thereby denying direct access to itself. In An Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger reaffirms this aspect of Being when he translates and interprets a Heraclitean Fragment (#123) as follows: "Being (emerging appearing) inclines intrinsically to self-concealment. Since Being means emerging appearing, to issue forth from concealment - concealment, its origin in concealment, belongs to it essentially."⁽¹⁾

This same trait of Being is referred to by Heidegger's characterization of Being as light. He asserts that it is the "light of Being" which enables metaphysics to see and deal with beings and yet the "light itself...does not come within the range of metaphysical thinking."⁽²⁾ From this characterization of Being as light we can gain further

1 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.114.

2 Heidegger, "The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics", pp.310-311.

insight into Heidegger's understanding of Being's concealing-revealing nature. Just as we must rely on light to make entities around us visible, so also are beings dependent on Being for their standing-out into Being. However, the very light which enables us to see our surroundings is itself invisible. Similarly Being also hides or conceals itself as it lights up beings.

Here then, as in Being as truth, we see how Being reveals and conceals itself simultaneously. That Heidegger refers to Being as truth so frequently (indeed Versenyi entitles his book Heidegger, Being and Truth) tells us that this particular mode of revelation is an extremely important aspect of Being for him.

39. Being as history

Another manner in which Being manifests itself, and one that is closely related to Being as truth, is through history. In "On the Essence of Truth" Heidegger states that the existence of historical man began when the first thinker posed the question of Being for with this question "unconcealment and revealment are experienced for the first time."⁽¹⁾

We can now see that Being as truth occurs as history. These three concepts are interrelated in Heidegger's thinking. As Richardson notes: "It is the mitterence of Being in its truth that constitutes the process of history."⁽²⁾ Further,

1 Heidegger, Existence and Being, p.335.

2 Richardson, op.cit., p.533.

the history in which Being manifests itself, the history thus caused by the Being process, can be associated with history as normally understood. Although Heidegger generally refers to the history of thought or metaphysics when he discusses this issue (an understandable approach in light of the close association between Being and thought), most commentators are quick to point out that history in its narrow Heideggerian sense (history of thought) determines history in the general sense.

In discussing the relation of truth to man, Being, and beings, Thomas Langan says: "The history of this truth relationship is the key to all history, for all men's comportment in any epoch is mediated by the contemporary conception of his place amidst the totality of the things-that-are [which in turn is determined by the current understanding of Being.]." ⁽¹⁾ Because his understanding of Being affects all of man's "comportment" or relation to his surroundings and self, the history of thought (of Being) will likewise affect and determine history as a whole.

The key terms in Heidegger's discussion of Being as history are "epoch" and "mittence." The meaning of the latter, in German Geschick, can be seen in its verbal root, schicken (to send, ordain). Thus the nature of history is determined by the manner in which Being 'sends' itself to thought. In this way thought's 'fate' is determined by the way Being is manifested to it. ⁽²⁾

1 Langan, op.cit., p.133.

2 Robinson, op.cit., p.26.

Epochs then are the different periods in history distinguished by the various mittences or modes of Being's manifestations. Heidegger generally terms each epoch according to the predominant way in which Being was thought in it. In Identity and Difference he mentions the various ways in which Being has historically revealed itself in some "fate enmeshed formulation": phusis, logos, en, idea, energeia, substantiality, objectivity, subjectivity, Will, Will to Power and Will to Will.⁽¹⁾ These terms identify various epochs which have each been determined by a particular mittence (Geschick) of Being. Recalling that Being as aletheia is a simultaneous revealing-concealing, we can also understand how each epoch is only based on a partial glimpse of Being's truth and this is simultaneously an 'epoch of error'.⁽²⁾ In this we can see that the revealing-concealing process is common to Being as history and Being as truth.

This mode of Being's revelation has several important repercussions for a correct understanding of history. First of all, as already noted, each epoch of history does have only a partial understanding of Being and is characterized by untruth as well as truth. Second, we must realize that there is no single expression of truth which forms an underlying theme throughout all history which need only be rooted out and analyzed by the historians. This is not possible

1 Heidegger, Essays in Metaphysics: Identity and Difference, p.59.

2 Heidegger, Holzwege, p.311.

because Being occurs differently in different times revealing different aspects of itself while concealing others.⁽¹⁾

Third, we can say, however, that there is something resembling a theme underlying all the epochs in history and this provides the necessary continuity between these various periods. Being in its forgottenness appears in all of them. In this we find the common bond. Werner Marx (who was appointed to the chair formerly occupied by Husserl and Heidegger on the merit of his book Heidegger and the Tradition⁽²⁾) states in regard to these various epochs: "They all therefore manifest the degree to which they in various ways are based upon the withdrawal of this idea of Being...and thus upon the dominion of the oblivion of Being. Herein lies what is common to all of them..."⁽³⁾

Heidegger gives his definition of Being as history a new twist when he says that Being as manifest in history is eschatological. As we might expect eschatology is used in a unique way here. In Heidegger's consideration of eschatology it is not only the ending which is important but also the beginning because: "The beginning already contains in a hidden way the end. The real beginning indeed never has the beginning nature of the primitive... [which]...is able to set free nothing other than that in

1 Langan, op.cit., pp.133-134.

2 Marx, op.cit., p.XVII.

3 Ibid., p.169.

which it is enclosed."(1)

In Heidegger's eschatological history of thought, the Greeks mark the beginning of history and, because of their pristine glimpses into Being, lend that beginning a special significance. However, and most important, contained within this beginning was the failure to recognize Being's veil, its concealment as well as revealment. Therefore Western thought was doomed from the start and this early error has been compounded by later generations of thinkers.

For further clarification we can turn to a passage in Holzwege where Heidegger states that "Being itself...is eschatological." He explains that we live in the "evening-land" of an age that began with the Greek insights into Being. Furthermore, the "Being of beings gathers itself up...in the last moment of its destiny. The essence of Being that has lasted until now perishes in its still obscure truth."(2)

Here Heidegger is referring to the ending of the present age with his use of the term evening. All of history is thought of in terms of a full day. Our present age belongs to the "evening-land" and this would indicate that a new age is soon to dawn. In this age there would possibly be a new "essence of Being" to replace the one that

1 Heidegger, Holzwege, p.63.

2 Heidegger, Holzwege, pp.301-302.

"perished" (untergehen) completely in the night of the last age, having never been fully comprehended. This new age, however, will not be completely shut off from the prior one as it too will be ushered in by an awareness of Being, just as the old age began with the Greek's awareness of Being. The same sun (Being) rises in the morning of each new day.

Furthermore, Heidegger sees his role in this eschatological process as not only a prophet of the forthcoming end of the present age but also the herald whose announcements will usher in the new age. We can now see the full implication of his efforts to "overcome metaphysics", for traditionally such thinking has been rooted in an epoch of Being's withdrawal. Metaphysics errs because it is predestined to do so by the withdrawing mittedness of Being. Therefore metaphysics must be abandoned.⁽¹⁾

Because the history of thought (metaphysics) is the key to history as a whole, Heidegger's efforts at "overcoming metaphysics", thereby bringing in a new epoch, will have repercussions on all aspects of the future age to come. Warner Marx explains that Heidegger feels he can overcome the old and help bring in the new age because of his thought "...being "granted" the possibility of explicating the initially incipient sense of Being in its basic traits as well as the history of Being based upon this sense."

He goes on to explain that the historical process which is Being functions by "commissioning" different epochs

1 Heidegger, Existence and Being, p.382.

or "missions". One epoch passes into another when thinking is able to see "the initially incipient creative sense of Being" beneath the contemporary understanding of beings. "Once this has been experienced and thought, then the basic traits of the other beginning of Being are "commissioned" to thinking and the "deliverance" takes place."⁽¹⁾ In this way, thinking about Being makes possible the transition from one age, epoch, or mission to another.

Heidegger is able to usher in a new mitterence or age because Being grants to his thinking its withdrawing or concealing nature, as well as its revealing character. When this has been granted, a new epoch has begun. However, this culmination (evening) of the present epoch is closely associated with the beginning of the new age because the grant to Heidegger's thought came through meditation on the Greek origins (the "morning") of present day thinking. The insights gained from the analysis of present day thought (in our epoch characterized as technology) as the culmination of trends inherent in Greek thought serve as the basis for the "commission" which forms the new epoch.

In this way the new age will come from Heidegger's efforts to grasp the essence of "technology" (which he strives to do in his essay "Die Frage nach der Technik" in Vorträge und Aufsätze). Inherent in the essence of technology is its roots in the aletheia problem of the Greek founders of Western thought and its subsequent epochs. To

1 Marx, op.cit., p.174.

understand technology in its essence is to be granted Being in its withdrawal.⁽¹⁾ In this way, then, Heidegger can usher in the new epoch by proclaiming the shortcomings of the old.

With our consideration of Heidegger's eschatology we conclude the analysis of his thoughts on history which, as we noted, is one of the modes through which Being as aletheia expresses itself.

1 Ibid., pp.174-179.

Nothingness

Section Two

40. Nothingness as Being

We turn next to yet another mode of Being's revelation as Heidegger sees it. His essay "What Is Metaphysics?" is devoted largely to a consideration of non-Being or Nothingness. He quotes the Hegelian statement "Pure Being and pure Nothing are thus one and the same" and explains his agreement with the insight expressed therein as follows: "Being and Nothing hang together, but not because the two things...are one in their indefiniteness and immediateness, but because Being itself is finite in essence and is only revealed in the Transcendence of Dasein as projected into Nothing."⁽¹⁾ Nothingness therefore serves as another mode of Being's revelation of itself. We have already noted that dread, angst, reveals Nothingness to us and we see now that this basic mood has far-reaching ontological consequences for Nothingness is now portrayed as the 'veil of Being'.⁽²⁾

Heidegger explains that the greatest barrier to an awareness of Being is man's natural orientation towards beings in his ontological investigations. As Being is not a being nor has any qualities of particular beings, man's

1 Heidegger, Existence and Being, p.377.

2 Ibid., p.392.

being-centered approach must be broken and it is the confrontation with non-Being or Nothingness which performs this task. As the purely "Other" than everything that 'is', as das Nicht Seiende, Nothingness prepares one for the experience of Being. As Heidegger explains, in Nothingness one experiences "the vastness of that which gives every being the warrant to be. That is Being itself."⁽¹⁾

It is not surprising, in light of Being's revelation through Nothingness, to find that the latter often performs the same functions as the former. We have already noted that Being, like the sun's light, makes beings appear or allows them to be. Now we find that Nothingness also lets beings appear. Basically this happens in two ways, which we shall call appearance by way of "appreciation" and by way of "contrast".

As to the first, "appreciation", Heidegger says that having experienced Nothingness, one realizes that beings could possibly not be and thus one returns from such an encounter with a new "appreciation" for and awareness of beings. "Only in the clear night of dread's Nothingness is what-is as such revealed in all its original overtness (Offenheit): that it "is" and is not Nothing...The essence of Nothing as original nihilation lies in this: that it alone brings Dasein face to face with what-is as such."⁽²⁾

The second way in which Nothingness lets Beings

1 Ibid., pp.384-385.

2 Ibid., p.369.

appear is by "contrast". This mode, somewhat more involved than the first, is basically a process in which beings "stand out" by contrast with the "dark" background of Nothingness. As he explains, Dasein is always being "projected into Nothing," and this places it beyond "what is". This being beyond what-is he calls transcendence. "Were Dasein not, in its essential basis, transcendent, that is to say, were it not projected from the start into Nothing, it could never relate to what-is..."⁽¹⁾

The above insights are expressed in brief fashion in "What Is Metaphysics?". However, in his Kant book Heidegger gives a more detailed explanation of the role Nothingness plays in letting beings appear. In analyzing Kant's thoughts on the epistemological process, Heidegger stresses that man's role in "knowing" is both active and passive. He is active in this process in so far as he must orient himself toward an object. However, man is finite and does not create the objects of his experience; they come to him. Insofar as he must await the object's coming toward him he is passive.

All finite beings must have this basic ability, which can be described as a turning-toward which lets [something] stand in opposition [as an object]. In this primordial act of orientation, the finite being first proposes to itself a free space within which something can correspond to it. To hold oneself in advance in such a free-space and to form it originally is nothing other than transcendence...⁽²⁾

The way to orient or turn towards an object is to

1 Ibid., p.370.

2 Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, pp.69-70.

transcend into Nothingness, which now assumes the character of an "open domain" or horizon within and against which objects can appear. Further the process wherein such a being "holds before itself" an "open domain" is a parallel phenomenon to "projecting into Nothing." Hence we can see that this "open domain" serves the same purpose as Nothingness and can equate the two.

Thus Nothingness lets beings appear by serving as the horizon or open domain which man holds out before him (or, as in the parallel process, projects into) and in which entities can stand out and come toward the knower. Nothingness, as this horizon-domain, is like a dark projection screen against which figures stand out. Further, we should also note that the idea of contrast runs throughout this process.

To this point it has been established that Nothingness is one mode whereby Being manifests itself (the veil of Being) and that these two perform similar functions in letting beings appear. With his assertion that dread is always present in Dasein, but usually in a repressed way, we find a final parallel between Being and Nothingness which stresses how closely the two are associated in Heidegger's thought. We can recall how Dasein, the 'ontological animal', is always aware of Being but in an unthematic, pre-ontological manner. Hence Heidegger's circular method is aimed at "thematizing" this vague awareness, or bringing it clearly to the fore.

Authentic dread, which is only rarely experienced (as exemplified by the fact that most exist inauthentically in the "everyday" mode), is similarly present in an "unthematic" manner when it is repressed. Since dread is the experience of Nothingness and Dasein's "unthematic" awareness is of Being, we can see how in the following quote Heidegger is speaking of Nothingness just as he speaks of Being. Having stressed the "permeation of Dasein" by dread, he explains that "...dread is generally repressed in Dasein. Dread is there, but sleeping. All Dasein quivers with its breathing..."⁽¹⁾

1 Heidegger, Existence and Being, p.373.

The Ontological Difference

Section Three

41. The relation of Being and beings

In what is surely one of the most exhaustive analyses of Heidegger's writings, W.J. Richardson asserts that the underlying theme of this philosopher's thought is Being as the 'ontological difference'. This commentary is alone in stressing the significance of this concept in Heidegger's works, but because of its stature, the claim must be taken seriously. Our position will be that while Being as the 'ontological difference' is a central theme, it is not the central theme since Being in its various manifestations, not just as the 'ontological difference', would be more appropriate as the central theme. Nevertheless, Being as the 'ontological difference' does play an increasingly important role in Heidegger's maturing thought and also reflects many of his insights into Being as a revealing-concealing process and Being as Nothingness.

André Malet points out that Heidegger's insights concerning the 'ontological difference' are extremely difficult to grasp unless one is prepared to think in a Heideggerian manner. Representational thought is unable to grasp the significance of this concept because it deals only with objective reality and "...ontological reality does not exist in the objective mode. In representational thought, Being no sooner appears on the scene than it is foundering. That kind of thought invariably levels down

the 'ontological difference' in favour of objects."⁽¹⁾

What exactly does Heidegger mean by this term?

Basically it refers to the fact that Being can not be comprehended solely through an analysis of Being as Being, nor can it be understood through examining the beings through which it manifests itself, or Being as beings. The proper perspective would be to see Being and beings in their inter-relatedness; identical yet different (as in his essay "Identity and Difference").

In "Einleitung Zu: Was Ist Metaphysik?" he says:

"What remains more of a riddle, the fact that beings are, or the fact that Being is? Or does even such a reflection as this still fail to bring us close to the riddle that has come to pass with the Being of beings?"⁽²⁾ Here he is saying that to concentrate on either beings or Being fails to solve the riddle of the process referred to by the term "Being of beings."

Malet explains this term does not mean that on the one hand there is a being and on the other hand there is Being which differs from the being. "Being "is" itself the difference from a being, it does not "have" the difference. The basis of something does not stand apart from what is based, and therefore can have no relation to it: the basis is identical with what is based, and yet remains different."⁽³⁾

1 Malet, op.cit., p.323.

2 Heidegger, Wegmarken, p.211.

3 Malet, loc.cit.

Richardson says of this concept in Heidegger's thought:

"It seems quite clear that Heidegger here is thinking Being and beings in terms of their mutual dependence on each other, therefore the 'ontological difference' as such."⁽¹⁾
This is the clearest explanation of the term and we shall continue to think of the 'ontological difference' as referring to Being and being in their inter-dependence or need for each other.

Perhaps the most difficult of all Heideggerian insights to comprehend is that Being is the difference between beings and Being. It was perhaps to aid his readers over the barrier posed by representational thought (which asks how Being can be the difference between itself and beings, thereby encountering the problem of the same concept playing two distinct roles in this triangular relationship) that Heidegger in his later writings (especially Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens) refers to Being, the 'ontological difference', as das Seyn. In a later annotation to "On the Essence of Truth", he refers to "das Seyn as the difference between Being and beings."⁽²⁾

As was the case with Being as Nothingness, the 'ontological difference' assumes many of the functions associated with Being itself and what was previously said in reference to Being is also said in reference to the

1 Richardson, op.cit., p.563.

2 Heidegger, Wegmarken, p.96.

'ontological difference'. Thus in an annotation to Holzwege he states: "The forgottenness of Being is the forgottenness of the difference of Being and beings."⁽¹⁾

As for the similarity of functions, in his essay "A Dialogue on Language" he refers to Being, the 'ontological difference', as the two-fold and this two-fold is then seen to function in the same manner as Being. Like Being it determines the essential nature of man who must bear witness to it by responding to its call. Similarly, just as Dasein is authentically itself only when consciously turned toward Being, thereby providing its da, so also is man "really as man [only] when needed and used by...what calls on man to preserve the two-fold." The similarity is further seen in his reference to the two-fold as a 'clearing', a term previously mentioned in describing Being.⁽²⁾ In this way we can see that the 'ontological difference' is yet another mode of Being's revelation.

As usual, Heidegger supports his insight into the 'ontological difference' with an analysis of Greek thinking and language. In one of his later works, What Is Called Thinking?, he notes that this 'ontological difference' stems from the dual nature of the participle, Being, in Greek. He notes that all participles have a verbal as well as nominal (nounal) association. The participle Being is especially subject to the confusion resulting from this

1 Heidegger, Holzwege, p.336.

2 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, pp.30, 32 and 33.

duality for when understood as a noun, it refers to a being. When seen as a verbal form, it refers to the process by which a being 'is' or Being itself. Thus in the participle eon can be seen the 'ontological difference' itself: "a being has its being in Being, and Being persists as the Being of a being."⁽¹⁾

In the dual nature of participles, then, we see a reflection of the 'ontological difference' between being and Being. The duality of this participle is grounded in the ontological necessity that Being "is" (or "Beings") only through beings and that beings "are" only through Being. This process was revealed-concealed to the Greek in the experience referred to by the term eon.

With our consideration of Being as the 'ontological difference' we come to the solution of a problem posed by a Heideggerian about-face. In the quotes to follow, the first is from "What Is Metaphysics?" as it appeared in 1943. The second comes from a later edition of the same work.

"...it is of the truth of Being that Being may be without what-is (beings), but never what-is without Being."⁽²⁾

"Being never Beings [or is] without beings...beings are at no time [or can never be] without Being."⁽³⁾

The earlier statement undoubtedly stems from a time when Heidegger's consideration of Being as the 'ontological

1 Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, p.221.

2 Heidegger, Existence and Being, p.385.

3 Heidegger, Wegmarken, p.102.

difference' had not fully crystallized. Earlier it was said that the 'ontological difference' refers to the mutual dependence of Being and beings. Thus the statement of 1943 expressed only one portion of this 'ontological difference' and this necessitated the redaction of the essay in the later edition.

With this stress on the mutual dependence of Being and beings we can also better understand Heidegger's claim that "...Being itself is finite in essence..."⁽¹⁾ Being's dependence on beings through which it must reveal itself means that its finiteness will stem from the finite nature of these beings.

42. The unity of Being

To this point in our analysis of Heidegger's understanding of Being we have basically dealt with Being in three modes of manifestation; as aletheia or unconcealment, as Nothingness, and as the 'ontological difference' [the discussion of Being as history hinges upon an understanding of Being as aletheia]. By way of summary, we shall see that Being as the 'ontological difference' is inherently grounded in and closely related to Being as aletheia and as Nothingness. By revealing this inter-relatedness we will be establishing the unity underlying all the various manifestations of Being in Heideggerian thought.

On the relation between Being as the 'ontological difference' and as Nothingness, we need recall that it is the experience of Nothingness that prepares for the awareness

1 Heidegger, Existence and Being, p.377.

of Being as not like beings but vastly different from them. In the foreword to the third edition of "Vom Wesen des Grundes" Heidegger identifies the not in Nothingness (Being is not beings) with the not in the 'ontological difference' (Being is not beings although the two are mutually dependent). "[The] negating not of Nothingness and...[the] negating not of the 'ontological difference' are...the same in the sense that in the essencing [or coming-to-presence] of the Being of beings they belong together."⁽¹⁾

Having seen that Being as the 'ontological difference' and Being as Nothingness are the same, we turn next to Being as unconcealedness (aletheia) and as the 'ontological difference'. In the following Heidegger attributes the fact that truth as unconcealedness can be considered on two levels, the ontic and ontological, to the process in which Being unconceals itself necessarily in beings and vice versa. (This names the mutual dependence of the two and therefore the 'ontological difference'.)

The unconcealedness of Being is always the truth of the Being of beings...On the other hand, in the unconcealedness of being lies a prior unconcealedness of its Being. Each after its own fashion, ontical and ontological truth concern being in its Being and the Being of being. They belong together essentially by reason of their relationship to the difference between Being and being, the 'ontological difference'. The essence of truth, which is and must be bifurcated ontically and ontologically, is only possible given this difference.⁽²⁾

We have now established that Heidegger is dealing with one process, Being, in its various aspects and in this lies the unity and cohesiveness of his ontological pursuit.

1 Heidegger, Wegmarken, p.21.

2 Martin Heidegger, Vom Wesen des Grundes, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), p.26.

Conclusion To Division One

43. Heidegger the ontologist

We should recall that our purpose in examining the various interests reflected in Heidegger's philosophy was to reveal the unchanging theme of his thought, Being. In analyzing Dasein's mode of existence we noted how he proceeded from the existentiell, superficial features of life to the more basic existential structures. We followed as he uncovered the basic unitary structure care, in both its totality and authentic mode, and we then observed how time was revealed as the even more basic, underlying factor which made care possible. We noted that time as a structure of existence is actually one mode of Being's manifestness, hence the title of his book, Being and Time. There can be no doubt now as to the ontological motive and interest of Heidegger's Dasein analysis and, as if to emphasize this even further, we can recall how this analysis was labelled "fundamental ontology."

Heidegger's insistence on this point remained unchanged in later writings as well; typical of these is the following from "The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics": "to lead our thinking on the way on which it may recall Being itself in its truth - to do that the thinking attempted in Being and Time is "on the way"."(1)

1 Heidegger, "The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics", p.315.

We moved next to Heidegger's language analysis and observed how he abandoned the Dasein analysis as an avenue to Being due to the inadequacy of traditional language to express his insights. His interest in the writings of early Greek thinkers was seen to stem from a belief that Being had revealed itself most clearly to these thinkers and had left its imprint on and been retained in their language.

Similarly we saw that his interest in poetry - poesie stemmed from the belief that poetry in the broad sense referred to that process in which Being provided the ground and basis for beings. Poesie, or poetry in the strict sense of the word, was also seen to be the result of Being revealing-concealing itself to particular thinkers.

We also noted in his assertions that language uses man and speaks through him, that language is the "house of Being" and that the Being of entities resides in the words for them, how Heidegger came to identify language as another term for the Being process itself. Thus in his language analysis it was very apparent that Heidegger's interest was ontological. Certainly there can be no question as to a basic shift in position involved in his move from Dasein to language analysis since Being continues to be the central theme.

Just as his quest for Being led him to consider language, it was also inevitable that he have to consider the thought process as well since this too was involved in

any consideration of Being. We noted how in his earlier works thinking was closely related to Being even though it was then seen basically as an activity of man, a human process.

However, as his thinking evolved and matured we observed a gradual shift in emphasis until thinking came to be seen as a process instigated by Being in which man no longer held the initiative. From man the questioner we moved to Being the questionable which granted thinking to man. In such concepts as aletheia, the unthought, and retrieving we saw Heidegger's insistence that thinking is another mode of Being's manifestation of itself. Now the thinker plays a far more passive role as Being expresses itself and Beings through his thoughts. Here, too, we established that Heidegger's interest and motivation was ontological from first to last.

We concluded our consideration of Heidegger's philosophy by noting how the results of his investigations into various fields were reflected in his understanding of Being itself. We noted how Being - aletheia indicated a simultaneous revealing-concealing in Being's revelation. This process was also seen as the ground of history, which began with Being's initial exposure of itself to the Greeks and included subsequent epochs characterized by the various ways in which Being was recognized.

We also saw how Nothingness was another term for the Being process and we finished with a consideration of Being as the "ontological difference." In his insistence on the mutual dependence of Being and being and their need for

each other, we saw a clear reflection of the balance in Heidegger's thinking. This concept, the "ontological difference," protected his anthropological and ontological flanks in that it nullified any criticism of an over-emphasis on one to the exclusion of the other.

Furthermore, we can see this concept lurking unthematically in the background of all his analyses, the nature of Dasein, the 'ontological animal,' reaches its fulfillment in an awareness of its dependence upon Being which in turn depends on Dasein for its da, its there, its place amongst beings. By the same token language and thinking are only authentic and essential when they are open to and reflect the Being process which in turn depends on them for revealing itself and grounding beings.

In this way we again are directed to this idea of balance as the key trait which lends such strength to Heidegger's varied pursuit of Being. As a consequence of this, we have an important standard by which to gauge the effectiveness of the various theologians' use of Heideggerian insights. Just as we were able to comprehend and appreciate his philosophy only through an awareness of his overall balanced position, so too any attempt to utilize his insights theologically should avoid any tendency to focus on one phase to the exclusion of the rest. Such an approach would inevitably distort his approach by losing sight of its balance.

DIVISION TWO

HEIDEGGER AND THEOLOGY

THE EARLIER HEIDEGGER AND BULTMANN'S THEOLOGY

CHAPTER FIVE

Introduction

44. A preliminary view of Heidegger's influence on Bultmann

By way of introducing the following analysis of Martin Heidegger's influence on the theology of Rudolf Bultmann, we might establish several basic points. First we shall show the importance of Bultmann's contributions to contemporary theology. Next we shall establish the fact that he is influenced by Heidegger. Then we shall outline the general approach and subject matter to be covered in this study, with particular note of the main thesis as well as several sub-theses to be proven.

Of Bultmann's importance for the contemporary theological scene there can be no doubt. As James M. Robinson in his book A New Quest of the Historical Jesus says: "Germany is just as nearly Bultmannian today as it was Barthian a generation ago, Ritschlian half a century or more ago, and Hegelian still earlier; and Bultmann's works and ideas have become Germany's dominant theological export throughout the world."⁽¹⁾

In speaking about his overall aim of continuing in the tradition of both "liberal" and "dialectical" theology, Bultmann openly acknowledges his dependence on Heidegger's approach to existentialism. In carrying out

1 James M. Robinson, A New Quest of the Historical Jesus, (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1959), p.11.

his aim, he says, "...the work of existential philosophy, which I came to know through my discussions with Martin Heidegger, became of decisive significance for me."⁽¹⁾ More particularly, in his article "Milestones in Books", Bultmann acknowledges that from an examination of Heidegger's Being and Time, he gained both a deeper understanding of the nature of human existence as well as a conceptual framework for giving contemporary expression to his theological insights.⁽²⁾

Basically our consideration of Bultmann's theology will be oriented toward four of his particular interests, the relation of philosophy and theology, his reaction to the subject-object pattern in thinking, his concern for hermeneutics and his interest in history. In our consideration of these various interests, we will substantiate our main thesis that Bultmann is influenced to a great extent by Heidegger's philosophy in the basic direction and structure of his theology as a whole as well as in many particular components of it. In addition we will also support the following assertions: first, that Bultmann's understanding and adaptation of Heidegger is generally oriented toward his earlier contributions and second, that the later Heidegger is relevant for Bultmann since the adaptation of certain later Heideggerian insights could

1 Kegley, op.cit., p.XXIV

2 Rudolf Bultmann, "Milestones in Books", The Expository Times, Vol.70 (1958), p.125.

greatly strengthen Bultmann's position.

Finally, we should state at the outset that we will only be considering those aspects of Bultmann's theology in which a Heideggerian influence is apparent. Therefore, our analysis of him will be somewhat restricted. However, because of the extent of Heidegger's influence, we will still get a fairly comprehensive view of Bultmann's theology.

The Relation of Philosophy and Theology

Section One

45. Bultmann and existentialism

Before considering some of the specific applications of philosophical insights in Bultmann's theology, we shall first note several of his more general observations on the need of theology to relate itself to philosophy. One such need, which stands within a tradition dating back centuries, would be related to the apologetic aim of theology. As Paul Tillich notes, theology has two purposes; "the statement of the truth of the Christian message and the interpretation of this truth for every new generation. Theology moves back and forth between two poles, the eternal truth of its foundation and the temporal situation in which the eternal truth must be received."⁽¹⁾ Certainly one of the central thrusts in Bultmann's theology is his concern to make the Word of God intelligible and relevant for his contemporaries. This concern partially explains his selection of a contemporary philosopher's insights as a vehicle for expressing an "eternal truth" to a particular "situation."

Bultmann also justifies the need for relating theology and philosophy by noting their shared interest in man; both consider man and develop an anthropology to some extent. Although alike in their concern for man, the two

1 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, I (London: Nisbet, 1951), p.3.

disciplines are distinguished by the manner in which they approach this object. In his essay "The Historicity of Man and Faith" Bultmann very clearly establishes the borders between philosophy and theology by pointing out where they share interests and where they part ways. He explains that while they have the same object, man, they approach it in different ways, philosophy by considering the formal ontological aspects of existence and theology by speaking of the concrete, existentiell aspects of everyday existence.⁽¹⁾ Bultmann further justifies this relation between theology and philosophy by saying that "...theology as a science can make fruitful use of the philosophical analysis of human existence. For the man of faith is in any case a man, just as the proclamation out of which faith arises encounters him as a human word."⁽²⁾

In a less general vein, Bultmann selects one school of philosophy, existentialism, as particularly relevant for contemporary theology. In An Existentialist Theology John Macquarrie says this selection is justified because of the special affinity between the Scriptural and existential understanding of human nature. He supports this thesis by noting the similarity of the distinctions made by Biblical writers between man, the image of God, and nature and the existentialists between entities whose mode

1 Rudolf Bultmann, Existence and Faith, trans. by Schubert Ogden, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1961), p.94.

2 Ibid.

of Being is Existenz and Vorhandenheit. He goes on to substantiate this similarity with a comparison of the main themes in the Biblical and existential understandings of man. Such Biblical interests as individual responsibility before God, man's fall from his true destiny into concern for the world, guilt, the call for decision, the fleeting nature of man's temporal existence and its termination by death are very similar to such existentialist themes as responsibility of the individual in regards to fulfilling his potential or losing it, fallenness, guilt, resolve, temporality and death. That these two approaches are closely related in their understanding of human nature thus seems undeniable.⁽¹⁾

Now we need to consider what it is about one existentialist in particular, Martin Heidegger, which causes Bultmann to rely so heavily upon him. Macquarrie points out that theology, of necessity, utilizes much of the same language and concepts as secular disciplines and if theology is to be rigorous and respectable it must not employ such language and concepts naively. Instead it should carefully analyse its presuppositions since these inevitably have a bearing on the outcome of theological analyses.

In considering a "theological" statement such as "Man is related to God", Macquarrie points out that even here certain philosophical presuppositions are implied;

1 John Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, p.18.

e.g. what is it about the Being of man that he can be related, does not the word "is" itself also have certain ontological connotations, etc. In this way he establishes the possibility of a "pre-theological" inquiry into the nature of the entities with which theology must deal. Although such an inquiry would be ontological in nature, its inherent relationship to theology stems from the fact that it considers the very foundation upon which any particular theology would be built.⁽¹⁾ When we recall Heidegger's insistence that ontology lays the foundation from which all particular disciplines must move, it is not surprising that Bultmann selects his philosophy, with its existential as well as ontological slant, as a guide for his "pre-theological" inquiry.

Bultmann's preference for Heidegger's philosophy can also be explained by this philosopher's inherent debt to an early theological training which gave a peculiar religious flavour to all his "secular" insights. André Malet notes that Heidegger "has a profounder knowledge of the New Testament than do many exegetes and theologians.." and he lists as formative influences on Heidegger's thought such great theologians as Augustine and Luther.⁽²⁾

Bultmann carefully points to this aspect of Heidegger's philosophy as being a factor in his relevance

1 Ibid., pp.6-7.

2 André Malet, The Thought of Rudolf Bultmann, trans. by Richard Strachan, (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1969), p.330.

for theology. In the essay "New Testament and Mythology" Bultmann says of Heidegger's concern for the decision between an inauthentic life immersed in the world and trapped by past deeds and the authentic life of commitment to and freedom for the future; "Is not that exactly the New Testament understanding of human life?"⁽¹⁾

We have now traced why Bultmann relates his theology to philosophy in general, why to one particular school of philosophy, existentialism, and why to one particular representative of that school, Heidegger. Later we shall see that actually he even limits himself to the earlier views of this one particular philosopher. We shall now consider how Bultmann incorporates Heidegger's insights into his theology.

1 Rudolf Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology", Kerygma and Myth, I, ed. by H.W. Bartsch, trans. by R.H. Fuller, (London: SPCK, 1953), pp.24-25.

The Subject-Object Pattern in Thinking

Section Two

46. Bultmann and talk about God

A basic thrust in Heidegger's philosophy stems from his rejection of the subject-object pattern in thinking which he feels leads to the modern technological outlook in which man, the subject, dominates the world around him. What does not conform to his outlook cannot be considered a part of reality. In place of this subject-object scheme, Heidegger offers the ontological notion of Being as aletheia, in which reality un-conceals, unfolds itself to man, who is more receptive than dominant.

This insight is to some extent incorporated throughout Bultmann's theology and would certainly qualify as a part of Macquarrie's "pre-theological inquiry." Walter Schmithals, a former student of Bultmann whose lectures commemorating his professor's eightieth birthday appear in book form as An Introduction to the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, notes that Bultmann has carried Heidegger's attack on the subject-object pattern into theological concerns. As a modern form of thought, the subject-object pattern is seen as alien to the Biblical outlook which could never understand God and the world as objects standing over against man the subject. Indeed, the thought of God as an object for man's comprehension and thus at his disposal is completely foreign to the Scriptural frame of mind. Thus theology's task is to

break down this barrier to a sympathetic interpretation of the Scriptural approach to the relationship between man, world and God.⁽¹⁾

Many Bultmannians feel that much of the criticism directed at Bultmann would be avoided were this aspect of his thought better understood. As we shall see, his views on the subject-object pattern of thinking underlie many aspects of his theology and, because of the difficulty in following his thinking on this topic, (Heidegger also despaired at times of ever being understood in his attempts at overcoming metaphysics) it seems plausible that this is a factor in the confusion and misunderstandings which have repeatedly followed the spread of Bultmann's thought in Germany and elsewhere.⁽²⁾ Thus we will be touching on this theme by implication throughout our analysis of Bultmann's theology. However, at this point it would be helpful to consider several specific examples of this theme as well as several specific criticisms resulting from a lack of insight into it.

In his essay "What Does It Mean to Speak of God?", Bultmann rejects all talk about God. In making God an object of thought or discussion, he feels theology inevitably loses touch with the reality it is seeking. God as the "wholly Other" can never be at the disposal of man's

1 Walter Schmithals, An Introduction to the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, trans. by John Bowden, (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1967), p.29.

2 Schubert Ogden, Christ Without Myth, (London: Collins, 1962), p.22.

thought and God as the "Almighty" who determines, guides, and indeed creates man's existence is wholly lost when man seeks to reverse the situation, and manipulate God through an idea or concept of Him. He explains that when regarded as an object of thought toward which one can be either neutral, positive or negative, the reality of God the Almighty is completely lost.⁽¹⁾ Here then we see Bultmann adapting Heidegger's criticism of the subject-object pattern in thinking in his rejection of all thinking and speaking about God which seeks to "grasp" or manipulate Him.

Next we need to consider how Bultmann adapts the positive alternative Heidegger offers to this defective type of speaking and thinking. Basically this alternative is developed in two stages. In the earlier Heidegger, Being is grasped solely through a consideration of its place or there (da) in the world, Dasein. As a result, Being and Time is devoted exclusively to fundamental ontology, or analysis of Dasein. In the later Heidegger, attention is still focused on Dasein but with less emphasis. Now Being as aletheia plays the dominant role in the revelation of itself through Dasein's language and thinking. Here Being is active and dominant, Dasein is passive and receptive.

Bultmann is directly influenced by the earlier stage in Heidegger's thinking in his formulation of the

1 Rudolf Bultmann, Faith and Understanding, trans. by Louise P. Smith, (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1960), p.59.

concept of self-understanding. Just as for Heidegger Being is understood through analysis of Dasein, so for Bultmann God is understood through analysis of the man of faith. How do we know God? Bultmann would reply that God as the Almighty who determines and grounds man's existence can only be understood as He is experienced. To know God is to experience God through His actions upon us. Now we can understand Bultmann's contention that "...when the question is raised of how any speaking of God can be possible, the answer must be, it is only possible as talk of ourselves."⁽¹⁾

We can see then how Bultmann's adaptation of Heidegger's opposition to the subject-object pattern in thinking leads to the formulation of his concept self-understanding. In its stress that an understanding of God always involves an understanding of the self, this concept clearly reflects one of the hallmarks of Bultmann's theology, a close association of theology and anthropology. In the following we shall see how extensive a role this concept does play in his theology as a whole.

In his interpretation of Old Testament material this concept is apparent in the assertion that affirmation of God the creator does not deal with information about the nature of a creator God. "The affirmation can only be a personal confession that I understand myself to be a

1. Ibid., p.61.

creature which owes its existence to God. It cannot be made as a neutral statement, but only as thanksgiving and surrender."⁽¹⁾

This same concern is also reflected in his interpretation of New Testament material. He insists that Pauline theology should not be treated as a speculative system since it deals not with God in Himself but only as He is significant for man. Now every statement about God is to be understood simultaneously as a statement about man and vice versa. Thus Paul's theology "is at the same time anthropology."⁽²⁾ Similarly, his views on the significance of Christ, that He is to be understood through His effect on our self-understanding, cause Karl Barth to make the accusation that Bultmann's Christology is wholly absorbed into his soteriology.⁽³⁾ Hence by virtue of its relation to self-understanding, a cornerstone concept, the influence of Heidegger's philosophy on Bultmann's theology is extensive.

To this point in his solution to the problem of speaking and thinking about God, Bultmann has followed a

1 Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1960), p.69.

2 Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, trans. by Kendrick Grobel, (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1965), p.190.

3 Karl Barth, "Rudolf Bultmann - An Attempt to Understand Him"; Kerygma and Myth, II, p.96.

course parallel to that of the earlier Heidegger. However, the later Heidegger saw the weaknesses of limiting ontology to a Dasein analysis and, as his thinking matured, he modified the direction taken in regards to the pursuit of Being. As stated earlier, his emphasis shifted to a consideration of Being as manifested in such various modes as language, thought, nothingness and the 'ontological difference.' However, Bultmann failed to follow this shift and continued even further on a path deeper and deeper into the nature of existence. As a result he continues to insist that speaking and thinking of God be limited to existence as the arena of the experience of God's revelation.

The issue is still not resolved for Bultmann since he also asserts that it is impossible to speak 'about' existence. This too would necessarily involve subjection to the subject-object pattern. In "What Does It Mean to Speak of God?" he states: "We thus find ourselves in the same astonishing predicament in relation to our existence as in relation to God. We cannot really talk about either; we have no power over either."⁽¹⁾

He explains that talk about existence inevitably succumbs to the subject-object pattern of thought since to view one's self as an object necessarily distorts the nature of existence, confusing the self with "an object of

1 Bultmann, Faith and Understanding, p.58.

scientific investigation." Nor is the problem solved by labelling the self as subject over against all else as objects for "man is seen from outside even when he is designated subject." He concludes, therefore, that "... the distinction between subject and object must be kept separate from the question of our own existence."⁽¹⁾

What then is the solution to this predicament into which Bultmann has placed theology. He rejects the solution of quietism since this too involves the same pattern of thought. (To decide for quietism "...would be making the old mistake, that is...regarding the idea of God as something in respect of which a specific attitude is possible or appropriate."⁽²⁾)

We can now see that Bultmann has posed an apparently insoluble problem for theology. He has said on the one hand that thinking and speaking of God, which must always be of ourselves as well, is impossible since we cannot think and speak of our own existence without utilizing the defective subject-object pattern of thinking. On the other hand, it is equally wrong not to speak and think about God.

Bultmann's solution to this dilemma is that obedience to God's revelation requires us to speak and think about God despite the objectivizing of Him that this

1 Ibid., p.59.

2 Ibid., p.61.

inevitably involves. This can be done because God gracefully forgives and justifies our necessarily sinful attempts to comprehend and communicate His revelation. As a result, "all our acts and words are freed from the curse of dividing us from God."⁽¹⁾ Walter Schmithals suggests that here we clearly see the dialectical note in Bultmann's theology since it speaks of God as that about which man cannot speak but nevertheless proceeds in faith to speak about Him. "That is its dialectic, in which it must persevere if it is not to fall into either objectification of its subject or silence."⁽²⁾

Unlike Schmithals, we would suggest that at this point Bultmann's position borders on being contradictory, the tension seems too great to be dialectically maintained. Bultmann admits he is speaking of God even when saying it is impossible to do so. His attempt to resolve the dilemma by speaking of a "forgiven" and justified God-talk certainly does not resolve the problem. Instead he does not completely escape the subject-object pattern since he asserts that any thinking or speaking of God necessarily objectivizes Him and is therefore sinful. However, Heidegger's later philosophy does provide insights into a type of language and thought which would respect the status of God the Almighty and nevertheless allow for real speaking and thinking of Him.

1 Ibid., p.64.

2 Schmithals, op.cit., p.45.

It is only fair to note here that Bultmann's failure to utilize fully this Heideggerian insight resulted from the fact that it was only partially developed in Being and Time and did not become a central issue until Heidegger's thinking developed further. We will discuss the relevance of these later developments for Bultmann's theology in a subsequent analysis. Suffice it to say now that Bultmann's answer to the possibility of speaking and thinking about God was motivated directly, as we have shown, by the earlier Heidegger's opposition to the subject-object pattern in thinking.

With our consideration of Bultmann's adaptation of these Heideggerian insights into the subject-object pattern of thought we have begun to see the extent of Heidegger's influence in such critical issues as God talk and self-understanding. We turn now to several of the more popular criticisms of Bultmann's approach which his supporters feel would be nullified by a better understanding of him on this point.

One of the most frequently encountered criticisms of Bultmann is that he ~~tends to be~~ subjective. Friedrich Gogarten in Demythologizing and History offers a detailed rebuttal of this charge. As we have already seen, Bultmann declares that to know God is to experience His effects on one's existence through an encounter with Him. The result of this ~~encoun~~ter is a new self-understanding since one sees oneself in a new light following such an experience.

Now, if considered in light of the subject-object scheme which is very alien to Bultmann's thinking, this concept of self-understanding inevitably smacks of subjectivism since the "objective" pole (God in this case) in the experience is not dealt with over against the subjective pole (man). As Gogarten notes, such criticisms stem from the failure of Bultmann's opponents as well as supporters to free their thinking of the subject-object pattern. As a result it follows "...with the logical necessity which thought conducted within the subject-object pattern cannot avoid, that this self-understanding is transformed into an 'immanent content of consciousness' or some sort of 'subjective validity and interpretation'..." (1)

Another of the charges frequently made against Bultmann's approach is that he dispels the "real" figure of Jesus and the "actual" Easter event. Gogarten is quick to point out that these criticisms also stem from a point of view labouring under the subject-object dilemma and therefore alien to Bultmann's approach. To seek an objective Jesus and resurrection typifies the need to make history into an object over against the historian as subject. This separation destroys the necessary involvement of the historian in his work. Gogarten believes that those seeking an 'objective revelational reality' are

1 Friedrich Gogarten, Demythologizing and History, trans. by Neville H. Smith, (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1960), pp.54-55.

hopelessly mired in the "...'Babylonian captivity' imposed on them by a scientific concept which is essentially alien to theology."⁽¹⁾ To seek an objective reality in historical revelation is simply another way of insuring man's supremacy as the 'subject' over against God's revelation as the 'object' of comprehension.

We have now seen several specific implications resulting from Bultmann's application of Heidegger's attack on the subject-object pattern of thought and have also noted how a sound understanding of this aspect of Bultmannian theology nullifies certain criticisms frequently made against it. We should keep in mind as we proceed that this same issue will continue to affect indirectly other areas of our analysis as well.

1 Ibid., p.85.

Hermeneutics

Section Three

47. Exegesis

If one were to look for a central thrust to Bultmann's diverse theological interests, the most plausible selection would be his interest in hermeneutics. For our purpose, we shall first consider Bultmann's hermeneutical principles as they are reflected in his views on exegesis. We will then see how the hermeneutical circle runs through his theology and finally we will observe his hermeneutical principles at work in his interpretation of Pauline theology. In each instance we will carefully note the influence of Heidegger's philosophy.

First we turn to exegesis. Bultmann firmly insists that exegesis is not an independent discipline but is closely related to other fields, especially philosophy, both for its terminology and presuppositions. In Kerygma and Myth I, he labels as a fallacy the belief that an exegete can work without the use of secular terminology since every exegete is "...dependent upon a terminology which has come down to him by tradition, though it is accepted uncritically and without reflection, and every traditional terminology is one way or another dependent upon a particular philosophy."⁽¹⁾

1 Rudolf Bultmann, "Bultmann Replies to his Critics", Kerygma and Myth I, p.193.

André Malet (whose book on Bultmann was highly praised and appreciated in a review by Bultmann himself⁽¹⁾) stresses that, despite his protests, even the most conservative exegete has philosophical presuppositions since as a human being he is subject to certain influences and factors which necessarily influence his judgment and comprehension. The less aware one is of these factors, the more dependent one is upon them for this indicates a dependence upon "the philosophy of the man in the street."⁽²⁾

However, Bultmann carefully stresses that his presuppositions are confined to the method and not results of exegetical endeavours. In Jesus Christ and Mythology, he explains that rather than presupposing the meaning of a text, "we must learn from it." An exegesis which seeks to coerce its results into conforming with a pre-conceived dogmatic statement is of course faulty. "There is, however, a difference in principle between presuppositions in respect of results and presuppositions in respect of method."⁽³⁾

We can grasp the essentials of Bultmann's exegetical presuppositions by considering two of his inter-related hermeneutical concepts, life-relation and preunderstanding. All exegesis is possible only if the exegete and document share a relationship to the matter

1 Malet, op.cit., p.1.

2 Ibid., p.192.

3 Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p.49.

involved in the document. On a crass level, this is illustrated by the necessity that both text and exegete share a common language. By the same token, they must also share common concepts and, further, common basic understandings of the subject matter. Bultmann illustrates this point by saying one can only understand a text dealing with music based on a prior experience with music, or a text discussing math based on a prior relationship to mathematics.⁽¹⁾

"The resulting...presupposition of exegesis is that you do have a relation to the subject matter...about which you interrogate a given text. I call this relation the life-relation."⁽²⁾ Such a relation is only valid, furthermore, when it concerns issues of vital importance and real interest to the exegete. This means that the subject matter in the text is never approached with an abstract, disinterested frame of mind.⁽³⁾

In addition, this life-relation to the subject matter of the text means that the exegete also has a certain amount of understanding of the matter prior to examining the text. Hence, the life-relation necessarily involves a preunderstanding. As he explains: "In this (life-relation) you have a certain understanding of the matter in question,

1 Rudolf Bultmann, Essays, trans. by James C.G. Greig, (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1955), pp.242-243.

2 Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p.50.

3 Bultmann, Existence and Faith, p.294.

...Without such a relation and such previous understanding /Vorverständnis or preunderstanding/ it is impossible to understand any text."⁽¹⁾ This preunderstanding influences the interpretation of a text in that it determines the standpoint from which the text will be approached. After all the formulation of a question about a subject matter presupposes at least a vague awareness of what is involved therein. Complete ignorance necessarily nullifies any questioning.⁽²⁾

John Macquarrie explains the influence of the preunderstanding with the term Fragestellung, which means "the putting of the question" or the way in which a question is asked. The attitude with which the text is approached or questioned does have some bearing on the answer given, e.g. a man desperately searching for spiritual guidance and meaning in his life will "put the question" of God's existence to a text in a radically different way than a philosopher who is searching for a ground or basis to the universe. Both may decide that there is a God but their opinion of this God's nature will differ considerably and this difference is the direct result of the way in which the question was put.⁽³⁾

In this way, the preunderstanding indirectly influences the outcome of the interpretation. Is this then a weakness

1 Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p.50.

2 Bultmann, Essays, p.239.

3 Macquarrie, op.cit., p.11.

leading inevitably to subjectively distorted interpretation? Not at all, says Bultmann, for it is only when the interpreter approaches the text fully aware of his own needs (or life-relation) and questions that the text becomes meaningful for him. Real comprehension of a text "presupposes the utmost liveness of the comprehending subject and the richest possible unfolding of his individuality...The 'most subjective' interpretation is in this case the 'most objective.'"⁽¹⁾

A closer analysis of the concept, preunderstanding, will dispel many of the criticisms which might be raised against it. For instance, several of Bultmann's critics question the wisdom of employing this hermeneutical concept in relation to the Bible as they fear it would not respect the uniqueness of God's revelation. However, Bultmann replies that even God's word must share something in common with man's mode of comprehension or else the two could not meet without one destroying the identity of the other.

In his essay "Revelation in the New Testament" Bultmann explains that our pre-understanding of revelation is a peculiar "not-knowing knowledge." He illustrates by saying that just as a person can know what love and friendship are without having fallen in love or made friends, so can one know about revelation without experiencing it.

1 Bultmann, Essays, p.256.

On the other hand such a person does not really understand revelation for "...the person who is friendless and unloved only really knows what friendship and love are when he finds a friend and is given love."⁽¹⁾

We have now seen how Bultmann asserts the necessity of philosophical presuppositions for the methods but not results of exegesis and we have analyzed his exegetical presuppositions through a consideration of the inter-related concepts "pre-understanding" and "life-relation." We can next consider how he adopts one particular philosophy as the correct source of presupposition for Biblical exegesis.

What is our life-relation to the content of the Scriptures? With what pre-understanding do we approach them? Bultmann stresses that there must be some continuity or point of contact between our comprehension and God's Word or otherwise there could be no revelation. However, respect for the otherness of God's Word requires that this continuity not be too extensive. In Jesus Christ and Mythology he states that man "...has a relation to God in his search for God, conscious or unconscious. Man's life is moved by the search for God because it is always moved, consciously or unconsciously, by the question about his own personal existence."⁽²⁾

1 Bultmann, Existence and Faith, p.62.

2 Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, pp.52-53.

What the Bible shares with its interpreter is the concern for existence. "The tradition and the preaching of the Church tells us that we are to hear in the Bible authoritative words about our existence."⁽¹⁾ The pre-understanding which determines our approach to the Scriptures is concern for our existence. Therefore it becomes our responsibility to clarify and elucidate this pre-understanding so that we can approach the Scriptures with the most pertinent questions and have a clear understanding of existence in which to incorporate the understanding revealed by revelation. "If it is true that the right questions are concerned with the possibilities of understanding human existence, then it is necessary to discover the adequate conceptions by which such understanding is to be expressed. To discover those conceptions is the task of philosophy."⁽²⁾

As John Macquarrie explains, any inquiry needs a terminology and corresponding complex of ideas appropriate for its subject matter. These he refers to with the term Begrifflichkeit, or terminology, which is the system of basic concepts any inquiry employs in comprehending its subject matter, e.g. biology, mathematics and history all have their own Begrifflichkeit.⁽³⁾

What then is the proper terminology for an interpretation of the Scriptures. As we have already seen,

1 Ibid., p.53.

2 Ibid., p.54.

3 Macquarrie, op.cit., p.13.

the shared life relation of the text and exegete here is concern for personal existence. Further, the preunderstanding we bring to the text, the perspective from which we question it, is also concern for our existence. Therefore we need to find a philosophy which has developed a suitable terminology for existential analysis and will also respect the uniqueness and otherness of revelation.

Heidegger's philosophy, with its existentiell-existential distinction in the analysis of existence, uniquely fills the bill as Bultmann's "right philosophy." Because it remains on the existential level, clarifying the boundaries and scope of the various groups of possibilities without infringing on the ontic-existentiell level, the realm of theology, this philosophy provides a neutral, formal foundation and framework into which theology's existentiell ontic concerns can be fitted. (We might recall that an existential analysis deals with the basic underlying aspects of existence while the existentiell analysis describes daily concrete concerns.)

Bultmann is very careful to stress the neutral formal nature of the existential-ontological analysis so as to avoid any criticism of allowing his philosophical foundation to swallow up his theological concerns. The philosophical analysis merely prepares man for the existentiell encounter of faith with its demand for a decision "here and now " In Jesus Christ and Mythology he explains:

...does the existentialist understanding...already include a decision in favor of a particular understanding? Certainly such a decision is included, but what decision? Precisely the decision..."You must exist." Without this decision, without the readiness to be a human being, a person who in responsibility takes it upon himself to be, no one can understand a single word of the Bible as speaking to his own personal existence. (1)

Hence, even the decision which is clarified by the existential analysis is not in any way theologically biased. Instead, it merely prepares for the existentiell decision resulting from an encounter with God's Word. The existential basis provided by philosophy does not conflict with the existentiell insights filled in by theological analysis since the two operate on different levels. For instance, the existential analysis might provide the formal understanding of an "encounter" while theology speaks of one particular encounter in the "here and now" which involves a specific decision, the formal structure of which had been analyzed existentially. We can now see how Heidegger's existentialist analysis can provide a preunderstanding of existence which is still open to the uniqueness of God's revelation. Here the dialectical tension between the continuity and discontinuity of man's comprehension and revelational content is maintained.

We can further appreciate Bultmann's unique

1 Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p.57.

approach to exegesis with a consideration of his terms Sachexegese (exegesis of the subject matter) and Sachkritik (criticism of the subject matter). As he is also heavily indebted to Heideggerian insights at this point, a brief review would be helpful. As we saw in the section on language in Heidegger's philosophy, he felt that Being's revelation of itself to man in a process of simultaneous concealment and unconcealment (aletheia) left an imprint on the words resulting from such a disclosure.

Hence, the later interpreter should use the text as a means of standing within this past disclosure of Being alongside the ancient author, so that another aspect of Being's revelation might be revealed to him which the original participant failed to appreciate. Such a process was referred to as a retrieve. Through this retrieve, a later interpreter might be able to understand the subject matter before the original author even better than the author himself. As Heidegger noted, he might be even more Greek than the Greeks.

We can now establish the meaning Bultmann assigns to the terms Sachexegese (exegesis of the subject matter) and Sachkritik (criticism of the subject matter) and then be able to point out Heidegger's influence at this point. In his essay "The Problem of a Theological Exegesis of the New Testament," he refers to theological exegesis as Sachexegese, which deals not just with what the text actually says but rather with the "matter" about which it

speaks. In his assertion that such an approach "focuses on the light which shines through from beyond the surface", we can see that Bultmann is attempting to penetrate to a reality or "matter" beneath the obvious expression of the text which is not necessarily apparent in the words of the text itself.⁽¹⁾

He goes on to explain that Sachkritik is a criticism "which distinguishes between what is said and what is meant and measures what is said by what is meant."

(2) In another article, "Karl Barth's Römerbrief", he further describes Sachkritik as "understanding the text in light of the subject matter."⁽³⁾ The subject matter behind the words of the text now becomes the standard by which the text is judged as to its effectiveness in expressing adequately its concern.

Sachkritik, then, is the methodology Bultmann recommends for theological exegesis, or Sachexegese, in

1 Rudolf Bultmann, "The Problem of a Theological Exegesis of the New Testament", quoted by James D. Smart, The Divided Mind of Modern Theology (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1967), p.137.

2 Bultmann, "The Problem of a Theological Exegesis of the New Testament", quoted by Schmithals, op.cit., p.245.

3 Rudolf Bultmann, "Karl Barth's Römerbrief", quoted by Schmithals, p.245.

which the exegete penetrates beyond the words or surface of the text to the subject matter with which the author was concerned. This subject matter is then used to determine how effective the author was in expressing his concern, for no author, Scriptural or otherwise, "always speaks only about the matter in hand."⁽¹⁾

The influence of Heidegger's approach at this point is quite apparent. For both men, the immediate text serves as a jumping-off point from which the underlying subject matter can be reached. There is the assumption in both approaches that the text does not necessarily express the subject matter adequately, and this explains how the exegete can penetrate beyond the author's words and understand his intention even better than he was able to express it.

48. The hermeneutical circle

To this point we have been seeking to understand Bultmann's hermeneutics through examining the reflection of his hermeneutical principles in his approach to exegesis. We now turn to a direct discussion of these principles themselves. The theme which runs throughout his hermeneutics, and therefore his theology as well, is the hermeneutical circle. This concept has also been encountered in the analysis of Heidegger's thought so we shall first consider Bultmann's use of it and then

1 Ibid.

establish the relation with Heidegger's use.

We have already encountered the idea of a pre-understanding in hermeneutics which was seen to be a vague not-knowing knowledge which can nevertheless give direction to an inquiry. Illustrations of such knowledge would be a blind man's understanding of sight and a friendless person's knowledge of friendship. Such pre-understanding, by acting as a guide for any inquiry, leads to the understanding resulting from such an inquiry.

To understand the relation between the two, we now must consider Bultmann's views on understanding. There are three key traits in understanding as defined by Bultmann. The first is that it involves practical, not theoretical, knowledge; that is, knowledge as experienced and not just known in the abstract. John Macquarrie stresses that Bultmann is directly indebted to Heidegger for the insight that understanding is primarily practical and is theoretical or abstract only in a secondary sense.

This order of priorities stems from the fact that science treats objects as vorhanden (present-at-hand) whereas Dasein is primarily related in its daily existence to objects zuhanden (ready-at-hand). Hence, practical knowledge, which Macquarrie labels existential knowledge, is of primary importance and in this category should fall theological awareness of God. In this way Bultmann's claim that knowledge of God is always existential and never theoretical or abstract can be seen as derived from

Heidegger's analysis of knowledge.⁽¹⁾ We have already seen one result of this approach in the discussion concerning the impossibility of an abstract knowledge about God.

The second trait of understanding as defined by Bultmann is its openendedness. Understanding is never definitely achieved in a once-for-all manner. Instead it is open toward the future when new understandings will develop. In contact with new experiences and new decisions existential understanding and knowledge constantly adapts and grows. As Schmithals explains, "existential understanding is per definitionem always new understanding: it is never knowledge possessed, because it is a decision to be made on each several occasion."⁽²⁾

The third trait of understanding as defined by Bultmann is that it is always self-understanding. To understand something is to understand oneself anew in light of it. If the object of understanding does not affect the self-understanding it remains on the secondary abstract level of theoretical understanding. Only when it is experienced is it primarily understood and then it has become a part of the self-understanding. Thus the acquisition of a new friend does not so much affect one's knowledge of the concept friendship as it changes one's self image. With a new friend what "more I know is this:

1 Macquarrie, op.cit., pp.56-58.

2 Schmithals, op.cit., p.244.

I know my friend and I know myself in a new way, because my understanding of the friend gives my concrete life in work and joy, in struggle and grief, a new quality."⁽¹⁾

Having defined understanding and pre-understanding we can now establish how the relation between the two forms the hermeneutical circle. Basically this circle results from the interdependence and interaction of these two concepts. Understanding always presupposes and depends on pre-understanding since any answer which gives new understanding is determined to a certain extent by the question asked, which in turn is governed by the pre-understanding. On the other hand, as the answer, understanding always corrects and improves upon the status of the question, or pre-understanding.

André Malet explains the relation between these two components of the hermeneutical circle by stressing the element of discontinuity and continuity in their relation. To those who assert that pre-understanding implies a natural knowledge of God and abolishes the need for special revelation, he describes pre-understanding as a lack of understanding, it indicates that understanding has not yet occurred. "To have Vorverständnis of the other is to be the lack of that other. To say that man has only a Vorverständnis...of God...means that he is not God, he is an absence of God."⁽²⁾

1 Rudolf Bultmann, "Die Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins und der Glaube", quoted by Malet, The Thought of Rudolf Bultmann, pp.14-15.

1 Malet, op.cit., p.16.

Malet goes on to describe the discontinuity between these components in the hermeneutical circle by distinguishing between the Was and the Dass of an object of comprehension. Pre-understanding is related only to the essence or Was of an entity - its basic reality. "...selfhood, irreducibility, uniqueness, transcendence, advent and event, altogether eludes Vorverständnis. Reason can win through to the idea of the other but not to the other itself."⁽¹⁾ In other words, the concept of another entity, its Was, is available to pre-understanding which would then provide knowledge "about" it. The entity itself, however, in all its uniqueness and concreteness, is only experienced through self-understanding.

Malet is careful to preserve the identity of the hermeneutical circle by stressing the continuity between these two levels or modes of understanding. Thus in actual friendship the Vorverständnis of friendship is deepened and widened in the new Verständnis gained from the experience. It is never the case that the understanding obscures or obliterates the pre-understanding.⁽²⁾ Hence, the hermeneutical circle is formed by this relation of pre-understanding and understanding. While distinctive the two are nevertheless rigorously connected by the circle. Pre-understanding indicates a lack of understanding but nevertheless the former inevitably points toward and is bound to the latter. The Was of pre-understanding is epistemologically different but ontologically identical with the Dass of understanding.

1 Ibid., p.17.

2 Ibid., p.16.

Before we review Heidegger's views on the hermeneutical circle and compare its use with Bultmann's, we should also note that this circle has previously appeared in our discussion of the subject-object pattern of thinking. There we noticed Bultmann's assertion that knowledge of God must be self-understanding, since it is only when the experience of God's word is incorporated into and changes our self-understanding that we can truly have knowledge of God. As a result it can be said that Bultmann's theology is anthropology and his Christology is soteriology. Furthermore, he holds that the reverse of this is true, that knowledge of ourselves is knowledge of God to some extent. As he explains, existentiell knowledge of God is always present in human existence "...in the form of the inquiry about happiness, salvation, the meaning of the world and of history; and in the inquiry into the real nature of each person's particular Being (or existence)."⁽¹⁾ Here too, then, the hermeneutical circle is present. Knowledge of ourselves is a type of preunderstanding of God which directs the inquiry which prepares for a better understanding of ourselves in light of God's revelation.

Now let us briefly review the hermeneutical circle in Heidegger's thought. He also stresses that some knowledge of the object of inquiry is presupposed, otherwise there could be no direction for the inquiry. Such knowledge is referred to as a vague awareness. As we saw, this was existentiell knowledge which was gradually deepened and

1 Bultmann, Essays, p.257.

clarified until this unthematic awareness led to a thematic, existential or ontological awareness.

Dasein was selected as the object of Heidegger's ontological quest because of its nature as the "ontological animal", the existence of which was inevitably motivated by a concern for Being, whether consciously or unconsciously. Because of this Heidegger can refer to existential analyses as "fundamental ontology." Because of Dasein's inherent ontological concern, existentialism, or anthropology, becomes ontology.

We can now establish how the influence here of Heidegger's insights into the hermeneutical circle results in close parallels in the thinking of both men. Just as anthropology is theology in Bultmann, so also is existentialism, as one approach to anthropology, fundamental ontology in Heidegger. To identify man as the "ontological animal" whose existence is motivated by a continual quest for Being is parallel to stating that man is constantly motivated by the need for God in his search for happiness and security, and in his concern about his existence. Similarly, to understand Being, one must understand Dasein; to understand God man must understand himself.

Further, we have seen that the not-knowing knowledge of pre-understanding is enriched and deepened in the self-understanding resulting from the inquiry guided and motivated by pre-understanding. By the same token, the unthematic knowledge of the existentiell level is clarified

thematically as one proceeds toward knowledge on the existential level. In both instances there is the dialectical tension of distinction and identity, continuity and discontinuity.

Just as the theology of Bultmann is motivated by his hermeneutical concerns, so also is the ontology of the early Heidegger concerned mainly with the hermeneutical task of interpreting the existence of the 'ontological animal.' (Fundamental ontology, as we saw in an earlier discussion of Heidegger's understanding of hermeneutics, was closely associated with a hermeneutical task.) So far then, our analysis of one of the basic themes of Bultmann's theology has borne out our contention that he is heavily indebted to the insights of Martin Heidegger's philosophy.

49. Demythologizing.

Having considered Bultmann's hermeneutics through an examination of his views on exegesis and his use of the hermeneutical circle, we can now move into a third area of interest which reflects his hermeneutical principles, demythologizing. This is one of the most controversial and widely known aspects of Bultmann's theology. Not surprisingly then we shall treat it in light of both his hermeneutical principles and his other area of interest previously discussed, the subject-object pattern of thinking. That both of these broad issues are involved in demythologizing emphasizes the centrality of this concern in Bultmann's theology. Because of our particular interest we will limit our analysis of this concept as much as possible to those aspects of it related to Heidegger's insights.

Bultmann is careful to stress that demythologizing does not mean the elimination, but rather the interpretation — of myths in the Scriptures. As he states in Jesus Christ and Mythology, the aim of this interpretation is to penetrate to the meaning behind or intention of mythological expression.⁽¹⁾ As L. Malevez notes, the discrepancy between the intention and form of mythology stems from its intention of revealing the role of an ultimate dimension in existence with the use of 'this-worldly' terminology.⁽²⁾

In a rather paradoxical way then, demythologizing is motivated by a respect for the meaning of mythology. As for the repeated criticisms that he is "watering down" the kerygma to make it more easily digestible for modern man, Bultmann replies that his intention is rather to eliminate any unnecessary stumbling blocks in understanding the Scriptures so that the real skandalon of the Gospel can be exposed in all its force and radicalness.⁽³⁾

These false stumbling blocks are related to the fact that the kerygma, as revealed in the New Testament, is closely tied to a particular world-view. Bultmann is opposed to such a relation for two reasons. The first is that the particular world-view expressed in the New Testament

1 Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p.18.

2 L. Malevez, The Christian Message and Myth, trans. by Olive Wyon, (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1958), pp.25-26.

3 Bultmann, "The Case for Demythologizing", Kerygma and Myths, II, pp.182-183.

is obsolete. Bultmann asserts that man no longer lives according to an understanding of the world as a three-storeyed structure of heaven, earth and hell, populated by angels, demons and evil spirits. He feels that this part of the kerygma, its expression, "is incredible to modern man for he is convinced that the mythical view of the world is obsolete."⁽¹⁾

However, Bultmann objects to the kerygma being tied to a world-view, indeed any world-view, for a second and equally important reason. World-views inevitably result from man's inherent drive to master his environment, to comprehend its structure and thereby have control over it. Whenever he encounters something new, it is fitted into this established pattern or world-view. Thus, the formation of a world-view represents man's rather desperate grasp for security in a world which can never be completely controlled. As Bultmann explains, despite all the progress made down through the years, there are "encounters and destinies which man cannot master...His life is fleeting and its end is death. History goes on and pulls down all the towers of Babel. There is no real, definitive security." This is particularly true of the contemporary scientific world view, he feels, which tempts man to think of himself as master of his world and his own fate.⁽²⁾

1 Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology", Kerygma and Myth, I, p.3.

2 Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p.39.

It is in this second reason for opposing the use of a world-view in expressing the kerygma that Bultmann is closely related to insights of Martin Heidegger. Here, too, our previous discussion of the subject-object pattern of thought is pertinent. In Demythologizing and History, a rebuke of Bultmann's critics, Friedrich Gogarten explains that Heidegger also sees the subject-object pattern of thought culminating in the modern scientific-technological world-view.⁽¹⁾ In Gogarten's attempt to defend and explain Bultmann's views on this matter by clarifying Heidegger's thought on the modern world-view can be seen the influence of this philosopher on Bultmann's opposition to world-views.

The criticism often made at this point that Bultmann is merely replacing the world-view of the New Testament with the more contemporary world view of existentialism can be refuted on two bases. The first, which we have already considered, is that Heidegger's fundamental ontology deals strictly with issues on the ontological-existential level and does not provide an existentiell-ontic guide, or world-view, for man's understanding of himself and his concrete actions in relation to his environment.

Secondly, rather than providing a world-view on which man can rely for security in his relations to his world, existentialism places the responsibility squarely on his shoulders. In defending against this charge Bultmann explains that because existentialism operates on the existential level and avoids any specific recommendations

1 Gogarten, op.cit., p.65.

about concrete, day-to-day affairs, the realm of ontic-existentiell concerns, it cannot be seen as providing a secure haven for retreat from existence in the world.

Existentialism says only, "you ought to exist" and explains that existence means accepting responsibility for one's own being. "So far from relieving us of our personal responsibility, it actually lays it upon us."⁽¹⁾

Thus it is that Bultmann opposes myth and its tendency to objectivize for the same reason that Heidegger opposes world-views. Both are seen as stemming from the subject-object pattern in thinking which culminates in man's domination of his world. Bultmann states: "Myth objectifies the other world in terms of this world and thereby makes it a controllable thing."⁽²⁾ And in Jesus Christ and Mythology he explains that world views stem from the human tendency to deny the element of risk in personal existence in favour of the security of a world view through which the environment and existence can be controlled. It is for this reason that the nevertheless and "in spite of" involved in faith is so frequently overlooked. He goes on to describe demythologizing as the radical application of the doctrine of justification by faith to the sphere of thought and knowledge. "Like the doctrine of justification it destroys every longing for security. There is no difference between security based

1 Bultmann, "Bultmann Replies to his Critics", Kerygma and Myth, I., p.197.

2 Bultmann, "The Case for Demythologizing", Kerygma and Myth, II, p.184.

on good works and security built on objectifying knowledge."⁽¹⁾

As stated previously demythologizing is closely related to the two main themes so far dealt with in Bultmann's theology. We have now considered its relation to the subject-object pattern of thought and will next turn to its relation to hermeneutics. The reason for considering demythologizing in our discussion of Bultmann's hermeneutics is related to its underlying meaning or intention. As we have already seen, mythology's purpose is to be distinguished from its form of expression. The latter must be interpreted to arrive at the former; hence demythologizing comes under the heading of hermeneutics. Of demythologizing Bultmann says: "Its aim is not to eliminate the mythological statements but to interpret them. It is a method of hermeneutics."⁽²⁾ Because of the difference in the purpose and the form of mythology Bultmann feels that "...myth contains elements which demand its own criticism."⁽³⁾

In the following, we see what Bultmann considers to be the nature of the underlying intention or purpose of mythology: "Mythology expresses a certain understanding of human existence."⁽⁴⁾ At another point he explains that since the "real purpose" of myth is to express man's understanding of existence in the world and not a scientific

1 Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, pp.83-84.

2 Ibid., p.18.

3 Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology", Kerygma and Myth, I, p.11.

4. Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p.19.

description of the world in itself, it "should be interpreted not cosmologically, but anthropologically or better still, existentially."⁽¹⁾

Having established the discrepancy between the intention and expression of mythology, and having determined the nature of its underlying intention as existential, his selection of Heidegger's philosophical framework and terminology as a form of expression compatible with the underlying intention of mythological material is hardly surprising. This completes our analysis of the demythologizing issue in Bultmann's thought. In its relation to two basic themes in his theology, the subject-object pattern in thinking and hermeneutics, the centrality of this concern can be seen.

50. Pauline theology and Heideggerian existentials

Having seen how Bultmann's hermeneutics are closely related to Heidegger's existentialism, we shall next consider the practical application of these hermeneutical principles in his interpretation of the New Testament, in particular, the Pauline epistles. As might be expected, Bultmann sees Paul's thought coming to its fullest expression when it is interpreted and expressed in an existential Begrifflichkeit, or terminology, instead of the vehicles of expression available to Paul, e.g. the language of gnosticism and mystery religions. In his formulation of Pauline theology, "what" Bultmann says will be influenced by Pauline insights and "how" he says it by Heideggerian insights.

1 Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology", Kerygma and Myth, I., p.10.

Bultmann justifies his approach to Pauline theology by the fact that Paul's theological position has a basic affinity with the principles he has adapted from Heidegger's philosophy. As he explains, Paul's theology is not speculative, it deals only with the significance of God for man, and not His nature in itself.

Correspondingly, it does not deal with the world and man as they are in themselves, but constantly sees the world and man in their relation to God. Every assertion about God is simultaneously an assertion about man and vice versa. For this reason, and in this sense, Paul's theology is, at the same time, anthropology.(1)

In this evaluation of Pauline theology, we can already hear echoes of Bultmann's views on the nature of existential understanding, self-understanding and theoretical speculation about God, for all of which he is indebted to Heidegger's thought.

Furthermore, because of its particular anthropological twist, Paul's theology "...can best be treated as his doctrine of man: first, of man prior to the revelation of faith, and second, of man under faith..."(2) Here we begin to see the very strong influence of Heidegger's philosophy on Bultmann's interpretation of Pauline theology. In both, the analysis proceeds from inauthentic existence. We shall also see that Bultmann's analysis aims primarily at exposing the formal, neutral existential level in Pauline thought, as was also the case with Heidegger's analysis of Dasein.

1 Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, I., pp.190-191.

2 Ibid., p.191.

The first aspect of Pauline anthropology to be considered is his use of the term soma. He begins by stating that the soma "belongs inseparably, constitutively, to human existence." Therefore Paul cannot conceive of a life after death which is not somatic since it would then not be existence at all and defends the resurrection of the body in I Corinthians 15. Bultmann refutes the common sense understanding of this term as the exclusive interpretation of its Pauline use. "...it is clear that the soma is not a something that outwardly clings to a man's real self...but belongs to its very essence, so that we can say man does not have a soma; he is soma..."⁽¹⁾ (Bultmann does acknowledge that the word is also used in the ordinary sense by Paul, but we shall limit our examination to what he sees as the distinctive Pauline use of the word).

He defines Paul's distinctive use of this term as follows: "Man is called soma in respect to his being able to make himself the object of his own action or to experience himself as the subject to whom something happens. He can be called soma, that is, as having a relationship to himself." He goes on to explain that an important implication of somatic existence is that man is constantly confronted by two possibilities. He can either be at one with himself or estranged from himself. These possibilities of finding or losing oneself, Bultmann sees as "inherent to human existence itself."⁽²⁾

1 Ibid., p.194.

2 Ibid., pp.195-196.

Now the connection between this rather theoretical explanation and actual Scriptural usage is not apparent. However, if Bultmann's interpretation is to retain its respectability this connection must be clearly seen. André Malet establishes the link by pointing to such passages as: "he (man) pommels himself and subdues himself" (I Cor. 9:27), "he delivers himself to be burned" (I Cor. 13:3), "he yields himself as an instrument to sin or to God" (Rom. 6:12, 12:1), "he spends himself for Christ" (Phil. 1:20) and "2 Cor. 5:10 declares that everyone will receive 'good or evil according to what he has done in the soma' - in other words according to his deeds, according to what he has made of himself by them."⁽¹⁾ In each of these instances we see a clear reflection of an understanding of man which assumes an ability to act upon himself. Here man is seen not as a material substance but as a relation of self to self.

As Bultmann intends this Pauline concept to be understood as an existential, he is at pains to stress that the concept is a neutral, formal one. He explains that because man can be an object to himself, he can either control his existence or find it controlled by powers greater than his own. If the latter occurs, one of two eventualities follows: this controlling power can make his self estrangement the permanent factor in his existence or it can give him back to himself. "That man is soma is in itself neither good nor bad. But only because he is soma does the possibility exist for him to be good or evil..."⁽²⁾ In this way he gives to

1 Malet, op.cit., p.34.

2 Bultmann, op.cit., p.198.

somatic existence the a priori, formal nature of an existential.

We have, then, seen how Bultmann protects both his Scriptural flank and philosophical flank from criticism. We are prepared now to trace more closely how his interpretation of Pauline anthropology is related to Heidegger's fundamental ontology. We can recall that the first and most general existential considered by Heidegger was Being-in-the-world. Macquarrie summarizes Bultmann's definition of somatic existence in a threefold manner; existence is always somatic, man always has a relation to himself, and therefore he can either be at one with or estranged from himself. He then points out the striking similarity to Heidegger's interpretation of existence: man is always Being-in-the-world, his existence involves a relation of himself to himself and his existence can be either authentic or inauthentic.⁽¹⁾ In this comparison Heidegger's influence becomes quite apparent.

Bultmann next turns to the consideration of several other Pauline anthropological concepts. In contrast with soma these terms all refer to man as the subject, not object, of his own actions. Again we shall only be considering what Bultmann sees as the distinctive Pauline use of these terms which does not always coincide with their use in the more normal sense.

The first term, psyche, is used in a distinctively

1 Macquarrie, op.cit., p.43.

Pauline manner in opposition to the more popular Greek usage as referring to the seat or power of the mental life in man's make-up. Rather than being the "principle of animal life" which animates the fleshly body, psyche "...is that specifically human state of being alive which inheres in man as a striving, willing, purposing self."(1)

A closely related concept is referred to as the pneuma. This too refers to man "in the orientation of his will," although it also sometimes denotes man in his self-awareness. Bultmann goes on to summarize Paul's anthropology as revealed so far: "...man is a living unity. He is a person who can become an object to himself...He is a person who lives in his intentionality, his pursuit of some purpose, his willing and knowing (psyche, pneuma)."(2) With his assertion that these traits are inherent to man's nature and in themselves are "neither good nor bad", we can again see his desire to underline their nature as existentials.

He reinforces his summary of the above insights by analyzing the term zoe as Paul uses it. In his analysis of the verbal form of this word, he states:

(Paul)...understands it ("to live" zen) as the life a man leads in his concrete existence, the intentionality of human existence...zoe...means the life that a man lives as the subject of his own actions, his living self (i.e. his striving, willing self) and...he factually lives only by constantly moving on, as it were, from himself, by projecting himself into a possibility that lies before him. He sees himself confronted with the future, facing the possibilities in which he can gain his self or lose it. (3)

1 Bultmann, op.cit., p.204.

2 Ibid., p.209.

3 Ibid., p.210.

In Bultmann's analysis of the terms zoe, pneuma and psyche, we can as easily see the influence of Heideggerian insights as we did in the case of soma. Heidegger's portrayal of Dasein as constantly "projecting" into future "possibilities", as always ahead-of-itself, and as only being its self authentically by projecting toward such possibilities, all of these traits are reflected in the Bultmannian analyses as outlined above. When we recognise that all of these terms are still being presented as on a neutral, formal (or existential) level, we again see the extent to which Bultmann is indebted to Heidegger's fundamental ontology for giving form to his understanding of Pauline thought.

We turn next to the final group of Pauline concepts which Bultmann considers as existentials. The term nous does not mean simply the mind or intellect but implies "the taking of a stand, a conscious or unconscious volition; it is an understanding intention, a planning..." He explains that in Paul's exhortation of Romans 12:2: "Be transformed by the renewal of your mind", it is obvious that "...what is meant is not a theoretical re-learning, but the renewal of the will."⁽¹⁾

Macquarrie exposes Bultmann's Heideggerian roots at this point by stressing that Paul's use of the word nous in Romans 12:2 clearly substantiates Bultmann's claim that Heidegger's definition of understanding as primarily practical

1 Ibid., p.211.

and closely connected with willing and doing is compatible with Paul's intention and can therefore serve as a contemporary vehicle for re-expressing Pauline theology.⁽¹⁾

Of suneidesis, Bultmann says it "is a man's knowledge of his conduct as his own."⁽²⁾ The relation of this definition to Heidegger's understanding of the conscience as that which calls man back to his true self is significant enough to be noted. However, even more illuminating for our purpose is Bultmann's interpretation of Romans 2. The statement that even the heathen know the law is seen as indicative of Paul's portrayal of the conscience as a universal structure in man's nature. In this we can see Bultmann establishing the existential nature of this interpretation of the conscience.⁽³⁾

Next we come to Bultmann's analysis of the Pauline use of kardia. He associates this word very closely with nous as they are used almost interchangeably by Paul. However, there is a subtle but important difference which stems from the fact that "the element of knowing which is contained in mind and can be prominently present is not emphasized in heart, in which the dominant element is striving and will and also the state of being moved by feelings."⁽⁴⁾ Here we are reminded of Heidegger's distinction between understanding and

1 Macquarrie, op.cit., p.65.

2 Bultmann, op.cit., pp.216-217.

3 Ibid., p.218.

4 Ibid., p.222.

moods. Both are modes of disclosure but in distinctive ways.

51. Pauline theology and Heidegger's existentiell analysis

At the beginning of his next section, Bultmann explains that he has previously been interested in exposing the existential-ontological level in Pauline anthropology. Now he proposes to move onto the ontic-existentiell level of the concrete. "If, up to this point, the ontological structure of human existence, as Paul sees it, has been clarified, this, nevertheless only affords the presuppositions for his ontic statements about man in which his real interest lies."⁽¹⁾ Therefore he will now move out from the neutral, formal sphere into the ontic sphere and here also his analysis will be guided by the direction of the fundamental ontology of Being and Time. Like Heidegger, Bultmann's ontic analysis will proceed from the inauthentic to the authentic level.

In his broad definition of sin, which introduces a more detailed analysis of sin in Pauline literature, we can see a basic affinity with Heidegger's understanding of inauthentic existence. In his philosophy, inauthenticity enters when Dasein, the 'ontological animal', denies its true nature by seeking to ground and direct its existence in a self reliance which involves a turning away from Being. Similarly, Bultmann says that the ultimate sin is "...the false assumption of receiving life not as the gift of the

1 Ibid., p.227.

Creator but procuring it by one's own power, of living from one's self rather than from God."⁽¹⁾ In both cases, the relation to the ultimate dimension, God in one and Being in the other, is the determining factor for sin or inauthentic existence.

Heidegger's influence can also be seen in Bultmann's assessment of the extent of sin or inauthentic existence. In Heidegger we find that inauthentic existence "...has to be conceived as that kind of Being which is closest to Dasein and in which Dasein maintains itself for the most part."⁽²⁾ In Theology of the New Testament, Bultmann says that the power of sin can be seen in the fact that it not only "...completely dominates the man who has become its victim, but also in the fact that it forces all men without exception into slavery: "for all have sinned" (Rom. 3:23)"⁽³⁾ Here, too, can be seen in the similarity of their views the strong influence of Heidegger on Bultmann's interpretation of Pauline thought.

We can move next into the particulars of Bultmann's interpretation of the Pauline understanding of sin and further see the very strong influence of Heidegger's philosophy on it. By way of review we need to recall the four traits Heidegger ascribes to fallenness, which is an ontological, not ontic, term. The traits are: temptation,

1 Ibid., p.232.

2 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.220.

3 Bultmann, op.cit., p.249.

"Dasein's structure of existence is such that Dasein is constantly tempting itself into falling"; tranquillity, which refers to the "self-sustaining, deceptive nature of this state of fallenness"; alienation, which refers to Dasein's being "alienated from and denied access to its real ground" or self; and entanglement, which indicates that Dasein in its fallenness, "becomes completely absorbed in itself" and its world which is a part of itself.⁽¹⁾

We might elaborate on the first of these traits by saying that fallenness is an inevitable consequence of existence as Being-in-the-world. From Dasein's structural orientation in its world and its neutral concern for worldly affairs it is only a short step toward inauthentic absorption in and orientation toward its world. We can detect this same approach in Bultmann's interpretation of the Pauline phrases, "in the flesh" and "according to the flesh."

In the Pauline usage of the phrase "in the flesh" that interests us, Bultmann asserts that a man's nature

is determined by the sphere within which he moves, the sphere which marks out the horizon or the possibilities of what he does and experiences... "to live" or "to walk in the flesh" means nothing else than simply "to lead one's life as a man", an idea which in itself does not involve any ethical or theological judgment but simply takes note of a fact; not a norm but a field or sphere is indicated by "in the flesh." (2)

Thus this phrase is a neutral formal one and can be closely associated with the existential Being-in-the-world.

1 See previously, p. 55.

2 Ibid., pp. 235-23

However, by virtue of its being the antithesis to life "in the Spirit" or life "in faith" or life "in Christ", it does have some faint overtone of sinful existence, just as Being-in-the-world carries within it and is coloured by the seeds of inauthentic existence.⁽¹⁾

In the phrase "according to the flesh" this inevitable fall into sin is more apparent and predominant. "It stamps an existence or an attitude not as natural-human, but as sinful."⁽²⁾ This phrase is not neutral but describes man's state when he has succumbed to his existence "in the flesh" and has allowed his existence to be solely oriented around this aspect of it.

Bultmann is careful to point out that the term "flesh" has the same meaning in both phrases which are rather to be distinguished by the fact that each indicates a different attitude toward this aspect of existence. As Macquarrie notes, "...whereas en sarki means usually no more than to exist in the earthly environment, to be kata sarka means that man has already decided for the earthly and the natural, and has rejected God and with God his own authentic being."⁽³⁾

For Heidegger temptation indicates that fallenness inevitably follows from Being-in-the-world and therefore inauthenticity is predominant in existence. On the side of Bultmann we see that he interprets Paul as stressing

1 Ibid., p.23.

2 Ibid., p.237.

3 Bultmann, op.cit., p.249.

that life "in the flesh" inevitably leads to life "according to the flesh." It is evidently Paul's opinion "...[that] in man - because his substance is flesh - sin slumbers from the beginning. Must it necessarily awaken? Yes..."⁽¹⁾ In this way Heidegger's concept of temptation is clearly reflected in Bultmann's interpretation of the Pauline understanding of sin. Here again he grounds his interpretation in Pauline insights and expresses it in Heideggerian form.

The second trait of Heideggerian fallenness is tranquillity and we find its Bultmannian parallel in his interpretation of Paul's phrase "putting one's confidence in the flesh." (Philippians 3:3-4). Bultman says of this: "...confidence in the flesh" is the supposed security which man achieves out of that which is worldly and apparent, that which he can control and deal with."⁽²⁾ The influence of Heidegger's concept tranquillity (the 'deceptive' nature of fallenness) can easily be seen in Bultmann's words "supposed security."

The third trait of Heideggerian fallenness is alien~~at~~ation of the authentic from the inauthentic self. At this point the influence of Heideggerian insights on this interpretation of Pauline thought is most striking. In Being and Time we read how Dasein can fall away from itself.

1 Bultmann, op.cit., p.249.

2 Ibid., p.243.

"In falling, Dasein itself as factual Being-in-the-world, is something from which it has already fallen away..."⁽¹⁾
 Similarly, Bultmann states: "...to be innerly divided, or not to be at one with one's self, is the essence of human existence under sin."⁽²⁾

The influence here continues in that both feel the possibility of sin or fallenness results from the structural possibility of man being an issue for himself. Consider the striking similarity of the following statements.
 "Dasein can fall only because Being-in-the-world understandingly with a state-of-mind is an issue for it."⁽³⁾
 (Being and Time) "In the fact that man is a self-that he is a being to whom what matters and should matter is his life, his self - lies the possibility of sin."⁽⁴⁾
 (Theology of the New Testament I)

The final trait of fallenness is entanglement, wherein Dasein becomes ever more absorbed in itself (we should remember that the world is a part of Dasein's existence). In entanglement, Dasein's normal orientation to the world and its existence has become inauthentically predominant. We can see this trait in Bultmann's analysis of Pauline criticism of salvation through observance of the Law. To trust in strict observance of the Law (which, in its proper

1 Heidegger op.cit., p.220.

2 Bultmann, op.cit., p.245.

3 Heidegger, op.cit., p.224.

4 Bultmann, op.cit., p.246.

perspective, is a constructive aspect of existence) is merely another mode of insuring salvation by confidence in the flesh or one's own effort and this "...living out of "flesh" is the self-reliant attitude of the man who puts his trust in his own strength and in that which is controllable by him."⁽¹⁾

This same trait is also reflected in the Hellenistic concern for wisdom and pride in knowledge. "The "wise in the flesh" (I Cor. 1:26) are the wise who trust in themselves, who are not willing to smash their wisdom before God and let it become foolishness."⁽²⁾ Similarly, "...a life "after the flesh" is a life of desire - a life of self-reliant pursuit of one's own ends."⁽³⁾ In this we have seen that Heidegger's understanding of fallenness, in all its aspects, is clearly reflected in Bultmann's interpretation of the Pauline understanding of sin.

Next we shall consider Bultmann's interpretation of the concept "world" in Pauline thought and see how this too reflects the influence of Heidegger's philosophy. We can recall that for Heidegger the world refers to the area of Dasein's interests, concerns and projects. It is an existential of Dasein, a part of its existence, and each world is oriented around a particular Dasein. The world is always the particular world of a Dasein's concerns.

1 Ibid., p.240.

2 Ibid., p.241.

3 Ibid.

In Theology of the New Testament I, we find: "...kosmos does not always mean earth as the mere stage for man's life and living, but often denotes the quintessence of earthly conditions of life and earthly possibilities...accordingly, human life in its worldly aspects, in its hustle and bustle, in its weal and woe, is a "dealing with the world" (I Cor. 7:31)..."(1)

However, this term also has another use in referring to the sphere which is the antithesis to the realm of the Lord. Here kosmos refers to the world not in its neutral sense but as a power over man. This aspect of the term bears a similarity to the sphere of the flesh discussed previously and, indeed, Bultmann claims that these two terms are used synonymously. As we saw before in the case of flesh, kosmos can be a neutral concept, as can Being-in-the-world, but it can also become a pejorative one, just as fallenness stems from Being-in-the-world. Hence kosmos can indicate the fact that "...the world of men, constituted by that which the individual does and upon which he bestows his care, itself gains the upper hand over the individual."(2)

And finally we can see in Bultmann's interpretation of this term a reflection of the Heideggerian concept das Man. As noted earlier, this term refers to the power wielded by the mass media in radio, television and press which completely stamps out any individuality and provides a false haven of security from the responsibility of

1 Ibid., p.254.

2 Ibid., p.256.

authentic resolve and decision. According to Bultmann, by kosmos Paul is referring to the fact that "...In modern terms, the "spirit of the world" is the atmosphere to whose compelling influence every man contributes but to which he is always subject."⁽¹⁾

We turn next to Bultmann's consideration of Pauline terms related to authentic existence. His relation to Heidegger at this point will be understandably less than in prior analyses since they basically disagree on the forces responsible for the transition from inauthentic to authentic existence, or from life "according to the flesh" to life in faith. For the philosopher, the resolute Dasein is able to approach authenticity by its own efforts; for the theologian, such a transition is only possible due to the aid of an ultimate power. Nevertheless, there are certain aspects of the Pauline understanding of the Christian life which Bultmann feels can find contemporary expression in Heidegger's terminology since there are some points of agreement between the two on this issue of Christian or authentic existence.

In his understanding of faith, Bultmann sees Paul as employing several concepts similar to existential insights. For Paul, one aspect of faith is knowledge and; "Ultimately 'faith' and 'knowledge' are identical as a new understanding of one's self..."⁽²⁾ This definition of knowledge as self-

1 Ibid., p.257.

2 Ibid., p.318.

understanding with its indebtedness to Heideggerian insights has already been established. (see p.234) One example of Bultmann's Scriptural support for this interpretation would be Romans 12:2; "be transformed by the renewal of your mind that you may prove what is the will of God..." After analysing other texts he states: "...it becomes clear that knowledge in all its forms and degrees besides being an understanding of its object is simultaneously an existential understanding of one's self in faith."⁽¹⁾

Another trait of the Pauline treatment of faith is that, as obedience, it is a decision. "Faith...is the free deed of obedience in which the new self constitutes itself in place of the old. As this sort of decision, it is a deed in the true sense: In a true deed the doer himself is inseparable from it, while in a "work" he stands side by side with what he does."⁽²⁾

Here we can see the influence of the "decision" by the authentic resolute Dasein to accept what is revealed in the call of the conscience and thereby enter into authentic existence. Thus, there is this element of decision in both. Further, the Bultmannian distinction between "true deed" and "work" brings to mind Heidegger's understanding of authentic actions as projections wherein Dasein creates its own "situation", and makes its world its own by putting its personal stamp or impression on it. In both instances then, the doer and the deed are closely interrelated, indeed inseparable.

1 Ibid., p.327.

2 Ibid., p.316.

Bultmann also sees in the Pauline understanding of faith an element of hope which points the believer toward the future. "This hope is the freedom for the future and the openness toward it which the man of faith has because he has turned over his anxiety about himself and his future to God in obedience."⁽¹⁾ As we saw previously, Heidegger also considers an orientation to and openness for the future an essential aspect of authentic existence.

Another "indispensable constitutive element in faith" is fear. Fear is a factor in that faith is based on the grace of a God who is also a Judge. For faith fear has not only the negative function of breaking down "false security and directing the believer's attention away from himself towards God's grace which alone supports him...but also the positive purpose of making man conscious of his responsibility..."⁽²⁾ We can see the influence of Heidegger on Bultmann's interpretation of Pauline thinking here by recalling that in anxiety man experiences the futility of his efforts at self sufficiency, breaks his over involvement with his world and is thereby prepared for a reorientation toward Being. Although these concepts bear different titles, there can be little doubt as to the similarity of their functions and roles. Here, too, Bultmann finds in Heidegger's philosophy a contemporary outlook which, due to its compatibility with Paul's approach, can serve as an appropriate vehicle for re-expressing Scriptural insights.

1 Ibid., pp.319-320.

2 Ibid., p.321.

Another Pauline concept concerning the life of faith, or authentic existence, is freedom. In Bultmann's treatment of this concept we can see further evidence of his indebtedness to Heideggerian insights. Basically he interprets Paul's view of sin as the surrender of man's old self-understanding "in which he lives unto himself, tries to achieve life by his own strength, and by that very fact falls victim to the powers of sin and death and loses himself." In the new self-understanding of faith, man gains freedom from these powers and is able to find himself and life. "This freedom arises from the very fact that the believer... no longer 'belongs to himself' (I Cor. 6:19), no longer bears the care for himself...but lets care go, yielding himself entirely to the grace of God..."⁽¹⁾ In Heidegger's understanding of fallenness as entanglement of Dasein, in which it becomes totally absorbed in itself, and in the understanding of authentic existence as re-orientation out of the self toward Being we can see the source of the Bultmannian re-expression of Paul on this point.

Another aspect of the Pauline approach to freedom as noted by Bultmann is that it is "...freedom from all human conventions and norms of value."⁽²⁾ Here again we see close ties with Heidegger's understanding of authentic existence as breaking the totalitarian, levelling influence of das Man.

1 Ibid., pp.330-331.

2 Ibid., p.343.

And finally we see that freedom for Paul meant freedom from enslavement to the world. "Free from the world's care which binds one to perishing things...[man] faces the world free, as one who...participates in the tumult of the world but does so with an inner aloofness - 'as if (he did it) not'..."⁽¹⁾ Here too we can see reflections of Heidegger's understanding of authentic existence in which Dasein deals with its world in a constructive manner without succumbing to the temptation of grounding its existence in worldly concerns. The relation between the two is quite apparent here as well as in the previous instances.

Another theme of Pauline thought, which is also found in the Gospel of John, is the role of the indicative versus the imperative in the Christian life. We might add that this is a constantly recurring theme in Bultmann's thinking. In History and Eschatology he explains that the life of faith can never be seen as a possession. "As for Paul, so for John, the life of the believer is not a static state but a dynamic movement in the dialectic of indicative versus imperative. The believer must still become what he already is, and he is already what he shall become."⁽²⁾ As a result of this dialectic it can be said that in regard to the Christian life the phrase "...'Become what thou art!'

1 Ibid., p.351.

2 Rudolf Bultmann, History and Eschatology, (Edinburgh: The University Press, 1957), p.48.

is valid."⁽¹⁾

We can see the strength of Heidegger's influence on Bultmann's interpretation of Pauline thought at this point by noting the following statement from Being and Time: "...Dasein is constantly more than it factually is...as Being-possible...it is existentially that which, in its potentiality-for-Being, it is not yet...only because it is what it becomes...can it say to itself 'Become what you are'..."⁽²⁾

Hence in Bultmann's understanding of the Christian life as a process of constant renewal and striving we can again see how such Heideggerian structures as Being-ahead-of, possibility, and projection, traits which are related to Dasein's constant realization of its authentic existence by continually projecting out onto ever new possibilities, provide the necessary terminology for giving new form to Scriptural insights.

We have now considered the relevant aspects of Bultmann's interpretation and re-expression of Pauline theology and have noted how, both in its overall structure (e.g. he employs the existentiell-existential distinction and moves in his consideration from inauthentic to authentic existence), and in its details it is strongly influenced by Heidegger's analysis of Dasein. This further substantiates our thesis that Bultmann's hermeneutics, the backbone of his theology as a whole, is indebted to Heideggerian thought

1 Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, I, p.332.

2 Heidegger, Being and Time, pp.185-186.

not only for its basic principles and structure but also for its actual form of expression.

It should be noted that Macquarrie's An Existentialist Theology has also dealt with the influence of Heidegger's philosophy on Bultmann's interpretation of Pauline theology. While our analysis has covered much of the same ground as Macquarrie's, it has done so in light of implications in Heidegger's thinking which were not yet apparent when Macquarrie's work was published. As we shall see in a subsequent chapter, however, Macquarrie has analysed the new implications of these later developments in Heidegger's thinking for theology in a subsequent work.

This also brings to a conclusion our analysis of Bultmann's hermeneutics as a whole. In looking at his hermeneutics by way of evaluating such topics as exegesis, the hermeneutical circle, demythologizing, and his interpretation of Pauline theology we have repeatedly established how closely Bultmann is influenced by the philosophy of Martin Heidegger in this central theme of his theology. The very length of this analysis in comparison with that of the relation between philosophy and theology, the subject-object pattern of thinking and the following discussion of history bears out our earlier contention that Bultmann's hermeneutical interests provide the central theme of his theology as a whole.

HISTORY

SECTION FOUR

52. History and Possibilities

Having seen the subject-object pattern of thinking as an underlying theme in Bultmann's thought and hermeneutics as one of his main interests, we turn now to a third general area of thought which has challenged Bultmann throughout his career, the field of history. Heinrich Ott estimates the importance of this concern for Bultmann as follows: "As a historian, as a man, and as a Christian, Bultmann is concerned with the problem of history. Perhaps we may say that it is the one great theme which claims his thought."⁽¹⁾ (This does not contradict our previous assertion concerning the importance of hermeneutics in Bultmann's theology, since hermeneutics involves history as one of several fields to be interpreted.)

Again we need to recall that our analysis of Bultmann's thought is restricted to those areas influenced by the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. We will be required to proceed with the utmost caution in the following discussion due to the fact that Bultmann's philosophy of history is rooted in the insights developed by numerous other thinkers. Further, many of these other thinkers are indebted to each other and therefore a clear line of influence is not always

1 Heinrich Ott, "Rudolf Bultmann's Philosophy of History", The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, ed. by Charles Kegley, (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1966), p.51.

discernible. For instance, both Heidegger and Bultmann have studied the approach of Wilhelm Dilthey and it cannot be ascertained exactly which of the Heideggerian insights Bultmann employs are uniquely Heidegger's and which result from his study of Dilthey's work or indeed any number of other thinkers also familiar to Bultmann.

Despite these difficulties, we shall be able to show that Bultmann is heavily indebted to Heidegger in his approach to history. First we shall listen to several different commentators, as well as Bultmann himself, as they express their evaluation of Heidegger's influence on Bultmann's understanding of history. Walter Schmithals states: "The concepts of historicity, temporality and futurity are therefore not expressions developed ad hoc by Bultmann; he takes them over directly from Heidegger..."⁽¹⁾ Macquarrie, in analysing Bultmann's book History and Eschatology, says that in spite of his repeated interest in Collingwood's theory of history and only one "passing reference to Heidegger's teaching on history...It would seem that the major influence with Bultmann is still that of Heidegger."⁽²⁾

Bultmann's indebtedness is to be seen not only in secondary sources but is openly acknowledged by the theologian himself. "My view of the historicity of human life is oriented to the scheme of the ontological structure

1 Schmithals, op.cit., p.311.

2 John Macquarrie, The Scope of Demythologizing, (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1960), p.89.

of human being as the analysis of existence, especially Heidegger's, has traced it out."⁽¹⁾ More specifically, he says of his analysis of human existence as historical: "...I use the concepts of authentic and inauthentic existence and of history and historicity developed by Heidegger in his Being and Time."⁽²⁾

Basically our discussion of Bultmann's approach to history will be structured around three topics, history as the realm of possibility, history and man's structure as historical, and eschatology. In all three we will note the influence of Heidegger's philosophy.

Before we see Bultmann's understanding of history as the realm of possibilities, we should recall Heidegger's views on this same subject. Not only does he see history as primarily the realm of possibilities rather than just a sourcebook of completed actions and past facts, but he also stresses that the possibilities found in history are factical in nature. They are not completely open-ended and oriented only toward future actions but are grounded and determined by the past from which they arose. Hence the interest in futural possibilities does not exclude a concern for historical roots or past events.

With our knowledge that Heidegger considers history

1 Bultmann, "Reply", The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, ed. by Charles Kegley, p.279.

2 Ibid., p.274.

to be primarily the realm of the possible, if we can establish that Bultmann approaches it with a similar concern for possibilities, then we will have shown a substantial relation between the two. In Jesus Christ and Mythology he explains that his motive for studying history is to "gain an understanding of the possibilities of human life and thereby of the possibilities of my own life. The ultimate reason for studying history is to become conscious of the possibilities of human existence."⁽¹⁾

Similarly, in "The Significance of Dialectical Theology" Bultmann says that because of the dialectical theologians' understanding of human existence, any historical source is approached with the presupposition that "in it a possibility of human existence has been grasped and expressed. We shall therefore achieve a final understanding of the text only when we reach final clarity on the possibilities of human existence."⁽²⁾ Thus we can clearly establish that Bultmann shares Heidegger's interest in history as the realm of possibilities and at this point is directly influenced by Heidegger's views.

Our review of Heidegger's understanding of possibilities noted that the range of possibilities encountered by the historian is limited by his facticity or relation to the past. This stems from the fact that Dasein's

1 Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p.53.

2 Bultmann, Faith and Understanding, p.150.

possibilities are inherited, it is thrown into a situation not of its own choice (although it can resolutely accept it.) In the discussion of history in Being and Time, Heidegger labels as "heritage" those possibilities inherited from the past which Dasein can resolutely accept as its own. For him then, future projections are grounded in these possibilities inherited from the past.

Similarly, Bultmann explains that man's real relation to history stems from the fact that "...the history from which we come gives us in advance the possibilities for our action in the present, with regard to the tasks which the future has in store for us. That is, we receive from our history an inheritance which is binding on us in the present."⁽¹⁾

Further, in History and Eschatology he says: "The concrete possibilities for human actions are, of course, limited by the situation arising from the past."⁽²⁾ Therefore, in his discussion of history as the realm of possibilities and in his more specific discussions of the nature of these possibilities we can clearly see the influence of Heidegger's philosophy of history with its interest in possibilities and heritage.

Before moving to our next area of interest, we might note that one of the repercussions of Bultmann's emphasis on

1 Bultmann, Essays, p.104.

2 Bultmann, History and Eschatology, p.141.

possibilities in history is his concern for demythologizing. Macquarrie suggests that the task of demythologizing can be discussed not only in terms of separating mythical form from underlying intention but also in terms of separating what is primarily historical (or related to a being whose mode of Being is existence) from what is secondarily historical (or an entity whose being is described as ready-at-hand or present-to-hand). The primary historical element would be the realm of retrievable possibilities. "What Bultmann is striving to do is to spotlight this essential primary historical in the New Testament, to separate it from the now meaningless secondary historical, and so make it a real possibility of decision for man today."⁽¹⁾

53. History and man's structure

The second of our three divisions in this analysis is concerned with the peculiar inter-relationship of history and man's structure in Bultmann and Heidegger. That these two factors are closely related for Heidegger can be seen in his inclusion of an analysis of history in Being and Time, which is devoted exclusively to fundamental ontology. Hence, his discussion of history forms one chapter in his analysis of man's structures of existence.

More specifically we can recall that man can retrieve possibilities through historical awareness only because his structure is one which resolutely takes over its heritage or the possibilities into which Dasein has been thrown. For Heidegger then, we can be historians only because we are

1 Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, p.165.

fundamentally historical by nature. Finally that history and man's structure are inter-related for Heidegger can be established by the fact that possibilities play a key role in both.

Here also, if we can ascertain that Bultmann closely relates history and man's nature in the same way as Heidegger does, then we can show that he is influenced by this philosopher. First, we shall establish that the two are closely inter-related for Bultmann. In History and Eschatology Bultmann says that man's historical nature stems not from the fact that he is "an individual who passes through history, who experiences history, who meets with history. No, man is nothing but history..."⁽¹⁾

In his essay "Christianity as a Religion of East and West" he says of his own approach to history: "... it becomes clear...that with the view we have of history is connected a conception of human existence as such. The inquiry into the meaning of history is dependent on that which inquires into the meaning of human existence."⁽²⁾ And at another point he asks the rhetorical question: "Must not a theological understanding of history start from an understanding of the historical character of man (as of that which belongs to the nature of man's being), not however, from the understanding of history as of a connected series of occurrences of the past?"⁽³⁾ Hence, we have established

1 Bultmann, History and Eschatology, p.11.

2 Bultmann, Essays, pp.223-224.

3 Bultmann, "The Bible Today und die Eschatologie", quoted in Kegley's, The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, p.167.

that for Bultmann, history is to be understood in light of man's structure and that consequently historical studies are only possible due to man's historical nature. In both instances we can see his relation to Heidegger's views as we reviewed them earlier.

We can see a further relation to Heidegger in Bultmann's insistence that the study of history, if done properly, is not an "objective" abstract pursuit but one which deepens and directs one's own existence. We might here recall Heidegger's oft quoted statement on history that "only factually authentic historicity as resolute destiny can so reveal past history that in the repetition the force of the possible gets struck home into one's factual existence, which is to say will be allowed to affect its futurity." (see p.113)

Bultmann reflects this in the following manner:

...history can...be understood as the range of possibilities for human self-understanding, which range is disclosed precisely in man's decisions. Through them, one can see that man not only stands within a historical course of events but is himself historical. It is then a question of the extent to which he is conscious of his own historicity, that is, how far he is conscious of being able in history to gain or lose his authentic existence...(1)

54. Eschatology

Just as we previously analysed Bultmann's understanding of hermeneutics by considering his actual application of hermeneutical principles in the interpretation of Pauline theology, so also we can better comprehend his understanding of history and historical

1 Bultmann, "Reply", p.267.

existence by observing the application of these insights into what he calls the eschatological event.

Edwin Good, in his essay "The Meaning of Demythologizing", stresses just how broad a meaning this term has for Bultmann. The adjective 'eschatological' is applied to all aspects of existence in faith as well as referring to Christ's death and resurrection as an event to be constantly appropriated into the lives of subsequent Christian generations. In a very real sense, he says, these eschatological events continually recur in the present through the proclamation of the Word and the celebration of the sacraments. As a result, the Christian life of faith, hope and love is constantly involved in and determined by the eschatological event. Furthermore, the apostles and all subsequent believers "belong to the one eschatological event."⁽¹⁾

Hence we can see that Bultmann's definition of eschatology and eschatological event is rather distinctive in its scope. For our part we shall consider of the components mentioned above the once-for-allness of the eschatological event, its relation to the cross, resurrection, and proclamation of the Word, and finally eschatological existence.

We should first note that demythologizing is also involved here. In Jesus Christ and Mythology Bultmann

1 Edwin Good, "The Meaning of Demythologizing", The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, ed. by Charles Kegley, p.74.

says that the real issue for demythologizing is whether the understanding of Christ as the "...eschatological event is inextricably bound up with the conceptions of cosmological eschatology as it is in the New Testament..."⁽¹⁾ The intention of the myth, then, is to be separated from its expression in the contemporary forms of apocalypticism.

In order to facilitate our understanding of this distinctive approach to eschatology, we should note that it is no longer solely concerned with matters of the future or end-time. Instead it significantly bears on present as well as future matters. In Primitive Christianity in its Contemporary Setting Bultmann describes Jesus' eschatological message by saying that His "...word invites men to decide for the reign of God now breaking in. Now is the last hour. Now it is Either-Or. Now the question is: Do men really want God's reign? Or is it the world they want?"⁽²⁾ As confronting man with a decision to be made in the present, we can see how a future event can break into the present dimension and how eschatological concerns are related to the present as well as future dimension.

Having established that the eschatological event does not refer merely to some future matter, we are better able to follow Bultmann's characterization of this as a

1 Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p.81.

2 Rudolf Bultmann, Primitive Christianity in its Contemporary Setting, trans. by R.H. Fuller, (London: Thames and Hudson, 1956), p.90.

once-for-all event. In Kerygma and Myth, II, he explains that the New Testament reference to the Christ event as ephapaz "...teaches us in a high degree of paradox to believe that just such an event of the past is the once-and-for-all eschatological event, which is continually re-enacted in the world of proclamation."⁽¹⁾

Thus for Bultmann an eschatological event has a once-for-all nature not in the sense of happening once and never again but in the sense of happening once-for-all ages. The once-for-allness of a past event stems from the fact that it can have repercussions in the lives of subsequent generations. What happened in the past can determine events in the present and this is what Bultmann refers to as a once-for-all eschatological event.

Bultmann's debt to Heideggerian insights is easily seen in the fact that this concept, eschatological event, is very close in its meaning to Heidegger's "repeatable authentic possibility" which has previously been defined as an event "which can be repeated so that the power of the possible is felt in present existence." Similarly, in the eschatological event the power of divine grace and the possibility it offers to man, first actualized in the person of Christ, is felt again whenever the Word is proclaimed and heard.

Let us now look at two components we would expect to

1 Bultmann, "Bultmann Replies to his Critics", Kerygma and Myth, II, p.209.

find in the eschatological event and a third which is more uniquely Bultmannian. The first two are the cross and resurrection. To believe in the cross, he explains, does not involve any concern for an "objective event turned to our advantage by God" but instead means "to make the cross of Christ our own, to undergo crucifixion with Him."⁽¹⁾ Hence, the significance of the cross only becomes apparent for those who are willing to die to the concerns of this world and be raised anew into a life with Christ. The crucifixion now becomes an opportunity or possibility which is repeatedly offered to men whenever the Gospel is proclaimed. It is as an eschatological event and not just a past historical fact that the cross is significant.

As for his understanding of the resurrection, we need recall that our analysis is concerned only with Bultmann's thought that is influenced by Heidegger's philosophy. Therefore we will not be engaging in the controversy concerning Bultmann's appraisal of the resurrection as an event of significance solely in the realm of Geschichte as against Historie. Nor will we analyse in detail his close association of the cross and resurrection. Suffice it to say that the cross can only be seen in light of the resurrection for the two "form a single, indivisible cosmic event which brings judgment to the world and opens up for men the possibility of authentic life..."⁽²⁾

1 Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology", Kerygma and Myth, I, p.36.

2 Ibid., pp.39 and 41.

Of the real significance of the resurrection, Bultmann says that just as all men die to their old selves with Christ on the cross, so through His resurrection all receive new life. "Paul does not only say: 'In Christ shall all be made alive'; he can also speak of rising again with Christ in the present tense, just as he speaks of our dying with Him..."⁽¹⁾ As in his understanding of the cross, Bultmann feels that the real meaning of the resurrection stems not from its miraculous form but rather from the possibilities it offers for subsequent generations. It is to be seen as a present option for a believer's life and not as an objective, past event.

Having repeatedly noted that the cross and resurrection, by virtue of their eschatological status, offer possibilities significant for present existence, we come now to the consideration of a third, more unique, component of the eschatological event. This component, proclamation of the Word, is responsible for the past act of Christ becoming significant for later generations of believers. It is the avenue across history by virtue of which the Christ event remains ever contemporaneous.

We need to realize, as Good noted earlier, that preaching is equally a part of the eschatological event along with the cross and resurrection. They are all parts of a unit for Bultmann. In Existence and Faith he says:

1 Ibid., p.40.

"...the preaching itself belongs to the fact of salvation ..."(1) In "New Testament and Mythology" Bultmann explains that proclamation of the word following the events of Easter is actually an extension of that occurrence.

This word supplements the cross and makes its saving efficacy intelligible by demanding faith and confronting men with the question whether they are willing to understand themselves as men who are crucified and risen with Christ. Through the word of preaching the cross and the resurrection are made present: the eschatological "now" is here...(2)

We have already noted how the structure of the eschatological event, with its emphasis on the significance of the cross and resurrection for present existence, is oriented toward the Heideggerian concept of possibilities and with a consideration of preaching as another component of the eschatological event we shall see a further relation to Heidegger's philosophy. At this point we need to recall how in his discussion of history in Being and Time, Heidegger employed the term wiederholen or retrieve.

We previously described retrieving as "...an attempt to go back to the past and retrieve former possibilities which are thus explicitly handed down or transmitted." Further on it is explained as a "going into the past in such a way that one fetches back the possibility which it contains and makes present this possibility in our existence now."⁽³⁾ Hence, in Bultmann's concept of preaching as a making present

1 Bultmann, Existence and Faith, p.79.

2 Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology", Kerygma and Myth, I, p.42.

3 See previously, p.109

of the Easter event we can see the influence of this Heideggerian concept.

As we noted in Edwin Good's analysis which served as our introduction to Bultmann's eschatology, Christian existence is also included in this broad concept. Bultmann himself notes in Jesus Christ and Mythology that "to live in faith is to live an eschatological existence..."⁽¹⁾ This transferring of eschatology's significance from the cosmological to the historical - existential realm is most apparent throughout his discussion of eschatological existence. Instead of dealing with the cataclysmic end times he deals with the end of the old man and the beginning of the new in the transition from inauthentic to authentic existence. In this way eschatology becomes highly individualized.

As Bultmann explains, the real significance of mythological statements about the end of the age becomes clear when one recognizes that the old age or past is "...not only a cosmic situation...but rather my particular past, in which I was a sinner, and the future for which I am freed is likewise my future."⁽²⁾ In this interpretation, then, eschatology is "wholly realised and wholly individualized."⁽³⁾

We can now consider several specific traits of this eschatological existence and observe their relation to Heidegger's philosophy. Both Schubert Ogden in his

1 Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p.81.

2 Bultmann, Existence and Faith, pp.254-255.

3 H.P. Owen, Revelation and Existence, (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1957), p.45.

Introduction to Existence and Faith and H.P. Owen in Revelation and Existence refer to the frequency with which Bultmann cites the Pauline passage of I Cor 7:29-31.⁽¹⁾ It is this passage which Bultmann feels reflects the Christian's authentic relation to the world.

R.H. Fuller in his book The New Testament in Current Study says that for Bultmann this passage, with its description of Christians as "those who deal with the world as though they had no dealings with it," reflects the nature of true eschatological existence.⁽²⁾ In his essay "The Understanding of Man" Bultmann prefaces his quote of this Pauline passage by saying that belief means the "taking of man out of the world, and his ingrafting into eschatological existence. In this way it gives to the man of faith a peculiar detachment from the world..."⁽³⁾

In his Theology of the New Testament, I, Bultmann stresses that this "as though not" of eschatological existence does not imply a complete withdrawal from the world but only an avoidance of inauthentic immersion in worldly affairs. Because the Christian is free from a total involvement in worldly concerns "...he faces the world free, as one who rejoices with those who rejoice and weeps with those who weep (Rom. 12:15), one who participates in the

1 Ibid., p.46, and Schubert Ogden, "Introduction" to Bultmann's Existence and Faith, p.20.

2 R.H. Fuller, The New Testament in Current Study, (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1963), p.15.

3 Bultmann, Essays, p.86.

tumult of the world but does so with an inner aloofness -
 "as if (he did it) not"..."⁽¹⁾

In Bultmann's stress on the "as though not" of the Christian's relation to the world we see the influence of Heidegger's views on authentic Being-in-the-world wherein Dasein maintains the dialectical tension between Being-in-the-world and being immersed inauthentically in it. Like Heidegger, Bultmann recognizes the need to have dealings with the world, but he feels that in eschatological existence man should be "in" but not "of" the world.

We can see another basic Heideggerian influence on Bultmann's understanding of eschatological existence by considering its temporal structure. Basically we shall see that Bultmann follows Heidegger in associating an openness for the future with authentic existence and an orientation toward the past with inauthenticity. Like Heidegger's views on the past dimension and inauthentic existence, Bultmann says: "To live on the basis of...the past is what is called sin."⁽²⁾ The influence continues with Bultmann's description of the past as something to which man "clings" in fleeing the responsibility of deciding for the future.⁽³⁾ This clearly reflects Heidegger's portrayal of the past or 'Dasein as having been' as a "secure retreat."⁽⁴⁾

Of the future and the life of faith, Bultmann says

1 Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, I, p.351.

2 Bultmann, Essays, p.81.

3 Ibid., p.80.

4 See previously, p. 99

that to live "on the basis of the future is called living in dependence on God."⁽¹⁾ As Schmithals notes, faith for Bultmann is "simple openness for the future."⁽²⁾ This too clearly reflects Heidegger's association of authenticity with a readiness to face the future of new possibilities and decisions. Thus we can see that Bultmann's portrayal of the temporal dimension underlying eschatological existence is strongly influenced by Heidegger's understanding of Dasein's temporal nature.

With this we conclude our consideration of the nature of eschatological existence. As we have seen, eschatological existence was just one component of the eschatological event, a concept with an unusually broad meaning in its Bultmannian context. Other components were the once-for-all nature of this event, the cross, resurrection and proclamation of the Word. As we examined each of these we noted their reflection of Heideggerian concepts.

And finally, to provide a broader perspective of our present position, we might recall that our consideration of Bultmann's eschatology brings to an end our analysis of his understanding of history. The other components in this discussion were history as the realm of possibilities and history in its relation to the historical structure of human existence. In each of these cases also we clearly established Heidegger's influence.

1 Bultmann, Essays, p.81.

2 Schmithals, op.cit., p.101.

The Later Heidegger and Bultmann

Section Five

55. A critical appraisal of Bultmann

Having traced Heidegger's influence on various aspects of Bultmann's theology, e.g. his views on the subject-object pattern of thinking, his views on hermeneutics and his understanding of history, we are now prepared to note that we have been dealing mainly with the early Heidegger. In the following we shall point out the consequences of Bultmann's disproportionate interest in the earlier Heidegger and make several suggestions concerning the fruitfulness of Heidegger's later thought for Bultmann's theology.

As we saw in our previous analysis of Being and Time, Heidegger repeatedly stressed that his interest in Dasein was merely a means to an end. Indeed, his description of the Dasein analysis as fundamental ontology very pointedly reminded readers of his underlying ontological aim. Despite these repeated reminders in Being and Time, Bultmann nevertheless treats the analysis of Dasein as an end in itself. In doing so he fails to appreciate Heidegger's expressed ontological intentions.

This fact has not been lost on other thinkers familiar with the work of both men. Heinrich Ott, in his work Denken und Sein, states that because of his misinterpretation of Heidegger as an existentialist, "...Bultmann may

legitimately appeal to Heidegger only to a very limited extent."⁽¹⁾ Indeed Ott's book has been seen as highly critical of the way Bultmann uses Heidegger's insights. It is his contention that because Heidegger's motive in Being and Time was ontological, Bultmann's existential adaptation of it is inappropriate and somewhat distorting.⁽²⁾

Against such criticism of Bultmann's use of Heidegger's philosophy, we have to balance the following information provided in André Malet's very favourable analysis of Bultmann's theology. "In a letter of 30 November 1954, Heidegger approves unreservedly of using his analysis of existence for interpreting the New Testament and states that Bultmann has 'made no mistake whatever' about his thought."⁽³⁾

Several points need be noted by way of reconciling these seemingly opposing interpretations. First, we need to recognize the extremely sympathetic position Malet takes and his constant defence of Bultmann's position. (As noted previously, Bultmann himself wrote the preface to the book in which he highly praises its position.) Next, we can agree that Bultmann is correct in his use of Heidegger's philosophy so far as he goes with it. Thus, in the

1 Heinrich Ott, Denken und Sein, (Switzerland: Evangelischer Verlag Ag. Zollikon, 1959), p.8.

2 James Robinson, "The German Discussion", The Later Heidegger and Theology, ed. by J. Robinson and J.B. Cobb, p.17.

3 Malet, op.cit., p.326.

influences noted previously there was no criticism of Bultmann's adaptation of Heidegger's philosophy, and it is agreed that Bultmann's use of Heidegger's philosophy in interpreting the New Testament is correct.

Where we must disagree with Malet, however, is in our assertion that Bultmann is not appreciative of later developments in Heidegger's thinking and fails to take account of these in his own thinking. As we saw earlier, Heidegger himself acknowledges that he abandoned the terminology and perspective of his earlier position, as epitomized in Being and Time, in favour of another standpoint toward which his earlier thinking was 'on the way.' The standpoint adapted by Bultmann represents Heidegger's participation in a mode of thinking which was to be overcome by his later thinking. Therefore we can say with Malet that Bultmann is correct in so far as he goes and with Ott that he does not continue to appreciate Heidegger's thoughts as they later develop.

Having established our position that Bultmann does not sufficiently follow Heidegger in his later thinking, we can next take note of the consequences this has for his theological position. Basically we can see that, just as the early Heidegger was criticized for being too Dasein oriented or anthropocentric in his approach, so also has Bultmann been subjected to parallel criticism. His failure to appreciate the later developments which corrected and provided balance in Heidegger's philosophy resulted in Bultmann's susceptibility to critics' charges of an anthropocentric bias.

Karl Barth reflects the feelings of many critics when he claims that Bultmann's position harbors a "pre-Copernican attitude" wherein the understanding of God is subordinated to the understanding of man. The danger here is that theology will lose the initiative in its relation to philosophy and fall into an "Egyptian bondage" with its results being dictated by philosophical insights.⁽¹⁾ In this same essay Barth also refers "to the younger Heidegger in his anthropological strait jacket!"⁽²⁾ Hence, by implication, he supports our contention that the consequence of Bultmann's exclusive reliance on the earlier Heidegger is susceptibility to charges of anthropological bias.

In addition we can note Macquarrie's similar appraisal of Bultmann's use of Heidegger's philosophy. He approves of this theologian's concern for the existential element in theology, a concern often neglected and yet very important for a relevant approach. On the other hand, he takes Bultmann to task for downplaying the transcendent element in his theology. He recommends that just as Heidegger always intended to proceed beyond a Dasein analysis to a consideration of Being's varied revelations of itself, "...so theology cannot rest in existential statements, but must go on to speak of God and the transcendent - though in both cases the question of man's existence certainly appears...to be the right starting-point

1 Barth, "Bultmann - An Attempt to Understand Him", Kerygma and Myth, II, p.127.

2 Ibid., p.114.

for the inquiry."⁽¹⁾

Hence we have established that Bultmann disproportionately relies on the early Heidegger and that this consequently leaves him open to charges of an anthropological bias. Next we can consider how the work of the later Heidegger might be constructively employed in strengthening Bultmann's theology against such criticisms.

56. The relevance of the later Heidegger

We have already touched on one such use, namely that Bultmann might have profited from his theology taking a parallel course to Heidegger's philosophy as it developed away from an anthropological - existentialist orientation toward a greater emphasis on the realm of the ontological-transcendent. Had Bultmann charted his course in the direction of these later Heideggerian developments, his theology might have found a balance similar to that of Heidegger's philosophy and been less susceptible to the criticism mentioned previously.

Another way Heidegger's later philosophy might be constructively employed in Bultmann's theology is related to the fact that a great number of the charges made against Bultmann's theology concern his understanding or misunderstanding of the nature of modern man. His critics feel that Bultmann unjustifiably portrays modern man as totally closed against and insensitive toward any intrusion into a self-contained world from a transcendent realm.

1 Macquarrie, op.cit., pp.244-245.

These criticisms are directly related to another set of charges that there is a basic inconsistency in Bultmann's theology. He aims his existential interpretation at a modern man portrayed as impervious to any transcendent intrusion and yet fails to demythologize out what would be an objectionable intrusion in the form of God's unique action in Jesus Christ. We shall examine these two weaknesses, the misunderstanding of modern man and the resulting inconsistency of a limited demythologizing, in further depth and then see how an appreciation of Heidegger's later thought might constructively be employed in resolving both.

First of all, we should establish that Bultmann's views of modern man as the target for his existential interpretation do not stem from any Heideggerian influence. His failure to follow through in his adaptation of Heidegger's concepts here represents an inconsistency which culminates in serious problems in his theology. John Macquarrie stresses in his review of Bultmann on this topic that "...at this point we perceive in Bultmann's thought not the influence of existentialism but the hangover of a somewhat old fashioned liberal modernism."⁽¹⁾

Karl Jaspers in his essay "Myth and Religion" explains that Bultmann understands the modern view of the world as based on a "self-contained causality" which excludes the possibility of any miraculous interventions. In criticism of this interpretation, Jaspers says that

1 Ibid., p.168.

certain aspects of human nature never change and the openness for mythological intervention from supernatural powers is one such aspect. "The absurd faiths of the modern era, ranging from astrology to theosophy, and from National Socialism to Bolshevism, suggest that superstition has no less power over the human mind today that it had formerly."⁽¹⁾

Jaspers then refutes Bultmann's claim that scientific insights have contributed to the modern world-view of a closed universe by saying that, one, very few of the masses today really understand the significance and meaning of scientific insights, and, two, if they did they would realize that science makes no pretence of providing "...a total world view, because it recognizes that this is impossible."⁽²⁾ Support for this view of contemporary man can also be seen in the modern penchant for the myth of the beauty pageant queen and the contemporary interest in faith healing and glossolalia. Hence, it can be said that Bultmann has failed to evaluate properly the target for his demythologizing and existential interpretation. Further, because his understanding of modern man is not derived from an appropriate and contemporary anthropology, it lacks the authority given his existential interpretation by its being grounded in a recognized philosophical scheme.

How then can Heidegger's later insights be fruitfully

1 Karl Jaspers, "Myth and Religion", Kerygma and Myth, II, pp. 134-135.

2 Ibid., p.135.

adapted at this point in Bultmann's thinking? L. Malevez points the way for us here when he examines Heidegger's thought in the Epilogue to "Was ist Metaphysik?" He stresses that essential thought for Heidegger is openness toward and reception of the revelation of Being. He believes the direct equation of Heidegger's Being with God is inappropriate but he does feel that the portrayal of Dasein as constantly open and transparent to Being "prepares us for the revelation of the true God."⁽¹⁾

We can see, then, that the view of modern man contained in Heidegger's later thought is one which is open to, and indeed oriented toward, intrusion from a power beyond its immediate world, a power in control of him and not at his control. Such a conception of man, if adapted by Bultmann, would be less susceptible to the criticisms we reviewed and certainly more in keeping with what we have seen to be the nature of modern man.

As stated previously, the charge of a basic inconsistency in Bultmann's theology can be related to the criticisms concerning his views on the nature of modern man. In addition, the solution to the weakness leading to one criticism is pertinent to the solution of the other. The charge of inconsistency, while voiced by several commentators, is levelled most vigorously by Schubert Ogden in his book Christ Without Myth as well as at several other points.

In his essay, "Rudolf Bultmann's Philosophy of History", Ogden says that one of the few points on which

1 Malevez, op.cit., p.146.

Bultmann's critics agree is that his "demand for radical demythologizing and existentialist interpretation is fundamentally inconsistent with his claim that authentic human existence is factually possible solely in consequence of God's act in Jesus Christ."⁽¹⁾

In his book he further explains how these two concerns are contradictory.

If....Christian faith is to be interpreted solely in existential terms as man's original possibility of authentic self-understanding, then it demonstrably follows that it must be independent of any particular historical occurrence. On the other hand, if... Christian faith has a necessary connection with a particular historical event, then clearly it may not be interpreted without remainder as man's original possibility of authentic historicity.⁽²⁾

First of all, we should stress that Ogden has put his finger on a real discrepancy in Bultmann's program of demythologizing. In his essay "New Testament and Mythology", Bultmann insists that demythologizing must be pursued rigorously to the end for "we cannot save the kerygma by selecting some of its features and subtracting others, and thus reduce the amount of mythology in it..." And yet, only a few pages later he speaks of a unique act of God in Jesus Christ. "The New Testament speaks and faith knows of an act of God through which man becomes capable of self-commitment, capable of faith and love, of his authentic life."⁽³⁾ For Ogden, this amounts to speaking of

1 Schubert Ogden, "Rudolf Bultmann's Philosophy of History", The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, ed. by Charles Kegley, pp. 120-121.

2 Ogden, op.cit., p.137.

3 Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology", Kerygma and Myth, I, p.9 and p.33.

an intrusion of the transcendent into man's immanent world, and this therefore involves mythology.

Bultmann almost seems to anticipate such criticism. Immediately following the sentence quoted above he asks: "Have we carried our demythologizing far enough?" and a few sentences later makes what must seem to Ogden a rather flimsy attempt at avoiding the issue: "Anyone who asserts that to speak of an act of God at all is mythological language is bound to regard the idea of an act of God in Christ as a myth. But, let us ignore this question for a moment."⁽¹⁾ He returns to the issue in his conclusion to make a rather ambiguous statement that some language about an act of God can be mythological but not in the same way as the mythological language associated with the world view of the New Testament. He fails, however, to clarify the nature of any alternative at this point.⁽²⁾ (It should be noted that he does seek to rectify this problem later by supplementing his demythologizing with the use of analogical language. Since this does not involve any direct Heideggerian influence, we shall not discuss it here.)

This discrepancy in Bultmann's thought results from his contradictory concerns to (1) stress the transition from inauthentic existence to authentic existence, or life in faith, in terms of an existential framework; and (2) to preserve the uniqueness of God's act in Christ which makes

1 Ibid., pp.33-34.

2 Ibid., p.43.

this transition possible. The two concerns are contradictory in that man understood in terms of the existential-ontological framework of the earlier Heidegger needs no assistance from a unique act by a transcendent power in order to effect the transition to authentic existence.

Herein lies the key to this discrepancy and were Bultmann able to understand man as portrayed by the later Heidegger or man who is open and receptive to the transcendent realm, then his understanding of man within an existential framework would be compatible with his stress on God's unique act in Jesus Christ which makes possible the transition in man's life. This is not to say that Heidegger's thinking provides a detailed model for describing how a transcendent God might break into and influence existence.

However, a better awareness of the later Heidegger's treatment of Dasein as an entity open to the powers of a transcendent force would open up Bultmann's theology for this possibility. Once this occurred, he could go on to offer an interpretation of the cross and resurrection which might be less objectionable to more conservative theologians. Hence we can see how the thought of the later Heidegger could be utilized to strengthen two points at which Bultmann's theology is most susceptible to criticism.

We have already touched on another aspect of the later Heidegger's thinking which can be constructively

applied to Bultmannian thought in our discussion of the subject-object pattern in thinking and speaking of God. There we noted that Bultmann failed to follow through in his adaptation of Heidegger's views on this problem.

We also suggested that the reason for this was Heidegger's lack of emphasis on this issue until later developments in his thinking. With his concern for the earlier Heidegger of Being and Time, Bultmann was unable to comprehend fully Heidegger's view point. However, other Bultmannian's have done so, as we noted in our consideration of Gogarten's defence of Bultmann in Demythologizing and History.

Heinrich Ott also has suggested the usefulness of Heidegger for Bultmann on this point. As we noted previously, Bultmann does not completely escape the subject-object dilemma in his thinking and speaking of God. We saw how he felt any such thinking or talking was necessarily sinful, although it could be justified by God's forgiveness. At another point we can see him very clearly denying the possibility of any non-objectifying thinking about God. In replying to an essay by Schubert Ogden, Bultmann deals with the criticism that he can only speak indirectly about God since he restricts knowledge of God to knowledge of the self. He defends himself by insisting that it is impossible to speak directly of God and his actions without objectifying Him.⁽¹⁾ For Bultmann, then, any thinking or speaking about God in Himself is necessarily objectifying.

1 Bultmann, "Reply", p.267.

How then can the later Heidegger's thinking be applied at this point? Heinrich Ott, in his books Denken und Sein and Theology and Preaching suggests that Heidegger's understanding of essential thinking and language would resolve Bultmann's dilemma concerning thinking and speaking of God. Briefly we can recall how in our own analysis of the later Heidegger Being took the initiative in both language and essential thought. Dasein assumed a more passive role and merely became the place, or da, where Being's disclosure through word or thought occurred. Indeed, it is this event which grounded and justified Dasein's existence.

Let us now see how Ott applies this to Bultmann's situation. In Denken und Sein, after reviewing Heidegger's views on essential thinking, he suggests how theology might be freed of the subject-object pattern of thinking which inevitably results in objectifying God. By understanding itself "...as an element of encounter, as encounter with what is to be thought, which shows itself, "unveils" itself to thought and thus determines thought...", theology's dealing with God would not be "about" God, or objectifying, but could be seen as coming from within the encounter of faith itself.⁽¹⁾

Hence we can see that Ott, utilizing the later Heidegger's insights, objects to Bultmann's implied distinction between faith as primary existential encounter and theology as a secondary objectifying appendage to this

1 Ott, op.cit., pp.173-174.

experience. Instead, he feels that thinking in theology also stems from an encounter with its subject matter which unveils (aletheia) itself to the thinker.

Clearly, then, Bultmann does remain trapped in some left-overs of the subject-object pattern of thinking which were fully removed only in the later thinking of Heidegger, a thinking which Bultmann has not sufficiently utilized. However, others such as Ott have done so and quite constructively, since the result is an approach more coherent and less susceptible to critics' charges.

In this section, then, we have noted that Bultmann's understanding of Heidegger's philosophy is oriented toward the earlier insights expressed mainly in Being and Time. We have also established that the charges of an anthropocentric bias in Bultmann's theology is directly related to his failure to follow the developments in Heidegger's thinking toward an ontological orientation. The result is that while Heidegger's overall philosophical position maintains a balance between immediate and ultimate or immanent and transcendent concerns, Bultmann's theology suffers from an unbalanced emphasis on only the one dimension.

We further noted how the insights of the later Heidegger might be effectively employed in strengthening Bultmann's theology against several other criticisms, e.g. his misunderstanding of the nature of modern man, the inconsistency of his proposals for radical demythologizing and retention of God's actions through Jesus Christ, and finally, his unnecessary distinction between the experience

of faith and theological thought. In this we have established that Bultmann's theology, despite his preference for the earlier Heidegger, could definitely be strengthened through a better understanding and utilization of the later Heidegger's philosophy.

Conclusion

57. Heidegger's influence on Bultmann's theology

By way of conclusion let us recall our main thesis as proposed in the introduction to this analysis which asserted that Bultmann was influenced to a great extent by Heidegger's philosophy in both the basic direction and structure of his theology as well as in many particular components of it. Let us review our analysis section by section to summarize the support of this assertion.

On the relation of philosophy and theology we noted that Bultmann concurs with Heidegger's belief that ontology lays the foundation for all other disciplines. He thus adapts the Heideggerian scheme by joining theological insights on the "here and now" existentiell level into the broader, neutral structure composed of Heideggerian existentials.

As for the section on Bultmann's reaction to the subject-object pattern of thinking, we observed how closely he followed Heidegger's philosophical reaction against such thinking. However, we also established that Bultmann's lack of appreciation of Heidegger's later thinking resulted in a failure to grasp completely the significance of this insight which only came to fruition in Heidegger's later works.

On the other hand, we saw how others (especially Gogarten) used these later Heideggerian insights in defending

Bultmann against his critics. Therefore this section as well as the previous one strongly supported our assertion concerning the influence of Heidegger's philosophy. In addition this section also supported our contention that Bultmann is influenced mostly by the earlier Heidegger and as a result his understanding of Heidegger is most accurate in regard to these earlier works.

The third section of our analysis dealt with Bultmann's hermeneutics. We first considered this as reflected in his views on exegesis. With his concept of pre-understanding we noted the influence of Heidegger's belief that all inquiries and analyses are guided by some sort of vague, ontic awareness which provides a clue as to the general direction of the analysis. We then observed how Bultmann directly adapted Heidegger's existential-existentiell concepts for his own exegetical Begrifflichkeit or terminology.

Further, in the Bultmannian concepts Sachexegese (exegesis of the subject matter) and Sachkritik (criticism of the subject matter) we could see the influence of such Heideggerian concepts as "retrieve" and "Being - aletheia". We should point out here that these latter two concepts are found in the later Heidegger so that our contention regarding the extent of Bultmann's dependence on the earlier Heidegger could not be phrased too strictly. Thus we qualified it by saying that Bultmann's adaptation and understanding of Heidegger is generally (but not exclusively) oriented toward the earlier Heidegger.

Our analysis of Bultmann's hermeneutics continued with a discussion of the concept, "hermeneutical circle." Here we saw how for Bultmann pre-understanding leads to self-understanding, in which the latter enriches and deepens the scope of the former in a manner similar to the relation between an ontic, vague awareness and a deeper ontological understanding in Heidegger's fundamental ontology. It further developed that Bultmann's concept of self-understanding, as a type of existential knowledge, stemmed from the Heideggerian distinction between objects vorhanden (present-at-hand) and zuhanden (ready-to-hand). And finally it became apparent that Bultmann's claim for an inherent knowledge of God in all men stemmed from the Heideggerian understanding of man as the "ontological animal."

As one form of interpretation, demythologizing was also considered in the section on hermeneutics. This concept, by virtue of its centrality in Bultmann's theology, was also related to the previous consideration of the subject-object dilemma in thinking. Mythology, due to existential intention being expressed in an objectivizing form (hence its relation to the problem of subject-object patterned thinking) necessarily invites interpretation (hence its relation to hermeneutics). In this way we established that Bultmann's concept of demythologizing was also influenced by Heidegger's philosophy through its involvement in these two basic Bultmannian concerns.

In the final section concerned with Bultmann's hermeneutics, we traced Heidegger's influence in the Bultmannian interpretation of Paul's theology. We clearly brought out Heidegger's influence in the direction of the analysis from inauthentic to authentic existence, in the existential-existentiell distinctions and also in the way Heideggerian concepts were used to give contemporary expression to Pauline anthropology.

The next general area analysed was Bultmann's interest in history and the evidence for our thesis here was three-fold. First, Heidegger's influence was seen in Bultmann's characterization of history as essentially the realm of "possibilities." Secondly, further support for our main thesis was garnered from Bultmann's tendency to study history in the light of man's historical structure. And finally, we saw reflected in the Bultmannian concept, eschatological event, Heidegger's understanding of possibilities, in the Bultmannian "proclamation", the Heideggerian "retrieve", and in the Bultmannian "Christian existence", Heidegger's "authentic Being-in-the-world" and temporal nature of existence.

In our final section the discussion moved away from the influence of the earlier Heidegger's philosophy (the concern of our main thesis and first assertion in the introduction) to a consideration of the later Heidegger's relevance for Bultmannian theology (the concern of our second assertion in the introduction). In particular the later Heidegger was shown to be relevant for Bultmann's

(mis-)understanding of the nature of modern man, for the basic inconsistency between his concern for demythologizing and his concern to retain the uniqueness of God's act in the Christ event, and for his dilemma in thinking about God.

Most importantly, however, Bultmann's failure to follow a course parallel to that taken by the later Heidegger was shown to result in a lack of overall balance in his theology between the transcendent-immanent, or the ultimate-immediate dimensions. As we noted previously, Heidegger's great strength lies in the fact that his later emphasis on the role of Being compensated for his earlier emphasis on Dasein. This allowed his philosophy to maintain the dialectical tension between these two inseparable yet distinct poles and gave it a balance lacking in Bultmann's theology.

THE LATER HEIDEGGER AND THE NEW HERMENEUTIC THEOLOGIANS

CHAPTER SIX

Introduction

58. Hermeneutics re-defined

With our consideration of Bultmann's theology we have been dealing mainly with the influence of the earlier Heidegger as seen in his Dasein analysis and to a less extent, his analysis of thinking. We move now into a consideration of the post-Bultmannian theologians, Ernst Fuchs, Gerhard Ebeling and Heinrich Ott.⁽¹⁾ Although we shall be touching on several theological issues, our analysis will be devoted mainly to the role of language in theology and this topic is distinctive of one particular school of thinkers, popularly known as the "new hermeneutic" theologians.

Paul Achtemeier, in his article "How Adequate is

1 In his article "The Post-Bultmannian Trend", John B. Cobb says that while the term post-Bultmannian is generally associated with those who have gone beyond Bultmann's position in regards to a new quest for the historical Jesus, "...the increasing use of Heidegger in continental theology should /also/ be included under the heading of post-Bultmannian." He specifically mentions Fuchs, Ebeling and Ott as key figures in this movement. The Journal of Bible and Religion, Vol.30(1962), pp.8-9.

the New Hermeneutic?" provides an excellent introductory definition of this new approach. He states that theology is always involved in hermeneutics to some extent since its purpose is to "explicate the meaning of God's act in Christ." This involves the two-fold task of understanding ancient thinking and giving this understanding appropriate expression in contemporary form. This involves both an analysis of understanding as such and of language.

He goes on to say, "It is the insight of the so-called "new" hermeneutic that these two questions really ask the same thing, and that they may both be approached in terms of the nature of language."⁽¹⁾ The central issue for the new hermeneutic theologians then is language.

Our approach to this topic will take the following form. We shall first consider the basic issues touched on by the "new hermeneutic" theologians. This will involve only a cursory examination of their basic position and will serve as an introduction to later detailed analyses. This introduction is necessitated by the radical and unique nature of their insights and hopefully it will facilitate the re-orientation required in understanding these new approaches to traditional topics. Following the introduction we shall engage in more detailed analyses of those aspects of the theology of Fuchs, Ebeling and Ott which are influenced by Heidegger.

1 P.J. Achtemeier, "How Adequate Is the New Hermeneutic?", Theology Today, vol. 23(1966-67), pp.101-102.

Our thesis will be that these theologians are influenced mainly, but not exclusively, by the later Heidegger, especially his analysis of language. In addition to the evidence we are about to consider in the following analyses of these theologians, we can also find direct support for our thesis. As seen in the following comments most commentators agree on the relation of the new hermeneutic to Heidegger's philosophy.

Carl Braaten, in his book History and Hermeneutics, stresses how Fuchs and Ebeling progressed beyond the position of Bultmann under the influence of the later Heidegger. He explains that their interest moved away from Bultmann's concern for the existential understanding behind the text to the actual language of the text. Braaten sees this shift of interest as parallel to the turn in Heideggerian philosophy from "...an existentialist analysis of Dasein...to an understanding of man whose language is the primal, non-objectifying voice of Being."⁽¹⁾

Similarly, in his essay "Jesus' Parables as God Happening" James Robinson suggests that the new hermeneutic "...has shifted its orientation from an 'understanding of existence' derived from the Bultmannian interpretation of the earlier Heidegger, to an understanding of language, derived from the later Heidegger."⁽²⁾

1 Carl Braaten, History and Hermeneutics, (London: Lutterworth Press, 1968), pp.138-139.

2 J.M. Robinson, "Jesus' Parables as God Happening", Jesus and the Historian, ed. by F. Thomas Trotter (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1968), p.140.

We can also recall Heidegger's words expressing, in turn, the influence of theology on his own approach to hermeneutics. "The term, hermeneutics, was familiar to me from my theological studies...Without this theological background I should never have come upon the path of thinking." (see page 124) Hence, this philosopher's influence on the new hermeneutic theology seems less inappropriate than might normally be the case.

We can turn now to our introductory remarks concerning the general traits of this new theological movement. James Robinson, in The New Hermeneutic, states that the theological approach instituted by the work of Fuchs and Ebeling can be considered a school of theology in itself "... just as were dialectic theology and Ritschlianism before it." (1) Indeed, it is this book which first provided a label for this movement and also limited the title mainly to the work of Fuchs and Ebeling.

In opposition to this, Carl Braaten wrote a rather stinging analysis of the book in which he suggested, one, that nothing in theology is really new and, two, that other theologians, Heinrich Ott in particular, have as much right to credit for the "new" movement as do those suggested by Robinson. (2) Like Braaten, we shall extend the limits of membership in the new hermeneutic and consider Ott as a

1 J.M. Robinson, "Hermeneutic Since Barth", The New Hermeneutic, ed. by J.M. Robinson and John B. Cobb (London: Harper and Row Publishers, 1964), p.67.

Carl Braaten, "How New Is the New Hermeneutic?", Theology Today, vol. 22(1965-66), pp.218-220.

valuable contributor.

Perhaps the most distinctive point made by this new approach is its broad definition of the term hermeneutics.— In distinction to the common understanding of hermeneutics as the "theory of the exposition of texts" Ebeling suggests that "...the basic meaning of hermeneuein 'to bring to understanding', which combines the various meanings 'state', 'expound' and 'translate', accords very well with the real sense of hermeneutics."⁽¹⁾

James Robinson continues along these same lines when he suggests that the English term hermeneutic has a narrower connotation than the Greek term hermeneia, which "...meant interpretation so broadly that it could be applied to whatever activity was involved in bringing the unclear to clarity." Employing an etymological argument reminiscent of Heidegger's approach, he traces the origin of the Greek term to the name of the divine herald of the gods, Hermes, who interpreted or made clear the will of the gods through his pronouncements. Therefore, his words themselves were a form of interpretation. "Here language is itself interpretation, not just the object of interpretation."⁽²⁾

He goes on to explain this broader understanding of "interpretation" by referring to an actor's or musician's

1 Gerhard Ebeling, Word and Faith, trans. by J.W. Leitch, (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1963), p.321.

2 J.M. Robinson, "Hermeneutic Since Barth", pp.1-2.

use of interpretation which "refers to his rendition or performance of the work of art, rather than to a commentary on the work of art."⁽¹⁾ In these words of Robinson and Ebeling we can see that hermeneutics means not just a particular, and rather limited, area of theology but rather interpretation in general.

Now there is less discrepancy between the Greek and contemporary understanding of hermeneutics. In addition, by virtue of its relation to Hermes, language is understood in hermeneutics not as the object of interpretation but rather as one means of interpretation, or bringing to understanding. Language as itself interpretation and hermeneutics in the broad sense of the word are two of the distinguishing traits of this new theological movement.

As a result of this broad definition of hermeneutics, Ebeling can say: "The question of hermeneutic forms the focal point of the theological problem today."⁽²⁾ (The term hermeneutic is used to distinguish this movement's new understanding of hermeneutics). He goes on to elaborate on this claim in relation to various theological disciplines.

He dismisses as obvious the need for hermeneutics in studying the Old and New Testaments. In relation to church history, he says interpretation is used in dealing

1 Ibid., p.2.

2 Ebeling, op.cit., p.27.

with source material and is even more directly involved in that "...the process of exposition of Scripture that goes on in the history of the church presents the hermeneutical problem in its full compass..." Also, dogmatics, with its "task of bringing the church's teaching into contact and discussion with contemporary principles of thought" necessarily involves hermeneutics. He similarly grounds practical theology and missions in hermeneutics. In all areas of theology then, "the hermeneutical problem proves to be of fundamental significance."⁽¹⁾ This ability to unify all the various fields of theology under this one hermeneutic theme is certainly a key characteristic of the new hermeneutic approach.

It is not difficult to see that in the thinking of these post-Bultmannians theology is taking a course parallel to that of the later Heidegger's philosophy. As stated previously (see page 159) hermeneutics in the later Heidegger refers to "the entire effort to let Being be manifest." In both cases, then, hermeneutics assumes a broad role and is related to, as well as relates, more specialized fields of investigation.

Having established something of the basic direction and scope of the new hermeneutic school of theology, we can next briefly consider several of the key aspects of this approach. We begin by noting that, like any responsible analysis of language, it strives to avoid an abstract

1 Ibid.

analysis in which its object is separated from its normal situation or environment and then mechanically examined.

In Word and Faith, Ebling states: "For hermeneutics is of course not a departure from the linguistic realm in order to understand language, but a deeper penetration into the linguistic realm in order to understand by means of language."⁽¹⁾ Similarly, Fuchs speaks of this same issue in the following: "Exegesis is always subject to the failing that through its very handling of the text it ties the text down and reduces it to silence, whereas the text ought really to come to light in the exposition...We want rather to catch live fish."⁽²⁾

That these men are taking an approach very similar to Heidegger's can be seen from the following quotes: /from a conversation between Heidegger and a visiting professor/
 "(Heidegger) Speaking about language turns language almost inevitably into an object. (Visitor) And then its reality vanishes. (Heidegger) We have then taken up a position above language, instead of hearing from it." And also, "In order to be who we are, we human beings remain committed to and within the being of language and can never step out of it and look at it from somewhere else."

In analyzing these statements, the illustration was used of studying a fish by removing it from the water.

1 Ibid., p.319

2 Ernst Fuchs, Studies of the Historical Jesus, trans. by Andrew Scobie, (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1964), p.188

Neither language nor the fish in their actual nature can be seen out of their natural context. (For quotes and analysis see page 125) Hence, these post-Bultmannians can be seen as taking the cue from the later Heidegger for their approach to language analysis.

It is his failure to consider language "in its natural context" that causes these theologians to progress beyond Bultmann's approach to language toward the direction of the later Heidegger's approach. Other theologians agree with this move away from Bultmann as can be seen in their analysis of the shortcomings of demythologizing, a result of its being based on a faulty understanding of the relation of language and thinking. As one notes, language for Bultmann is a secondary objectification of the thinking it expresses. The result is that language often distorts what it expresses and interpretation involves getting behind or through the language to the "reality to which it points, so that that reality may find more adequate expression in different language."⁽¹⁾

For these post-Bultmannians, however, one cannot separate language and thinking. Instead, as we saw in our discussion of hermeneuein and Hermes, language is a vital part of the process of "bringing to understanding." It is one of the means through which understanding occurs. Thus, Bultmann's demythologizing under-estimates the value and role of language with the result that it is separated from its natural context.

1 Achtemeier, op.cit., p.103.

Here too, the influence of the later Heidegger's thinking is most apparent. It was stated previously that Heidegger reverses our normal consideration of language as subservient to thought. In What Is Called Thinking? he says: "Only when man speaks, does he think, not the other way around." (see page 155) Now it can be seen that in the approach of both Heidegger and the theologians of the new hermeneutic, language assumes a central role in understanding and in relation to the thought process.

Another key aspect of this new movement's thinking might be called the linguisticity of existence. P.J. Achtemeier explains that language consists of two elements, call, (Anruf) and response (Zuruf). As a result, "Man exists therefore between call and answer. He is called by language and he answers by language, and thus man is essentially "linguistic" in his existence."⁽¹⁾

Similarly, Heidegger says that authentic language consists of both a listening to language as Being and a subsequent speaking in response to it. He says that listening occurs not only in normal conversations but that the "simultaneousness of speaking and listening has a larger meaning. Speaking is of itself a listening. Speaking is listening to the language which we speak. Thus, it is a listening not while but before we are speaking." For Heidegger also, the language process has these two aspects of listening to the call of language and then responding to

1 Ibid., p.108.

it with language. He goes on to say that "the essence of man is brought into its own through language in order that it serve the essence of language." (both quotes from On the Way to Language, see page 151) Now we can see how the new hermeneutic's understanding of existence as basically determined by man's ability to speak stems from the later Heidegger's work.

We have now completed our introductory analysis of the new hermeneutic wherein we established something of its nature, its key figures, its basic scope, and its key components. Throughout our attempt at orientation to this new approach we have been able to establish the strong influence upon it of Heidegger's later philosophy.

Ernst Fuchs

Section One

59. Language-event

We begin our examination of theologians within the new hermeneutic approach with Ernst Fuchs, since he seems to typify all the movement represents and is also heavily influenced by Heidegger. Our analysis of Fuch's thinking will begin with a consideration of his basic concepts and presuppositions, e.g. his understanding of such matters as language, Being, thinking, time, and reality, and will then move into a consideration of such basic theological concerns as his hermeneutical principle and anthropology. From there our analysis will move into a brief consideration of more narrowly theological concerns such as the cross, the resurrection, Christology, revelation and faith. Throughout the influence of the later, and occasionally the earlier, Heidegger will be noted. We will conclude with a critical appraisal of Fuch's thinking in light of Heidegger's influence on him.

As we saw from our introductory remarks, language is a central concept for these theologians, so we shall begin by examining Fuch's understanding of it. For him, language is more than just speaking in the ordinary sense. In Hermeneutik he explains that language is not just talk or speaking but is in a more basic sense a "...showing or letting be seen, an indication in the active sense: I intimate to you or instruct you what you yourself should

perceive (take notice of or watch out for) ...That can take place through a simple movement, even by turning away from another."⁽¹⁾ Thus for Fuchs, language can be acts as well as words, e.g., a sunrise can be language as well as the event of a cow licking her calf.⁽²⁾

In the above, two approaches to language are assumed. One is the ordinary everyday understanding and the other is what Fuchs would see as the deeper, more meaningful aspect of language. Of the former, he says: "Language does not consist of the verbal reporting of meaning content."⁽³⁾ J.C. Weber notes that for Fuchs, "...language does not simply name things as they are so that a correspondence between subject and object can be established. Language is not just a conceptual tool of man."⁽⁴⁾

In his rejection of the common understanding of language, Fuchs is directly following in Heidegger's footsteps. Consider the following in which Heidegger makes a similar appraisal of the ordinary understanding of language. "Language is his man's own property...Language serves to give information...it is a possession. But the essence of language does not consist entirely in being a means of giving information. This definition does not touch its

1 Ernst Fuchs, Hermeneutik, (Bad Cannstatt: R. Müllerschön Verlag, 1954), p.131.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 J.C. Weber, "Language-Event and Christian Faith", Theology Today, vol. 21 (1964-65), p.449.

essential essence..."⁽¹⁾

Of language in its essence, language on the deeper level, Fuchs says in "What is a Language-Event?": "What does language do? It justifies Being. How does it do this? It permits Being to be present in time; it makes Being into an event."⁽²⁾ To distinguish this understanding of language from the ordinary approach, Fuchs coins a new phrase for it, language-event (Sprachereignis). Hence it should be noted that by language-event, Fuchs is referring to the language of man in which Being comes to expression. The result is that language is now the main aspect of existence where Being is to be encountered.

In Fuchs' understanding of language as language-event there is a direct reflection of Heidegger's understanding of language as Being; as we proceed with our examination of this concept we will note the many points of contact it has with Heidegger's philosophy. As observed in our original definition, language-event permits Being "to be present in time." It should be pointed out that the term translated here as 'be' is anwesen, "a term for Being revived by Heidegger to accentuate the event character of Being."⁽³⁾

This idea of language as letting Being be recurs

1 Heidegger, Existence and Being, p.229.

2 Fuchs, Studies of the Historical Jesus, p.207.

3 Robinson, "Hermeneutic Since Barth", p.58.

frequently in Fuchs' analyses. In "Das Problem der Theologischen Hermeneutik" he says: "Where an intelligible word is, there Being takes place; and what is shows itself."⁽¹⁾ And in another essay he states: "When language states what 'is', it does not merely state, but rather it brings existence for the first time to its Being."⁽²⁾ He next establishes the close relation between language and Being: "...without language Being also is nothing" and "without Being, language is without a basis, absurd, chimerical, glossolalia."⁽³⁾

The influence of Heidegger's philosophy is most apparent in this key aspect of Fuchs' definition of language-event. In his analysis of logos Heidegger closely associates Being and language and explains how this Greek word reflects language as letting be. "The oldest word... for Saying is logos. Saying which, in showing lets beings appear...The same word, however...is also the word for Being, that is, the presencing of beings."⁽⁴⁾

Fuchs elaborates on the meaning of essential language as follows: "Language assumes the essential characteristic of Being - that is, that it gathers together. And the assembling of Being needs language, in order to be."

1 Ernst Fuchs, "Das Problem der Theologischen Hermeneutik", as quoted by Gerald O'Collins, "Reality as Language: Ernst Fuchs' Theology of Revelation", Theological Studies, vol.28 (1967), p.90.

2 Fuchs, "Was Ist Existentielle Interpretation?", as quoted by O'Collins, p.90.

3 Fuchs, "Das Problem der Theologischen Hermeneutik", as quoted by O'Collins, p.90.

4 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, p.155.

He then applies this Christologically by speaking of Christ the proclaimer as the one "who gathers us." Further, the Christian community makes Christ "present" through its own proclamation. The Christian community "has its being, its 'togetherness" in performing this language function of proclamation.⁽¹⁾

Here too, we see the influence of Heidegger's later philosophy. In analysing the Greek conception of language, Heidegger says: "The word Logos names that which gathers all (beings) into (Being) and thereby lets (them) lie forth..." (see page 131). In both cases, language and Being function interchangeably as a process of "gathering".

In his analysis of the relation of language to reality, we can further see how closely Fuchs adapts Heidegger's understanding of language as performing the role of Being. The following will be a careful analysis of the section in Hermeneutik entitled "Das Problem der Wirklichkeit und die Sprache". He begins by saying that "reality is based on being present" and something can become present only when "its presence corresponds with my presence." Therefore something can only be real if it is present and it can become present only through a person.

On the individual's part, this requires that he "adapt" himself to reality and "be able to say how, where

1 Fuchs, Studies of the Historical Jesus, p.208.

and in what manner he confronts it." As a result, "the real is only that which can become present as language... Thus reality has not yet been fully defined when we locate it only in the context of beings, but rather as a category it is even more basically built into the nature of another realm, that of language." Furthermore, "an eternal silence would be the abolition of reality." The function of language now is seen as the "releasing" of reality through the expression of it.⁽¹⁾ Here we see language performing the role normally assigned to Being in relation to reality.

Fuchs explains this rather difficult idea with the following illustration concerning a brother in Christ. In Studies of the Historical Jesus he states:

The other person is not simply called a brother because he is; he would not be a brother if I did not so call him. Through my calling him brother I certainly do not make him into one, but I admit him as a brother among us by myself entering this community with him. This event is the very happening with which language is concerned. The concrete word is what first raises Being...admits gathering as gathering and therefore also allows it.⁽²⁾

R.C. Oudersleys illustrates Fuchs' assessment of the power of language in relation to reality by speaking of a prisoner who has been released from jail. The opening of the cell doors does not guarantee the prisoner's freedom for he could spend the rest of his life a hunted fugitive in fearful apprehension of capture. "Before freedom is

1 Fuchs, Hermeneutik, pp.128, 130, 132.

2 Fuchs, Studies of the Historical Jesus, p.209.

his, a word must reach him; acquitted, pardoned, ..."(1)
 Here we can see how language alone insures the reality of freedom for this man and we can better understand how, for Fuchs, language assumes the role of Being in relation to reality.

In our analysis of Heidegger's later views on language, we encountered the concept, "bethinging" (die Bedingnis) which was derived from the following line of a poem - "Where word breaks off no thing may be." Heidegger explained this concept as the process wherein "the word... is what brings /a/given thing, as a being that is, into this "is"...". The comment on this explanation was "...the word gives a being its Being." (see page 154). We can begin to see now how closely Fuchs follows Heidegger in his language analysis. In both it is language that brings a being into reality and lets it be, and for both, where language ceases, reality and Being are no more. Fuchs' words "Being without language is nothing" ⁽²⁾ strongly reflect the line of poetry mentioned above.

In the Heideggerian phrase "Language is the house of Being" (see page 155) we see a further relation between this theologian and philosopher. It was this phrase which showed how closely Being and language were associated for Heidegger. In Heidegger's statement that the "Being of

1 R.C. Oudersleys, "Some Reflections on the New Hermeneutic", The Reformed Review, vol. 21 (1968), p.46.

2 loc.cit.

anything that is, resides in the word", we can see the source of Fuchs' belief that an entity's reality lies in the realm of language. In Fuchs' understanding of language and reality we can now see the strong influence of Heidegger's later thoughts on Being, being and language.

60. Jesus' Parables

We can continue to trace the influence of Heidegger's philosophy by considering Fuchs' analysis of Jesus' parables as examples of language-event or language in its essence. For him, the parables typify Jesus' language at its best. As he says in "The Essence of the Language-Event and Christology": "I understand Jesus' proclamation as language-event...It is his parables which are typical of Jesus."⁽¹⁾ In our discussion of Fuchs on parables we will encounter Heidegger's influence at three points, in Fuchs' understanding of world, of language as the realm of the possible and as the "ontological difference."

Fuchs sees the parables functioning as language-event in that they grasp the hearer deep down and cause a basic re-orientation in his existence. Of the parables he says: "What is meant is that one must allow oneself to be laid hold of. This can happen in no other way than that the man who is addressed understands himself anew...This is the decisive achievement of the parables of Jesus: whoever understands...moves already in a new context, in being

1 Ernst Fuchs, "Proclamation and Language Event", Theology Today, vol. 19 (1962-63), p.347.

before God."⁽¹⁾

We need to consider how the parable manages to affect the hearer so deeply. In Hermeneutik, Fuchs closely associates man with his "world". He states that "out there, as world, is to be decided what is to be worked out inside, in man, as Dasein." Furthermore, "We either meet in the world our own Being or we lose it there."⁽²⁾ This world is to be understood, not as "nature", but as the realm of historical significance (Geschichte) which receives its meaning through language.⁽³⁾

As James Robinson explains: "...man's location in a given historical tradition means that he hears reality in terms of a certain 'world', a context of meaning that he simply takes over from his culture in its language."⁽⁴⁾ Therefore, to re-orient a man's existence would be to place him in a new world. Here we see striking overtones of Heidegger's existential Being-in-the-world which stresses the unity of man and world: they cannot be viewed as two separate entities ~~since~~ since Dasein is its world. Indeed, "worldhood" becomes an existential of Dasein (see page 37). We see from this not only the influence of Heidegger but also a case of where Fuchs relies on the earlier Heidegger's work in Being and Time. (Hence the need for our thesis to

1 Fuchs, Studies of the Historical Jesus, pp.220-221.

2 Fuchs, Hermeneutik, p.67.

3 Ibid., p.66.

4 Robinson, op.cit., p.49.

state that the new hermeneutic theologians are influenced mainly but not exclusively by the later Heidegger.)

Thus, to affect deeply their hearers' existence, the parables need to affect the worlds in which they function. A.C. Thiselton, in his article "The Parables as Language-Event", stresses that Fuchs sees Jesus using the images of his parables to portray a scene or world into which the hearer is drawn. In the story of the householder who pays both early and late comers the same wages, Fuchs says: "...the last are paid first, so that we, too, share the inevitable reaction of the first" and, "the circumstances surrounding the hire of the labourers, the minute attention to detail...singles out the individual and grasps him deep down."⁽¹⁾ To understand the parables, then, he feels one must "be able inwardly to adhere to the parable and participate in it."⁽²⁾

The parable can be explained by saying that through the use of familiar images it engages the listener's attention and then involves him in its plot. However, when the events in the parable "...fail to take a predictable and familiar course..., the hearer finds himself exposed and put on trial in a strange world. Conventional values and...criteria are transcended and perhaps even reversed."⁽³⁾ Now we can see how parables as language-events deeply

1 Fuchs, Studies of the Historical Jesus, pp.33-35.

2 Ibid., p.140.

3 A.C. Thiselton, "The Parables as Language-Event", Scottish Journal of Theology, vol. 23 (1970), p.442.

affect and change the hearer's existence through questioning the world in which he functions. Furthermore, in the close association between man and world which allows language to function so essentially we can see the definite influence of Heidegger's philosophy.

We turn next to see how Fuchs is influenced by the Heideggerian concept of possibilities in his interpretation of the parables as language-event. In Hermeneutik we find the following explanation of the relation of language and the realm of the possible. "Language helps reality to its truth. In faith's view it is the possible that helps the real linguistically to its truth and thus expresses itself as itself..."⁽¹⁾

For Fuchs then, reality comes into its own through language which is understood as the realm of possibilities, one of which is selected and actualized. As a result the reality of one's existence can receive new meaning by the actualization of a new linguistic possibility. Just as Heidegger understands the realm of the possible as the field from which Dasein must choose, thereby resolutely creating its world, so Fuchs sees language as this realm of possibilities, one of which is chosen to be the means whereby reality is gathered and admitted into its being. (For Heidegger on 'possibilities' see pages 47-48.)

1 Fuchs, Hermeneutik, p.211.

Finally, we can see in Fuchs' discussion of parables a reflection of Heidegger's insights into Being as the "ontological difference." For Fuchs, what is distinctive about the parable is that its analogous language is particularly suited for establishing the relation between the Kingdom of God and the world. This can be seen in an analysis of Eberhard Jüngel's Paulus und Jesus in which the parables are examined. This book can be taken as representative of Fuchs' position since Jüngel was a student of his and since he has reacted very favourably to the results of Jüngel's analysis.⁽¹⁾

In analysing Jesus' use of parables, Jüngel stresses that through parables Jesus was able to bring "the difference between God and the world to language."⁽²⁾ In this problem of expressing the relation of God and the world, how they are related and yet different, can be seen the theological parallel to Heidegger's problem of relating beings and Being, the solution to which is the "ontological difference" (beings and Being are both identical and different.) Therefore, idolatry is the theological parallel to mistaking a being for Being.

In the parables especially, Jesus is trying to

1 Ernst Fuchs, "The New Testament and the Hermeneutical Problem", The New Hermeneutic, ed. by J.M. Robinson and John B. Cobb (London: Harper and Row, publishers, 1964), p.119.

2 Eberhard Jüngel, Paulus und Jesus, (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1962), p.128.

establish the relation of the Kingdom of God with this world. By interpreting the parables as language-events, Fuchs and Jüngel feel they can give contemporary expression to Jesus' understanding of the Kingdom of God. As they understand Him the Kingdom of God is a real possibility within the world of reality, which should be re-oriented toward actualizing this possibility through language-events. Indeed, the Kingdom of God is the authentic possibility for reality, wherein reality can become fully realized. Now the Kingdom is seen as ushered in by Jesus' language.

Further, the kingdom is best seen in its proper relation to the world as a possibility within it; a possibility toward which the world must be re-oriented. Yet it is not totally identified with the world. As James Robinson explains: "Between the presumption of the Establishment that identifies reality with God and the fanaticism of other-worldliness that separates reality from God...lies the event of Jesus' language in which God's reign happens as reality's true possibility."⁽¹⁾

In the analogous language of the parables, the possible (the Kingdom of God) is identified by using language normally employed in describing the world. The re-oriented language of the parable points toward the possible while remaining grounded in reality. In this way the two are connected without denying their "difference".

1 Robinson, "Jesus' Parables as God Happening", p.145.

In this, then, can be seen the influence of Heidegger's "ontological difference" on Fuchs' interpretation of the parables. However, this was only done indirectly through a consideration of another's (Jüngel) position which Fuchs supports.

We turn now to further evidence supporting Heidegger's influence here which is taken directly from Fuchs' own writing. In his essay "What is a Language-Event?" he states: "Language certainly has man as its object ...But conversely...man has language as his object."⁽¹⁾ (We need to recall that, as for Heidegger, language is here functioning as Being.) Now we can see that language (as Being) and man are closely dependent on each other for Fuchs. Similarly, in our previous analysis of Heidegger's philosophy, we saw that the "ontological difference" referred to the "inter-relatedness" of Being and beings. (see page 212).

Therefore we can support our contention that Fuchs' understanding of language is influenced by Heidegger's concept of Being as the "ontological difference" by reference to his support for Jüngel's insights as well as by evidence gathered from his own definition of language. In our consideration of Fuchs' definition of Jesus' parables as language-events we have also established the influence of such Heideggerian concepts as world and possibilities.

1 Fuchs, Studies of the Historical Jesus, p.209.

Two of these concepts are from the earlier Heidegger and since Fuchs' position has grown out of Bultmann's it is not surprising to find traces of the earlier Heidegger's influence on Bultmann in Fuchs' thinking.

61. The nature of time and of thought

We turn now to another basic concept in Fuchs' thinking and in our analysis of his understanding of time, we shall be able to see the influence of Heidegger's philosophy on yet another key aspect of his theology. In his essay "The New Testament and the ^{Hermeneutical} Problem" Fuchs states that the "trait of language which in general composes its essential feature" is time. He goes on to explain that "time is always time only as a given time, as time for this or for that." Therefore time is always to be seen in its practical relation to individuals' activities: "as time to get up, to eat, to work, to play, to go to sleep, etc." This use of the term, Fuchs believes, "is not a figurative secondary usage, but rather the primary and genuine usage." (1)

In that time is always "time for" some activity of man, we can see how Fuchs' definition is anthropocentric. By the same token we can recall how in Heidegger's analysis time was derived from his examination of care as a basic structure of Dasein (see page 91 and page 92). Here, we can see a structural similarity in the approach of both men. However, the similarity goes further.

1 Fuchs, "The New Testament and the Hermeneutical Problem", p.125.

In "What Is a Language-Event?" Fuchs explains: "What does language do? It justifies Being. How does it do this? It permits Being to be present in time; it makes Being into an event."⁽¹⁾ Indeed, it is this very relation to time which accounts for the language-event's status as an event. It is an event in the sense that through it Being can break into time.⁽²⁾

In the same analysis of Heidegger's understanding of time referred to previously, it was established that he was aiming toward a very close association of Being and time. As it was noted then: "Being is...constantly coming out of itself into revelation or openness. This...gives birth to time: it is time. Being cannot be thought of as separate from time; time is Being's coming to openness." (see page 94). Now we can see how Fuchs clearly follows Heidegger in understanding time as oriented toward man, as always "time for", and as closely related to Being.

In the introduction to this analysis we touched on the relation of thinking and language as one of the distinctive traits of the new hermeneutic school of theology. At this point we shall go into this very important topic in more detail. Because it reverses the normal understanding of the thinking-speaking process, Fuchs' approach requires a conscious re-orientation and openness on the part of those

1 Fuchs, Studies of the Historical Jesus, p.207.

2 Robert Kysar, "Demythologizing the New Hermeneutic", Journal of the American Academy of Religion, vol.37(1969), p.218.

studying it. A clear understanding of him on this point certainly should contribute toward a better comprehension of his theology in general. Not surprisingly, here too the influence of the later Heidegger is prominent.

In Studies of the Historical Jesus Fuchs declares: "Language is not the abbreviation of thought: thought is the abbreviation of language."⁽¹⁾ In this, the traditional emphasis on thinking as primary to language is reversed. In his essay "Jesus' Understanding of Time", Fuchs elaborates on this approach with a most stimulating illustration: "...the thought is just the medium for the word, not its end, in the same way that the wood of a tree serves the interests of the bark and not the bark the interests of the wood, even though the forester could rightly say that his wood has grown particularly well thanks to the bark."⁽²⁾

Therefore, language is no longer the instrument for expressing the insights of the thought process. Instead, thinking is the medium for language, the primary factor in the process of comprehension. Because this idea initially seems strange, another practical illustration would be helpful. It sometimes happens that a student is told his work is unsatisfactory due to an inability to communicate or express himself. It then happens that the student can take heart at this and rationalize away his

1 Fuchs, op.cit., p.210.

2 Ibid., p.129.

shortcomings by saying "Nevertheless, I do understand and have thought through the material."

This is unfortunate since an inability to communicate often indicates a flaw in the thought process itself. The student's attitude is based on a misunderstanding of the relation of thought and expression. The thought process is only complete when one is able to express and communicate adequately. By the same token, one occasionally experiences sudden moments of insight and clarification in trying to explain and clarify verbally a particularly difficult idea or concept. In this we can better see how for Fuchs the language process is just as creative and important as the thought process.

Having clarified this relation of thinking and language, we are now better able to understand the significant role assigned to language in Fuchs's theology. Furthermore, we also have a better understanding of language in its essence, or language as event, which Fuchs opposes to the shallower, everyday understanding of it. In addition, we can establish Heidegger's influence at this point by recalling his words "...only when man speaks, does he think - not the other way around, as metaphysics still believes." (see page 155).

To this point we have been considering the basic building block concepts of Fuchs' theology. One might refer to them as pre-theological, and more philosophical, presuppositions. Such matters as language, Being, thinking,

time, reality, all of these are also encountered in philosophy. We are prepared now to turn to the more specifically theological applications of these basic concepts in Fuchs' thinking.

62. The hermeneutical principle

As a contributor to a radically new approach to hermeneutics, Fuchs offers his own "hermeneutical principle". As we saw previously, Bultmann was able to make the first step toward interpreting a text by virtue of his concept of pre-understanding which insured at least a minimal contact between translator and text. Fuchs sees Bultmann's starting point as inadequate and replaces it with his "hermeneutical principle".

He sees Bultmann's pre-understanding as insufficient in that it requires one to approach the text already having faith, which is the content of texts in the New Testament. As he states in Hermeneutik: "...a hermeneutical principle which presupposed faith in us would be of no help to us: indeed we would not even need it."⁽¹⁾ If we already understand faith, we need no assistance in understanding the New Testament.

P.J. Achtemeier agrees with this objection to Bultmann's approach. He quotes Bultmann's statement: "to understand reports about events as acts of God presupposes

1 Fuchs, Hermeneutik, p.115.

a pre-understanding of what acts of God can mean in the first place" (from Glauben und Verstehen II, page 231) and asks "...how does one know what an act of God is except through faith? Surely not as an objective event in the world of sense-perception! To argue this is to speak 'mythologically'. One can therefore apply the logic of Bultmann's approach to hermeneutics to argue for the necessity of faith as the pre-condition for interpreting the New Testament."⁽¹⁾ (This argument shows a shallow grasp of Bultmann's definition of pre-understanding as indicating a lack of something, e.g. to pre-understand God shows a lack of God. Nevertheless, the criticism does indicate a certain obscurity in Bultmann's presentation on this point and so is useful to us in that it sets the stage for Fuchs' alternative proposal.)

Of his alternative to Bultmann's approach, Fuchs explains that the hermeneutical principle does not clarify the content of understanding, "...instead it only speaks of how the...event of understanding gets under way. It asserts...that there is the possibility of a device (Barth would call it, not very humorously, a "trick") which sets the event of understanding in motion."⁽²⁾ In other words, the hermeneutical principle is what causes understanding to occur.

He goes on to explain this principle by stating

1 Achtemeier, op.cit., p.104.

2 Fuchs, op.cit., p.109.

that if one wants to learn about a cat, one puts it in the presence of a mouse and the resulting action identifies the cat's nature. The hermeneutical principle is what allows something "to show itself, as it is."⁽¹⁾ What is it then, that we can set before, or bring to, the New Testament that will let it show itself and be understood? Basically, the hermeneutical principle that we set before the text is our own existence with its self-concern and questionableness. In Hermeneutik we find: "Which neutrality of understanding does the New Testament demand for its declaration [exposition]?" Answer: it demands the neutrality of understanding in the question concerning our own selves."⁽²⁾

Hence, the hermeneutical principle is neutral in regards to faith. To be able to understand the New Testament we need only come to it with full awareness of the questionableness of our existence. Armed with this awareness, we are perfectly capable of comprehending the message of the texts; we need no particular pre-understanding of their content, "for nothing more is said of us (or existence) in Christ than we can understand in the question concerning...our existence."⁽³⁾

What does happen when the mouse, our questionable existence, is placed before the cat, the New Testament? How does it function? Fuchs replies in his Hermeneutik:

1 Ibid., p.110.

2 Ibid., p.116.

3 Ibid., p.61.

[then]...the teaching [or content] of the text says that...which places the man so in question, that he must himself be questioned if he hears. Then the natural man is able, without further ado, to confess the truth of the text. Consequently he understands. Certainly, therefore, he will only be able to avoid the claim of the text by force of will. (1)

Here we see a radical reverse in the normal direction of the interpretation process. We do not question the text, it questions us. Instead of the text being the object of interpretation, it becomes the means whereby we, the object, are able to be interpreted anew. Fuchs illustrates this by saying that the object of demythologizing can no longer be God, Jesus, the world or language but instead is "man caught in a distorted relation to himself..."⁽²⁾

In Studies of the Historical Jesus he also says that it is no longer the past but "it is really the present that is interpreted with the help of the text."⁽³⁾ And in "Translation and Proclamation" he declares that "the translator encounters not a passivity on the part of the text...but the text's own activity. Indeed, the activity of the text obliges the translator to play the role of passive participant: that is to say, the translator is involved in the activity of the text."⁽⁴⁾ Now we can see just how radically the function of hermeneutics has been

1 Ibid., p.124.

2 Ernst Fuchs, "Ergänzungsheft" to Hermeneutik, as quoted by J.M. Robinson, "Hermeneutic Since Barth", p.53.

3 Fuchs, Studies of the Historical Jesus, p.212.

4 Ibid., p.193.

changed; its direction is reversed to a movement from text to translator and its scope is broadened in that its object is not a text but man himself.

In the following from Gesammelte Aufsätze I, we see that the hermeneutical circle is involved in this new relation of text and interpreter: "...it is not only the text which is illuminated by the understanding but also the understanding by the text."⁽¹⁾ Unlike Heidegger's and Bultmann's use of this concept, Fuchs stresses mainly that half of the circle which moves from the text toward the interpreter. For him, understanding occurs, not when the text is comprehended, but when the interpreter sees himself anew with the aid of the language of the text. This occurrence would then be a language-event in its true sense.

Now we can see how for Fuchs language has man for its object and not vice versa. No longer is it a tool to be manipulated. Along similar lines he says of truth: "...it is not dependent on our good pleasure to know the truth, insofar as the truth has us ourselves as its object."⁽²⁾ In this reversal of the relation of man and language in Fuchs' reorientation of hermeneutics, we can see the influence of the later Heidegger's philosophy on a crucial aspect of this new theological development.

For the same emphasis on the activity of language

1 Ernst Fuchs, Zum Hermeneutischen Problem as quoted by Amos Wilder, "New Testament Hermeneutics Today", Current Issues in New Testament Interpretation, ed. by William Klassen and G.F. Snyder (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1962), p.43.

2 Fuchs, "The New Testament and the Hermeneutical Problem", p.143.

itself in relation to man, and even the use of the word "event" in relation to the activity of language, consider the following taken from our previous analysis of Heidegger's understanding of language. "Man does not use language, language uses man. The event and advent of Being in and through language, word, and saying 'puts man to use for its own sake'." (see p.152). With this we can clearly see the influence of the later Heidegger on this basic part of Fuchs' theology.

63. Anthropology

We move next into how Fuchs theologically applies his basic insights into an understanding of authentic and inauthentic existence, or life within and without faith. For him, the decisive standard for distinguishing authentic existence from inauthentic is the use of language. In Hermeneutik we find the following example of this: "That man then has made language a means of usurped existence merely proves that man is accustomed to exist in daily life having missed the mark."⁽¹⁾ To understand better how language determines the authenticity of existence, we must consider further its relation to man's structures of existence.

For Fuchs, the determinative factor in man's existence is his relation to language. It is man's linguisticity which makes him distinctive, for it is not

1 Fuchs, Hermeneutik, p.63.

only that "our Being...expresses itself only in the event of language", but rather the "language-event is our Being."

(1) Furthermore, man must see his relation to language in its proper perspective. Instead of the normal understanding of language as a tool or possession, man must realize that priority in the relationship lies with language itself. "For it is not true that man has given birth to language. Rather man is born out of language." (2)

Here again we can see Fuchs reversing the normal approach to a subject in that the initiative lies with language, not man, in their relationship. Now man is determined by language. In Hermeneutik he relates how this happens:

Man exists linguistically between call and answer. In this relation language advances him what he may really 'let be'. Reality certifies for him only that which has been linguistically advanced to him. His behaviour towards reality is the mirror of the answer which he has given to the call of language which went out to him. (3)

Thus we can see that man functions linguistically only in response or answer to the call of language. In "Was Ist Existentielle Interpretation?", he says that man is "not only a doer but always also a hearer...related to language." (4) Therefore, man's existence is determined by his linguisticity, or the call of language to him and his response to it.

1 Ern-st Fuchs, "Alte und Neue Hermeneutik", as quoted by O'Collins, p.77.

2 Fuchs, Hermeneutik, p.63.

3 Ibid., p.133.

4 Fuchs, "Was Ist Existentielle Interpretation?", as quoted by O'Collins, p.77.

At this point, let us pause and establish the rather strong influence of Heidegger's philosophy. We have already stated that, for Heidegger, language holds the initiative in its relation to man. However, more particularly, we can also find in Heidegger's thinking the source of Fuchs' definition of man as determined by the call of and answer to language. As Heidegger stated previously, (see page 151) language involves both speaking and listening. "Speaking is of itself a listening. Speaking is listening to the language which we speak. Thus, it is a listening not while but before we are speaking." In this we can see the source of Fuchs' assertion that man's linguisticity stems from his hearing and answering the call of language.

Having established the influence of the later Heidegger on Fuchs' understanding of existence up to this point, we can proceed with the discussion of how language is the criterion by which authenticity or inauthenticity of existence is decided. We have already seen how existence, as the realm of the call of and answer to language, is basically linguistic and we are prepared now to see how Fuchs closely associates language, understood as an active determinative element, with Being.

In Gesammelte Aufsätze I he says: "Being emerges from language when language directs us into the dimension of our existence determinative for our life."⁽¹⁾

1 Fuchs, Gesammelte Aufsätze I, as quoted by Robinson, "Hermeneutic Since Barth", p.55.

Here we see that language in its essence, or as language-event, refers directly back to Being. Similarly, in our analysis of the later Heidegger's consideration of language, we repeatedly stressed that "language is one more term for Being in one of its many aspects." (see page 152). Again, we have established his influence on Fuchs' approach.

We are well aware of Heidegger's insistence that the authenticity of existence is determined by an openness toward Being and we have now seen how Fuchs follows Heidegger in closely associating language and Being. It logically follows, then, that for Fuchs authentic existence, or the life of faith, would be determined by an openness toward language as language-event and this is exactly what happens. In Hermeneutik he associates inauthentic existence with an insensitivity toward language as language-event and he sees Jesus' language of love as an avenue to authentic existence.⁽¹⁾

Because Fuchs moves away from Heidegger's analysis in focusing on Jesus' language of love, we will not be concerned with this aspect of his analysis. Suffice it to say that Jesus' language alone "lets man be" authentically. While this final step in establishing language as the criterion for authentic existence does not reflect Heidegger's influence, the base or foundation on which it was laid does indicate how strongly Fuchs is indebted to

1 Fuchs, Hermeneutik, pp.63. and 78.

the later Heidegger's philosophy.

64. Traditional theological concerns

We shall turn now to a consideration of how Fuchs applies his insights into the nature of language to such topics as faith, the cross and resurrection, the relation of the historical Jesus to the kerygmatic Christ, the relation of Jesus Christ to God and the relation of Jesus Christ to later generations of believers. In comparison with the previous discussions of his hermeneutical principle and anthropology, these topics about to be considered are even more exclusively theological issues in that they would rarely, if ever, come under the scrutiny of philosophers.

As a result Fuchs' relation to Heidegger at this point will mostly be indirect in the sense that he is here indebted only for his basic direction and underlying principles. Our purpose for considering these aspects of Fuchs' theology is merely to sense some of the flavour of his approach and consider the final outcome of a theology using Heideggerian insights for its guidelines.

Not surprisingly, Fuchs sees Jesus' language (in its broad sense) as his most important contribution and we hear that "...What Jesus said is precisely the kernel of his procedure."⁽¹⁾ This statement becomes more plausible when we better understand how Fuchs sees the cross and

1 Fuchs, "Glaube und Geschichte", as quoted by O'Collins, p.85.

resurrection, normally thought of as two of Jesus' greatest acts, as language-events. We need to remember that, for Fuchs, deed or acts speak just as clearly as words.

Of the cross, Fuchs says: "...the crucified one Himself transforms Himself into the words of the cross, into the permission for all men to believe."⁽¹⁾ And at another point: "Where everything seemed to be over it was precisely then that God was not silent. He made himself heard out of the mouth of the Christ."⁽²⁾ Thus, through the cross Jesus spoke to the world of His love for it and His faith in God.

Furthermore, when we hearken to this word spoken out of the cross, then "...the message thrusts us right into the 'nothingness' of our existence, in order to declare God as the sole saving power."⁽³⁾ (Here we can see the direct influence of Heidegger in that he, too, saw the experience of 'nothingness' as a prelude to better awareness of Being.)

Similarly he says that the reality of the resurrection depended on whether or not the witnesses to the resurrected Lord "...were moved through their experiences to that definitive language which spoke in the mouth of men definitively of God's presence. In actual fact, there were obviously no such experiences without confession..."⁽⁴⁾

1 Fuchs, "Zum Hermeneutischen Problem in der Theologie", as quoted by Achtemeier, p.110.

2 Fuchs, Hermeneutik, p.134.

3 Fuchs, Gesammelte Aufsätze III, as quoted by O'Collins,

4 Fuchs, Studies of the Historical Jesus, p.216.

To put it simply, one might say that, while for Bultmann the resurrection was the result of viewing the cross through the eyes of faith as a victory over death by God, for Fuchs the resurrection consists of the cross being proclaimed, in place of believed, as God's victory over death. This recurring proclamation, a language-event, assures the continuity of this victory into later generations.

We should also mention here one of the better known aspects of Fuchs' theology, his renewal of the quest for the historical Jesus. This too is motivated by his concern for language as language-event. Because the significance of Jesus lies in His words, and not just the kerygmatic reflection of them, Fuchs feels the historical person of Jesus is significant. As he explains: "This is why I have in my own way renewed the question of the historical Jesus. Jesus himself had been God's word to which all clung, for Jesus did not want to be, or to be understood as, anything other than God's word..."⁽¹⁾ Thus it is because Jesus' person was uniquely the place where God's word was revealed that the quest for the historical Jesus assumes new importance.

As for how subsequent generations of believers can become "contemporaries" of Christ, or can feel personally related to Him, Fuchs sees language as the solution here also. For him, the believer makes Christ his own,

1 Fuchs, "The New Testament and the Hermeneutical Problem", p.136.

appropriates Him into his life, through proclaiming Him as Lord. This appropriation occurs when the believer hears God's word, makes it his own, and then reproclaims it in light of his faith.

As Fuchs explains in "The Essence of the Language-Event and Christology", in the proclaimed word the hearer is addressed by a question. He is not requested simply to accept and pass on a "list of doctrinal points." Instead what he is asked is "if he will, through his own decision, give precision to the proclamation."⁽¹⁾ In giving precision to God's word, the proclaimer makes God's word his own and this provides the occasion whereby God's language-event 're-occurs.' Now we can see that it is through the continuously 're-occurring' language-event of Christ that later generations of believers can become contemporaneous with Him.

Likewise we can see how language is the key aspect of Fuchs' solution to how God makes Himself known in our lives. In "The New Testament and the ^{Hermeneutical} Problem" Fuchs states: "...I can rejoice...since Jesus has made God present for me. And how has He done that? Through His words, which now lie like Christmas presents on the table."⁽²⁾ If we recall that reality can only come into Being through language, then we can see that it was the language of Jesus through which the reality of God's presence came into Being.

1 Fuchs, Studies of the Historical Jesus, p.214.

2 Fuchs, "The New Testament and the Hermeneutical Problem", p.130.

In particular, Fuchs explains that Jesus "... brought to language what God in His - Jesus' - presence not merely wished, but also did" and "with His preaching as event He made known also that God Himself wished in the word of man to come definitively to language and did come to language."⁽¹⁾ Thus it is because of Jesus' language that all men now have the possibility of experiencing God's presence as it comes about through their own words.

We can continue to see how central a role language plays in Fuchs' theology by considering his definition of faith. "To believe", he declares, "means now very simply to listen to something which can only be said to us."⁽²⁾ In this we can see how faith here depends on language. In comparing his approach to Bultmann's, Fuchs explains: "Like Bultmann, I deny that a person has faith 'at his disposal'. But the reason does not reside in the actuality of sin, but prior to that in dependence of faith on word, God's word."⁽³⁾

For Fuchs, having faith in God depends on having heard His word in and through Jesus. "Faith, in the New Testament sense, therefore means that God finally, once and for all, makes Himself heard in Jesus."⁽⁴⁾ As a result of this relation between faith and language, Fuchs sees the New Testament as a lesson in language. "The New Testament

1 Fuchs, Gesammelte Aufsätze III, as quoted by O'Collins, p.78.

2 Ibid., p.85.

3 Fuchs, Studies of the Historical Jesus, p.211.

4 Ibid., p.85.

is itself a textbook in hermeneutic. It teaches the hermeneutic of faith - in brief, the language of faith - and it encourages us to try out this language ourselves, so that we may become familiar with - God."⁽¹⁾ Just as is the case with all reality, faith can only come into being through language and the New Testament provides the appropriate language whereby faith comes into being.

By the same token, a believer's faith is confirmed and strengthened by a new command of language; "...faith is established in the hearer...", Fuchs claims, "...when...he is wholly struck by what he himself is then able to say. He recognizes this by his ability to describe to others what has struck home to him in such a way that they can likewise find it striking them."⁽²⁾ Here too, as was the case in previous instances, a key aspect of Fuchs' theology is based on his understanding of language.

65. A critical appraisal

In review, we have been trying to sense the flavour of Fuchs' theology through an examination of his approach to several traditional theological problems. Invariably we noted that this approach was very dependent upon his definition of language as language-event. We can now see that Fuchs operates, in all of his thinking, in the realm of linguisticity. Reality is admitted through language

1 Fuchs, "The New Testament and the Hermeneutical Problem", p.141.

2 Fuchs, Studies of the Historical Jesus, p.198.

into Being and the authenticity of existence is determined by its relation to language.

Operating within this scheme, Fuchs sees Christ as the language-event which enables man to approach language correctly, thereby admitting reality into its true, undistorted Being, and insuring that his own world and existence is whole, at one with itself, or authentic. For him, then, Christ's contributions must be seen as basically linguistic and God's presence can only be possible through language.

In Hermeneutik he states: "But faith follows the inner tendency of language itself, to understand the truth in that new Word [of God], which demands...of fallen man that he become himself. This demand is grace."⁽¹⁾ When it functions essentially then, language assumes the role of grace since it is through language alone that God makes His presence known to the believer in such a way "that he is no longer divided."⁽²⁾

We have now concluded our cursory examination of Fuchs' treatment of traditional theological issues which has provided something of the flavour of his theology. Invariably we have noted that, in each case, his treatment of these issues was based on his understanding of language.

1 Fuchs, Hermeneutik, p.265.

2 Fuchs, Studies of the Historical Jesus, p.198.

Having previously established the direct influence of the later Heidegger's philosophy on Fuchs' approach to language, we have also established an indirect influence on his approach to these theological issues.

As in the analysis of Bultmann's thinking, we shall end our consideration of Fuchs' approach by noting the most common criticisms of his work and seeing how his position might be strengthened in light of a better appreciation of Heideggerian insights. A common criticism is voiced by P.J. Achtemeier, in his article "How Adequate Is the New Hermeneutic?", when he points out that Fuchs provides no criterion for determining when language is revealing reality clearly and when it is distorting reality.⁽¹⁾ (J.C. Weber's article "Language-Event and Christian Faith" makes this same criticism as well.⁽²⁾)

Fuchs' problem seems to be that in stressing the role of language as that which lets reality into its Being, he failed to account for the rather obvious problem of illusion, distortion, or, theologically speaking, sin which abounds in each man's world. A ready-made pattern for strengthening his position on this point is to be found in Heidegger's conception of language as Being (aletheia) which simultaneously reveals - conceals itself and the reality it lets be.

1 Achtemeier, op.cit., pp.118-119.

2 Weber, op.cit., p.455.

As Heidegger notes in his analysis of language as "showing", "Language speaks in that it, as showing, reaching into all regions of presences, summons from them whatever is present to appear and to fade." Here we see how language, as causing both appearance and fading, parallels Being - aletheia as a revealing - concealing. (see page 152) Utilizing the form or pattern of this insight, Fuchs would be better able to account for the fact of illusion, distortion and sin, thereby strengthening his position against such criticisms as those of Achtemeier and Weber.

Another point on which Fuchs is criticized is his understanding of the relation of thinking and language. As we noted earlier, Fuchs does pick up the later Heidegger's stress on language as more than just the mouthpiece for the important insights provided by thinking. However, in his emphasis on the primacy of language he apparently slips over into the Bultmannian position of regarding thinking as an objectifying process once-removed from the vibrant sphere of linguistic reality (or in Bultmann's case faith).

In a review of Heinrich Ott's book Denken und Sein, Fuchs states: "When will the thinker finally give up thinking about Being? If he has experienced that Being speaks, then he will understand why I pose my question this way."⁽¹⁾ From this it is but a short step to relegating the thought process to an entirely subordinate role.

1 Ernst Fuchs, "Denken und Sein", Philosophische Rundschau, vol.VIII (1961), p.108.

Therefore, the criticism of Fuchs on this point, made by James Robinson, Heinrich Ott and Helmut Franz (in his article "Das Denken Heideggers und die Theologie") is that he fails to appreciate the role of the thought process in the relation between man and God.⁽¹⁾

Fuchs' position here would also be strengthened by a better grasp of the later Heidegger's insights into the relation of thinking and language in the revelation of Being. In a previous summary of Heidegger's thinking on this same issue (see page 144) the following comment was made: "...in Heidegger's works essential thought and essential poetizing as well as essential language are so closely related to the finite revelation of Being that they become almost one in their subservience to Being."

Heinrich Ott is a theologian who has utilized Heidegger's insights on this point and he compares his own position with that of Fuchs as follows: "Both [word and thought] belong very close together, as I have emphasized over against Ernst Fuchs."⁽²⁾ In regards to Fuchs' approach, Ott declares that "he in no way takes into consideration what Heidegger has already thought with regard to the structural connection of word and thought." He then makes a recommendation which fits in with our own approach that "theology would be better advised to think

1 J.M. Robinson, "The German Discussion of the Later Heidegger", p.70, and Heinrich Ott, "Response to the American Discussion", The Later Heidegger and Theology, pp.200 and 211.

2 Ibid., pp.211-212.

further along with Heidegger rather than, as does Fuchs, to bring immediately into play the law-gospel antithesis." As equivalent to the gospel, language is to be relied upon to the exclusion of thinking, the equivalent to the law and works righteousness.⁷⁽¹⁾

With this we come to the conclusion of our consideration of Fuchs' theology. We began by considering his basic principles and presuppositions in which we noted the direct influence of Heidegger's philosophy. We then observed briefly how he applied these basic insights to strictly theological issues, thus establishing an indirect influence of Heideggerian insights. And finally, we established how Heidegger's philosophy might have been further employed in strengthening Fuchs' position in light of frequently voiced criticisms. Throughout we have supported our thesis that Fuchs' theology is influenced mainly, but not exclusively, by the insights of the later Heidegger. We are prepared now to move into a discussion of Fuchs' partner in the new hermeneutic movement, Gerhard Ebeling.

1 Ibid., p.200.

Gerhard Ebeling

Section Two

66. Language as word—event

The close association of Gerhard Ebeling and Ernst Fuchs in the new hermeneutic school of theology is generally acknowledged by commentators. Indeed, the two are considered co-founders of this movement. James Robinson says of them: "When Fuchs...and Ebeling...were together at the University of Tübingen just after World War II, there grew up not only a unique personal friendship but also a material unity of position that has made of the new hermeneutic a single school of thought with a shared leadership."⁽¹⁾

Similarly, Robinson points out that the basic term of each man, language-event for Fuchs and word-event (Wortgeschehen) for Ebeling, are synonyms and can be used interchangeably.⁽²⁾ Therefore, we shall not need to spend as much time in our analysis of Ebeling's theology as we have already covered his position by virtue of our previous consideration of Fuchs.

Our brevity in this analysis is also justified by the fact that Ebeling falls less under the influence of Heidegger than does Fuchs. Although a decisive factor at

1 Robinson, "Hermeneutic Since Barth", p.65.

2 Ibid., p.57.

many points in Ebeling's theology, Heidegger is certainly no more influential on Ebeling than the thinking of Martin Luther and Dietrich Bonhoeffer.⁽¹⁾ Nevertheless, Heidegger's thinking, especially on language, certainly plays a formative role in the development of Ebeling's theological position and thus our analysis of his theology will continue to bear out our thesis that this new hermeneutic school of theology is definitely influenced by the later Heidegger's philosophy.

So as to avoid repetition, where Ebeling is related to Heidegger in the same way and for the same insight as Fuchs, this will be merely noted, thereby eliminating a detailed explanation of the relation. However, where the Heideggerian influence is distinctive, or results in a different insight, this relation will be given the same attention as it was with the Fuchs analysis. (As was the case with Fuchs, we shall begin by considering Ebeling's philosophical presuppositions and his basic insights and then move into his applications of these to traditional theological issues.)

Just as Fuchs did, Ebeling associates reality with the realm of language. Thus in "Word of God and Hermeneutic" he declares: "For in that hermeneutic addresses itself directly to the word, it addresses itself directly to the reality that comes to understanding through the word."⁽²⁾ For him, reality can only have

1 Ibid., pp.36 and 67.

2 Gerhard Ebeling, "Word of God and Hermeneutic", The New Hermeneutic, trans. by James W. Leitch, p.96.

significance through language. It is language as word-event which makes anything understandable and this means that hermeneutics deals not just with words but also with "the thing that is to be brought to understanding by means of the word-event."⁽¹⁾ Here Ebeling shares the same debt to Heidegger as does Fuchs (see page 344).

As was also the case with Fuchs, for Ebeling language as word-event plays the crucial and predominant role in the process of understanding. "The primary phenomenon in the realm of understanding", he says, "is not understanding of language, but understanding through language." Therefore, the word is not the object of understanding but is the means of, an aid in, understanding. "The word itself has a hermeneutical function."⁽²⁾

Rather than our pre-understanding being something we bring to the text in order to understand it better, the text, when it is approached correctly and allowed to happen or occur as word-event, aids in interpreting our own understanding. As Ebeling explains in Theology and Proclamation: "In dealing with a text there is a transition from an exposition of the text to an exposition by the text (i.e. that one is concerned to be taught the truth about oneself by the text)."⁽³⁾ Here language is emphasized over against thinking in the process of understanding which now

1 Ibid., p.95.

2 Ibid., pp.93-94.

3 Gerhard Ebeling, Theology and Proclamation, trans. by John Riches, (London: William Collins Sons & Co.Ltd.,1966), p.28.

occurs through language as word-event.

In his article "Verantworten des Glaubens in Begegnung mit dem Denken M. Heideggers", Ebeling suggests that Heidegger's overcoming of metaphysical thinking is relevant for theology in that it opens the way for a new emphasis on the role of language. Theology should ask of Heidegger's philosophy "if it is not precisely by the overcoming of representational [~~metaphysical~~] thinking that freedom for the correct use of...language will be disclosed [~~since~~] language, especially the traditional language of faith...has been misused...by representational thinking."

(1) In this way Ebeling picks up on Heidegger's overcoming of metaphysical thinking in a basically negative way by severely delimiting the role of thinking in favour of the language process.

We move next into Ebeling's understanding of existence, or his anthropology. One of the fundamental traits of existence for Ebeling is its "questionableness", by which he means a tendency to constantly question its own purpose, origin, and meaning. In Word and Faith, he says: "The task of a comprehensive analysis of reality...would now be: to observe the radical questionableness of reality." He further describes the "common ground of every man's experience" as "the questionableness that encounters us in

1 Gerhard Ebeling, "Verantworten des Glaubens in Begegnung mit dem Denken M. Heideggers", Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, Beiheft II (1961), pp.123-124.

the reality that encounters us."⁽¹⁾

Another basic trait of existence he calls the "experience of passivity" which "underlies all human activity ...In his existence between birth and death man is also exposed to passivity in various ways as one who is involved, called, challenged, questioned."⁽²⁾ In Theology and Proclamation he refers to this same aspect by saying: "It is still of course true that man's relation to his own particular historical circumstances may best be characterised as Geworfenheit (thrownness)."⁽³⁾

In these two traits of existence we can see the direct influence of Heidegger's philosophy. In the latter, passivity, we can easily identify this influence through Ebeling's use of the Heideggerian term "thrownness". As for the former, the questionableness of existence, we need only recall our reference to Heidegger's portrayal of man as the 'ontological animal' to realize that Dasein's nature consists of an inherent tendency to question its own nature and ground of existence. Man as constantly questioning and man as the 'ontological animal' are one and the same and now we can see the direct influence of Heidegger on Ebeling's anthropology.

As was the case with Fuchs, here too we see the influence of the earlier Heidegger in Ebeling's use of the

1 Ebeling, Word and Faith, pp.348-349.

2 Ibid., p.350.

3 Ebeling, Theology and Proclamation, p.16.

term Geworfenheit and the concept, questionableness. With Ebeling as well as Fuchs then, we must refer to the Heideggerian influence as coming mainly, but not exclusively, from his later insights.

Another basic trait of existence is, of course, its linguisticity. Like Fuchs, Ebeling asserts that man can only come into his own through his relation to language. He explains that "...the precise purpose which the word is meant to serve is that man shows himself as man. For that is his destiny. And for that reason word is absolutely necessary to man as man." At a later point we find: "...existence is existence through word and in word."⁽¹⁾ And therefore authentic existence would be determined by its relation to language. "Where word happens rightly, existence is illumined..."⁽²⁾ In his understanding of existence and language, Ebeling bears the same relation to the later Heidegger as does Fuchs (see previously page 364).

Another point at which Ebeling is influenced by the later Heidegger concerns his method of approaching and interpreting the insights of past thinkers. As we saw in our discussion of Heidegger's concept, "retrieve", he did not feel bound to the traditional approach to past thinkers, but instead attempted to penetrate beyond their writings to the subject matter revealed - concealed to them,

1 Ebeling, "Word of God and Hermeneutic", pp.104 and 109.

2 Ibid., p.104.

thereby becoming a partner in their creative thinking and becoming "more Greek than the Greeks."

Similarly, in attempting to comprehend the significance of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's concept, "non-religious interpretation of biblical concepts", Ebeling declares that one should "Certainly not [approach him] without seeking to discover Bonhoeffer's own opinion from what statements of his we have, yet for all that making [one's] own efforts to think his thoughts for him, think over them and think them further, until in the end [one] loses all interest in Bonhoeffer as compared with the subject itself..."⁽¹⁾

67. Traditional theological concerns

We are prepared now to move into a consideration of Ebeling's position in regard to traditional theological issues. Here we shall see how he applies the presuppositions and basic concepts of his thinking as we have so far analysed them. The stage is set for the entry of a transcendent factor in that existence has been portrayed as constantly pointing beyond itself. Further, the means whereby the transcendent factor can make its entrance is also established in that existence and reality are basically linguistic.

Based on what we have already established, reality and authentic existence depend entirely on the appearance of language in its undistorted, essential form. Ebeling also believes that language in its most essential form is

1 Ebeling, Word and Faith, p.105.

language functioning as the Word of God. God's Word is language which avoids distortion of reality, and lets man exist authentically in relation to his world, other men and himself. In opposition to those who contrast God's Word and man's word, or language, he sees the former as having basically the same nature and structure as the latter.

God's Word is what man's word should be. Between these, Ebeling says:

...the point of contrast is whether the word-event is one that is misused and corrupted by man, or whether it is one that is sound, pure, and fully realized - which is meant to be the destiny, and indeed the natural destiny, of words in human society. And that implies at the same time a contrast in what the word produces: whether it is a destructive and deadly word or one that brings wholeness and gives life.

(1)

Hence when language is essential and fulfills its function, it becomes Word of God which reveals reality in its truth and allows authentic existence.

This position has important repercussions on Ebeling's treatment of other theological issues. Most immediately, it allows him to resolve what he considers to be a crucial problem in contemporary theology. Basically he sees the Barthian and Bultmannian schools of theology differing in their assessment of the relation between hermeneutics and God's Word. "On the one side, the passion for the Word of God tends toward disparagement of the

1 Ebeling, "Word of God and Hermeneutic", pp.104 and 109.

hermeneutical problem; on the other side, the interest in the hermeneutical problem appears to jeopardize what is said of the word of God."⁽¹⁾

By closely associating God's Word and man's word, and by reversing the relation between man and word which underlies the positions of these two contemporary approaches (language interprets man, he believes, not vice versa as others formerly assumed), Ebeling provides an alternative to the Barthian and Bultmannian approaches. No longer is word or text an object to be analyzed and interpreted, instead it acts on and through man. Hermeneutics now becomes a "doctrine of the word of God." Furthermore, theology as a whole is hermeneutical in that it is the process through which God's word-event occurs and brings the interpreter into his true existence. Here then is a radically new solution to the problem previously solved in mutually exclusive ways in contemporary theology. No longer is hermeneutics to be either avoided as antagonistic to God's Word (Barthian) or else applied at the risk of endangering or swallowing up God's Word (Bultmannian). Instead it is seen as the avenue through which God's Word comes to fullest expression.

Another repercussion of Ebeling's close association of Word of God and man's language can be seen in his understanding of the process of proclaiming God's Word.

1 Ibid., p.83.

He sees the minister's task in the pulpit as letting the word-event which resulted in the text happen anew. Therefore, word-event is the text's origin and future. The text, he explains, always serves the purpose of the word-event. "For the word that once happened and in happening became the text must again become word with the help of the text and thus happen as interpreting word."⁽¹⁾ In the sermon then, God's Word 're-occurs' through man's language in a word-event.

We have now seen the repercussions of Ebeling's close association of God's Word and man's word in his treatment of several theological issues. We might remind ourselves that we are looking at how Ebeling applies his basic insights, which are influenced mainly by the later Heidegger's philosophy, to traditional theological issues. Although we are not pausing to point out each particular Heideggerian influence, since this has already been established in the Fuchs' analysis, we can still see it here by realizing that Heidegger's insights result in Ebeling's basic position that language uses man, not vice versa, and we are continually seeing this reflected in his theological views.

We have already said that when language functions essentially it is God's Word and we can now see how this stresses the relevance of God's Word for man and his relation to reality. Rather than the believer being out of touch

1 Ebeling, Theology and Proclamation, p.28.

with reality and the world, Ebeling's position means that it is the believer, not the unbeliever, who is most in touch with reality by virtue of his relation to God's Word.

In his essay "Faith and Unbelief in Conflict about Reality", he declares:

Faith does not flee reality, but stands up to it... faith is never in conflict with reality...but only ...with unbelief about reality...Unbelief declares that faith is ignorant of reality and hostile to it. It is not a sign of faith to meet this with a bad conscience and a fifty-fifty mixture of admission and excuse. But faith's reaction is a decided 'NO!' 'Unbelief is ignorant of reality and hostile to it.' (1)

Just as it is the believer who sees things as they really are, so it is also the believer who, by virtue of his relation to God's Word, exists authentically. It is language which "...as an event...can touch and change our very life..."; (2) and since essential language is God's Word, the believer alone experiences authentic existence, he only is fully human. "For God's Word is...but one single thing - the word that makes man human by making him a believer..."

(3) Hence, it is language as God's Word which reveals reality as it is and also makes authentic existence possible.

As a result of this understanding of the relation of reality and God's Word, Ebeling rejects those criticisms of contemporary sermons which demand less talk of God and faith and more stress on action in the world. These, he

1 Ebeling, Word and Faith, p.381.

2 Gerhard Ebeling, The Nature of Faith, trans. by Ronald G. Smith, (London: William Collins' Sons & Co.Ltd.,1961), p.186.

3 Ebeling, Word and Faith, p.328.

feels, are based on a false dichotomy of reality and God's Word. The sermon will not become more relevant by merely inserting "more practical illustrations or...topical... digressions into contemporary history." Appeals to action and attempts at modernizing the gospel are ineffective in that "the message has no wish to be illumined by our reality but our reality is to be illumined by the message."⁽¹⁾ In light of his understanding of God's Word, Ebeling asserts that effective, relevant sermons are based upon the knowledge that ultimately all reality has meaning solely with the aid of God's Word.⁽²⁾ (In like manner, the present is not the means by which the past is to be gauged and in terms of which the past will be interpreted. Instead "...the text by means of the sermon becomes a hermeneutical aid in the understanding of present experience."⁽³⁾)

We can see now the very central role language or word-event plays in Ebeling's theology. To underline this, we can note his words: "...it is 'word' that unites God and man.";⁽⁴⁾ and also "knowledge of God is a linguistic event..."⁽⁵⁾ Here we might stress the parallel with Heidegger's later thinking on language by saying that he too saw language as that which insured a point of contact between man and Being; he also saw Being's revelation of

1 Ibid., p.198.

2 Ibid., pp.199-200.

3 Ebeling, "Word of God and Hermeneutic", p.109.

4 Ibid., p.103.

5 Ebeling, Word and Faith, p.351.

itself as happening through language. Here the influence of the later Heidegger is again most apparent.

We will not consider Ebeling's Christology as he basically shares Fuchs' views. However, in his doctrine of God we can see definite Heideggerian influences. We have already noted that God's revelation is a linguistic event and that "word" provides the link between God and man. In addition, he sees this revelation as an event whereby God illuminates and lights up man's Being and world. "...revelation means the...illumination of the whole of my existence with everything it embraces...revelation is itself light...not anything at all that seeks to be considered in itself, as little as the source of light is there to be looked into (which everyone knows blinds instead of illuminating)."(1)

By the same token, we previously saw how the later Heidegger considered Being to be the source of the light which enables beings to come into view. We noted too that for him, "Being also hides or conceals itself as it lights up beings." (see page 199). Here, then, we see striking parallels in the thinking of Ebeling and Heidegger which result from a shared position on the role of the transcendent power (God and Being) in man's life.

In his doctrine of God, Ebeling also employs the later Heidegger's concept of the "ontological difference."

1 Ibid., pp.350-351.

As he specifically refers to this Heideggerian term itself and employs it in a manner different from Fuchs' use of it, we shall give the Heideggerian influence more attention at this point. In his article "Verantworten des Glaubens in Begegnung mit dem Denken M. Heideggers" he says: "It would be a relapse into metaphysical thinking to explain the ontological difference theologically. On the other hand, if this were maintained as the difference between God and creation, this would avoid any confusion with the metaphysical difference of two worlds..."⁽¹⁾

Here Ebeling is trying to employ the 'ontological difference' in theology to distinguish between God and creation without falling prey to the tendency to see the two as totally separate and distinct realms. Heidegger himself used this concept to indicate both the continuity and discontinuity of Being and beings in their dependence upon each other. In the above quote, Ebeling is striving to emphasize the discontinuity between God and man (he even refers to them at a later point as man the sinner and God the justifier.⁽²⁾)

We can see him emphasizing the other side of this Heideggerian concept, the continuity between the two realms, when he states that the tendency in theology to speak of God and world as separate entities is a serious error; "...the fact is that God cannot be spoken of in theology without the world coming thereby to expression as event, and the world cannot be spoken of...without God thereby likewise

1 Ebeling, "Verantworten des Glaubens in Begegnung mit dem Denken M. Heideggers", p. 124.

2 Ibid.

coming to expression as event."⁽¹⁾ Here, then, we can see the direct influence of Heidegger's later philosophy on Ebeling's theology.

And finally in our consideration of Ebeling's views on traditional theological issues we come to his understanding of faith. We shall continue to limit our examination of this topic to that aspect which is not also reflected in Fuchs' approach. Basically, Ebeling sees faith as a word-event in that, like everything else, it is made possible by language. As he explains, faith "...is the becoming effective of the word as that which it claims to be - as God's word..."⁽²⁾ Here again we see how his understanding of language, for which he is indebted to the later Heidegger, forms the basis for his theological views.

68: A critical appraisal

Having established the extent of Heidegger's influence on Ebeling's theology, we turn now to a critical appraisal of his use of this philosopher's thinking and also to a consideration of how it might be better employed. In his article concerning the response of faith to Heidegger's thinking, he summarizes how this philosopher's insights as a whole might best be utilized in theology. He recommends this relationship be moulded according to the traditional Lutheran law-gospel structure.⁽³⁾

1 Ebeling, "Word of God and Hermeneutic", p.101.

2 Ibid., p.64.

3 Ebeling, "Verantworten des Glaubens in Begegnung mit dem Denken M. Heideggers", p.122.

Basically, Heidegger's thinking is equated with the law and since theology is also concerned with the law, the two have a common point of interest. Furthermore, like the law to a certain extent, this philosopher reflects the contemporary outlook and this too is of interest to theology.⁽¹⁾ However, despite his claim to use Heidegger only for a better understanding of the "law" and the contemporary situation, our analysis would suggest that Ebeling has been influenced also in his understanding of issues which would come under the heading of gospel.

If we transpose the pattern of law-gospel into the pattern of question-answer, we can see that Heidegger's later insights into the nature of language have influenced not only Ebeling's definition of reality and existence as dependent upon language, as pointing away from themselves in their dependence on and need for an ultimate or transcendent power, thereby posing the question, but also his answer to this question in the form of a God who appears only linguistically and thereby brings reality into its own and existence into authenticity.

Indeed Ebeling's use of Heideggerian insights in his definition of faith, God, revelation and proclamation, all issues which would come under the heading of gospel, reveals that he does not abide by his suggested law-gospel pattern. Instead, Heidegger's influence is far more

1 J.M. Robinson, "The German Discussion", The Later Heidegger and Theology, p.76.

extensive and determinative than indicated in his limitation of it to matters of the "law". By virtue of his allied position with Ebeling on the nature of language, Fuchs too would be susceptible to this same criticism of using Heidegger in more ways than he is willing to acknowledge. R.W. Funk, in his book Language, Hermeneutic, and Word of God, is of the same opinion. He points out that both, despite their attempts "to distinguish their work from that of Heidegger" by use of "the law-gospel dichotomy" are heavily influenced by his later thinking in all aspects of their theology.⁽¹⁾

Next let us consider how Heidegger's thinking might be better employed in Ebeling's theology. In his book God Talk John Macquarrie stresses that the great strength of Heidegger's hermeneutics is its balance. This balance results from the fact that his earlier views on language stress a different aspect than his later views. To focus on his later approach, as happens in the new hermeneutic, is wrong in that "...it would be a mistake to suppose that Heidegger's final word on language and interpretation is that the interpreter can only be passive and listen for the voice of Being."⁽²⁾

Instead, Macquarrie recommends accepting Heidegger's own claim that his earlier and later views

1 Robert W. Funk, Language, Hermeneutic, and Word of God, (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1966), pp.45-50.

2 John Macquarrie, God Talk, (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1967), p.167.

constitute a unity and this would mean that language "... has to be understood as both an existential and an ontological phenomenon; interpretation demands both questioning and listening, a sense of direction and a willingness to be directed."⁽¹⁾ By focusing so strongly on the later Heidegger's views on language (although he does employ earlier views at less important points), Ebeling's own language analysis, which forms the basis for his whole theological position, loses the balance so admired by Macquarrie and a better appreciation of Heidegger's earlier views would certainly strengthen Ebeling's position.

In conclusion to our analysis of Ebeling's theology, we can see that the basic cornerstone of his theology, his understanding of language, is influenced directly by the later Heidegger's philosophy. As was the case with our consideration of Fuchs, we have therefore further substantiated our thesis that the new hermeneutic theologians are influenced mainly, but not exclusively, by the later Heidegger.

1 Ibid.

Heinrich Ott

Section Three

69. Theology and language

We turn next to a theologian who also stresses the importance of the role of language in theology, even though he is not generally included in the new hermeneutic movement. This is possibly the result of the fact that Heinrich Ott also takes a great deal of interest in other aspects of theology. While language is one of his basic interests, it does not dominate his theology to the extent it does that of Fuchs and Ebeling.

Nevertheless, we can justify our consideration of him along with what generally is considered the new hermeneutic theologians. In his essay "What Is Systematic Theology?", Ott says: "The nature of theology as a whole is hermeneutical. Theology is really hermeneutic...He who inquires as to the nature and the program of theology cannot avoid the problem of understanding, the hermeneutical problem."⁽¹⁾ Hence, like Fuchs and Ebeling, Ott broadens the scope of hermeneutics (it considers the problem of understanding as a whole, not just theories of interpretation) and sees theology and all its various fields in light of the hermeneutical issue.

Like Fuchs and Ebeling, he also stresses the

1 Heinrich Ott, "What Is Systematic Theology?", The Later Heidegger and Theology, trans. by J.M. Robinson, pp.78-79.

importance of language for theology. The important role of language for Ott is reflected in the title itself of his book, Theology and Preaching. In it he explains how at one time he "sought to define theology (and hence more particularly dogmatics) as the reflective function of preaching itself...[since] preaching and dogmatics are in the last resort a single activity of the Church, two aspects of one and the same thing."⁽¹⁾ Therefore language, in the form of proclamation, is certainly one of the central interests of his theology. This, combined with his understanding of hermeneutics, supports our association of Ott with the members of the new hermeneutic movement.

As for the influence of Heidegger's philosophy, there will be no difficulty in establishing Ott's relation to this philosopher as he openly acknowledges that the main thrust of his thinking is concerned with incorporating Heidegger's later insights into theology. Not surprisingly, his essay provides the focal point for Robinson and Cobb's work, The Later Heidegger and Theology. His interest in the thinking of Heidegger is further reflected in the title of his work Denken und Sein: Der Weg Martin Heideggers und der Weg Theologie and his essay "Die Bedeutung von Martin Heideggers Denken für Methode der Theologie". Of the new hermeneutic theologians, then, it can be said that Ott has undoubtedly devoted the most attention and energy to the

1 Heinrich Ott, Theology and Preaching, trans. by Harold Knight, (London: Lutterworth Press, 1965), p.19.

theological relevance of Heidegger's philosophy.⁽¹⁾

Although he is more concerned with Heidegger's thinking than the other theologians so far considered, we shall devote less time to an analysis of Ott's theology than we have to the others because it has had less impact and influence than that of the others. The reason for this could possibly be that his thinking has not yet matured (he succeeded Barth at the University of Basel at the relatively early age of 33) and thus his works are not yet widely known.

Nevertheless, Ott should be considered as it is quite possible that he will be remembered more than Bultmann, Fuchs or Ebeling as the theologian who used Heidegger's philosophy most constructively. In addition, because in the works so far available he has focused on the basic problems of method and presuppositions involved in theology we will not be considering the usual topics of Christology, soteriology, doctrine of God, etc. in this analysis.

We begin by seeing how Ott understands the relation of language and man. Like Fuchs and Ebeling, he does not see language as a tool used by man. Instead man's speaking is only possible due to his being spoken to or addressed. In analysing the following lines from a poem by Joseph von Eichendorff:

1 John R. Williams, "Heidegger and the Theologians", The Heythrop Journal, vol. 12 (1971), p.273.

There stands written in the wood
 A still, earnest word,
 Of right doing and loving,
 And what man treasures.

Ott declares that the being of entities actually speaks to man and thereby enables him to talk. Rather than saying that man has "...the special ability at his free disposal to invent speech as the opportunity arises", he suggests: "How should man be able to speak of the wood, if the wood had not first spoken to him?"⁽¹⁾

Ott goes on to explain that this is exactly what Heidegger is speaking about when he calls speech "the 'house of Being' in which 'man lives'."⁽²⁾ Here, we see Ott openly adapting the later Heidegger's insistence that language, as Being, holds the initiative in the process whereby man comes to speech and lets beings be. Hence, just as we saw with Fuchs and Ebeling, the normal relation between man and language is reversed.

Another consequence of this adaptation of the Heideggerian approach wherein language holds the initiative over man is that theological speaking is always prayer. In Denken und Sein: Der Weg Martin Heideggers und der Weg der Theologie, Ott explains that because all theology is done in response to God's "call" to man, it has the character of prayer. "Can one speak of God truly in any other way than by prayer? Therefore, must not all theological

1 Heinrich Ott, "Non-Objectifying Thinking and Speaking in Theology", Journal for Theology and the Church, trans. by D.M. Smith, vol. 3 (1967), p.119.

2 Ibid.

speaking in its ground and in its execution, both outwardly as well as inwardly, be prayer?"⁽¹⁾

Although he does not develop in depth his definition of faith, we can see that it is developed along similar lines to the linguistically centred approach of Fuchs and Ebeling. In analysing the nature of theology, Ott explains that theological thinking and speaking brings man to a certain place or puts him in a position where he has "freedom for the obedient hearing and proclaiming of the Word of God. This hearing...we call faith."⁽²⁾ Thus, for Ott faith is dependent upon language in that it involves a linguistic event in which God reveals Himself. Both faith and language have the character of response to a prior linguistic act of God and here we see the Heideggerian pattern emerging in Ott's theology.

70. The nature of theology

Ott has devoted a large part of his writing to defining the nature and scope of systematic theology, or dogmatics. Both his article "What Is Systematic Theology?" and his book Theology and Preaching dwell on this theme. We have already noted that Ott closely associates theology with preaching and this continues to be the basis upon which he works in defining systematic theology. He explains that this association is the result of the nature of faith

1 Ibid., p.132.

2 Ott, Denken und Sein, p.192.

itself. "Faith is aimed at communication and attaining a common understanding, or a communication that makes faith understandable."⁽¹⁾

Ott sees theology as a whole involving three basic aspects; "the understanding of the texts, the understanding of the subject matter coming to expression in the texts, and the understanding of the contemporary witness to this subject."⁽²⁾ As a result he divides theology into exegetical, systematic and practical theology, and says that systematic theology "finds its position, as it were, in the middle of the arch extending from the text to contemporary preaching. It stands between exegesis, which is primarily concerned with the text as such, and practical reflection, which is primarily concerned with the Church's preaching."⁽³⁾

As a result theology with its threefold function is described as a "hermeneutical arch" stretching from the past to the present. As stated previously, theology is hermeneutics. A result of this is that theology can no longer be allowed to break down into opposing factions with exegetes disputing and refuting the positions of systematic theologians and vice versa. Ott stresses the unity of theology by using a familiar Heideggerian formula, the hermeneutical circle. Its theological form is described as follows: "...dogmatics is no more absolutely and one-sidedly dependent upon exegesis than exegesis is absolutely

1 Ott, "What Is Systematic Theology?", p.94.

2 Ibid., p.79.

3 Ibid., p.81.

and one-sidedly dependent upon dogmatics. Rather, dogmatics and exegesis stand in a relation of interaction with one another...They mutually illumine and explicate one another."
(1)

What, then, is the function of systematic theology in its "between" position in theology? Ott sees systematic theology, with its interest in the gospel as a whole, as a necessary counterbalance to exegesis and preaching, with their interest in particular texts and therefore only particular aspects of the gospel. He believes that the concern of systematics is the "unspoken" of the gospel. This "unspoken" results from the fact that the Christ event is never exhausted in any of its particular manifestations or accounts. Further, the gospel itself is never to be identified with one particular gospel "according to..." for "the one gospel itself is heard through all gospels and witnesses..."⁽²⁾

Because of this nature of the gospel, systematic theology plays a vital role in theology. It alone insures that the unity and wholeness of the gospel behind the gospels "according to..." is maintained in light of the interests of preaching and exegesis. Heidegger's influence here is quite apparent and Ott himself quotes the following Heideggerian passage as the source of his insight into the nature of systematic theology. "Every great poet composed from only a single poem...The poem of a poet remains

1 Ibid., p.81.

2 Ibid., p.87.

unspoken. None of the individual poems, not even the total of them, says it all."⁽¹⁾

He then goes on to explain the meaning of the word systematic in systematic theology. It "is not the putting together of various doctrines into a doctrinal structure that may be readily surveyed...This would be the metaphysical understanding of systematic theology. Rather, the systematic aspect consists in looking through the complexity of what is spoken to the indivisible unity of the unspoken ..."⁽²⁾ Here we can see how Ott employs Heideggerian insights in his definition of the nature and scope of both systematic theology and theology as a whole.

Ott also employs Heidegger's approach in defining the type of thinking which is involved in theology. Basically, his approach at this point can be seen as an effort to carry through in theology Heidegger's overcoming of metaphysical thinking and he feels this is not to be accomplished by simply declaring that all theological thinking is objectifying and thus to be distinguished from the faith encounter. Instead the theological parallel to overcoming metaphysics "...takes place by understanding thinking...as experiential thinking."⁽³⁾

Here we see Ott employing later Heideggerian insights in attacking the Bultmannian separation of

1 Heidegger, Unterwegs Zur Sprache as quoted by Ott, "What Is Systematic Theology?", p.87.

2 Ott, "What Is Systematic Theology?", p.89.

3 Ibid., p.109.

theological thinking as objectifying and thereby once-removed from the primary experience of faith. In place of this approach, Ott adopts Anselm's definition of theology as "faith seeking understanding." Theology now becomes "a movement of faith itself" as it strives for clarity in the believer's understanding.

Why does faith seek clarity and understanding? Because it by nature strives toward language, expression, and communication and this invariably involves clarity and understanding. As we have already noted, being put into language and communicated to others is an essential element of faith and now theological thought is not once-removed from faith, but is part of the faith process itself. "Faith presses toward presenting itself in the clarity of thought...But then the movement of 'seeking understanding', that is, theology, is a movement of faith itself."⁽¹⁾

The reason other contemporary theologians have not been able to comprehend this relation of thinking and faith is that they insist on seeing the thought process as necessarily objectifying.⁽²⁾ However, Heidegger has decisively overcome this approach and provided insights into the deeper, more essential level of the thought process. "For Heidegger, the essence of original, essential, i.e. non-metaphysical, non-subjective thought consists in

1 Ibid., p.92.

2 Ott, "Non-Objectifying Thinking and Speaking in Theology", pp.112-113.

existential encounter or...is only possible as existential encounter. Thinking...has the character of experience."

(1) Hence faith and thinking both have an experiential character, need not be set in opposition, and can be seen as part of the same process.

Ott's understanding of theological thinking also employs the Heideggerian insight into the primacy of language in understanding. Like the other new hermeneutic theologians, he sees language as playing a far greater role in the process of understanding than has been traditionally assigned to it. Understanding results not from thinking but primarily from language and communication.

For Ott, the faith experience only reaches culmination when it involves expression and communication. "For in my efforts...to make faith and its subject matter understandable to brothers in faith and to the world, I am reaching an understanding with myself at the same time as to my faith. What I make clear to others becomes clear to myself..."(2)

While he does stress the primacy of language in the process of understanding, Ott does not succumb to the tendency noted in other new hermeneutic theologians to over-react against the traditional understanding of the role of the thought process by severely minimizing it in favour of

1 Ott, Theology and Preaching, p.21.

2 Ott, "What Is Systematic Theology?", p.96.

the language process. Instead, as we noted earlier (p.375), he maintains Heidegger's close association between the thinking and speaking processes.⁽¹⁾ Thus, we can see how Ott has employed Heidegger's "overcoming of metaphysics" in his definition of theological thinking and we see in his theology another way in which Heidegger's later philosophy can be adapted theologically.

As we noted earlier, language is not as dominating a concern for Ott as it is for Fuchs and Ebeling. We have already encountered his interest in the nature of theology as a whole and in the nature of theological thinking, and now we turn to his doctrine of God. In Denken und Sein Ott devotes a good deal of attention to utilizing Heidegger's ontology in his doctrine of God.

He quotes Heidegger's question from "Was Ist Metaphysik?": "Why is there any being at all and not much rather nothing?" and says this can easily be converted into the theological question "Why is there any God at all and not much rather nothing?"⁽²⁾ Ott then interprets the Heideggerian understanding of the contingency of beings, "the wonder of all wonders: that beings are", into the theological doctrine of God the Creator. "Faith in God the Creator...experiences...the strangeness...of beings. Faith is...thinking along with Heidegger, simply the uncompromising persistence of the basic question as to 'why

1 Ott, "Response to the American Discussion", The Later Heidegger and Theology, trans. by J.M. Robinson, p.211.

2 Ott, Denken und Sein, p.28.

there is any being at all and not much rather nothing?' "(1)

He then moves into the actual question of God in Himself and begins by saying that, if Heidegger's thinking is to be the guideline, God must be thought of as a being, not as Being itself. He bases this on a Heideggerian statement in the Introduction to "Was Ist Metaphysik?" in which God is listed alongside a rock, a horse, and an angel as beings, or things that are, but do not "exist" since this belongs uniquely to Dasein's mode of Being. (2)

One of the main objections to this approach would be that it fails to respect the uniqueness of God in associating Him under the general category, Being, with other beings. However, Ott says this criticism is based on the very thinking overcome by Heidegger's philosophy. Being is no longer seen as at man's disposal and therefore it could not be a category through which man could gain control over God. Instead, this approach would protect the initiative of God in revealing Himself to man.

Ott then explains the nature of God's Being. "The Being of God...means an occurrence of revelation: that God reveals himself to thinking as who he is; that he... gives himself to thinking as matter for thought...the thinking which is met by the Being of God is the thinking of faith." (3) Here we see how by defining God's Being in

1 Ibid., p.88.

2 Ibid., p.142.

3 Ott, Denken und Sein, p.148.

terms of the aletheia aspect of Being, Ott has avoided the danger of constructing a concept by which man could strive to manipulate God.

However, Ott's attempt to fit Heidegger's philosophy directly into a theological framework was later seen as overly ambitious and he withdrew somewhat from the position of Denken und Sein to a more defensible understanding of Heidegger's relevance for theology. Heidegger himself suggested to a meeting of German theologians that his work might best be related to theology by means of an "analogia proportionalitatis: A is to B as C is to D. As philosophical thinking is related to Being, when Being speaks to thinking, so faith's thinking is related to God, when God is revealed in His word."⁽¹⁾

In light of this proposal (made in 1960, one year after the publication of Denken und Sein) Ott adopted a position of doing theology within its own framework that is structurally parallel to Heidegger's thinking. This avoids such difficult problems as deciding whether God is to be thought of as a being or as Being itself.

Unlike Fuchs and Ebeling, Ott openly acknowledges the extensive influence of Heidegger's later thinking on his theology. He explains that as a Reformed theologian he feels no need to structure his relation to Heidegger according to a law-gospel pattern. Instead, he can "take

1 J.M. Robinson, "The German Discussion", p.43.

philosophy seriously as a theologian" and "...test from case to case the extent to which philosophy has perhaps discovered something that the theologian too can acknowledge as suitable and helpful and hence can appropriate."⁽¹⁾

Ott's insight is particularly significant in light of the fact that the influence of Heidegger's philosophy has mainly been restricted to Lutheran theologians, e.g. Bultmann, Fuchs and Ebeling. However, Ott has shown now that Reformed theologians, less restricted by this law-gospel pattern, also can fruitfully utilize Heideggerian insights and can perhaps do so even more constructively than their Lutheran counterparts.

With this we come to the conclusion of our analysis of Ott's use of Heideggerian insights. We have noted how he has employed these insights not only in his understanding of language but also in his definition of the nature of theology as a whole, of systematic theology, of theological thinking, of faith, and in his doctrine of God. Moreover, the Heideggerian insights involved here have been mostly from the thinking of the later Heidegger, e.g. his views on language, poetry, the overcoming of metaphysics, and on Being. Therefore, this further supports our thesis that the new hermeneutic theologians have been influenced mainly by the philosophy of the later Heidegger.

1 Ott, "Response to the American Discussion", The Later Heidegger and Theology, p.199.

71. A critical appraisal of the new hermeneutic

In seeking to appraise the contribution of this theological movement in light of Heidegger's influence upon it, we need to focus our attention on its understanding of the language process since this provides the foundation on which the rest of its views are based. Basically the new hermeneutic has erred in attributing more importance and initiative to Being as Language than this process can reasonably be able to claim.

The language process certainly does play an important role in man's make-up and in the structure of reality as a whole but this is not to say that it is the single most important factor. By the same token, we saw in those instances where new insights and clarity of understanding occur in the effort to express and communicate a particularly difficult idea that the language process does have a creative aspect and does possess a certain amount of initiative in granting reality and understanding to the speaker.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that man plays an entirely passive role in this process. The new hermeneutic's claim that language uses man is a distortion of this basically sound insight that language plays a more creative and central role than is often realized. Even allowing for the fact that these theologians have greatly expanded the meaning of this term (language includes non-verbal acts as well as speaking), their emphasis on its role

is still extreme.

This flaw in the new hermeneutic theologians' outlook can easily be traced back to its origin in the way they adapted Heidegger's insights into language. It was noted in our analysis of his development that having focused on the Dasein side of the Dasein-Being relationship, he then over-reacted somewhat by stressing the initiative of Being in its revelation to man. The result was an unbalanced outlook in which man was portrayed as little more than the messenger or loudspeaker for Being as language.

In restricting their use of Heidegger's insights to this period, the new hermeneutic theologians (especially Fuchs and Ebeling) carried over this unbalanced approach into their own theology. However, a better appreciation of Heidegger's over-all approach would have prevented this undue stress on the role of the language-process. As we saw earlier, language was but one of several avenues through which Heidegger saw Being revealing-concealing itself.

Ott rightly saw that thinking should not be portrayed as a weak sister to language since it too provides an opening through which Being can shine. By the same token, we established that anxiety was another aspect of man's structure which was open to Being. The variety of ways in which Being revealed itself was further seen in his discussions of history, the "ontological difference", aletheia and others. Indeed, the theme which runs

throughout Heidegger's ontology is that Being reveals itself in many ways, none of which can claim exclusive rights to Being's revelation.

Hence these theologians' extreme emphasis on the language process is not in keeping with Heidegger's outlook. As we saw in his understanding of Being as the "ontological difference", the role of beings (or man) must always be protected and appreciated over against the role of Being, thereby maintaining a balanced view of their need for each other. The failure of these theologians (Fuchs and Ebeling more than Ott who does at least recognize that Being reveals itself through modes other than the language process) to retain this balance results in the rather extreme nature of their approach.

THE EARLIER AND LATER HEIDEGGER
AND MACQUARRIE'S THEOLOGY
CHAPTER SEVEN

Introduction

72. An existential-ontological theology

In our consideration of Heidegger's influence on theology we have so far looked at the theology of Rudolf Bultmann, who utilized mainly the earlier Heidegger's philosophy, and also the theology of the "new hermeneutic" theologians, who utilized mainly the insights of the later Heidegger. We come now to a theologian who insists on the unity of Heidegger's philosophy and strives to adapt it accordingly.

We have already encountered the work of John Macquarrie as he has devoted much attention to interpreting and critically developing the insights of both Heidegger and Bultmann. The unusually clear and concise style of writing in his books on these thinkers has greatly contributed to a better appreciation of both. To this point we have been concerned only with Macquarrie as a commentator on other thinkers, but we now begin a consideration of his own theological contributions.

It is not difficult to establish that Heidegger influences this theologian's work. In the preface to Principles of Christian Theology (the one volume devoted solely to establishing his theological position in a systematic way) Macquarrie directly acknowledges the use of Heidegger's philosophy which he believes can "...provide the

basis for a viable twentieth-century philosophical... theology, and can be used further for the articulation and elucidation of the whole body of Christian truth in a contemporary way."⁽¹⁾

We noted in our previous analysis of Heidegger's philosophy that Macquarrie was among those commentators who stressed the unity of his outlook and the value of his ontological as well as existential contributions. We shall now establish that he adapts this philosophy into his theological approach according to this balanced interpretation and it is thus appropriate that we conclude our analysis of Heidegger's influence with a consideration of Macquarrie's theology.

That he uses both the earlier and later Heideggerian insights is reflected in the title he gives to his approach in Principles of Christian Theology, "existential-ontological theism." While this phrase is used mainly in only this one book, the outlook it represents underlies what is said in all of this theologian's works. We shall see how he stresses the need for appreciating the role of existential involvement as well as that of an ontological ground in the themes running throughout his theology.

In his understanding of God, we shall note how he strives to establish the reality of God in Himself as well as to appreciate that God can only be known insofar as He

1 John Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, (London: SCM Press, 1966), p.IX.

acts upon man. In his analysis of history, we shall see how he appreciates both the need for existential involvement in historical events as well as the need for grounding such involvement in concrete factual occurrences. In his analysis of language, we shall note his appreciation of the existential (language as an existential structure) and ontological (language as Being uses man) aspect of this phenomenon. In his dogmatics, we shall note how he seeks to develop both the existential and ontological components of such issues as the human-divine nature of Christ, atonement and salvation. Although there will be some overlapping, generally the first portion of this analysis will cover the apologetical and pre-theological issues in Macquarrie's theology while the second portion will deal more with his dogmatic theology.

Apologetics

Section One

73. The language process

The first area of Macquarrie's thinking we shall consider concerns his views on language. We shall begin with his analysis of the language process in itself and then move into his discussion of language in theology. Throughout we will note Heidegger's influence as it occurs.

In God-Talk he performs a phenomenological analysis of language which seeks to avoid the presuppositions and outlooks of previous language analyses and strives to "take developed human speech as we find it."⁽¹⁾ He begins with an etymological analysis of the various words for saying, speaking and talking. He finds that all such words refer to a process wherein what is talked about is "brought into the light" and he immediately relates this to Heidegger's understanding of truth as aletheia, or unhiddenness.

He then seeks to break down the language process into its various components, being very careful to respect the "discourse-situation", or to avoid isolating any one aspect of the language process to the exclusion of the rest. Basically he analyses language from the standpoint of its three components: the speaker, the spoken to and that about which something is said.

1 Macquarrie, God-Talk, p.63.

When seen from the side of the speaker, language involves expression, in the sense that in speaking a person expresses something of himself. Macquarrie stresses that what is expressed in speaking is not an isolated subject which seeks to relate itself to an external world. Like Heidegger, he insists that existence is always being-in-the-world, and that self and world are inseparable. As a result, in the most primordial mode of speaking the 'total existence' of the speaker finds expression.

However, there are other modes of speech where only certain aspects of being-in-the-world come to expression. In certain specialized modes of speaking it is possible to "dim down" that part of existence related to feeling, concern and value-judgments. The various specialized modes of speaking have a proper role to play and are of great value so long as they do not usurp the place of the primordial mode of speaking which expresses the "full range of what is implied in being a self-in-the-world."⁽¹⁾

He next considers that about which something is said in the language process. The key words here, 'referring' and 'representing', describe the relation of "talk to that which is talked about." These words describe how language always points beyond itself to some "person, thing, or state of affairs." More particularly, he explains that language refers to or represents in various ways, the link between word and reference being sometimes direct, other times

1 Ibid., pp.68-71

indirect, sometimes concrete other times abstract.⁽¹⁾

When seen from the standpoint of the person spoken to, language is described as communication which is based on the sharing of a common world by the speaker and the spoken to. "Communication takes place when some aspect of the shared world is lit up and made accessible to both parties in the discourse."⁽²⁾ Here Macquarrie is simply referring to the fact that unless two people share certain basic understandings, e.g. language, culture and historical backgrounds, they are unable to communicate.

The components of language or discourse as understood by Macquarrie, then, are expression, representation and communication. As he explains, unless something is expressed, nothing can be 'brought into the light'. Further, if something is expressed which does not refer to or represent anything, or fails to represent the same thing for the person spoken to, then there is no communication and again nothing is "brought into the light". Thus all three components are needed to ensure the functioning of the language process.

Having completed his phenomenological description of language, Macquarrie then seeks to penetrate to even more basic relations that make possible the relations between the speaker, the spoken to and that which is spoken about. He proposes two such relations which allow for the possibility of language. The first he calls intuition and by

1 Ibid., pp.71-73.

2 Ibid., p.74.

this refers to the fact that existence or being-in-the-world is characterized by a certain 'openness'. Not only is man open in the sense of having sensuous intuition of objects in his surroundings but, even more basically, he has an openness which reveals not just particular aspects of his being-in-the-world but also 'total existence.' Such intuitions, he says, are what existentialists call affective states (e.g. anxiety) and these are the most fundamental types of intuition.

The second basic relation allowing for the language process is called the person-to-person relation. In explaining this concept he quotes Heidegger's understanding of discourse as always involving the existential Being-with, e.g. speech always implies the existence of another, the hearer. In concluding his analysis of language, Macquarrie says that these two relations can be seen as the result of one basic trait of existence, its openness to both being-in-the-world and to being-with-others.

Heidegger's influence on Macquarrie's analysis is two-fold. The various concepts involved here, being-with, being-in-the-world, and the openness which basically characterizes existence all stem from Heidegger's fundamental ontology. Further, the direction of this analysis and the way in which it develops also stems from Heidegger's methodology which proceeds from an analysis of the phenomena as they are found to a laying bare of more fundamental structures which ground and make possible the more visible

phenomena. In Macquarrie's analysis this pattern involves his moving from a description of the relations involved in language as we know it (between speaker, spoken to and that which is spoken about) to the more basic relation in the openness of existence to its being-in-the-world and to other centres of existence-in-the-world.

From an analysis of language in general Macquarrie turns his attention to the problem of language in theology. The theme of this analysis stems from his previous discussion of that which is spoken about in language. In the case of religious language the most crucial topic spoken about is God and Macquarrie proposes that one of the great problems for twentieth century theologians has been their failure to establish the relation between the word God and that to which it refers.

In An Existentialist Theology Macquarrie explains that Bultmann's desire to limit all speaking about God to existential language about God as He is experienced reflects a certain vagueness in the relation between the word God as he uses it and that to which the term refers or about which it speaks. In a discussion of the Roman Catholic reaction to demythologizing, Macquarrie stresses that Bultmann has correctly seen the existential side of God-talk (one can only talk about God insofar as His actions have been experienced) but has failed to explain adequately the ontological reference of such talk.

Macquarrie explains that while God-talk must always illuminate existence, it must also throw a certain amount of light on the nature of God in Himself. He quotes one Roman Catholic commentator, L. Malevez, who claims (in a somewhat exaggerated manner) that Bultmann's theology speaks only about existence and is silent about the nature of the God which it urges people to worship.⁽¹⁾

In God-Talk Macquarrie sets the stage for his own way of speaking about God by evaluating the thinking of the three leading contemporary theologians on this issue. He refers to Bultmann's use of analogical language to supplement his existential language about God (we can know God only insofar as we experience Him) as an "unexplained leap or hiatus in his thought." He sees this unexplained gap as the result of Bultmann's failure to establish how language which normally refers to the human realm can have an indirect reference to an ultimate dimension.⁽²⁾

While Bultmann approaches the problem of God-talk from the human side, Karl Barth stresses the divine factor in this issue. Barth suggests that analogical language can reveal God, not through any virtue of its own but through the gracious intervention of God in the language process. Since this divine intervention, like the incarnation, is essentially a mystery, Macquarrie points out that Barth's

1 Macquarrie, The Scope of Demythologizing, p.127.

2 Macquarrie, God-Talk, p.41.

explanation of God-talk also involves a leap, in this case a leap of faith.⁽¹⁾

Although they approach the problem from different sides, Barth from the divine and Bultmann from the human, neither seem to Macquarrie able to bridge the gap between the human word and the divine realm. Paul Tillich's understanding of God as Being itself is then suggested as the contemporary approach which comes closest to bridging this gap in the God-talk problem.

In that God is Being and all that "is" participates in Being, language about the realm of being can also refer indirectly to Being itself. The problem with this basically sound approach is that Tillich's language about Being is somewhat vague and ambiguous, thus Macquarrie proposes to clarify and build on Tillich's solution employing Heidegger's insights into the Being-process.⁽²⁾

74. Symbolic language

Macquarrie's understanding of religious language, and particularly God-talk, centers around his definition of symbols. Using this concept he seeks to move beyond the positions of Barth and Bultmann by retaining the strengths of both, and the weaknesses of neither. In that his approach is to be existential, it can acknowledge Bultmann's insight that God can only be spoken of insofar as

1 Ibid., p.49.

2 Ibid., pp.52-54.

He is related to man. In that Macquarrie's religious language will stress the ontological aspect of God's nature, it will respect Barth's insight that the initiative in any divine-human contact must stem from the divine side.

By symbols, Macquarrie refers to those words "which stand for a thing or phenomenon which is itself a symbol, in so far as it stands for something else, so that the word ...refers indirectly through its immediate reference to whatever this may symbolize."⁽¹⁾ As an example of symbolic language, he cites St. Athanasius' description of Christ's outstretched hands on the cross which symbolized the unity of the Hebrews and Gentiles in Christ's body. The words refer immediately to the outstretched hands and refer indirectly to that which the hands symbolize, the unity of the various members in the body of Christ.⁽²⁾

Macquarrie's understanding of analogical language plays a key role in the way he defines symbolic language. He poses the problem for analogical and symbolic language about God by asking how language which normally refers to the human realm can validly refer to the divine realm, e.g. God the Father?

First of all, Macquarrie stresses that the users of analogical language do not claim to gain direct knowledge of God through it. The knowledge gained is indirect, but is nevertheless knowledge of God. "Here indeed we see as in a glass, darkly, and not yet face to face; nevertheless we

1 Ibid., p.194.

2 Ibid., p.131.

see."⁽¹⁾ Although only claiming to give indirect knowledge, symbolic and analogical language still must establish some connection between that which is represented by the symbol and its reference (or that which is indirectly brought to light.)

For bridging the gap between symbol and symbolized, for establishing the link between the two, Macquarrie turns to three aspects of Heideggerian philosophy, Being as the "ontological difference", the nature of time and man as the "ontological animal." For Heidegger, as seen in his understanding of the "ontological difference", Being is both transcendent of all beings and immanent and accessible in them.⁽²⁾ It is this understanding of the relation between Being and being which justifies symbolic talk of God for Macquarrie. The fact that Being is present to some extent in all beings means that symbols for the latter can refer indirectly to the former also. Of time as a factor in bridging the gap between human language and the divine realm, Macquarrie says that all beings exist in time but that man does so in a unique way. Rather than simply moving from one moment to the next, man can be seen as "constituted by his temporality" and as "extending himself through past, present and future."⁽³⁾ Indeed it is through his ability to relate constructively to the various tenses of time that man gains authenticity.

1 Eric Mascall, Words and Images, as quoted by Macquarrie, God-Talk, p.218.

2 Ibid., p.222.

3 Ibid., p.224.

At this point Macquarrie is following directly in the path of Heidegger's fundamental ontology which penetrated beyond Dasein's existentiell traits to the fundamental existential "care" and then established the temporal basis of care. Heidegger also saw Dasein's relation to time, especially the future dimension, as constitutive for authenticity.

Now if time can be established as a factor in the Being process then a certain likeness would exist between Being and man which could provide the basis for analogical language about Being. The very title of Heidegger's major work, Being and Time, underlines how closely he believes these two concepts are related. Indeed we can recall that Heidegger was pointing toward establishing in Being and Time that the Being process functions through time. (see p.94) Thus Macquarrie sees time as the common bond between Being and man which allows the language for one to light up the other in an analogical symbolic manner.

Similarly, Macquarrie sees the existentialists' understanding of man as providing another link between being and Being. Unlike other beings, man not only participates in Being but is aware of and has a certain amount of responsibility for his relationship to Being. In a sense, man shares in the power and functioning of the Being process. Heidegger's fundamental ontology is quite influential here also. In that Dasein is the place, or da, where Being breaks through into the realm of beings, it is an invaluable partner in the Being process. Heidegger's portrayal of man

as the "ontological animal" reflects his understanding of the distinctive relation between man and Being.

Macquarrie portrays this relationship theologically by saying that man has a share in the creativity of God and is created in the image of God. Like time then, man's special relation to and openness for Being provides the basis for a language which can refer both to God and to man.

Next we shall examine four important aspects of symbolic language as understood by Macquarrie. The first is related to the fact that symbolic language must always involve both the existential and ontological dimensions. A symbol is only effective insofar as it is related to some aspect of human experience. God as he acts on and through man is the concern for theology since it is the God of human experiences which best commands the commitment and response of worship and faith.

By the same token, there must be some ontological ground or basis for the reality of God. As noted in the Roman Catholic criticism of Bultmann, there must be more to God than human experience, otherwise He is just another aspect of the finite, immanent realm. In stressing the need for an ontological dimension in theological language, Macquarrie recognizes that such language must have a valid claim to represent a reality beyond the finite realm of existence.

Indeed, he stresses that the existential power of a symbol depends upon the strength of its ontological reference:

The power of a symbol to awaken an existential response must be related to its power to yield insight into some ontological reality. When this fails to happen, the symbol becomes obscure, its power is weakened and it may eventually fall out of use. (1)

Heidegger's philosophy, with its insistence that all existential analysis leads straight into ontological considerations and his stress that all ontological-existential insights be derived from and related back to the ontic-existentiell realm of everyday life, provides a sound source from which Macquarrie feels he can draw a symbolic language that maintains an existential-ontological balance.

A second aspect of symbolic language concerns what Macquarrie refers to as the "hierarchy of beings." A problem arises in seeking to select certain beings as more appropriate symbols of Being because Being participates in all beings. There must be a criterion then for selecting certain beings as the most appropriate symbols. Macquarrie solves this problem and establishes this criterion by pointing out that some beings light up Being more adequately than others due to their greater range of participation in the Being process.

The "hierarchy of beings" can be established according to the respective beings' mode of participation in Being and the greater the rank of a being in this hierarchy the more appropriate a symbol it can be for bringing Being

1 Ibid., p.206.

into the light. Man is the most appropriate being for symbolizing Being and stands very high in the "hierarchy of beings" since his existence involves the material Being of inanimate objects, the organic Being of animals, and personal Being which is uniquely his.

Therefore Macquarrie says that "symbols and images drawn from personal life have the highest degree of adequacy accessible to us."⁽¹⁾ Although many of the traditional symbols of Christianity are inanimate objects (the cross, bread and wine), they receive their significance from their association with a personal being.

The third aspect of this concept of symbols as developed by Macquarrie concerns its paradoxical nature which stems from the fact that God must be affirmed in theology as both hidden and revealed. Symbolic language must recognize even while it seeks to bring God's nature to light that He is utterly incomparable and transcendent. As Macquarrie explains, the doctrine of analogy, upon which symbolic language is built, tries to respect both sides of God's nature, "acknowledging on the one hand that all our language about God is oblique and inadequate, yet claiming that there is a sufficient basis of likeness to make this language meaningful and not merely empty."⁽²⁾

It is this paradoxical nature of symbols which Macquarrie offers as a safeguard against idolatry. No

1 Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, p.131.

2 Macquarrie, God-Talk, p.228.

symbol can claim exclusive or direct reference to God but must always be corrected by and understood in light of other symbols. This nature of symbolic language stems from the Heideggerian insight that beings and Being are never to be confused or too closely associated since Being is manifest in various ways, through various beings, and always conceals as well as reveals its nature through beings.

A fourth aspect of symbolic language is related to that portion of the language process which Macquarrie called 'communication'. In order for something to be "brought into the light" by a word between the speaker and the spoken to, this word must be based on a common shared understanding or reference. It is at this point that mythology breaks down since its presuppositions are not those of the modern world. The idea of a three-storey universe in which demons from below and gods from above are constantly breaking into actions on the middle level is no longer functional. Hence, mythological language fails to communicate today.

On the other hand, Macquarrie's use of existential-ontological language, which refers to the basic structures of existence-in-the-world and does not infringe upon any particular existentiell world view, offers a type of language from which symbols with a wide range of communication can be drawn. He explains that certain sets of symbols which have arisen from a particular culture or historical background would necessarily be limited as they would have meaning only for those familiar with the particular situation from which they arose. For instance,

the significance and meaning of the black power fist salute given at the Mexican Olympics would be lost on someone unfamiliar with the racial problems of the United States. However, language which deals with the structures of existence and the nature of Being deals with that which is common to all men, would have a much greater relevance and is thus a proper source for Macquarrie's symbolic language.⁽¹⁾

Thus we can see how in his treatment of the God-talk issue, which is the basic factor in the broader problem of theological language, Macquarrie has adapted Heidegger's insight into the Being-being relationship to provide the link which allows language normally referring to entities of one order (being) to refer to phenomena of another order (Being). We also established a strong Heideggerian influence on each of the four traits of Macquarrie's symbolic language.

75. Hermeneutics

We will consider Macquarrie's views on hermeneutics by examining his hermeneutical principles and their exegetical application. We will continue to focus on those aspects of his theology which are influenced by Heideggerian philosophy and will begin by noting several of the characteristics Macquarrie attributes to any type of interpretation. The first is that interpretation always involves some sort of pre-understanding of the matter to be considered. However "vague and marginal" such an understanding

1 Ibid., p.239.

might be, it is nevertheless the necessary condition for a point of contact between interpreter and subject matter.⁽¹⁾ This same idea has already been discussed in our analysis of Bultmann's and Heidegger's hermeneutics and the concept is basically the same in the approaches of all three.

Another characteristic is the circularity involved in all interpretation. This stems from the fact that while the pre-understanding affects the interpretation of a text, that interpretation allows for a new understanding based on the text which in turn affects and develops the pre-understanding. Macquarrie seeks to maintain a "true reciprocity" in the interaction of text and interpreter⁽²⁾ As a result, he would stand with Bultmann who insists on the effect of the pre-understanding on the text as well as the "new hermeneutic" theologians who insist that the text interprets the interpreter. These two approaches are thus seen as dealing with different sides of the same coin. Here, too, we can see the direct influence of Heidegger's philosophy with its emphasis on the hermeneutical circle.

Indeed, in the conclusion to his analysis of how Heidegger's understanding of hermeneutics developed and evolved through his career, Macquarrie suggests that the lesson to be learned from this philosopher is that the interpreter's relation to the text must be active and passive,

1 Ibid., p.149.

2 Ibid.

it demands "both questioning and listening, a sense of direction and a willingness to be directed."⁽¹⁾

Another characteristic which reflects Heidegger's influence ascribes an artistic nature to interpretation as it "draws on the imagination and experience of the interpreter in ways that seem to evade any attempt to formulate them in rules." He suggests the following adjectives as descriptive of this side of interpretation: personal, creative, imaginative, revelatory and charismatic.⁽²⁾ In light of Heidegger's reported claim of having written important pieces of his work "in a state of inspiration" and in view of descriptions of his work as "prophetic-kerygmatic", it is not difficult to see his influence on this last characteristic of interpretation as understood by Macquarrie.⁽³⁾

Macquarrie also fills out and explains his understanding of hermeneutics by focusing on a particular case study, Heidegger's interpretation in Being and Time of a classical fable. He introduces this case study with a review of how Heidegger's views on hermeneutics evolved and developed in his writings. Basically his analysis agrees with our own which emphasized a movement away from an understanding of interpretation which stresses the role of presuppositions and the action of the interpreter on the

1 Ibid., p.167.

2 Ibid.

3 Richard Kroner, "Heidegger's Private Religion", Union Seminary Quarterly Review, II (1956), p.26. and Laszlo Versenyi, Heidegger, Being and Truth, p.164.

text to a later position which (like the "new hermeneutic") stresses the action of the language in the text on the interpreter, who plays a far more passive role in the interpretation process. Macquarrie stresses that Heidegger's approach to hermeneutics must be understood in a balanced manner, retaining and balancing off against each other the excesses of the particular periods in his thinking.

From his interpretation of Heidegger's hermeneutics Macquarrie draws two concepts which play a key role in his own understanding of interpretation: repetitive thinking and the idea of 'violence' in interpretation. By the former, Macquarrie understands Heidegger to be referring to a re-thinking which is more than just a mechanical reproduction of an earlier insight and implies "going into some experience in such a way that it is...brought into the present and its insights and possibilities made alive again."⁽¹⁾ Macquarrie sees this type of thinking as an aid in theology's attempt to reach over the intervening interpretations of prior commentaries for a fresh clear understanding of source material.

Macquarrie understands Heidegger's use of violence in interpretation as a "driving of words...beyond their everyday usage so that they become creative and illuminating for new and hitherto hidden areas..."⁽²⁾ In his own hermeneutics Macquarrie calls this process the "stretching"

1 Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, p.83.

2 Macquarrie, God-Talk, p.160.

of language.

In evaluating a hermeneutics which employs these concepts, Macquarrie correctly senses an openness to the charge of being subjective and arbitrary. His answer is that while this approach does focus on the creativity and imagination of the interpreter, there are limits imposed by the language itself. Nevertheless, "these limits are wide ones, and clearly much depends on the sensitivity and perceptiveness of the exegete."⁽¹⁾

The question to be asked here concerns the wisdom of adapting a hermeneutical approach knowing full well that its success hinges largely upon the "sensitivity and perceptiveness" of the individual interpreter involved? Is it not possible that such an approach only seems credible when utilized by a thinker of Heidegger's character? For an answer to the issue raised by these questions let us consider a specific instance in which Macquarrie has applied these hermeneutical principles in Scriptural exegesis.

One of the basic concepts in Macquarrie's Principles of Christian Theology is his understanding of God as holy Being (he defines Being as a process of letting-be, as we shall see later.) In seeking to give a Scriptural ground to this association of God with Being defined as 'letting-be', he turns to the Old Testament passage in which God reveals His identity as "I am who I am". (Exodus 3:14)

1 Ibid., p.164.

Macquarrie accepts a translation of the key verb in this passage as "I cause to be" or "I bring to pass" which he openly acknowledges has been rejected by a majority of scholars. His reason for accepting what he recognizes as a dubious translation is that it would "fit in remarkably well with the exposition of Being given in the earlier part of this passage: "I let be what I let be."⁽¹⁾

Here Macquarrie seems very susceptible to the criticism against which he defended Heidegger's hermeneutics, subjectivism. Rather than allowing the text to speak for itself and be brought into the light, he appears to be in danger of coercing its meaning into a pre-conceived position within his own system. He seems to be in danger of stepping beyond the limits, wide as they are, imposed by the language of the text itself.

The crucial question is whether this instance invalidates his method as a whole or whether it merely points to the difficulties and weaknesses involved in adapting Heidegger's hermeneutical principles for theological interpretation? Unless used responsibly, Heidegger's hermeneutics, with its emphasis on repetitive thinking, on being more Greek than the Greeks, and on "violence", could be used to support less than responsible exegetical practices. However, because Macquarrie recognizes the limitations of this approach and the danger of it slipping into a groundless

1 Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, pp.179-180.

subjectivism it seems fair to say that his rather questionable exegesis in this particular instance points more to the difficulties and subtleties involved in adapting Heidegger's hermeneutics rather than toward the impossibility of such a project altogether.

76. History

We turn next to another very important theme running throughout Macquarrie's theology, his understanding of history. He formulates his doctrine of history in reaction to Bultmann's approach which he basically accepts with very important qualifications. He appeals to Heidegger's views on history, which we saw were influential on Bultmann's, as the basis for moving beyond this theologian at certain points. Like Bultmann, Macquarrie distinguishes between two levels of history, the objective-historical and the existential-historical. The former is the realm of objective fact while the latter is the realm of significant, repeatable possibilities. He also agrees with Bultmann's emphasis on the existential-historical as the realm of primary importance for theology. However, he goes beyond Bultmann by insisting that "every existential-historical event implies an objective-historical event."⁽¹⁾

He bases this on the Heideggerian insight that while history is primarily the realm of possibilities, these possibilities are not random, groundless phenomena, (thus history is more than legend or fiction) but are factical

1 Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, p.178.

possibilities. As he explains, only a possibility which has been factually actualized in the past can be repeated. "To say that history is concerned with the possible does not release it from the course of real happenings...from the facts."⁽¹⁾

Thus Macquarrie stresses that the existential-historical is the primary realm of interest for theology but that it must always be supplemented by a respect for the objective-historical realm. It is because of this stress on the existential-historical that Macquarrie agrees with Bultmann's opinion that "scientific historical research can never be decisive either one way or the other for the claims of Christianity as a historical religion."⁽²⁾

Macquarrie suggests that in regards to the issue concerning the relation of the kerygmatic Christ to the historical Jesus, the balance between these two levels of history can be maintained by speaking of a "minimal core of factuality." He explains the content of this minimal core in The Scope of Demythologizing as the fact "that there was someone who once exhibited in history the possibility of existence which the kerygma proclaims."⁽³⁾ At another point this core is described as the "assertion that at the source of the Christian religion there was an actual historical instance of the pattern of life proclaimed in the kerygma under the notions of dying and rising."⁽⁴⁾

1 Ibid.

2 Macquarrie, The Scope of Demythologizing, p.75.

3 Ibid., p.93.

4 John Macquarrie, Studies in Christian Existentialism, London: SCM Press, 1965), p.149.

In view of the various and conflicting results from previous portrayals of the historical Jesus, Macquarrie feels that his much less ambitious approach (the main purpose of which is to ground the existential-historical understanding of Christ and not to portray the historical Jesus) may "reasonably be assumed to be constant and unshakable through all the shifting patterns of research."

(1) He does not feel compelled to characterize the veracity of this core as absolutely certain but instead describes it as having "overwhelming probability" and it is this which makes it sufficiently stable to free the theologians from a slavish dependence on the changing results of historical research. (2)

One of the more interesting results of his stress on the need for grounding the existential-historical in the objective-historical comes out in Macquarrie's criticism of Bultmann's views on the resurrection. He rejects this theologian's portrayal of the resurrection as a mythological expression of the cross's significance since this interpretation fails completely to provide for any objective-historical ground for the resurrection event. Because the cross signifies the defeat of good and the resurrection the ultimate defeat of evil, the significance of the latter can best be protected by insisting that it too has an objective ground in a factual event. (3)

1 Macquarrie, The Scope of Demythologizing, p.98.

2 Macquarrie, Studies in Christian Existentialism, p.150.

3 Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, p.187.

Based on the available historical evidence, Macquarrie's interpretation stresses that Christ definitely appeared to his disciples after His death, ("in what way we do not presume to say, nor do we think it needful to inquire"). With his stress on the primacy of the existential significance of the resurrection, however, Macquarrie is able to say that he basically agrees with Bultmann's understanding of the nature of the resurrection with only a few reservations concerning the proper manner of expressing the nature of this event.⁽¹⁾

However, Macquarrie's insistence on the objective-historical ground of the resurrection event definitely resolves one of the most criticized and debated aspects of Bultmann's approach and can thus be seen as an improvement on his views. (This makes it all the more regrettable that Macquarrie's views on the objective ground of the resurrection are not as clearly expressed in Principles of Christian Theology where he systematically formulates his own theological position.⁽²⁾)

Another aspect of Macquarrie's approach to history which would indicate the direct influence of Heidegger (as well as his indirect influence through Bultmann) concerns the involvement of the hermeneutical circle in the historical process. In an analysis of the existential approach to

1 Ibid.

2 Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, pp.265-266.

history (of which he gives a qualified approval⁽¹⁾) Macquarrie says that the primary subject matter for historical reflection is human existence and it is a prior understanding of existence which makes possible the study of history. On the other hand, he feels that the study of history also provides a new self-understanding and in a paradoxical way, that which enables one to study history is also that which is gained through such a study.

It is this paradox which reveals the circular logic involved in all interpretation. He explains that the vague preunderstanding which provides the initial point of contact with the subject to be interpreted is that which is expanded and developed in contact with the subject matter.⁽²⁾ As was the case with his understanding of the two dimensions in history and the resulting need for a minimal core of factuality, the influence of Heidegger's philosophy can also be seen in his understanding of the circular logic involved in the study of history.

77. Anthropology

We turn now to consider Macquarrie's understanding of man and we shall find that this leads directly into a consideration of such matters as faith, revelation, sin and God. Many of the issues we are about to discuss come under the heading of philosophical theology in Macquarrie's approach and his apologetical intentions for this

1 Macquarrie, The Scope of Demythologizing, p.95.

2 Ibid.

philosophical theology can be seen in the description of its purpose as providing "...a bridge between our everyday thinking and experience and the matters about which the theologian talks..."⁽¹⁾

He will provide this bridge by phenomenologically describing existence-in-the-world and showing how this leads inevitably to and involves one in matters of faith. We will begin by considering his views on the structure of existence and will later focus on those aspects of existence which lead into a discussion of theological matters. Throughout we will indicate the influence of Heidegger's philosophy.

We have noted in a previous discussion that Macquarrie considers time as a basic factor in human existence. In Studies in Christian Existentialism he devotes a chapter to analysing the self in terms of temporality. This chapter closely follows Heidegger's consideration of "care" and "time" as the basis for Dasein's mode of existence. That he refers back to this chapter when later speaking of his own views on the structure of existence indicates his acceptance and use of Heidegger's approach.⁽²⁾

Basically he explains how Heidegger derives the three temporal dimensions from an analysis of care, an existential structure. In that existence is factual and man is thrown into a world of limited possibilities and

1 Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, p.51.

2 Macquarrie, God-Talk, p.224.

opportunities on which to act, it involves the past as that from which man inherits his limited possibilities. In that existence involves possibilities, man has always to move forward out of himself, to project himself onto his possibilities. Thus man is always on the way, striving and planning for future activities.

The third aspect of care or existence-in-the-world is falling, which refers to the way in which man operates in the present by dealing with his environment in such a way as to avoid his responsibility for the future, deny the limits he has inherited from the past and thus live inauthentically for the moment, or in the present. Hence, authenticity stems from man's ability to unify these three temporal dimensions in his 'self' and resolutely create a situation out of the environment in which he finds himself.⁽¹⁾

We turn now to see how Macquarrie uses this contemporary understanding of man apologetically to bridge the gap between the secular outlook and theological concerns. We can see this quite plainly in the way he describes the theological concept faith in terms of what Heidegger describes as authentic existence. As Macquarrie explains, authenticity involves both commitment and acceptance. The former refers to an ability to hold to a "master possibility" toward which one's future can be directed. The latter, acceptance, refers to an honest acceptance of one's limited heritage.

1 Macquarrie, Studies in Christian Existentialism, pp.64-70.

For Macquarrie authenticity also involves a belief that the ultimate dimension in existence is gracious, enabling one to strive toward a master possibility despite the limitations of factual existence. Furthermore, the belief in such a gracious dimension is not speculative or academic but demands existential involvement. Belief in an ultimate dimension that is gracious, commitment, acceptance, and existential involvement, what better terminology could one find to describe the attitude intended by the theological term faith, he asks?⁽¹⁾

We shall focus next on two aspects of contemporary existence which Macquarrie sees as having apologetical relevance for the doctrine of revelation. In analyzing the various existentialists' (especially Heidegger's) understanding of moods, Macquarrie explains how their approach nullifies the common understanding of such phenomena as merely subjective, emotional feelings.

He explains that far from being groundless, passing emotional states, moods or feelings have their own type of understanding or awareness; each one refers beyond itself to a particular situation. (In Brentano's language, moods have an "intentional" structure.) He illustrates by pointing out that the feeling of fear always refers to and is based upon a definite object or situation. He refers to Heidegger's phenomenological description of moods as a mode of disclosure which "makes us aware of something, gives

1 Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, pp.68-71.

us to understand something, or asserts that to something there belongs a certain character."⁽¹⁾

In particular, Macquarrie feels that the most basic mood or feeling-state, anxiety, does more than just disclose one aspect of a certain situation. Instead, it discloses to man his total situation, the fact of his finitude, his thrownness, his limited possibilities; because of its comprehensive nature such a mood can be called ontological for "it lights up man in his Being."⁽²⁾

At another point, Macquarrie further develops his understanding of anxiety and points out how it leads to the experience of "nothingness" which breaks man's inauthentic immersion in the beings around him in preparation for an awareness of Being's unconcealing. In that anxiety as an existential (a universal structure of existence) is the result of a phenomenological description of man's structure and provides the basis for an awareness of an ultimate dimension, it can serve as a point of contact toward which the theologian can apologetically relate a doctrine of revelation.⁽³⁾

Another aspect of existence which bridges the gap between this religious doctrine and the contemporary outlook can be found in Heidegger's understanding of essential

1 Macquarrie, Studies in Christian Existentialism, pp.33-35.

2 Ibid., p.37.

3 Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, p.77.

thought in which the initiative lies with what is known rather than the knower. It involves a "meditative character which contrasts with the probing activity of calculative thinking"; it "waits and listens."⁽¹⁾

When the nature of thought is seen to have this passive receptive character, the knowledge gained through the revelatory process no longer stands in such sharp contrast with knowledge gained through the usual thought process. Furthermore, the knowledge gained through essential thinking, like the knowledge of revelation, demands existential involvement and commitment. Here then is another aspect of the contemporary understanding of existence which has apologetical relevance.

Macquarrie suggests that the contemporary understanding of death also has apologetical relevance. Here too he focuses on Heidegger's approach as representative of the contemporary view. He explains that Heidegger is interested in death as an existential rather than biological or metaphysical phenomenon. Instead of considering the physiological aspects of dying or the question of death as the transition point between two worlds or levels of being, he focuses on how death affects existence as it grapples with the meaning of its pending end.

Heidegger refers to this existential significance

1 Ibid., p.85.

of death with the term Being-unto-death. He explains that death is an integral part of factual existence; we are thrown into the possibility of death from the moment our existence begins. "Man is always old enough to die." Furthermore, the way one exists towards death determines the inauthenticity or authenticity of his existence. Fallenness (as an existential) is characterized by flight from or denial of death. On the other hand, to accept death, the ultimate possibility, involves an acceptance of one's finitude, sharpens one's awareness of the limited number of possibilities which can be realized, and leads to the creation of a responsible and unified self.⁽¹⁾

Macquarrie acknowledges that Heidegger places more emphasis on the role of death in the achievement of authenticity than does the Biblical understanding but he feels that both approaches have enough in common to allow for Heidegger's to serve as the source for a contemporary expression of Biblical content as well as an apologetical starting point for explaining the theological doctrine of death. He supports his claim that the two approaches have much in common by saying that for the Biblical writer as well, death is primarily important as it affects man throughout his life:

Man is bidden to return to destruction, to the dust from which he was formed, which seems to stultify his existence; no sooner does he flourish than he is cut down and withered: he may prolong his life for seventy or eighty years, yet the best of his days are labour

1 Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, p.119.

and sorrow, and the inevitable end comes suddenly.
(based on Psalm 90, verses 3,6, and 10.)⁽¹⁾

The inauthentic flight from death is reflected in Jesus' story of the rich man who built barns to store his wealth for his future years, allowing his absorption in worldly concerns to blind him to the possibility of his own death. By the same token, the Scriptural understanding of accepting death as a factor in the transition to authentic existence is seen in such sayings as one must "die to live" and "whoever would save his life will loose it; and whoever loses his life for my sake and the Gospel's will save it."

⁽²⁾ We can see, then, how Macquarrie establishes that Heidegger's existential analysis of death has a two-fold relevance for theology; it can serve as the starting point for the explanation of the theological doctrine of death and it can give contemporary form to the Biblical understanding of this phenomenon.

This two-fold relevance is also apparent in Macquarrie's use of Heidegger's thinking to explain the relation between sin and death in theology. A traditional problem for theology has been the need to clarify the difference between death as punishment for sin and as an inevitable, neutral part of finite existence. The point should always be made that death belongs to existence irrespective of the presence of sin.

1 Ibid., p.120.

2 Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, p.69.

Heidegger's philosophy provides a useful model for clearly expressing the dual significance of death. In existence that is inauthentic, death is not viewed constructively but is overlooked, denied and thereby contributes to the shallowness, brokenness and fallenness of existence. This is death as punishment for sin. On the other hand, in authentic existence, or the life of faith, death is dealt with constructively, sharpening up the drive for realizing possibilities and potentialities, and is thereby recognized and accepted as an inherent part of finite existence.⁽¹⁾ Here then Heideggerian insights have given relevance and clear expression to the theological understanding of the relation between death and sin.

Our discussion of Macquarrie's views on death has lead into a consideration of the doctrine of sin which he feels would also benefit from an encounter with Heidegger's philosophy. In an etymological analysis reminiscent of Heidegger's controversial and often criticized approach, Macquarrie establishes a connection between the words "sin" (in German Sünde) and the verb "sunder" (German: sondern) and says that originally sin involved a state of separation. He feels that the original force and strength of the word "sin" has gradually been lost and suggests that the Heideggerian concept alienation provides a model for restoring the original significance to the theological

1 Ibid., p.243.

doctrine of sin.⁽¹⁾

By alienation (which is one aspect of the existential 'fallenness'), Heidegger refers to Dasein's falling away from its possibilities into an inauthentic absorption in its world. Thus Dasein becomes alienated from, has fallen away from, its true self. Furthermore, because authenticity hinges upon an awareness of Being, alienation affects Dasein's relation to the ultimate dimension also. Hence, Heidegger's concept, alienation, can not only give relevance to the doctrine of sin but can also help to restore its original connotation of separation.⁽²⁾

The aspect of sin which the Scriptures refer to as idolatry can also be given new expression in terms of what Heidegger calls the forgetting of Being. Turning from God to worldly affairs for support in the quest for meaning and significance in life can be understood as the turn from Being to beings in the quest for authentic existence. Furthermore, idolatry or the forgetting of Being is not to be considered a secondary or weaker force in life since it involves the same urgency and motivation as the quest for Being or God, namely the need for support and aid in attaining an existence that is not broken by frustration and distortion.⁽³⁾

The relation between sin and the world is another

1 Macquarrie, Studies in Christian Existentialism, p.128.

2 Ibid., p.132.

3 Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, pp.238-239.

aspect of Christian doctrine that is often difficult for the contemporary outlook to appreciate. Macquarrie says that the Scriptural alliance of the world with the "flesh" and the devil over against God is not in keeping with the more neutral contemporary understanding of the term "world" as referring to the physical universe.

How, then, is the Scriptural understanding of the world (as a reference to the "collective body of mankind in its fallen and sinful state, cut off from God, and bringing under its domination every individual existence born into the world") to be understood? In particular the New Testament term kosmos occasionally is used in reference to the collective, cumulative nature of sin as opposed to individual concrete sinful actions. How is this cumulative nature of sin, which drives home the powerful nature of sin as a whole, to be understood and expressed in contemporary terms? In reply, Macquarrie points out that the Heideggerian concept, das Man (which refers to one aspect of existence-in-the-world as that "depersonalized and dehumanized collective body, responsible to no one, that dictates the standards of the lowest common denominator to every individual existence" (1)), adequately expresses the theological understanding of sin in its cumulative state.

Heidegger's understanding of existence is also seen as providing an apologetical base for explaining the Scriptural portrayal of man as in the image of God. He explains that of all the beings, man alone can be called an

1 Macquarrie, Studies in Christian Existentialism, pp.132-133.

ontological entity "because he not only has being...but has his Being disclosed to him, so that he has the potentiality to become the being to which Being as such manifests itself, gives itself, and entrusts itself."⁽¹⁾

In light of this definition of Being as a process of letting-be (which we will examine later) Macquarrie explains that because of man's openness to Being, he acts as a partner in the ultimate process of letting-be the beings around him. Although his power of letting-be is finite and limited, it nevertheless distinguishes him from all other beings. (The influence of Heidegger's approach, which understands existence as uniquely the place or da where Being lights up beings, thus making Dasein a partner in the Being process, is quite apparent here.) Existence, which is man's unique mode of Being and indicates his close relation to Being, thus provides a contemporary form of expression for the unique relation between man and God referred to Scripturally with the term image of God.⁽²⁾

In his understanding of existence Macquarrie also stresses the finite and limited side of human nature, or its facticity. In his explanation that facticity refers to the limitations imposed on all men by their environment, heredity and place in history, we can see that he uses this term in the same way as Heidegger. The apologetical relevance of this concept becomes apparent when he says

1 Macquarrie, God-Talk, p.100.

2 Principles of Christian Theology, pp.210-212.

that the Biblical symbol "dust" refers not to man's body over against his soul but rather to "all the factors in man's existence that belong to his facticity."⁽¹⁾

Finally, we shall consider how Macquarrie's phenomenological analysis of existence provides an apologetical base for explaining the religious belief in an ultimate dimension. Relying heavily on such Heideggerian concepts as facticity, possibility, fallenness and death, Macquarrie concludes that the contemporary understandings of existence take into account an element of frustration, imbalance and alienation. However, there are two schools of thought on this distinguished by their respective assessment of the extent of brokenness in existence. One approach, epitomized by Sartre, sees existence as a "useless passion" while the other looks beyond it for meaning and purpose.

Like Heidegger, Macquarrie stands with the latter approach in stressing that a phenomenological description of existence leads inevitably to the recognition of an ultimate dimension, for "human existence considered in isolation does not make sense." The brokenness of existence stems from the great gulf between human resources, the limited heritage or factual possibilities, and the demands made upon them, the disclosed possibilities or potentiality. Thus Macquarrie feels:

Either we acknowledge the absurdity of a situation in which we find ourselves responsible for an existence which we lack the capacity to master...

1 Ibid., p.210.

or else we look for a further dimension in the situation, a depth beyond...man...that is open to us in such a way that it can make sense of our finite existence by supporting it and bringing order and fulfillment into it. (1)

In this way the stage is set for the appearance of an ultimate dimension, Being or God, and we can see how he has formed an apologetical bridge between theology's belief in God and the secular understanding of existence. From a starting point acceptable to both theology and the contemporary outlook (the phenomenological description of existence), he has established at least the feasibility of belief in an ultimate dimension. His next apologetical step is to clarify the nature of this ultimate power and see whether it can be appropriately associated with the theological doctrine of God. As we shall see, he relies heavily on Heidegger's ontology in establishing his own understanding of the Being process.

78. Being and God

He begins by clearly distinguishing between being and Being.. He refers to Heidegger's concept, the "ontological difference", as contributing to a better understanding of the difference between being and Being.⁽²⁾ The implication of this concept is that Being is not to be understood as the "absolute", whether this implies an all-inclusive phenomenon or one understood as the totality

1 Ibid., pp.63-71.

2 John Macquarrie, God and Secularity, (London: Lutterworth Press, 1968), p.32.

of all beings, because one would then have to consider this "absolute's" mode of Being, thereby establishing its nature as another being.⁽¹⁾

What can be said of Being in an affirmative manner then? Generally he lists three positive traits of Being. First of all, it is strictly incomparable, a power which is basically mysterious. On the other hand, a second trait of Being is described as its presence and manifestness. Paradoxically, this mysterious force also reveals certain aspects of itself.

The presence of Being refers to the fact that it is present in every being, indeed it is that which allows all beings to be. All beings must "participate" in Being. The manifestness of Being is its revelation of itself through this presence in beings. However, this manifest-ness is for the most part latent and when it does become apparent is often subject to distortion. Thus he explains that "Being is, paradoxically, both the closest and the furthest."⁽²⁾

In God-Talk, when referring to Being as God, Macquarrie summarizes by saying that God is:

hidden as well as revealed, and that part of his Godhood, without which he could not be God, is just his incomparability and his transcendence of all human understanding. Yet equally a part of his Godhood is

1 Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, pp.98-100.

2 Ibid., pp.103-104.

that he has come forth from his hiddenness and given us such knowledge of himself as makes it possible for us to worship him... (1)

The third trait of Being also concerns its relation to beings. Macquarrie looks for a contemporary term with a meaning similar to that of the words "act" and "energy" which could characterize Being as the condition that allows all beings to be. He selects the term "letting-be" and while he does not identify its origin or source we can readily see that this is very similar to one of the many ways Heidegger described the Being process. (see p.168) By letting-be Macquarrie does not mean leaving alone or not interfering with; instead he uses the expression in an active sense, "meaning something like 'enabling to be', 'helping to fulfil the potentiality for being'." (2)

Hence it is more correct to say Being lets-be rather than Being is, for in the strict sense "is" refers to a being's mode of Being; thus Being is not. However, when used in a qualified sense, there is justification for saying Being "is" (using the verb in a "stretched" manner) since it is more beingful than any being, and "is the prior condition that anything may be." He summarizes the three traits of Being by describing it as the "incomparable that lets-be and that is present and manifest in and through the beings." (3)

1 Macquarrie, God-Talk, pp.227-228.

2 Ibid., p.226.

3 Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, pp.103-105.

The next step is to consider the appropriateness of this secular understanding of Being for expressing what the theologians refer to as God. If the appropriateness is established, the apologetical bridge from a phenomenological analysis of everyday existence to a belief in God would be complete. He begins by denying that the terms Being and God should be understood as synonyms since some thinkers accept the reality of Being but consider it an indifferent or alien factor in existence, e.g. the nihilistic philosophers like Sartre.

In contrast, use of the word God generally indicates one has adopted a different approach to existence by accepting the reality of an ultimate dimension which provides the means for healing the brokenness of existence. To indicate his affirmative understanding of Being, Macquarrie refers to it as holy Being, or Being that is gracious and supporting. (When we recall that Heidegger used the term holy to refer to the unconcealing positive side of Being as aletheia, we can see how closely Macquarrie is following Heidegger's line of thought.) Furthermore the use of the word holy also underlines the existential side of Being as a power which commands commitment, respect and awe.⁽¹⁾

As a gracious, supporting power which existentially involves those who affirm it, holy Being certainly can be seen as an appropriate model for expressing the theological doctrine of God and since the acceptance of holy Being has

1 Macquarrie, God-Talk, p.101.

ultimately been based on the phenomenological analysis of existence, an apologetical bridge has been completed between the secular and theological outlook.

In his analysis of the relation between the concepts Being and God in Principles of Christian Theology, Macquarrie acknowledges his debt to Heideggerian insights and then feels compelled to deal with this philosopher's often repeated assertion that Being is not God. Macquarrie interprets this as a criticism of theology's attempts to associate God with a concept of Being in which the difference between being and Being has been overlooked.⁽¹⁾

Hence, Being as theology has traditionally understood it, an absolute or all encompassing being, can never be understood as God. In light of his recognition of the "ontological difference" Macquarrie believes his association of God and Being has not contradicted the intention behind Heidegger's statement concerning this issue.⁽²⁾

As we noted previously, Macquarrie refers to his theological stance as "existential-ontological theism." We can see in his term for God, holy Being, how he maintains the tension between the existential and ontological dimensions in this concept. As holy, Being is understood as a power which involves the believer and in this involvement can be seen the existential side of holy Being. In

1 Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, p.105.

2 Ibid., p.106.

that an understanding of holy Being can only be gained through consideration of beings, particularly man, we can see how ontological considerations are necessarily grounded in and related to existential ones. To this point Macquarrie has remained within the limits established by the Bultmannian insistence that understanding of God is always self-understanding.

In his stress on the ontological side of holy Being can be seen Macquarrie's desire to move beyond Bultmann's position toward some type of knowledge about God which transcends self-knowledge. The great shortcoming of existential theology for Macquarrie is that it fails to provide "some kind of transsubjective validity for the experiences which belong to the life of faith." As he explains, the claim that God in Himself cannot be known, only God as He is related to man, should never be taken as implying that "God is nothing but a factor in human experience..."⁽¹⁾

The problem for existential theology is posed in the following words of R.W. Hepburn:

...existentialist thought is in continual peril of failing to emerge from the subjectivist circle... A subjectivist account can provide an informative description of what it is like to think and act as if there was a God...but it is unable to...say whether or not there exists a being [the words 'exist' and 'being' do not have the same meaning here as they do for Heidegger and Macquarrie] before whom the believer has taken up the attitude of faith.⁽²⁾

1 Macquarrie, God-Talk, pp.242-243.

2 R.W. Hepburn, as quoted by Macquarrie, The Scope of Demythologizing, p.216.

How then is theology to establish the reality of that which it calls God? Macquarrie begins by saying that it would not be possible to establish the reality of God independent of or prior to any experience of Him. There is no way to "get behind the experience or find a second route to that which we know in the experience..."⁽¹⁾ To attempt this is to deny the need for faith which is, of course, necessitated by the finiteness, risk, and uncertainty in existence.

Macquarrie then turns to a consideration of how other contemporary theologians have grappled with this problem for guidance in constructing his own solution. We have already noted that Bultmann felt compelled to supplement the existential language of demythologizing with analogical references to God's actions. Macquarrie feels that Paul Tillich has made the best effort to retain an existential-ontological balance in the understanding of God. With his consideration of God as Being, Tillich tries to clarify the ontological reality of God and with his understanding of Being (God) as of "ultimate concern" he recognizes the existential dimension of this issue.⁽²⁾

To answer constructively the question concerning the reality of that upon which faith is based and toward

1 Macquarrie, God-Talk, p.244.

2 Macquarrie, God and Secularity, p.33.

which the term God refers, Macquarrie openly relies on Heideggerian insights into the nature of existence and Being.⁽¹⁾ He suggests that just as moods (a phenomenologically established aspect of existence should be acceptable to the secular outlook) and essential thinking point toward the reality of an ultimate dimension which breaks into existence, so too can revelation be understood as indicative of a transsubjective God who acts upon the believer. Furthermore, an analysis of symbolic, mythological and analogical language which incorporates Heidegger's insights into the Being-being relation can "at least point to the theistic vision of the world as more probable than the atheistic one."⁽²⁾ And finally, Heidegger's ontology, with its stress on the interdependence of Being and Dasein, can provide the model for a theological understanding of God which is grounded in the existential dimension but moves on to a discussion of the ontological reality of God.⁽³⁾ He has now completed his apologetical bridge from a phenomenological description of man to the reality of God or holy Being.

So far, Heidegger's influence on Macquarrie's approach has been very apparent. In the case of such pre-theological concerns as the nature of language, interpretation and history, we have noted how Heidegger's

1 Macquarrie, God-Talk, p.247.

2 Macquarrie, The Scope of Demythologizing, p.219.

3 Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, p.166.

views have been openly incorporated into Macquarrie's position. In addition we have observed how he has employed Heidegger's insights into the nature of existence and Being in establishing his apologetical bridge from the contemporary understanding of human nature to the acceptance of what theologians refer to as God.

We have already encountered the name he gives to his approach, "existential-ontological theism" and we have noted how he maintained the existential-ontological balance in his understanding of God as holy Being. As we turn to the dogmatic portion of his theology, we shall give close attention to the way Macquarrie seeks to carry out his existential-ontological intentions there also.

Dogmatics

Section Two

In considering Macquarrie's dogmatic theology we shall rely heavily on his Principles of Christian Theology since this is the one work where he has systematically presented his own theological position. We shall continue to focus on those aspects of his theology where Heidegger's influence is most apparent and we shall establish that this influence stems mainly from Macquarrie's use of Heideggerian categories and insights to give concise and contemporary expression to traditional doctrines.

79. Doctrine of God

Macquarrie begins by formulating a doctrine of God. He first considers the doctrine of the trinity, an extremely complex theological problem, and employs the insights previously established in his philosophical theology concerning the relation of God and Being (as holy Being) in order to express the trinitarian formula in a contemporary form which he feels is less problematic and far more concise.

The traditional formula of one substance and three persons is to be replaced since it "talks the language and moves in the universe of discourse of an obsolete philosophy." Nevertheless, what the traditional formula tried to express must be retained and thus its value is not to be underestimated. With its stress on the one substance of the trinity, this formula emphasized the unity of God and with its idea of three persons, it pointed out the diversity in God, His triune nature. Any attempt to re-express this

formula must keep these basic emphases in mind.⁽¹⁾

Macquarrie begins his explanation of the trinitarian doctrine in existential-ontological terms by grounding his association of God and Being in the Old Testament formula "I am who I am." (see pp. 432-433 for a discussion of this) In the New Testament he refers to the Fourth Gospel in which so many of Christ's sayings are introduced by the words, "I am..." and he says these are allusions to the "I am" of the Old Testament. These sayings stress the close relationship of Christ to God and here "...we see the doctrine of God as Being converging with the emerging doctrine of God as trinity..." Indeed the foundation is laid for a trinitarian God in the Old Testament understanding of God as Being where Being was understood dynamically, as including becoming, movement and development.⁽²⁾

Having, so to speak, protected his Scriptural flank, Macquarrie next moves to re-establish the trinitarian doctrine in contemporary terminology. Using St. Thomas' insight into the substance of God as involving an identity of being and essence, he declares that if the three persons are of one substance, and this substance is Being, then we again find an "understanding of God as Being, rather than a being, and are likewise directed to understanding Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in terms of Being rather than as three

1 Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, p.176-177.

2 Ibid., p.181.

beings." In this way the term "Being" replaces the term "substance" in stressing the unity of the trinity. As for the diversity or distinctions within the trinity, he suggests that since the "word 'persons' has become so misleading...perhaps we would do better to think of 'movements' of Being, or 'modes' of Being..."⁽¹⁾

The first person of the trinity Macquarrie refers to as "primordial" Being. This term points to the ultimate "act or energy of 'letting-be'" and is the condition "that there should be anything whatsoever." Furthermore, this "primordial" Being is not to be thought of in isolation or in itself but as a "source of outpouring which is inseparable from the whole structure of Being." Beings can only "be" or exist insofar as this outpouring occurs.⁽²⁾

The second person of the trinity, the Son, is called "expressive" Being. It is through expressive Being that the energy and letting-be of primordial Being is poured out into the world, thereby creating beings. This is in keeping with the understanding of the Son as the Logos or the Word, "the agent of the Father in the creation of the world." It is through this second movement of Being or Logos that Being participates in beings and it is also this aspect of the trinity which is responsible for any knowledge of God or Being.⁽³⁾

1 Ibid., pp.176-177.

2 Ibid., p.182.

3 Ibid., pp.182-183.

The third person of the trinity is described as "unitive" Being and its function is to "maintain, strengthen and, where need be, restore the unity of Being with beings, a unity which is constantly threatened." Just as in Heidegger's philosophy the relationship between Dasein and Being is frequently distorted or even overlooked in inauthentic existence, so also in this approach man the creature often rebels against his Creator and tries to live self-reliantly. It is the function of "unitive" Being to restore the proper relationship between Being and beings. Thus we can see how Macquarrie has employed Heideggerian terminology and insights in giving new expression and clarity to this traditional doctrine of the trinity.

Macquarrie further develops his doctrine of God by relating the more important traditional "attributes" of God to his existential-ontological approach. He feels that the Heideggerian understanding of Being as that which is both closest to and furthest from beings, as that which both participates in beings but is never to be identified with them, is an especially relevant way of expressing God's nature in contemporary theology.

The reason for this, he explains, is that "the nineteenth century was an age of theological immanentism" and "the first half of the twentieth century so stressed God's sovereign transcendence that any sense of his presence in the world was almost lost." By understanding God as Being, theology is "then compelled to think of him as both transcendent and immanent."⁽¹⁾ God's immanence finds

1 Ibid., p.186.

suitable expression in this new approach since Being is always "present" in beings. By the same token, the significance of such attributes as "incomparable" and "incomprehensible" which seek to protect the mystery that is God, is also retained in that Being is furthest from man and is never to be confused with beings.⁽¹⁾

Another attribute of God which has been particularly prone to misinterpretation is "omnipotence." Against those who have overemphasized this trait and portrayed God as "a capricious despot" with "an arbitrary power to do anything", Macquarrie accepts St. Anselm's belief that by the omnipotence of God, "...we do not mean an irrational force that might break out in any direction, but a power that is ordered and which cannot...do some things without disrupting itself."⁽²⁾

Macquarrie suggests that a most appropriate way of expressing God's omnipotence as a self-imposed limitation of power would be to think of the possibilities open to Being in contrast to the factual possibilities of man which are limited by his situation. Unlike man's possibilities, those of God are unlimited and rather than being thrown into His heritage, God is Himself the source and horizon of His possibilities, freely choosing and rejecting them according to His own standards.⁽³⁾

1 Ibid., p.187.

2 Ibid., p.189.

3 Macquarrie, God and Secularity, p.124.

Macquarrie deals with several other attributes as well, e.g. God's love can be better understood in light of Being as letting-be since self-giving is a vital part of love.⁽¹⁾ He concludes by saying that the attribute of holiness is the most comprehensive of all in the sense that it reflects most of the other attributes (omnipotence and mystery contribute to a sense of holiness). Furthermore, this attribute has a two-fold aspect in that it involves both the nature of God (Being) in Himself and the existential response to this nature. In his approach to these traditional attributes of God, we can see that Macquarrie has effectively utilized Heidegger's thinking not only in giving contemporary expression to traditional content but also in maintaining a balance between existential (God as we know Him, immanent, awe inspiring) and ontological (God in Himself, transcendent, mysterious) factors.⁽²⁾

80. Creation

Macquarrie next moves into a discussion of creation and creaturely beings. His previous definition of God as holy Being is also instrumental at this point in his dogmatics. Unlike past approaches which spoke of the Creator as a being, Macquarrie's understanding of God as holy Being means that the question of creation is not about how the world began or who made it but is instead the existential question about what it means to be a creature. Because of

1 Ibid., p.125.

2 Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, p.192.

the inseparableness of being and Being, the question of creation deals not with the Creator in Himself but with the meaning of creaturely existence.⁽¹⁾

He supports this Scripturally by pointing out that the older of the two creation accounts begins with man and then shows how his environment is built around him. On a practical level, his approach is not only more in keeping with the intentions of the Scriptures but also avoids unnecessary conflicts with science. Furthermore, because man only has first hand knowledge of his own mode of being, discussion of the existential significance of creation would be far more fruitful than idle speculation about "who", "how", and "when" questions.⁽²⁾ The basic trait of creaturely existence is dependence and when we recall that existence makes demands upon man which he is unable to meet by his own means (due to his factically limited resources), and that it is the gracious intervention of holy Being alone which can extricate him from his predicament, we are able to understand his portrayal of creaturely existence as dependence.⁽³⁾

His approach also throws new light on another notion associated with creation, the idea of creatio ex nihilo. The significance of this doctrine is not to be found in metaphysical speculations about matter, form, and nothingness. Instead it stresses that, as a being, man stands always

1 Macquarrie, The Scope of Demythologizing, p.88.

2 Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, pp.195-196.

3 Ibid., p.196.

between Being and nothingness with the chance that if he ceases to be supported by Being he can slip back into nothingness.⁽¹⁾ To this point it should be noted that Macquarrie's doctrine of creation is very existential. While he continues to use Heideggerian terminology (e.g. the facticity of existence and nothingness) to give expression to this doctrine, he nevertheless is strongly favouring existential factors over against any ontological elements.

He completes his doctrine of creation with a consideration of creaturely beings or the realm of nature. He defines nature by quoting the Heideggerian translation of phusis as "the process of arising, of emerging from the hidden." This understanding of nature fits very well into his doctrine of creation in which expressive Being pours out into the world and "lets-be" beings. He also suggests that creaturely beings (nature) can be ranked according to their place in a hierarchy of beings. This hierarchy results from the fact that beings have different ranges of participation in Being. As we noted earlier, man's mode of Being, existence, manifests Being in various ways and thus he stands above other beings in this hierarchy.⁽²⁾

81. Providence

Macquarrie next considers the doctrine of providence. Like creation, this doctrine should also be considered

1 Ibid., p.198.

2 Ibid., pp.205-206.

existentially since belief in providence inevitably results from an existential experience. Biblically this can be seen in the way men worked out an understanding of God's providential concern based on such events as the Exodus and the Cross. An existential approach also avoids a mechanistic understanding which can be so problematic.

In existential-ontological terminology, providence refers to the fact that having "let-be" beings out of nothingness and having thereby exposed itself to the risk of nothingness through a participation in beings, Being constantly strives to aid beings in fulfilling their potentiality for Being and thereby avoiding dissolution into nothingness. As for the problem of maintaining the balance in this doctrine between God's control and man's freedom, he sees the existential-ontological approach as offering a workable solution. Man does have a great many possibilities for which he is responsible; however, God (Being) has ultimate control in that He has fixed the boundaries of these possibilities (thus man's heritage is a factual situation).⁽¹⁾

Macquarrie also feels that, expressed in an existential-ontological context, a doctrine of miracles becomes less offensive to the contemporary situation while still retaining its original significance. An understanding of miracles as magical, supernatural manifestations of a providential God should be just as offensive to theology as it is to science. That this understanding is not that of

1 Ibid., pp.220-225.

Jesus can be seen in His rejection of the devil's offer to prove His status by a crass use of miracles.

The significance of a miracle is not that it persuades anyone to accept God ("If they do not hear Moses and the prophets, neither will they be convinced if someone should arise from the dead." Luke 16:3.). The significance of the miracle lies not in its outward, extraordinary form but what is distinctive about miracle is God's presence and self-manifestation in the event." There is a certain element of "ambiguity" in miracles in that to some an event appears ordinary, to others it appears extraordinary.⁽¹⁾

In contemporary terminology, one can say that in all events holy Being (God) can be seen since just as every being is potentially a symbol of Being, so is every event potentially a revelatory one. However, forgetfulness of Being (God) abounds and therefore this aspect of events is often overlooked. Furthermore, just as some beings by virtue of their position in the hierarchy of being are more effective symbols, so too are some events more appropriate for revelation.⁽²⁾

At this point Macquarrie introduces a very important concept in his approach, the idea of "focusing". Basically this explains how God's activity, which is present everywhere and at all times, is only recognized at certain times by

1 Ibid., pp.228-229.

2 Ibid., p.230.

particular individuals. In focusing, God's presence is brought to the conscious awareness. In the case of miracles, what some see as an ordinary event, e.g. the death on the cross, others see as symbolic of God's presence and manifestness.⁽¹⁾ Symbols have an ambiguous nature in that some perceive them in depth (through focusing) as reflecting an ultimate dimension while others see them in a shallower manner as ordinary events. Miracles are now understood as symbolic events, the ambiguity of which is dispelled by the eyes of faith focusing on God's presence in them. When understood and expressed in such contemporary language and in reference to a contemporary outlook (Heideggerian ontology), Macquarrie feels the doctrine of miracles need not be offensive to modern man.

Although this will be discussed in more detail later it should be noted that with the introduction of this concept, 'focusing', Macquarrie is in danger of slipping into an emphasis on the existential aspect of an issue. However, his discussion of holy Being's providential concern for the potentiality of beings does reflect an ontological concern and this gives some balance to his interpretation of God's providential activity.

82. The person of Jesus Christ

In his chapter "The Person of Jesus Christ" Macquarrie applies his approach to another set of important

1 Ibid.

Christian doctrines. Basically he understands Christ as the "symbol" of Being. In reply to the accusation that this destroys the identity of Christ with God (Being), he replies that his definition of symbol and his understanding of the relation of Being and being (which, of course, stems from Heideggerian insights) actually protects the unity of God and Christ. Previously, he had referred to Being as "present and manifest" in beings that symbolize it and he now explains that:

this expression...is peculiarly appropriate when we think of Christ as...the revelatory symbol of God: for 'presence' in Greek is parousia, and 'manifestation' is epiphaneia, and these are precisely the words that have been traditionally used for the revelation of God in Christ, 'advent' and 'epiphany'.
(1)

In his consideration of the traditional titles for Christ, Macquarrie selects two, "Lord" and "Word", as particularly representative since they "transcend the limits of a purely Hebrew or purely Hellenistic reference." In addition, they also confirm his own approach in that together "they constitute an existential-ontological interpretation of Christ's person."⁽²⁾

The title "Lord" which always implies rank and a feeling of respect, also implies commitment, thereby indicating an existential dimension in the traditional understanding of Christ. On the other hand, the title "Word" or Logos ties in with what has already been said about the

1 Ibid., p.249.

2 Ibid., p.269.

second person in the trinity, or expressive Being. To call Jesus the "Word" is to imply that through Him Being has come into the world and in this we see the ontological dimension in the traditional interpretation of Christ.⁽¹⁾

The interpretation of these titles for Christ also paves the way toward a solution of the predicament imposed by the need to see Christ as both God and man. The two titles and the assertion that Christ is true God and true man are to be seen as interrelated approaches to His nature. His manhood is necessary for existential reasons. As man, a historical being, Christ's existence was factual; thus the example He set is a real possibility for other men and interest in Christ demands commitment instead of just being an academic exercise. On the other hand, it is important to recognize that Christ was truly God so that worship of Him would not be idolatry, or dependence upon a being, but an authentic turning towards Being (God).

By recognizing that Christ the man was also the Word (expressive Being) one avoids ignoring the ultimate dimension and by acknowledging that Christ as God is also Lord (who demands existential obedience) one avoids a merely academic metaphysical approach to the problem. By interweaving these "various strands - Lord and Word, humanity and deity, the existential and the ontological" one is able to maintain an appropriate view of Christ's nature.⁽²⁾

1 Ibid. p.270.

2 Ibid., pp.271-272.

How exactly are these two natures, divinity and humanity, united in Christ? This too is a question that has troubled theology down through the years and Macquarrie has been particularly successful in employing Heideggerian insights and categories to give consise and contemporary expression to the traditional solution to this problem. He begins by considering the Chalcedonian solution which employs such terminology as "two natures" and "one person and subsistence." The key word in the traditional interpretation is nature. As it has traditionally been understood this word has caused many difficulties.

However, if understood etymologically, in light of the original sense of phusis as emerging or coming into the light, then Christ's humanity becomes more acceptable.⁽¹⁾ As a creaturely being, as part of nature, man is constantly emerging and coming to light. This means that he is constantly developing and potentially is capable of moving ever closer toward fulfilling his potential for Being (God). Although it does not normally happen, man could reach this point of fulfilling his nature and become one with God. This has happened uniquely with Christ. While His nature is truly human, He is nevertheless at one with God.⁽²⁾

Coming at the problem from the divine side, we can ask how Christ as divine, can also be human? As divine, Christ's "nature" is still of an emerging, coming-into-light type since, as we have already seen, the second person of

1 Ibid., pp.273-274.

2 Macquarrie, God-Talk, p.210.

the trinity is to be understood as expressive Being through which Being emerges into the world. The type of being with the greatest potential for emerging would then be a suitable avenue through which expressive Being could enter the world. Man is the being with the greatest potential and Christ is the particular man in which this potential has been reached. In this way the divine Christ can also have a human nature.

(1) In this instance we can see how a Heideggerian insight has influenced not only the form of expression for a solution but also the solution itself of a theological issue.

Using this approach, the unity of two natures in "one person and subsistence" also makes far better sense. The word subsistence (hypostasis) he interprets as referring to a particular being, Jesus Christ. The word person refers to personal Being which alone has the openness which would allow the union with holy Being. In addition, we can also better understand how Christ is "of the same essence" (homoousios) as the Father. Personal Being, as a superior and unique being with the ability to let-be, has the potential of being "raised to an absolute level" and thereby becoming essentially like holy Being in its pure form of letting-be.

(2)

How exactly was Christ's mode of Being raised to the absolute level? Macquarrie replies that in any existence the attitude toward death is instrumental in

1 Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, p.275.

2 Ibid.

determining how far one goes toward fulfilling his potential. He refers to this attitude with the Heideggerian phrase Being-towards-death and it is in Christ's Being-towards-death that we can see the fulfilling of His potentiality. "The death of Christ is taken up into His life as its climax and fulfillment and it is in the moment of death that Christhood fully emerges."⁽¹⁾

He goes on to explain that letting-be is always a self-giving, or form of love, thus God's creation involves His self-giving to beings. The most perfect example ever observed of this love or self-giving was seen in Christ, the symbol of Being (God) who "emptied" Himself in His lifetime. What raises this aspect of Christ's existence to the absolute level was precisely His Being-towards-death since "death is the one absolute in life." In Christ's death, "self-hood passes into Christhood, the human Jesus becomes the Christ of faith." Now we can better understand how Christ's "most utter self-abasement" on the cross is also seen as His ascension, His victory.⁽²⁾

Heidegger's influence on Macquarrie's Christology has been two-fold to this point. As was the case with his explanation of the two titles for Christ's person, Macquarrie continues to use Heidegger's philosophy in giving a relevant, concise form of expression to particularly complex theological doctrines. However, as seen in his use of

1 Ibid., p.278.

2 Ibid., pp.278-279.

Heidegger's views on the meaning of the term phusis and his interpretation of death, Macquarrie also has been directly influenced by Heidegger in the formation of his own explanation for these traditional theological issues.

83. Atonement

From a discussion of the person of Christ, Macquarrie moves to a consideration of the work of Christ and begins with the traditional doctrines of the atonement. In light of the existential-ontological approach, he sees the past tendency to take either an objective or subjective approach to this doctrine as unsatisfactory. The objective views, whether they take the form of a theory of satisfaction or of sacrifice, err in their tendency to stress an atoning work "outside of man and independent of him", since this overlooks the existential dimension. On the other hand, the subjective views, with their emphasis on Christ's actions as an example to be followed, fail to take into consideration the depth and extent of sin, thereby overlooking the need for a gracious intervention by a power above the human level. In this way the ontological dimension suffers.

An alternative understanding is the "classic" view of the atonement which is described as follows: "Man has fallen into the grip of dark powers; Christ comes into this situation, and battles against these powers, with His cross comes the overwhelming victory, bringing deliverance and new life to man."⁽¹⁾ This approach, Macquarrie explains,

1 Ibid., p.287.

has recently been revived and emphasized by Gustav Aulén's Christus Victor. When interpreted in an existential-ontological manner, he feels this theory not only adequately relates atonement to the contemporary situation but also gives it a more comprehensive scope in which both the subjective and objective approaches are combined.

The "dark powers" enslaving man can now be understood as the tendency of man to orient his life around beings instead of Being. The depth and strength of this enslaving power can be represented by such a term as das Man. Understood in this way we can see that this dark power is just as problematic in our technological era of man "come of age" as it was in earlier times. Christ's battle with and victory over this demonic power is now seen in His clear reflection or symbolizing of Being (God) on the cross which reawakens man to an authentic awareness of the ultimate dimension in his existence.⁽¹⁾

Understood in an existential-ontological manner, the classic view incorporates the important emphases of both the subjective and objective theories of atonement. As an historical figure who resisted temptation and remained completely faithful and open to Being (God), Christ represents a real possibility for which men can strive. As in the subjective view, Christ is an example to be imitated. However, this model draws attention to the objective aspect of the atonement in that Christ's self-giving points to and

1 Ibid., p.288.

stresses Being's self-giving. In this way the ontological, or objective, aspect of God's action is also retained.⁽¹⁾

As for how Christ's atoning work on the cross can become effective for later generations of believers, Macquarrie recommends Bultmann's Heideggerian approach as a viable answer. While the cross does have a "once-for-all" character as an event which happened at a specific point in time, there is also a side to it which Bultmann refers to as its eschatological significance. Macquarrie explains that this is comparable to seeing it as a source of "authentic repeatable possibilities." It is this aspect which makes the cross significant for later believers as an event that "happens, not literally or factually, but none the less truly over and over again in the experiences of those who have made it part of their history."⁽²⁾

84. The Holy Spirit

Before moving into Macquarrie's chapter "The Holy Spirit and Salvation", we might remind ourselves that we are in the process of observing how he uses the philosophy of Heidegger, in the form of an existential-ontological approach, to clarify and express his dogmatic (symbolic) theology. He has already closely analyzed the roles of the first two persons of the trinity and he moves next into a consideration of the third person, the Holy Spirit.

1 Ibid., p.289.

2 Ibid., pp.290-291.

As unitive Being, it continues and carries forward the work of primordial Being in creation. In this we see its relation to the first person of the trinity. As for the second person, we have already noted that, like any symbol, Christ could be seen either as just another being among many or in His mode of Being could be seen the clear reflection of holy Being. "It is this perceiving in depth, this apprehension of the divine presence and activity...that we attribute to the work of the Holy Spirit."⁽¹⁾ In this we see a relation to the second person of the trinity and this gives us some idea of how Macquarrie seeks to establish the interrelatedness of the trinity as he defines it. He also stresses the need to realize that the Holy Spirit is God. In contemporary form, the Holy Spirit can be portrayed as "one of the modes or movements of Holy Being" and this is "God at His closest to us." At another point he further explains the Holy Spirit as "God's coming to man in an inward way to enlighten and strengthen him; it is the awakening in man of the realization of his kinship with Being..."⁽²⁾

One of the great problems in dealing with the work of the Holy Spirit is to maintain a balance between the initiative of God in enlightening and strengthening man and the responsibility and freedom of man in his relationship to God and the world. Underestimating God's initiative fails to respect His omnipotence. To ignore man's

1 Ibid., p.295.

2 Ibid.

responsibility and freedom as he is affected by the Holy Spirit results in the loss of existence itself. To be related to the Holy Spirit then turns one into a puppet.⁽¹⁾

This problem can be traced all the way back to the conflict between Augustine and Pelagius. Here too Macquarrie uses Heidegger's insights into the nature of existence and Being to give a relevant form of expression to a doctrine of the Holy Spirit in which the roles of both man and God are constructively balanced. In his understanding of a being that is most fully itself when completely open to the presence of Being Macquarrie sees a perfect model for preserving God's gracious intervention and guidance as well as man's freedom and responsibility.⁽²⁾

Macquarrie considers the work of the Holy Spirit by discussing entry into and growth in the Christian faith. Of the former he says that salvation involves four stages. He stresses that the stages are merely devices used to aid the process of understanding and are not to be seen as representative of four successive, separate steps. Instead all four stages are intermingled and constantly involved with each other.⁽³⁾

The first stage of entry into the life of faith is conviction, which has been traditionally understood as that process whereby the Holy Spirit convicts man of his sinful

1 Ibid., p.297.

2 Ibid., p.298.

3 Ibid., p.300.

and broken condition. The convicting work of the Holy Spirit provides an excellent example of how God can graciously intervene in man's existence without thereby altering or destroying its structure. In existential-ontological terms, all men are aware of their shortcomings, of the lack in their existence. This inherent awareness is then "heightened and intensified" by the Spirit so that man understands the full consequence of his broken nature and this "is no violation of his being, but the raising of it to a higher level."⁽¹⁾

The next stage or "moment" of entry into the Christian life is repentance, which means a "turning of the whole person." In the life of faith, repentance and conviction are inseparable. Repentance includes conviction as it is the awareness of sin that motivates the turning away. By the same token, conviction for the Christian always leads to repentance. For others, it might lead to despair but "the revelation that convinces of sin also offers promise of reconciliation." The turning away of conviction is always the turning toward of repentance. Although it might seem that this process of "turning toward" involves mainly an effort of man, the fact that it is so closely related to conviction, in which God's initiative has already been established, shows that here too man has a responsible part in an act in which God's initiative can also be seen.⁽²⁾

1 Ibid., p.301.

2 Ibid., pp.301-302.

The next step is election, which he feels might better be expressed as choosing. ("You did not choose me, but I chose you." John 15:16). In the doctrines of predestination and double predestination Macquarrie sees an approach in which the existential element has been totally ignored. The result is that God's nature as love or letting-be is completely lost. However, if the doctrine of election with its ontological emphasis is supplemented by an existential interpretation, it can have a proper place in theology.⁽¹⁾ Besides referring to an act of God, election should also refer to the believer's awareness of having been chosen, in particular of having been "chosen to be." He is called into existence out of nothingness. In this way he feels the balance has been maintained between the ontological (God's act of choosing) and the existential dimension (man's response to and awareness of this act).

The fourth stage of entry into the life of faith, justification, expresses the "experience of being accepted by Being, of emerging from lostness and alienation into a right relation with Being." Macquarrie feels that since the Reformation this stage has often been overemphasized to the exclusion of the other stages. Actually, justification can best be understood only in relation to these other stages, he says. For instance, as "the experience of being accepted by Being", we can see how closely justification is related

1 Ibid., p.303.

to election as an awareness of having been chosen by Being.

While a valuable corrective to "abuses in the medieval penitential system", the reformer's principle of justification by faith in God's act can lead to a downgrading of man's role in this process (or the existential element). The result is a justification completely external to the actual condition of the man involved; it is done for him by God. In a balanced view of this process, however, justification "must happen in man as well as for him" and "in restoring a right relationship with God, it sets man on the way to a right ordering of his own existence."⁽¹⁾ In this way both God's act and man's responsibility are protected by the existential-ontological understanding of justification.

Macquarrie moves next from a consideration of entry into the life of faith to analysis of "growth and progress" in it, or from the doctrine of justification to that of sanctification. Here also the two should not be thought of as distinct and separate phases and the emphasis on both man's freedom and God's initiative is to be maintained. In his analysis of sanctification, he considers faith, hope, and love.

He says that faith, a vital part of Christian life, is to be understood in terms of its central content, Jesus Christ. It is to be described in relation to the grace expressed in God's action through Christ in the incarnation,

1 Ibid., p.305.

cross and resurrection (the ontological dimension) and in relation to the decision with which this confronts all men (the existential dimension). By describing faith in terms of both grace and decision, Macquarrie intends to maintain the balance in his approach.⁽¹⁾

By the same token the Christian understanding of hope would also involve an ontological and existential dimension. As it is based on a belief in God's activity for the future, hope involves an ontological element. However, Christian hope also indicates the need for obedient participation and cooperation in God's plans for the future and in this we can see the existential aspect.⁽²⁾

Greatest of the characteristics of the life of faith, or of the Christian virtues, is love. It can be thought of as man's greatest potentiality since it was through Christ's ability to reflect perfectly God's letting-be (which is love) that His humanity was exalted to the divine level. We have previously noted Macquarrie's ontological definition of love as letting-be and on the existential level, "letting-be means helping a person into the full realization of his potentialities for Being..."⁽³⁾ At his best, when he has managed to move toward a fulfillment of his potentiality, man's love (on the existential level) for his fellow man clearly reflects God's love or letting-be (on the ontological level).

1 Ibid., p.308.

2 Ibid., pp.309-310.

3 Ibid., pp.310-311.

This brings us to the end of Macquarrie's discussion of the nature and work of the third person in the trinity. It is not difficult to see how he has utilized Heideggerian philosophy to give a contemporary form of expression to traditional doctrines, e.g. election as having been chosen to be, justification as the experience of being in correct relation to holy Being, and love as a form of letting-be. In addition, Heidegger's influence here is also apparent in the way Macquarrie strives to respect the role of both existential and ontological factors in his interpretation of the various issues associated with a doctrine of the Holy Spirit.

85. Eschatology

In keeping with the usual order of dogmatic theology, Macquarrie concludes his symbolic theology with a discussion of "The Last Things." He divides the traditional approaches to eschatology into two camps. The first thinks of the eschatological happenings as belonging to a "remote and indefinite future." This approach is insufficient both because of its reliance on an outdated mythological belief in divine intervention and also because it overlooks the existential dimension, thereby robbing eschatological belief of its original sense of "urgency and responsibility."⁽¹⁾

In the second approach, which he calls realized eschatology, the promised events are seen as having already

1 Ibid., pp.315-316.

occurred. Support for this approach is found in the reference of St. John's Gospel to the Christian who already "has eternal life" and has "passed from death to life." This approach tends to be highly individualized and certainly retains the existential dimension in all its strength. On the other hand, it tends to de-emphasize the cosmic side of eschatology, thereby down-playing the ontological dimension. The model Macquarrie intends to propose should accordingly have incorporated the strengths of both these approaches and thereby be able to move beyond them.⁽¹⁾

As was the case with his consideration of creation as referring primarily to the relation between Creator and creature, and not to the "how" of the world's beginning, so too in his approach to eschatology Macquarrie believes that the significance of the doctrine is not to be found in speculation about the how and when of the world's end but in its implications about the relation between holy Being and world. Indeed, he feels that eschatology need not imply a cataclysmic end to the world at all.

Instead, he interprets the doctrine of eschatology to mean that "man and the world are destined for holy Being and will find their completion and fulfillment in God, but this is quite compatible with the possibility that the world may continue to endure for ever." When we recall that God's nature as holy Being can only be understood as constantly moving out into the world, thereby letting-be beings, then

1 Ibid., pp.316-317.

we can see that if His nature is to remain unchanged, the world must always exist.⁽¹⁾

Macquarrie defends the necessity for a Christian doctrine of the end (not an ending in death and destruction but in a complete merger with Being which involves new possibilities of letting-be on a higher scale) for the same reason he advocates an authentic Christian understanding of Being-towards-death. Like an acceptance of death on the individual level, this doctrine serves to provide theology with a proper perspective and leads to a clearer understanding and better appreciation of the overall picture with which it deals.⁽²⁾

Macquarrie also prefaces his doctrine of eschatology by acknowledging the frailty of any attempt to penetrate into the mystery of God's future actions which as Paul declares, "No eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man conceived." (1 Cor.2:9) However, he feels that a limited amount of speculation on such matters is permissible if it keeps within the guidelines established in other areas of theology.⁽³⁾

Having qualified his approach Macquarrie bases his analysis of the future actions of God or holy Being on His activities as revealed in the doctrine of creation and providence (or His actions in the past and present). Just

1 Ibid., pp.317-318.

2 Ibid., p.318.

3 Ibid., p.319.

as creation was seen as an outpouring of Being as beings were let-be, and providence was understood as holy Being's continuing support of beings threatened by dissolution into nothingness, so too is His eschatological activity understood as a tendency to draw beings ever closer as they fulfill their potential for Being (God) in their own acts of letting-be.⁽¹⁾

However, this culmination cannot be thought of as a static end point in which all potentialities are finally and completely fulfilled. If this occurred, the dynamic element in Being would cease to exist as well as the separate beings into which it must always be moving. Instead, these end times must be understood as a "moving from perfection to perfection." The tension between unity and diversity in the relation between Being and beings must be maintained even in this doctrine of the end time. If there were a complete merging of these two, then holy Being as understood in theology would cease and "the risk of creation, and its suffering and striving, would have been sheer waste."⁽²⁾

Thus the end times must be seen as leading toward a "diversified unity." This unity would be "far more valuable than any merely undifferentiated unity, and...each new stage in this unity [would be]...more valuable than the more restricted one that went before it." As would be expected, this approach means that all men will gradually be led up the

1 Ibid., p.320.

2 Ibid., p.321.

scale of potentiality for holy Being and that no part of creation will be allowed ultimately to step back into the hell of nothingness. Macquarrie openly acknowledges his preference for a doctrine of universalism as it is more in keeping with his overall position.⁽¹⁾

Again we can see Heidegger's influence both in the form of expression Macquarrie gives to this traditional doctrine and in the balanced manner in which he portrays the role of divine and human (ontological and existential) elements. In addition, through his influence on Macquarrie's understanding of holy Being, Heidegger has directly influenced Macquarrie in his rejection of a cataclysmic end to created beings, in his understanding of the end times as a moving from perfection to perfection, and in his preference for a doctrine of universalism. (His position on all these issues stems from the way he has defined the nature of holy Being.)

Macquarrie also reinterprets several other traditional eschatological doctrines and we shall note those where Heidegger's influence is most apparent. The first to be interpreted is eternal life. He prefers this to the term "immortality" which implies an imperishable soul or self which breaks away from the material body to endure forever. He feels this soul-body dualism is certainly not reflected in the Scriptures which speak of a resurrected body instead of an immortal soul, thereby implying a "full existence" in eternity.⁽²⁾

1 Ibid., p.322.

2 Ibid., pp.323-234.

As a more relevant alternative Macquarrie suggests that the soul (or self) be understood as that potentiality of existence which can either be realized or squandered away through daily decisions and acts. This, in turn, means that by eternal life one understands the soul's (self's) potential for overcoming inauthentic submission to a single temporal dimension. Rather than living in the past, or being subject to passing whims in the present, or idly hoping for the future, the soul (self) can exist authentically by coordinating these temporal dimensions into an integral whole. (The Heideggerian flavour of his thinking is especially strong at this point.) To exist authentically, Macquarrie says, is to have a "taste" of eternal life and since all will eventually develop ever closer to Being, this is a possibility for everyone.⁽¹⁾

However, the idea of eternal life has always implied more than just a "taste" of eternity in this life and he further defines it as the limit towards which existence points. Christ is the only man ever to reach this limit and this in turn meant His identity with God. To attain eternal life now means "to be adopted as sons with Christ into the life of God" and this eschatological unity of beings with Being has already been described. Macquarrie is careful to point out that he is not suggesting an evolutionary approach whereby man gradually works his way to God. Instead, this development is the result of God's gracious act in and through man.⁽²⁾

1 Ibid., p.327.

2 Ibid., p.325.

Another concept to be re-interpreted is the idea of heaven which is no longer to be thought of as a reward over and above the life of faith. Instead it is the fruition of the life of striving to develop one's potentiality for Being and is "rightly identified with the 'beatific vision', that direct indubitable awareness of the immediate presence of God." This closeness to God means, in turn, the ability to follow His example in letting-be and giving of oneself for others. This is the significance of the early church's insistence that only martyrs enter directly into heaven without the usual need for purification since in their act of self-sacrifice they clearly reflect holy Being's letting-be and love. ⁽¹⁾

By the same token, hell is not to be thought of as a punishment God imposes for sinful deeds. Instead it refers to the loss of Being which brings one closer to the lower limit of existence, or nothingness. This loss of Being is always a relative loss and never an absolute one. Just as eschatological union with God was seen as implying ever new sets of possibilities on increasingly higher levels, and never a final unity with God, so too is hell seen as falling ever further away from holy Being without reaching an absolute point of no return. In addition there can be a "taste" of hell as well as heaven in life. However, the idea of a hell where God everlastingly punishes man is

1 Ibid., pp.326-327.

completely rejected.⁽¹⁾

To conclude his consideration of eschatology, Macquarrie considers the "crowning eschatological idea," the kingdom of God. Whereas the previous eschatological concepts dealt mainly with the destiny of the individual, with a consideration of this concept one comes directly to the actions of holy Being itself. This kingdom would be "a commonwealth of free beings, united in Being and with each other through love, yet...preserving a diversity that heightens the value of the unity far above that of any undifferentiated unity."⁽²⁾

Although the kingdom of God is already present, it will nevertheless still come again "with glory" since in its present form it is manifested in a very ambiguous manner. As we noted before, while symbols of holy Being can be seen in depth, as reflecting and pointing toward God, they can also be seen in only their shallower dimension. It is because of this that the kingdom is said to be presently manifested in an ambiguous manner.

The influence of Heidegger's thinking on these eschatological issues is representative of the two-fold influence it has on the whole of Macquarrie's symbolic theology. Primarily this influence can be seen in the use of Heidegger's approach to give a contemporary form of

1 Ibid., p.327.

2 Ibid., p.329.

expression to theological doctrines. However, the way Macquarrie has interpreted Heidegger's thinking has also spilled over into his own interpretation of theological issues. Throughout our consideration of his dogmatics, we have noted how he sought to maintain the same balance he attributes to Heidegger's work in his own theological position. The question we must now consider is, how effective has he been in attaining the existential-ontological balance he seeks?

Conclusion

86. A critical appraisal

Based on his dogmatics in Principles of Christian Theology, it seems that despite a claim to be maintaining the tension between the ontological and existential dimensions, Macquarrie nevertheless favours the existential side of his theology. Not only shall we remain within the framework of Macquarrie's stated intentions and outlook in supporting the above claim but we also shall operate within this framework in considering how best to restore and maintain the existential-ontological balance he seeks. Thus, it will be a question in this concluding analysis of fulfilling Macquarrie's expressed intentions by developing and elaborating on the insights he has himself established.

To do this within the confines of the problem as Macquarrie has stated it, we must respect the Bultmannian insistence that all understanding of God has to be related to our own experiences; we can only know God insofar as He has acted upon us. On the other hand, we must also respect Macquarrie's feeling that knowledge of and language about God does more than illuminate our own existence; it points toward and clarifies a reality above and beyond our own experiences. In his earlier work, An Existentialist Theology, Macquarrie declares that "every existential statement of the content of Christian faith assumes a proposition about the real activity of God, a statement about God which

is not reducible to a statement about human existence..."⁽¹⁾

We shall consider the need to deal with the ontological reality behind the existential experience as a vital part of Macquarrie's expressed theological intention and we shall establish that, as expressed in Principles of Christian Theology, his approach in actuality does not completely fulfil this intention. We shall then consider how Heidegger's thinking might act as a corrective and conclude by noting what Macquarrie's position on key issues would be if the existential-ontological balance of his theology were maintained.

Essentially we will be approaching Macquarrie's theology just as he approaches Bultmann's. He recognizes Bultmann's awareness of the need for supplementing existential statements with ontological ones (hence his use of analogical language in conjunction with demythologizing) but feels that Bultmann's approach "sometimes obscures the genuine intention of his theology."⁽²⁾ The parallel between our treatment of Macquarrie and his treatment of Bultmann continues in that Heidegger's philosophy is a key factor in both.

One of the main issues on which Macquarrie takes a strong existential stand is the doctrine of creation. He correctly sees the need to deal with the significance of creation in existential terms and yet he makes very little

1 Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, p.180.

2 Macquarrie, The Scope of Demythologizing, p.243.

effort to clarify the ontological reality of God's creative act. The only sentence which even approaches such an ontological consideration says simply that the prior letting-be of Being which allows for any being to be is the creativity of Being.⁽¹⁾ The rest of his discussion is a strictly existential interpretation of this doctrine and he seems in real danger at this point of failing to fulfil an earlier expressed desire to ground every existential-historical consideration in an objective-historical one and of supplementing existential understandings with ontological ones.

Macquarrie might have better maintained his existential-ontological intention here by stressing that the doctrine of creation refers both to the feeling of creaturely dependence upon and need for an ultimate dimension as well as to an ontological action of God (letting-be) in which all creation has its ultimate ground. This could be stressed without elaborating on the specific "how" of a creative act or a specific beginning point in time. Indeed, in his discussion of eschatology Macquarrie does visualize (in very "approximate" language he says) something of the ontological aspect of holy Being's actions in the eschatological gathering up of all beings into holy Being.⁽²⁾ (Here too he stresses

1 Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, p.195. "A being is a being in virtue of the fact that it is, but Being is not something that is but rather the letting-be that is prior to any is-ness... This letting-be is the creativity of Being."

2 Ibid., p.425.

that such an action would not mean an end to time nor should it be understood as occurring at a particular point in time).

Just as he manages to stress the existential significance of eschatology without ignoring its ontological dimension, so also might he develop his doctrine of creation in a more balanced manner. This would mean the elaboration of an already established insight (holy Being's letting-be) rather than the introduction of any new insights. Since the problem here is more one of presentation than content, any corrective action need not involve new philosophical or theological factors.

A second and even more fundamental concept which gives his dogmatics an existential imbalance concerns the concept 'focusing', the importance of which is reflected in his statement that it plays a crucial role in his interpretation of miracles, providence, the incarnation and the eucharist.⁽¹⁾ To begin our consideration of how focusing tends to favour an existential emphasis, let us consider its function in Macquarrie's understanding of the eucharist.

He sees God's presence in the eucharist as an instance of His presence and manifestness which is everywhere but which can become focused in particular beings and events.

(2) Despite his claim that "focusing" allows for God's

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid., p.320.

initiative in approaching the believer through the elements, the end result of his interpretation of the eucharist is that God's presence in the eucharist is only distinctive because the eyes of faith are focused on it.

Thus the distinctiveness of the 'real presence' in the eucharist stems not so much from a special act on God's part as from the believer's ability to become aware of an ever-present reality through focusing on it. In this approach, the ontological reality of God's act seems to play a secondary role to the existential act of focusing. By suggesting that God is present and manifest everywhere in an ambiguous manner, Macquarrie has no choice but to establish the distinctiveness of a divine act in the eucharist according to an existential criterion.

Next let us consider his understanding of miracles and see how the use of focusing leads to an existential bias here as well. He begins by cautioning against the nineteenth century theologians' mistake of overemphasizing God's presence in all acts because "if everything can be called miracle, the word has been generalized to the point where it can be virtually devoided of content."

In place of past approaches which associated miracles with supernatural interventions in actions defying the laws of nature, Macquarrie suggests that "every event, insofar as it is embraced within divine providence, can be understood as potentially an event manifesting God's action..."
(1)

1 Ibid., p.226.

Now it is the act of focusing, wherein God's presence is clearly revealed, which reveals the miraculous nature of an otherwise normal event.

Again the existential dimension is the key factor with the result that miracles are no longer to be seen solely as the result of a special act of God (since all events are potential miracles, God apparently is just as present and manifest in one as in the other) but are also determined by the eyes of faith, or an existential factor. The question of the ontological reality of God's act is not sufficiently developed here.

Macquarrie does recognize the problem and attempts to resolve it by saying that "miracle is the approach and self-disclosure of Being to us in and with and through the focusing event..."⁽¹⁾ To say that God acts in and through the focusing act is still to remain on the existential level since focusing is primarily a human process.

Despite his recognition of the problem here, Macquarrie ultimately fails to break out of the existential realm with a discussion of the trans-human reality of God's miraculous activity. (A direct result of this is that he comes very close to repeating the very error against which he warns. Because he says that all events potentially manifest God's presence and fails to establish adequate ontological criteria for determining the distinctiveness of God's actions in

1 Ibid.

miraculous occurrences, he could easily be misunderstood as portraying all events as miraculous, with some recognized as such and others not.)

Since the explanation for miracles would also stand for his understanding of providence (God providentially stands behind all events in an ambiguous manner and His presence is apparent only to the eyes of faith), we shall conclude our consideration of focusing and its existential emphasis by examining Macquarrie's views on the incarnation. As a symbol of God, Christ manifests His presence in an ambiguous manner; to some He appeared as a tragic and misguided zealot, to others He was the son of God.⁽¹⁾

Again, the decisive factor is the believer's ability to see Christ in depth as the symbol of God's activity. The question of the ontological reality of God's activity in and through Christ is not developed here any more than it was in the previous instances. Thus because of his concern for this concept of focusing, Macquarrie has not completely fulfilled his intention of maintaining an existential-ontological balance in his interpretation of several key issues.

Having established how Macquarrie fails to resolve fully this problem as intended (despite the fact that he has recognized and identified the issues clearly), let us next consider how Heidegger's insights can be employed in rectifying the situation (without moving beyond the framework

1 Ibid., p.232.

established by Macquarrie). In his understanding of Being - aletheia as a process of revealing and concealing, as supporting and withdrawing, we have a model which would provide for an understanding of God as a force which acts distinctively in certain instances.

By making more allowance for this withdrawing side of the Being process, Macquarrie could establish that while God is always present in an ambiguous manner (revealing and concealing simultaneously), there are times in which this revealing side is a more decisive factor in the revelatory act. The result would be an occasion or symbol (or even person) in which God's presence was more readily available for the eyes of faith. By involving this withdrawing aspect of Heidegger's understanding of the Being process, we are not introducing a new element into Macquarrie's theology since he too recognizes it in his portrayal of God as a mystery. Instead we are simply developing this insight and expanding its role in his theology.

Let us now determine whether this understanding of the Being-process remains within the limits proposed by Macquarrie for any theological approach: namely that one can only speak of the ultimate insofar as it affects experience and such talk of the ultimate must reveal something of its trans-human reality. As for the first portion of this statement, we can see in the phenomenological analysis of anxiety as the experience of Being's withdrawal that speaking about the ontological reality of God's withdrawing has an existential basis in our own experience. As for how language

about human moods can refer to a transhuman reality, we find in the understanding of anxiety as a mood which is intentional (points beyond itself), discloses something to the individual, and breaks into or seizes the individual in a manner beyond his control, a model for explaining how this existential experience points to a distinctive action on the ontological level (Being itself) about which some knowledge is available.

Thus anxiety and withdrawal are concepts on the existential and ontological levels which clearly reflect how these two dimensions are inter-related as well as something of their respective natures. Having established that this understanding of Being as withdrawing remains within the limits of Macquarrie's approach and is indeed merely an elaboration on his own insight into the Being-process, let us next see how this concept can be employed in fulfilling his existential-ontological intentions.

In order to balance out the existential emphasis of focusing, we need to establish that an act of God occurs which corresponds to the comprehension involved in focusing. Just as Macquarrie states that every existential-historical event has an objective-historical ground, so would we want to establish the ontological ground for every existential act of focusing.

The understanding of Being as withdrawing or concealing at the same time as it draws near and unconceals itself provides a model for establishing how God's presence

can be of a distinctive nature at certain times or in certain symbols. This element of withdrawing and concealing allows not only for the mysterious and ambiguous nature of God's presence but also allows for 'degrees of presence'.

This is not to deny Macquarrie's insight that holy Being is always present and manifest nor does it deny that this presence is always ambiguous. Hence the need for focusing continues and the existential dimension is not overlooked. Now it can be said that there is an ontological act corresponding to the existential comprehension in focusing. Thus this approach makes more allowance for speaking about the mighty acts of God while also recognizing the need for the Holy Spirit's assistance in focusing on and recognizing such acts through the eyes of faith.

Now the difference between God's presence and manifestness in the eucharist, miracles, Christ and His presence and manifestness at all other times would be more a matter of ontological as well as existential factors. In particular it could be said that God acts less ambiguously (but nevertheless still in an ambiguous manner) in the eucharist, miracles and the incarnation than on normal occasions. Hence, the significance of even these less ambiguous acts would still be lost on the non-believer who is unable to see the symbols of divine presence 'in depth' as reflecting the ultimate dimension. No longer would all events have to be seen as potentially miraculous, nor would God's presence in the eucharist and Christ depend so strongly on the existential perception of focusing.

We have now completed our task of developing certain aspects of Macquarrie's insight into Heidegger's philosophy and employing them to maintain in a more adequate manner the existential-ontological balance he seeks. In so doing we have not been contradicting Macquarrie's approach in any way but have been acting within his established framework in carrying out his expressed intentions. That it was possible to develop his position in this way underlines the basic validity of both his theological adaptation of Heidegger's thinking as well as an approval of his theological stance.

Earlier we established a criterion by which to judge the effectiveness of any theological use of Heideggerian insights: namely, whether or not the balance (reflected in his concept, the "ontological difference") between a concern for beings, Dasein in particular, and Being was respected and retained in some form. We established not only Macquarrie's intention of retaining this Heideggerian insight (in the form of an existential-ontological theism) but also how his theology developed out of an attempt to fulfil this intention. It might also be held that any success enjoyed or to be enjoyed by Macquarrie's theology is due in no small degree to its adaptation of this Heideggerian insight into the relation and balance between the existential and ontological realm.

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER EIGHT

87. A summary

Let us begin by briefly summarizing the material covered to this point in our discussion of Heidegger's influence on theology. We first considered Heidegger's pursuit of Being by way of Dasein, language, thinking and other phenomena. We were careful to note the unity of purpose which ran throughout his varied analyses and established that the strength of his philosophy stemmed from its balance. When seen as a whole, his understanding of Being avoided extreme emphases on any mode of its revelation and it was this balance which we established as the criterion by which to judge the success of various theological appropriations of his insights.

Bultmann's was the first theological adaptation of Heidegger's insights to be considered. Partly due to the chronological factor (his first theological contributions were made before the ontological direction of Heidegger's thought was generally acknowledged) and partly due to a basic similarity of approach (his theology has more in common with Heidegger's existential concern than with his ontological emphasis), this theologian relied primarily on the earlier Heidegger's insights into Dasein. We noted the effects of this on his theology and suggested how a better appreciation of Heidegger's ontological interests would strengthen his position on several theological issues.

In considering the "new hermeneutic" theologians it was determined that Heidegger's influence stemmed mainly from his later insights into Being as language. While Bultmann's theology was unbalanced due to an extreme emphasis on the role of man, the "new hermeneutic" theologians so stressed the initiative and dominance of Being as language that man's role in the Being-being relationship was overlooked and subsequently his nature as a responsible and free being was denied.

Here, too, it was shown that a better appreciation of Heidegger's thinking would have strengthened the position of Fuchs and Ebeling who distorted Heidegger's language analyses to a certain extent by failing to take into account his views on thinking and on Being in its other modes of manifestness. Heinrich Ott, on the other hand, was seen to have a better understanding of Heidegger's views but his contribution was seen as limited by the fact that his position had not yet matured and developed fully.

Of all those considered, Macquarrie alone attempted to retain the balance of Heidegger's overall position. His intention of stressing both the earlier and later Heidegger's insights was reflected in the title he gave to his approach, "existential-ontological theism". However, we noted that his balanced existential-ontological intentions were somewhat frustrated by a slight existential bias as reflected particularly in the important role of focusing in his approach to several crucial doctrines. That his approach was basically sound, however, was reflected in the fact that

it already contained the insights needed to fulfil its existential-ontological aim.

An excellent way to draw together this summarized material would be to consider the basic themes which have run throughout it: the relation of philosophy and theology, anthropology, hermeneutics and language analysis, and the relation between God and Being. These last three themes correspond respectively with the central emphasis in each of the last three chapters; on Bultmann, the "new hermen-
eutic" theologians and Macquarrie. Not surprisingly then, this conclusion will be touching on and drawing together points already discussed. In addition, we will also seek to go beyond the positions previously considered by raising new questions and offering new alternatives on several issues.

88. The relation of philosophy and theology

The basic theme which has run throughout this work has been the relation between philosophy and theology. This relation can be considered on three distinct but related levels. Theology employs philosophy in regards to what Macquarrie labelled a pre-theological inquiry in which the presuppositions, methods and certain fundamental concepts of a theology are examined. On another level, theology employs philosophy in its apologetical efforts to stand with and establish common ground with the non-believer. On yet another level, theology uses philosophical insights to give relevant form and expression to its dogmatic content.

All the theologians we have considered correctly saw that philosophy is necessarily involved in doing theology. Therefore, the responsible theologian makes a conscious effort to appraise the extent and nature of his contacts with philosophy. On the pre-theological level, this means involvement in such areas as language analysis, anthropology, ontology and consideration of the thought process.

It is at this level that the theologian is most involved with philosophy. Here he has to make critical evaluations of how constructive and sound a particular philosophical insight or overall outlook is; it is here that he must diligently strive to understand correctly the intentions of a philosopher, being careful not to manipulate, coerce or distort any insights to fit a preconceived outlook. A mistake in this pre-theological analysis can have serious consequences as it lays the foundation upon which the whole theological enterprise stands and a weak foundation eventually leads to faults in the overlying superstructure which can never be entirely eliminated.

Therefore, the need for responsible pre-theological inquiry into certain areas of philosophy must be maintained. For instance, Heidegger's opposition to the subject-object pattern in traditional metaphysics has repeatedly cropped up in our analysis of these theologians. This has been an important factor in Bultmann's portrayal of theological thought as once-removed from the experience of faith and in Ott's close association of theological thought, as experiential and a form of encounter, with the faith

experience. Similarly, the "new hermeneutic" theologians base their entire approach to theology upon a certain understanding of language. In Ebeling's discussion of the relation between the nature of God's Word and the human capacity for speaking we can continue to see how important language analysis is for theological concerns.

On a second level, theology uses philosophy in fulfilling its apologetic goals. Here theology seeks to move out from itself and stand sympathetically with the non-believer. In order to communicate with and establish a common ground with the non-believer, it must understand his outlook and become adept at discourse on his level. Macquarrie's philosophical theology, with its bridge linking the non-believer with the realm of faith and its success in establishing the credibility of often obscure phenomena such as revelation, God and theological language, is an excellent example of how apologetics can successfully employ philosophical insights.

The third level by which the relation of these realms can be considered concerns theology's need to give relevant form and expression to its content. It is on this point that the debate concerning the wisdom of using philosophy rages most fiercely. To ignore philosophical forms of expression endangers the relevance of theology; to become too involved leads to the danger of theological content being swallowed by philosophical form. Both extremes must be avoided and a balanced approach is crucial at this point.

Bultmann is generally thought to have erred on the side of too closely associating these two realms. His claim for a unique and special affinity between the New Testament outlook and the existentialist school of thought could pose a danger for theology. Theologians must never allow their alliance with one particular school of philosophy to become too strong since all schools of thought, existentialism included, will eventually lose favour.

Nevertheless, theology must always be flexible and open to new forms of thought, thereby retaining its relevance and thus Bultmann's motive for seeking to express his theological insights using a contemporary philosophy to insure its relevance is basically sound. It is essential here to realize that as theology provides the content for the system it must always retain the initiative in the relationship. Theological content must provide the criteria for determining the suitability of philosophical forms and never the reverse.

Theology's primary allegiance is to its own unique sources e.g. Scripture, revelation and the Holy Spirit, and these must always be the determinative factors in its make-up. Bultmann's tendency to eliminate, and not just interpret, certain aspects of New Testament mythology stems ultimately from his desire to make the Gospel relevant. This failure in execution does not jeopardize his overall intention however. Bultmann's success in giving existential form to Pauline insights, or content, confirms just how

constructive theology's effort constantly to renew its outer garb and keep in step with the times can be. Similarly, Macquarrie's success in substituting contemporary forms of expression for the outmoded trinitarian formulas (substance, nature, etc.) and in explaining the divine-human make-up of Christ also supports the need for this type of theological approach.

While Bultmann can be criticised at certain points for endangering content by his emphasis on relevance, Fuchs and Ebeling are open to criticism for attempting to avoid this pitfall by a superficial retreat behind the law-gospel pattern. Although they professed to use philosophy to perform the equivalent function of the law (setting the stage for the appearance of the Gospel or asking the questions which the Gospel alone can answer), we established that in fact they employed philosophical insights in both aspects of their theological systems: to pose the questions and to frame the answers. It is important not only that theology employ contemporary thought forms to give its content relevance but also that it do so in a conscious and responsible manner, well aware of the extent to which it is indebted to these forms and thereby able to guard against any tendency to allow content to be devoured by form.

One other danger theology must constantly avoid in its quest for relevance is the tendency to be defensive in its relation to philosophy or the position of any non-believer. It must never give the impression of turning to philosophy because of its own insufficiency or weakness.

Nor should it ever appear to alter its position on basic issues in order to be more compatible with the contemporary outlook. The skandalon of the gospel is its strength not its weakness. Its hope lies not in playing down this side of its nature but in giving its significance even clearer expression for the contemporary situation. The question for theology is not should the skandalon be brought to light but rather how can this best be done.

Gerhard Ebeling makes this same point when he stresses that faith should never set itself over against non-faith and its claim to have a better grip on reality. Instead faith should always insist that it alone really sees things as they are. In this way, theology need never have to assume the role of a weak sister to philosophy.

We have now seen how theology has a three-fold relation to philosophy. It employs philosophical insights in (a) a pre-theological analysis of its language, thought forms and presuppositions, (b) its apologetic aim of standing with the non-believer and bridging the gap between the outlook of faith and non-faith, and (c) giving a relevant form to its content. Throughout we have affirmed the need for this relationship as long as theology is fully aware of the pitfalls and dangers such an association involves.

89. Anthropology

Another major theme running through this analysis of Heidegger's influence upon theology has been its anthropological concern. We saw how each of the theologians

considered established their own views on man's nature and we can consider Heidegger's influence here on all three levels of the theology-philosophy relationship.

On the pre-theological as well as apologetic level, he offers an understanding of man's structure which is extremely suitable for the needs of theology. He stresses that Dasein cannot be understood as a self-contained, independent unit. The analysis of existence is necessarily an analysis of the ultimate domain as well; existentialism is (fundamental) ontology; to consider Dasein (man) is to consider Being (God). The implications of such an understanding for apologetics are apparent in that it is not difficult to move from this secular understanding, with its openness toward the ultimate, to faith's understanding of man as one whose heart is restless till it rests in God.

On the pre-theological level, Heidegger's existential - existentiell distinction makes his anthropological analyses especially suitable for theological adaptation. Because he operates on the formal, a priori, neutral existential level and theology is concerned with the concrete, everyday existentiell level (e.g. Heidegger determines what it is about man's make-up which allows him to make decisions while theology discusses one particular decision), his insights cannot clash with or contradict those of theology.

On the third level of the philosophy-theology relationship, Heidegger's anthropological insights provide a strong model by which theology can give relevant expression

to its understanding of man as both made in God's image and as fallen. Heidegger's anthropology provides a balanced model for this theological doctrine in that it takes the reality of inauthentic existence very seriously (indeed we noted how he established that inauthenticity was the predominant mode of existence) while also stressing that the primary and most basic characteristic of existence is its openness and transparency to the ultimate dimension (were Dasein not basically an "ontological animal" his existential analysis would never have taken place).

The theological understanding of man must walk the tightrope of being optimistic about human nature without being naive or unrealistic. Man was created in God's image and this aspect of his nature was not destroyed by the fall. To deny such a basic component of human existence would be to destroy man's identity as such (just as to deny Dasein's inherent ontological openness because it operates mainly on the unthematic level due to the predominance of inauthenticity, or "fallenness" as an existential, would be to destroy the identity of Dasein.) Man as the ontological animal, then, is a relevant model for expressing the Scriptural characterization of man as made in the image of God.

Similarly, Heidegger's portrayal of man as existing predominantly in the inauthentic mode, which as an existential is an a priori fundamental trait of existence, provides a relevant model for safeguarding that aspect of human nature attributed by the Scriptures to the fall.

Here, then, is one example of how Heidegger's anthropology can provide a relevant and balanced model for expressing and preserving theological insights.

Probably the greatest strength of Heidegger's anthropological analysis and that aspect of it which theology should strive to retain in adapting his insights, is its balanced view of man's relation to the ultimate dimension. In his earlier works, Heidegger was in danger of over-emphasizing the Dasein side of the Dasein-Being relationship; hence the charges of being subjective and the portrayal of his outlook as existentialism. To overcome this imbalance he moved from a Dasein oriented position toward an emphasis on the role of Being in the Dasein-Being relationship.

Here man was portrayed as a passive participant in this relationship, e.g. he was the mouthpiece for Being as language, or he was merely the da or opening through which Being lit up beings, or his thinking was simply a reflex response to the advances of Being which in withdrawing, drew with it and drew out man's thoughts. In the end, however, with his emphasis on the need of Being and beings for each other, Heidegger achieved a balanced understanding of this relationship and of human nature. Man is neither a totally passive partner in the relation to Being nor is he completely responsible for establishing and maintaining the relation.

None of the theologians we have considered were completely successful in maintaining this balance in their utilization of Heidegger's anthropology. In limiting his

use of Heidegger to earlier existential insights it was inevitable that Bultmann's theology should reflect the same weaknesses which forced Heidegger to re-orient his thinking toward a more explicit consideration of Being. Bultmann's shortcoming can be excused to a certain extent by the chronological factor; much of his work was done at a time when Heidegger's thinking had not yet matured to its balanced conclusion.

Macquarrie, on the other hand, is fully aware of the need to maintain this balance in any theological adaptation of Heidegger's philosophy. Although his expressed intention is to provide a balanced existential-ontological system, we saw that he was not completely successful in fulfilling this intention. Indeed, he too seems to have taken a stance which tends to favour the existential side of this relationship. This is seen mainly in his stress on existential involvement as the criterion for determining the reality of acts on the divine or ontological level e.g. the reality of miracles and providential acts depend upon man's ability to "focus" his eyes of faith on otherwise ambiguous events.

Fuchs and Ebeling also lose this balance in that they tend to limit their use of Heidegger to that period in which he was over-reacting to his earlier Dasein emphasis. In their portrayal of man as the tool of language (their insistence that language uses man and not vice versa) can be seen a failure to account for any human responsibility in the relationship to an ultimate dimension; man is simply a

passive, mechanical partner to Being as language.

These theologians make the same basic mistake although they err in different directions. One group loses Heidegger's balanced view of human nature by overemphasizing the existential side of the existential-ontological relation while the other errs by overemphasizing the initiative of the ultimate factor in this relation. Of all these theologians, Macquarrie comes closest to maintaining this balance and we have already noted how a better appreciation of the function of Being would provide a workable model which could better maintain the balance of his theological position by assigning a slightly greater role to the ontological dimension as it is related to the existential dimension.

90. Hermeneutics

Another basic theme running through this analysis has been the scope and meaning of hermeneutics. The extremes to be avoided in seeking to establish a sound and balanced view of hermeneutics are, on the one hand, allowing the text to be dominated by the interpreter and on the other, allowing the interpreter to be dominated by the text. Or to put the issue another way, does the interpreter question the text or does the text call the interpreter into question? We will first see how several of these theologians tend to move toward one extreme or the other and then establish how Heidegger's insights can provide the model for a balanced view which avoids the weaknesses of extreme positions.

The alternatives from which one can choose in

seeking to establish a sound understanding of hermeneutics can also be expressed in the following way: either the past is interpreted in light of the present or vice versa.

Bultmann's approach favours interpreting the past in light of the present. Those aspects of past mythology which are no longer true for the present situation are either given new form or eliminated altogether. Fuchs and Ebeling, on the other hand, stress that the past is meant to interpret and call into question the present. Ebeling explains that sermons are not made relevant by moulding their content to the present situation by way of contemporary illustrations and digressions into current events. Instead, the effective sermon will allow the content of the past text to question the present situation. Here the criterion by which interpretation is done is the past and the object of the interpretation is the present.

Again, the issue can be expressed by asking: does the interpreter question the subject matter or vice versa? Is the interpreter the subject or the object of interpretation? Is his role active or passive? Of all those considered, Fuchs and Ebeling seem to have the more extreme tendency in regards to these alternatives. For them, the interpreter plays a rather passive role in the interpretation process.

The language-event just "happens" to man, he seems to have very little responsibility or control over it. The action seems to lie all on the side of the text. As Fuchs explains, the interpreter is the mouse placed before the

text which like a cat is then set into motion. These two seem to be most in danger of slipping over into an extreme hermeneutical position which emphasizes exclusively the action of the text on the interpreter.

At this point we shall consider how Heidegger's hermeneutical position evolved and see what relevance it has had for more responsible theological views on interpretation. In his earlier thinking, Heidegger generally stood within the normal understanding of hermeneutics (a process in which the interpreter acts on the subject matter rather than vice versa) as he sought to interpret various subject matter, e.g. Dasein and poetry.

However, in his later views this position evolved into the more unusual outlook based on an etymological analysis of hermeneuein as it comes from the name of the divine messenger Hermes. In light of his new insight the interpreter becomes merely the herald or messenger for Being as Language. Here the subject matter or text assumes the predominant role and it is this approach which Fuchs and Ebeling utilize.

However, Heidegger's most constructive insight into the nature of hermeneutics and one which is stressed at various points throughout his development is his understanding of the hermeneutical circle. Basically this concept points out that the interpreter acts on the text and the text acts on the interpreter. Insofar as the interpreter must have a vague, unthematic awareness of his subject matter which

initially directs his investigation, the initiative is his. However, once the interpreter is involved in the analysis of the subject matter he must be prepared to let it correct and inform his understanding, the nature of which changes from a vague, unthematic awareness to a thematic and full insight into the matter involved.

In this concept can be seen a balanced and sound understanding of the hermeneutical process. Both the text and the interpreter play vital roles, both question and in turn are questioned. The past is interpreted in terms of the present which in turn finds new meaning and significance in light of the past. This model is utilized to some extent by both Bultmann and Macquarrie.

The former develops his own understanding of the hermeneutical circle which is composed of the relationship between pre-understanding and understanding. The latter, Macquarrie, affirms this aspect of Bultmann's approach and in his own analysis of theological language (God-talk) stresses that Heidegger's hermeneutics can be best appreciated by keeping both his earlier and later emphases in mind; the interpreter questions the subject matter as well as allows the subject matter to question him. Here then is how Heidegger's insights can provide a balanced model for the theological understanding and application of hermeneutical principles.

91. Being, revelation and God

Another very important theme in this consideration

of Heidegger's influence on theology concerns his insights into the nature of Being. Before considering Being in itself, however, we need to consider how Being makes itself known since this revelation is what makes any discussion of it possible. The theological relevance of Heidegger's insights into Being's mode of disclosure can be seen on all the levels of the philosophy-theology relationship.

Apologetically Heidegger's understanding of man's structure as basically oriented toward an ultimate dimension is a relevant aspect of the contemporary secular outlook to which theology can relate its doctrine of revelation. We have already noted how his insights are in close accord with the Scriptural concept, image of God, and this stress on the continuity between man and Being provides a ready-made model of the bridge linking the immanent and transcendent domains which makes revelation a possibility. Hence his philosophy certainly allows for the possibility, indeed probability, of revelation.

In addition his understanding of language, essential thought and moods also represents an aspect of the contemporary secular outlook to which theology can relate on this issue. His understanding of moods as an experience of nothingness which confronts man with his finiteness and contingency, dispels his fascination with and dependency upon his immediate environment, and prepares him for an experience of the ultimate dimension, provides an effective means for explaining the Christian's need to face his own

finiteness and need for grace and to endure his "dark night of the soul" before encountering God's revelation.

Similarly Heidegger's understanding of language as the result of a process wherein an ultimate factor speaks through and utilizes man also prepares the secular outlook for a better appreciation of how God speaks through man. In that his understanding of essential thought has this same tendency to stress the inbreaking and initiative of a trans-human factor, it too has strong possibilities for apologetics. All of these concepts, then, underline the relevance of his thinking for a doctrine of revelation.

We can next consider the relevance of Heidegger's philosophy for a doctrine of revelation on the pre-theological level. On this level the theologian must be prepared to deal with philosophy on its own terms, evaluating and criticizing its strength and weaknesses from a philosophical as well as theological standpoint. A basic Heideggerian insight which recurs throughout his writings and upon which he builds a great deal of his philosophical superstructure is his opposition to the subject-object pattern in thinking. He repeatedly stresses that in essential thought the initiative lies with Being as it reveals-conceals itself to man through his thinking. No longer is man to be seen as a thinker who grasps and sets over against him the object of his thoughts.

Of all the theologians we have considered, Bultmann alone refuses to adapt this Heideggerian position. The

others depend heavily upon it in formulating their doctrines of revelation and of God. Is this insight a sound one upon which theology can depend in expressing and relating its dogmatic content? In so far as it tends to set man the subject over against God the object, this pattern does tend to erect an unnecessary barrier between the two through which revelation must then break.

Heidegger's approach avoids this problem but in doing so encounters another equally serious one. In stressing that the ultimate dimension works through man rather than standing over against him in essential thought and language, he is in danger of denying man any responsible role in these processes. We have already noted in our discussion of hermeneutics how man can be seen as merely the tool for language and this applies to thinking as well. In adapting this insight into essential thinking, theology must not allow man to become a completely passive partner in the revelation process or in thinking and speaking of God.

Similarly, in Heinrich Ott's attempt to utilize Heidegger's insights into the language and thought processes for eliminating the Bultmannian distinction between the faith experience and theological thought and between the language-event of the pulpit and the more abstract language of theology, another serious problem is encountered. In broadening the scope of the faith experience and encounter to include the realm of theological thinking and speaking, Ott tends to so broaden and generalize the meaning of the

faith experience as to deny it any special significance.

Hence, the question that must be asked on this pre-theological level is, can the subject-object pattern in thinking be avoided entirely without destroying man's role in the thought process and denying his nature? Is it not rather the case that the subject-object pattern is necessarily involved in man's assimilation of revelation's content?

A more constructive model might be one which recognized two phases in the revelation process. In so far as God revealed Himself to man, essential thought provides a model which would protect God's initiative and avoid any unnecessary barriers. In so far as man must be responsible for accepting this revelation, for assimilating and applying it to his own situation, and for communicating it to and discussing it with his fellow man, then the subject-object pattern is involved and insures that he too has a responsible role in the revelation process.

This approach would protect the distinctive status of the faith experience as well. Such an understanding of revelation would recognize the position of both Bultmann and Ott and while not being able to agree completely with Heidegger's opposition to the subject-object pattern in thinking, it would nevertheless arrive at the same end toward which his insights aim: the protection of the nature and roles of both Being and beings (including Dasein) in their need for each other.

Finally we can consider how Heidegger's views can be related to the theological doctrine of revelation on the third level (providing a relevant form for dogmatic content.) His portrayal of thought as waiting but not awaiting and as a willed non-willing provides a balanced model whereby theology can protect its understanding of revelation as a process in which man has a part but which is ultimately the result of divine initiative. We have already established the need for preserving man's role in this process and this concept of waiting, which leaves open and respects that for which it waits (unlike awaiting which re-presents to itself the anticipated subject matter and thereby closes itself off to the experience of anything radically new), could be used to describe a process in which man turns toward God while remaining open for any guidance through revelation.

Similarly, his reference to essential thought as a non-willing which requires an initial "trace" of willing points to the need for man to make a conscious effort to turn toward God or put himself in a position where revelation can be received. In this way these concepts could provide a relevant form which would respect the intentions of the theological content they express.

This completes our consideration of the relevance of Heidegger's philosophy for the theological doctrine of revelation on all three levels of the philosophy-theology relation. We move now from a consideration of how God reveals Himself to a discussion of His nature. That aspect

of Heidegger's philosophy most relevant here is, of course, his understanding of Being.

On the apologetic level Heidegger's emphasis on the role of an ultimate dimension in the world (Being) which has a supportive, gracious and positive effect definitely opens up the secular outlook to the possibility of God. On the pre-theological level, we should determine whether Being or being is the most fruitful aspect of this philosophy for a doctrine of God. In light of the insurmountable difficulties Ott encountered in referring to God as a being, there can be no question as to following this line of thought. (Even Ott himself abandoned his project of referring to God as a being.)

An aspect of the debate over portraying God as a being or Being which has not been sufficiently considered by these theologians is related to what has been said about the revelation process. While God's nature as Being can be protected in His revelation of Himself through man's thoughts and language, it does not seem possible that this nature can be retained when man completes the process by assimilating and communicating the contents of revelation.

In speaking and thinking about God, which must happen if man is to have a role in the revelation process, is it not inevitable that His status assume the character of a being rather than Being itself? As an object of man's thought, the Being character of God would necessarily be lost. Does this not mean that theological speaking and

thinking of God is necessarily an idolatrous substitution of a being for Being? The answer to this is yes and no. Yes, insofar as idolatry is the great danger theology must constantly guard against. The possibility of ascribing to its finite interpretations, views and impressions an absolute character is always a temptation for theology. No, insofar as idolatry need not necessarily follow from approaching God as a being. Theology is capable of acknowledging its limitations and remaining within the scope of possibilities open to it.

Furthermore, we have already established a model expressing how God can be seen as both Being and being without threatening the unity of His nature. Just as Being must always be comprehended through beings but never identified solely with them, so too can God be comprehended through our finite representations of Him without making such thoughts and words an idolatrous substitution for God.

At first glance such an approach appears to be positing a dual nature for God. On the epistemological level, God as we know Him is treated as a being; on the ontological level, God in Himself is portrayed as Being. The understanding of the interaction of Being and being, however, is what insures the continuity between these two levels and preserves the unity of God's nature. God as a being, or as we know Him, can reflect and open up God in Himself, as Being, just as any being reflects Being. (The concept of the "ontological difference" stresses that neither Being nor being can "be" without the other and in this can be seen their interacting.)

On the third level, Heidegger's understanding of the Being process provides a variety of models which theology could employ in giving relevant form to its doctrine of God. Being as the "ontological difference" provides two such models. As it expresses the absolute difference between Being and beings it could be used to express the majestic transcendence of the Creator who is not to be identified with creation. As this concept stresses the close relation between Being and beings (neither can be without the other) it could also responsibly reflect the other aspect of God's relation to creation, His omniscient and providential immanence and presence in it.

Being as aletheia, a simultaneous revealing and concealing, also could be used to express the extent of God's self-revelation. Basically, and most importantly, God does reveal Himself to man in various ways. By the same token, His revelation is always partial and incomplete (As Paul says we see through a glass darkly and we prophesy in part) and His mysterious nature is never completely dispelled by revelation. Similarly the Being process is both revealing (Being as Holy) and concealing (Being as mystery) in Heidegger's understanding and this could provide a relevant and balanced model for expressing theology's understanding of God's self-revelation. This concludes our consideration of how Heidegger's views on Being are and can be related to the doctrine of God, the last of several themes running throughout our analysis of his influence on various theologians.

92. A maker of theology

In our consideration of Heidegger's influence on contemporary theology we have established not only that he affects theology but also how extensive his influence is. We have seen how the complexity and range of his thinking has been carried over into various theological camps. We might conclude by noting John Macquarrie's estimate of this philosopher; "one could hardly hope to advance very far in the understanding of contemporary theology without some knowledge of Heidegger's thought...Though not himself a theologian, he is a maker of theology, in the same way in which Plato and Aristotle and Kant have been makers of theology."⁽¹⁾

1 John Macquarrie, "Preface" to Martin Heidegger.

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